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FOR THE GARDENER-THE SEED PLANTER &
NURTURER TO THE JOURNAL OF
FOOD LAW & POLICY
A couple of years ago, the University of Arkansas School of Law
embarked upon a journey to create the first student-edited scholarly
publication in the nation devoted to the study of food law and policy.
The Journal of Food Law & Policy began its path to publication as a
mere seed planted in the garden long before any words were put to
print. Long before potential authors were contacted, students
engaged, faculty approval, and publishers selected, the idea of our
journal had to be nourished as any living creature. But for the
constant encouragement and dedication demonstrated by the Dean
of our law school during this time, the Journal would not exist.
On the morning of Thursday, August 4, 2005, the entire
University of Arkansas was deeply saddened to learn of the passing
of a dear friend, mentor, professor, and dean of the School of Law-
Richard B. Atkinson. The loss of Dean Atkinson has been felt within
the University, the Law School, and by all of those who knew him.
He was a part of the law school since 1975, and one professor went
onto say "for many of our graduates, he is the University of Arkansas
School of Law."
Dean Atkinson received his Bachelor of Arts from Duke
University in 1966, graduating Phi Beta Kappa. In 1971, he
received a master's degree in divinity from Yale University and
received a Juris Doctorate from Yale in 1974. He was admitted to
practice in Georgia, became an associated with the law firm of King
and Spalding in Atlanta, and served as a visiting professor at the
University of North Carolina, Emory University, and Georgia State
University.
Each year, students selected two faculty members to participate
in the hooding ceremony at commencement. Dean Atkinson was
one of the two faculty members selected by the graduating classes
every year since its inception in the early 1990s. He served as chair
of the Faculty Appointments Committee, gave bar review lectures
around the nation, and served as chair of the Workers'
Compensation Reform Commission. Dean Atkinson's primary
teaching and research interests were in the areas of property, real
estate transactions, and wills and trusts.
In addition to his service to the University community, Dean
Atkinson was an active member of the community in which he lived.
He dedicated many years of service to the Washington Regional
Medical Center by serving as a member of its Board of Directors.
He was also a founding board member of the Northwest Arkansas
Radiation Therapy Institute (NARTI).
Dean Atkinson was known for his sincere compassion and
dedication to teaching the law and was a true servant to the
community. Yet, a little known fact to those external to the
Fayetteville, Arkansas community was that Dean Atkinson was a
devoted gardener. Since vegetation is often at the heart of many of
the food law and policy related issues, it seems appropriate to
address this important aspect of his life in a publication dedicated to
the study of such issues.
Three noteworthy points about gardeners is that they are always
optimistic, always enterprising, and never satisfied. They always look
forward to doing something better than they have ever done before.
Dean Atkinson was no different. He approached everything in life
and the law school as the ultimate optimist. He was never satisfied
until all of his students understood the subject matter from his
property classes. He constantly strove for excellence in both the
legal community and the community at large. For some thirty years,
he touched the lives of hundreds and hundreds of law students,
preparing them to make their mark on society and the legal
profession.
Under Dean Atkinson's leadership, the law school became the
epitome of excellence, enjoying widespread national recognition.
The law school was included among the "most diverse law schools in
the country" by the 2006 U.S. News and World Report's "America's
Best Graduate Schools." The law school also ranked No. 12 in the
specialized category of "Legal Writing." In 2004, The National
Jurist magazine ranked the law school among a select group of
public law schools it regarded as "Very Good Value." It also
reported that the law school ranked 13th out of 172 in the nation in
successfully improving gender and ethnic diversity over the ten-year
period from 1993-2003.
Dean Atkinson's vision and commitment to excellence did not
stop there. Specifically to the Journal, he approached the idea of a
second legal publication at the University of Arkansas School of Law
with this same enthusiasm, optimism, and energy. Just as he
devoted much time to his garden at home, he nurtured the "seed"
that had been planted to have a scholarly journal dedicated to the
study of food law and policy. He gently encouraged students and
faculty to support a journal. He considered the publication a unique
opportunity for the school to capitalize upon the law school's
existing LL.M. program in Agricultural Law. During what would be
Atkinson's last few weeks on earth, he had an opportunity to
examine and to praise the inaugural issue of the Journal, just as a
gardener would stand in adoration of a bountiful vegetable garden
or a rose bush in full bloom. He had seen the Journal from a mere
seed to a full-grown flower.
Without the encouragement, dedication, and support of the late
Richard B. Atkinson, it is likely that the Journal of Food Law &
Policy would have been just another seed that withered, just another
idea without a vision. A spiritual adage for many gardeners is that
life began in a garden. For our publication, we can truly say that our
life as a scholarly journal did begin in a garden-the seed planted
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over 180,000 cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(BSE), or mad cow disease, have been detected since the first
diagnosis of the disease in 1986 in the United Kingdom.' Outbreaks
of mad cow disease have drawn considerable attention to the issue of
livestock and meat regulation. Consumers are becoming more
health conscious and increasingly concerned about food safety and
quality. Both the United States and the European Union (E.U.) have
created substantial bodies of regulations to ensure the safety and
quality of the beef supply for their citizens.
In the United States, the bulk of the regulations pertaining to
the beef industry are implemented by the United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA), with additional regulations promulgated by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In many respects, state
and local municipalities also contribute to the meat regulatory
framework, especially in the area of health and safety inspection of
meat production and processing facilities. Nevertheless, the scope of
this article is limited to federal regulatory measures.
In Europe, the Council of the European Union addresses
Directives to its Member States, and the Member States are given
specific deadlines for the adoption of implementing legislation to
incorporate the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions
necessary to comply with the Directives into their national legal
1. Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), Current Thinking on Measures That
Could Be Implemented to Minimize Human Exposure to Materials That Could Potentially
Contain the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Agent, at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/
topics/BSE-thinking.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005) [hereinafter FSIS Measures].
[VOL. 1:269
AMERICAN & E.U. REGULATION OF BEEF INDUSTRY
frameworks. Lists of the implementation deadlines for various
Directives are routinely updated and published subsequent to the
adoption of new Directives.2
Interestingly, USDA, FDA, and their predecessors have been
implementing laws to regulate the meat industry since 1906;
3
whereas, E.U. and its predecessor, the European Economic
Community (EEC), began implementing such laws more recently
because EEC was more recently formed in 1957.4 Considering that
both the United States and E.U. face the Herculean task of
regulating cattle and beef production in each of their many states
and countries, respectively, many factors must be covered in their
regulatory schemes. First, this article briefly describes the existing
regulatory requirements under both systems. Second, it compares
the two approaches. In comparing the two systems, attention is
concentrated on the quality of legislative drafting, the likelihood of
implementation, the adequacy of consumer protection, the voluntary
or compulsory nature of the measures, and the requirement of
records retention.
II. ANIMAL DRUG REGULATION
The United States and E.U. have different regulatory
approaches regarding the rearing of livestock such as cattle. The
difference is highlighted by the current World Trade Organization
(WTO) dispute between the United States and Canada and E.U.,
involving trade in beef treated with growth promoting hormones.5
The United States and Canada, two countries that have approved
the administration of growth hormones to livestock, brought an
action against the E.U. to determine, among other things, whether
the E.U.'s ban on beef containing growth hormones is grounded on
2. Council of the European Union, Calendar for Transposition of Directives, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariatgeneral/sgb/droitcom/index-en.htm#calend
ar.
3. PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAw 4 (2d ed.
1991).
4. Europa, The EU at a Glance: The History of the European Union (2005), at
http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/history/index-en.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2005)
[hereinafter Europa History].
5. See, e.g., Press Release, Dispute Settlement Body, WTO, WTO Dispute Body
Establishes Panels on US and Canada Sanctions in 'Hormones' Dispute (Feb. 17,
2005), at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news05_e/dsb 17feb05-e.htm (last
visited Dec. 27, 2005) [hereinafter WTO Dispute].
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scientific evidence that the use of hormones poses a danger to
human health.' This section of the paper outlines several major
facets of animal drug regulation for both the United States and E.U.
A. United States Regulation of Animal Drugs Used in Meat Production
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) was enacted
in 1938 and revised completely by the enactment of the Animal
Drug Amendments in 1968.2 FDCA, which has been amended
periodically since 1968, governs the regulation of new animal drugs.
The Act establishes the requirements for a new animal drug
application to obtain FDA approval of the use of an animal drug.
Applications for new animal drugs must include the name and
address of the applicant; the trade name and chemical name; the
chemical structural formula; a description of the dosage and
quantitative composition; the scientific and clinical purpose of the
drug; the particularly significant pharmacological or toxicological
findings of laboratory studies; a conclusion explaining the new
drug's major points of effectiveness and safety; copies of each piece
of labeling; usage directions as they appear on the label; a statement
of the ingredients used in the production of the new animal drug;
and a description of the manufacturing, processing, and packing
methods.'
Along with information on other animal drugs, the relevant
portions of FDCA provide details about permissible growth
promotion hormones and their approved usage. Several specific
hormones are examined in order to explore the approved
quantities, methods of administration, and uses for such drugs.9
One of the hormones prohibited by E.U. is estradiol which can
be administered in the United States in the form of silicone implants
in either 25.7 or 43.9 milligram doses.' Estradiol implantation is
allowed in steers and heifers only." One 25.7 milligram implant
6. See Press Release, USDA, Glickman and Barshefsky Announce WTO Panel to
Review EU Hormone Ban (May 20, 1996), at http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/
1996/05/0265 (last visited Dec. 27, 2005).
7. See HuTr & MERRILL, supra note 3, at 13, 637.
8. See 21 C.F.R. § 514.1(b) (2005).
9. For detailed information regarding new animal drugs see 21 C.F.R. pt. 510
(2005).
10. 21 C.F.R. § 522.840(a) (2005).
11. See 21 C.F.R. § 522.840(d)(3) (2005).
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may be used every 200 days, or one 43.9 milligram implant every
400 days.' 2 The estradiol implant is used to increase weight gain in
suckling and pastured growing steers, to improve feed efficiency,
and to increase the rate of weight gain in confined steers and
heifers.13 A second implant was expressly permitted until November
2004 when the language authorizing such use was removed from the
regulation. 4
Section 522.841 permits the use of estradiol benzoate in stock-
farming. 5  It may be administered for growth enhancement
purposes via subcutaneous injection, but only in the ear.'6 Ten
milligrams of estradiol benzoate may be administered to suckling
beef calves,' 7 and twenty milligrams for steers and heifers fed in
confinement for slaughter." Use of estradiol benzoate on calves
intended for reproduction or calves less than thirty days old is
prohibited."
Section 522.850 authorizes the utilization of estradiol valerate
and norgestomet in combination for synchronization of estrus or
ovulation in cycling beef cattle and non-lactating dairy heifers.2 °
Pursuant to section 522.850, the implant must be removed on day
ten.21 As implants are removed they must be collected and burned.22
This combination is not to be used in cows producing milk for
human consumption.28
Other hormones, such as testosterone propionate, 24 progeste-
rone,25 and trenbolone acetate,26 can be used alone or in
12. 21 C.F.R. § 522.840(d)(1) (2005).
13. See 21 C.F.R. § 522.840(d)(2) (2005).
14. See 21 C.F.R. § 522.840(c)(3) (2005); 69 Fed. Reg. 67,818-67,819 (Nov. 22,
2004).
15. See 21 C.F.R. § 522.841 (2005).
16. 21 C.F.R. § 522.841(d)(1)(iii) (2005).
17. Id. § 522.841(d)(1)(i) (2005).
18. Id. § 522.841(d)(2)(i) and (d)(3)(i) (2005).
19. Id. § 522.841(d)(2)(iii) and (d)(3)(iii) (2005).
20. Id. § 522.850(c)(2) (2005).
21. 21 C.F.R. § 522.850(c)(3) (2005).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Testosterone treated beef has been banned in the E.U. See generally Council
Directive 2003/74, 2003 O.J. (L 262) 17 (EC).
25. Progesterone is one of the six growth hormones that is prohibited in the E.U.
See generally Directive 2003/74, at 17.
26. Trenbolone acetate is also one of the hormones prohibited by the E.U. See
generally Directive 2003/74, at 17.
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combination with other hormones." Although the approved
hormones are administered in different ways, they have several
growth promotion and production functions, including increasing
weight gain, improving feed efficiency, and synchronization of estrus
and ovulation."
B. E. U.'s Prohibition on the Use of Hormonal Drugs
In the 1970s, concerns over the use of growth-promoting
hormones in livestock production and their impact on consumer
health escalated in Europe. 9 Specifically in the 1970s, exposure to
diethylstilboestrol (DES), due to its illegal use in veal production in
France, was linked to hormonal irregularities in adolescent
consumers in Italy and to congenital birth defects in infants born in
other European countries." In response to increasing concern
surrounding the use of hormones in the production of livestock
generally, on July 31, 1981, the European Council of Ministers
European adopted Directive 81/602/EEC, the first directive of its
kind, banning the domestic use of five growth hormones in livestock
farming.3' Subsequent directives were adopted leading to the E.U.'s
ban of imported meat from animals treated with hormones.2
On April 29, 1996, Directive 96/22/EC was established in order
to prohibit the employment of hormonal, thyrostatic, and beta-
agonist substances in stock-farming.3 This directive is applicable to
beef and meat products 4.3  The directive gives details on the growth
hormones that have been banned by the E.U. since 1988."s It
27. See 21 C.F.R. § 522.842 (2005); 21 C.F.R. § 522.1940 (2005); and 21 C.F.R. §
522.2476 (2005).
28. See 21 C.F.R. § 522.842 (2005); 21 C.F.R. § 522.1940 (2005); and 21 C.F.R. §
522.2476 (2005).
29. Tim Josling, Donna Roberts & Ayesha Hassan, The Beef-Hormone Dispute and
Its Implications for Trade Policy, 3-4, at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/I 1379/
HORMrev.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2005).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 5.
32. See, e.g., Council Directive 2003/74, 2003 O.J. (L 262) 17 (EC).
33. The full title of the Directive is Council Directive 96/22/EC of 29 April 1996
concerning the prohibition on the use in stock-farming of certain substances having
hormonal or thyrostatic action on beta-agonists.
34. Council Directive 96/22, art. 4, 1996 O.J. (L 125) 3, 5 (EC).
35. See generally Directive 96/22, at 5.
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authorizes use of hormones for therapeutic, but not weight or
growth promotion, purposes.36
Article 4 provides that Member States may authorize the
therapeutic administration to livestock of testosterone, progesterone,
and their derivatives that readily yield the parent compound on
hydrolysis after absorption.' 7 Importantly, veterinary medicinal
products must be administered by a veterinarian.3" They cannot be
administered by implant, but must be administered by injection or
for the treatment of ovarian dysfunction in the form of vaginal
spirals.5 9 Farm animals undergoing such treatment must be clearly
identified, and such treatment must be registered by the veterinarian
responsible.4" The veterinarian must record at least the following
details in a register: the type of treatment, the type of products
authorized, the date of treatment, and the identity of the animal
treated.41
Member States may authorize, for therapeutic purposes, the
administration of veterinary medicinal products containing beta-
agonists to induce tocolysis in cows.4" The above-mentioned
registration measures must be followed for the administration of
beta-agonists as well. Farmers are prohibited from holding
veterinary medicinal products containing beta-agonists."
Article 5 also allows veterinarians or their auxiliaries to
administer hormonal substances for the synchronization of oestrus
and for the preparation of donors and recipients.44 However, under
Article 6, the authorization of the following is prohibited: (1)
hormonal products acting as a deposit, (2) products with a
withdrawal period of more than fifteen days after the end of
treatment, (3) products for which there are no reagents or
equipment for detecting the presence of residues in excess of the
permitted levels, and (4) veterinary medicinal products containing
36. See Directive 96/22, art. 4, at 5.
37. See Directive 96/22, art. 4(1), at 5.
38. See Directive 96/22, art. 4, at 5.
39. See Council Directive 96/22, art. 4(1), 1996 O.J. (L 125) at 5.
40. See Directive 96/22, art. 4(1), at 5.
41. Directive 96/22, arts. 4(1) & 5, at 5.
42. See Directive 96/22, art. 4(2)(ii), at 5.
43. Council Directive 96/22, art. 4, at 5.
44. Directive 96/22, art. 5, 1996 O.J. (L 125) at 6.
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beta-agonists which have a withdrawal period of more than twenty-
eight days after the end of treatment.45
Article 8 requires that Member States restrict the possession of
permissible substances to persons authorized by national
legislation.46 This article also provides that official checks by the
competent national authorities must occur without prior notice, with
a view toward ascertaining: (1) the presence of prohibited
substances intended to be administered for the purpose of
increasing weight gain, (2) the illegal treatment of animals, and (3)
failure to observe the withdrawal periods and restrictions on the use
of certain substances.47 Article 8 requires tests for the presence of
the substances and residues in the drinking water of animals, in all
places where animals are kept and bred, and in their excrement,
body fluids, animal tissues, and products.48 Article 11 prohibits the
inclusion of countries whose legislation authorizes the placing on the
market and administration of stilbenes, stilbene derivatives,
hormonal, thyrostatic, and beta-agonist substances to livestock on
the lists of countries authorized to import farm animals, meat or
meat products.49
In 2003, the European Council and the European Commission
amended Council Directive 96/22/EC with Council Directive
2003/74/EC in order to revise its prohibitions on the use of
hormonal, thyrostatic, and beta-agonist substances in livestock
farming." This amendment was made in light of the Hormones
Case, which is pending in the WTO, and the recommendations
made by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on February 13, 1998.51
In this case, the United States and Canada challenged the E.U.'s ban
on imported beef from cattle treated with growth hormones on the
grounds that there is no evidence of adverse effects on human
45. Directive 96/22, art. 6, at 6.
46. See Directive 96/22, art. 8(1), at 6.
47. See Directive 96/22, art. 8(2)(a)-(d), at 6.
48. Directive 96/22, art. 8(3), at 6.
49. Council Directive 96/22, art. 11, 1996 O.J. (L 125) at 7.
50. See Council Directive 2003/74, 2003 O.J. (L 262) 17 (EC).
51. The Hormones Case involves a dispute settlement proceeding between the
United States and Canada and the E.U., regarding the E.U.'s ban on beef treated
with growth promoting hormones. See WTO Dispute, supra note 5. There are six
hormonal substances in question (estradiol 17p3, testosterone, progesterone,
trenbolone acetate, zeranol and melengestrol acetate) whose administration for
animal growth promotion purposes is prohibited by Directive 96/22/EC. See
Council Directive 2003/74, 2003 O.J. (L 262) 17 (EC).
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health.52 The WTO found that the ban was not justified by a risk
assessment, that there was there was no rational relationship between
the directive and the scientific evidence submitted on the five
hormones, and that there was no risk assessment at all for
melengestrol acetate.5"
Article 2 of Directive 96/22/EC was amended to prohibit the
placing on the market of thyrostatic substances, stilbenes, stilbene
derivatives, their salts and esters for administering to animals of all
species and the placing on the market of estradiol 173, its ester-like
derivatives, and beta-agonists for administering to animals whose
flesh and products are intended for human consumption.54 Article 3
was amended to prohibit thyrostatic substances, stilbenes, stilbene
derivatives, their salts and esters, and provisionally prohibits
estradiol 173, its ester-like derivatives, and beta-agonists5 5
Article 5a was added to allow Member States to authorize the
administration to farm animals of veterinary medicinal products
containing estradiol 1703 or its ester-like derivatives for estrus
induction in cattle until October 14, 2006.56 The treatment must be
carried out by the veterinarian on farm animals that have been
clearly identified, and the veterinarian must record the details of
treatment in a register.57 However, stockfarmers are prohibited
from holding on their farms veterinary medicinal products
containing estradiol 1703 or its ester-like derivatives.58
Consistent with the E.U.'s position that growth stimulating
hormones pose dangerous risks to humans, the E.U.'s Scientific
Committee on Veterinary Measures relating to Public Health re-
evaluated the perceived risks from residues in beef meat and meat
52. World Trade Organization, SPS Agreement Training Module (2004), at
http:/Aww.wto.org/english/tratop_.e/sps-e/sps._agreement cbt-e/clsipl-e.htm.
53. Id.
54. See Council Directive 2003/74, 2003 O.J. (L 262) 17 (EC).
55. These substances are prohibited under the following circumstances: (1) the
administration of those substances to farm animals; (2) the holding, except under
official control, of animals who have been administered the prohibited substance on
a farm, and the placing on the market or the slaughter of such animals for human
consumption; and (3) the placing on the market of meat from animals that have
been administered prohibited substances. Directive 2003/74, art. 3, at 17-21.
56. Directive 2003/74, art. 1(4), at 19.
57. Directive 2003/74, art. 1(4)(3), at 19.
58. Directive 2003/74, art. 1(4)(3), at 19.
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products treated with growth hormones. 9  In 1999, this
independent advisory body concluded that no acceptable daily
intake of hormones could be established." Based on this opinion,
the European Commission has maintained its ban on the
importation of beef treated with the six growth hormones.61
III. ORGANIC LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION
One alternative to purchasing beef treated with growth
hormones is the purchase of organically produced beef. In recent
years, consumer demand for organic products has risen greatly. 2
While all agricultural products are covered by safety and quality
guarantees, organically produced beef must fulfill additional
production criteria. The next section describes the American and
the E.U.'s approach to regulating organic livestock production.
A. United States Rules on Organic Livestock Farming
The Organic Foods Production Act (OFPA) of 1990 was enacted
in order to establish national standards governing the marketing of
agricultural goods as organically produced products.63 OFPA seeks
to assure consumers that organically produced products meet a
consistent standard.64
OFPA enables USDA to establish a national certification
program for producers and handlers of agricultural products that
have been produced using organic methods.65 USDA can also
permit each state to implement its own organic certification program
for producers and handlers of agricultural products that have been
59. See Europa, Summary Report of the Meeting of the Scientific Committee on Veterinary
Measures Relating to Public Health, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/
fs/sc/scv/out23_en.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
60. Europa, Food and Feed Safety, Hormones in Meat-Introduction, at
http://europa.eu.int/comn/food/food/chemicalsafety/contaminants/hormones/index_
en.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Europa Hormones].
61. Id.
62. See Organic Trade Association, Organic Food Facts, at
http://www.ota.com/organic/mt/food.html (stating that some trends show that
organically produced products such as milk, cheese, and meats are growing in
popularity) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
63. OFPA of 1990, 7 U.S.C. § 6501(1) (2000).
64. Id. § 6501(2).
65. Id. § 6503(a).
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produced using organic methods.66  The program must be
implemented through certifying agents, who may certify a farm or
handling operation as organically certified.67 To be sold or labeled
as an organically produced agricultural product, an agricultural
product must have been produced and handled without the use of
synthetic chemicals. 8
A label may be affixed to organically certified domestic
agricultural products for the purpose of indicating that they comply
with USDA standards for organic production.69 Such labels may
incorporate the Department of Agriculture seal.7" Imported
agricultural products may be sold or labeled as organically produced
if USDA determines that such products have been produced and
handled under an organic certification program that is equivalent to
the requirements laid down for products in the United States.7'
An organic certification program is required to ensure that an
agricultural product sold or labeled as organically produced is
produced only on certified organic farms and handling operations.72
To be certified, the producers and handlers must establish an
organic plan.7" The farm must certify to USDA, the state official,
and the certifying agent on an annual basis that all agricultural
products have been produced organically.74 The farm must be
inspected annually, there must be periodic residue testing by
certifying agents of the agricultural products to determine whether
they contain any pesticide or other nonorganic residue, and there
must be public access to certifying documents and laboratory
analyses that pertain to certification.75
Any livestock that is to be slaughtered and sold or labeled as
organically produced must be raised in accordance with the require-
ments as established in Section 6509.76 Livestock farms must feed
the livestock organically produced feed.77 The farms are prohibited
66. Id. § 6503(b).
67. Id. § 6503(d).
68. OFPA of 1990, 7 U.S.C. § 6504 (2000).
69. Id. § 6505(a)(2).
70. Id.
71. Id. § 6505(b).
72. Id. § 6506(a)(1)(A).
73. OFPA, 7 U.S.C. § 6506(a)(2) (2003).
74. Id. § 6506(a)(4).
75. Id. § 6506(a)(6).
76. Id. § 6509.
77. Id. § 6509(c)(1).
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from using growth promoters and hormones on livestock, including
antibiotics and synthetic trace elements used to stimulate growth or
production.7"
Livestock produced by organic farm producers must not use
subtherapeutic doses of antibiotics, synthetic internal parasiticides
on a routine basis, or administer medicine other than vaccines, in
the absence of illness.7 9 In order to facilitate livestock identification,
organic livestock producers are required to keep adequate records
and maintain verifiable audit trails so that each animal can be traced
back to the farm."° The records must specifically contain details on
the amounts and sources of medications administered and all feeds
fed to the livestock." Producers must maintain records for five years
concerning the production or handling of organically produced
agricultural products.82
B. E. U. Regulation of Organically Produced Livestock
On July 19, 1999, the European Council drafted Regulation No.
1804/1999,3 which is a supplement to Regulation No. 209/91, in
order to prescribe rules for the organic production of livestock. 4
This supplemental regulation pertains to livestock and livestock
products from bovine animals that are intended for human
consumption."5
Under section B. 1.3 of this Regulation, organic production
requires stock-farming methods that use renewable natural
resources, such as livestock manure, legumes, and fodder crops.8 6
Organic stock-farming to maintain the soil fertility utilizes the
78. OFPA, 7 U.S.C. § 6509(c)(3)(2000).
79. Id. § 6509(d)(1)(4-6).
80. Id. § 6509(0(1).
81. Id. § 6509.
82. Id. § 6511.
83. The full title of this Regulation is Council Regulation (EC) No. 1804/1999 of
19 July 1999 supplementing Regulation (EEC) No. 209/91 on organic production of
agricultural products and indications referring thereto on agricultural products and
foodstuffs to include livestock production. Council Regulation 1804/1999, 1999
OJ. (L 222) 1.
84. Regulation 1804/1999, at 1-28.
85. The Regulation does not apply exclusively to bovines. It also applies to swine,
poultry, and other livestock. Regulation 1804/1999, at 8.
86. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.1.3, at 8.
[VOL. 1:26 9
AMERICAN & E.U. REGULATION OF BEEF INDUSTRY
cropping/stock-farming system and the pasturage system.87 Section
B.1.4 stipulates that organic stock-farming requires that animals
have access to a free-range area and the number of animals per unit
must be limited to ensure integrated management of livestock and
crop production on the production unit."
Although section 3.2 provides that organic production systems
must be applied throughout the life of the livestock, section 3.3
establishes that livestock not complying with organic rules of
production can be converted in the specified time periods.8 9
Conversion of livestock associated with organic livestock production
is allowed under section 2.90 In order to convert them, livestock
from which organic products are derived must be reared as such for
at least twelve months in the case of bovines for meat production.91
Similarly, conversion occurs if livestock marketed as organically
produced are reared as such for six months in the case of animals for
milk production.92
In connection with the organic production of livestock for
human consumption, feed is intended to ensure quality rather than
maximize production.93  However, fattening processes are
authorized if they are reversible at any stage of the rearing process.94
Livestock must be fed organically produced feed, and young bovine
animals must be fed natural milk, preferably maternal milk, for a
period of three months.95 Rearing systems for herbivores are to be
based on pasturage.96 At least sixty percent of the dry matter in daily
rations must consist of roughage, fresh or dried fodder, or silage.97
Vitamins and minerals can be fed to animals, but antibiotics,
coccidiostatics, medicinal substances, growth promoters, or any other
substance intended to stimulate growth or production can not be
used in animal feeding.9" Animal feed must not have been produced
87. See Regulation 1804/1999, art 3(5)(22), at 4.
88. Council Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.1.4, 1999 O.J. (L 222) at 8.
89. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.3.3, at 10.
90. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.2, at 9.
91. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.2.2.1, at 9.
92. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.2.2.2, at 9.
93. Council Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.4.1, 1999 O.J. (L 222) at 11.
94. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.4.1, at 11.
95. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.4.2 & B.4.5, at 11.
96. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.4.7, at 11.
97. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.4.7, at 11.
98. See Council Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.4.17, 1999 O.J. (L 222) at 12.
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with genetically modified organisms or products derived from such
organisms.99
In connection with organic production, disease prevention and
veterinary treatment of organic animals should be performed under
specific guidelines. Disease prevention in organic livestock produc-
tion must adhere to the following principles: (1) selection of appro-
priate breeds or strains of animals; (2) the application of animal
husbandry practices appropriate to encourage strong resistance to
disease and infections; (3) the use of high quality feed, regular
exercise, and access to pasturage to encourage natural immuno-
logical defenses; and (4) avoidance of livestock overstocking.1
00
These principles are intended to limit animal health problems
so they can be controlled primarily through prevention.'0 ' Never-
theless, sick or injured animals must be treated immediately.
0 2
Naturalistic veterinary medicinal products are regarded as prefer-
able for use in organic farming. For example, phytotherapeutic,
homeopathic, and trace elements are to be used in preference to
chemically synthesized allopathic medicinal products or antibio-
tics.' The latter may be administered by a veterinarian if necessary
to combat illness or treat injury.0 4 The use of substances to promote
growth or production, such as antibiotics, coccidiostatics, and other
growth enhancers and the use of hormones or similar substances to
induce or synchronize estrus is prohibited.0 5 Hormones may be
administered to an individual animal for therapeutic treatment.0 6
Whenever veterinary products are used, the product type and
details of the diagnosis and treatment must be recorded. 07 The
legal withdrawal period must also be recorded. This information is
to be declared to the inspection authority before the livestock or
livestock products are marketed as organically produced.' Live-
stock that has been treated must be clearly identified.'0 9
99. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.4.18, at 12.
100. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.5.1(a)-(d), at 12.
101. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.5.2, at 12.
102. Council Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.5.3, 1999 O.J. (L 222) at 12.
103. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.5.4(a), at 12.
104. Regulation 1804-1999, ann. I.B.5.4(b), at 12.
105. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.5.5.(a), at 13.
106. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.5.5.(a), at 13.
107. Council Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.5.6, 1999 O.J. (L 222) at 13.
108. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.5.6, at 13.
109. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.5.6, at 13.
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With the exception of vaccinations, treatments for parasites, and
any compulsory eradication schemes, livestock and livestock
products that have received more than three courses of treatments
with chemically synthesized allopathic medicinal products or
antibiotics within one year may not be sold as organic products." °
The livestock must undergo conversion periods subject to the
agreement of the inspection authority."'
Additional rules for organic livestock exist. For instance, the
reproduction of organic livestock should be natural as a matter of
principle, but artificial insemination is permitted."' Keeping
livestock tethered is forbidden unless it is for limited time periods as
authorized by the inspection authority for health or safety reasons."'
Insulation, heating, and ventilation of the livestock housing facilities
must ensure that air circulation, dust level, temperature, and relative
humidity are kept within safe limits.' Furthermore, free-range and
open air exercise areas must provide sufficient protection from rain,
wind, sun, and extreme temperatures.'
The E.U.'s rules encourage rearing practices that safeguard the
health and welfare of the animals" 6 as well as the consumer." 7 Beef
bearing the E.U. logo for organic farming is produced under strict
guidelines."' Member States are free to impose more rigid
standards on organic beef produced in their territory." 9
IV. HUMANE METHODS OF SLAUGHTER
Both the United States and E.U. have enacted legislative
provisions on the humane slaughtering of livestock. The regulations
prevent needless suffering of animals. Special provisions for
religious or ritual slaughter are made in both instruments.
Important provisions from both legislative frameworks are outlined
below.
110. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.5.8, at 13.
111. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.5.8, at 13.
112. Council Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.6.1.1, 1999 O.J. (L 222) at 13.
113. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.6.1.4, at 13.
114. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.8.1.1, at 15.
115. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. I.B.8.1.2, at 15.
116. See Council Regulation 1804/1999, whereas 20, 1999 O.J. (L 222) 1.
117. See Regulation 1804/1999, whereas 4, at 2.
118. See Regulation 1804/1999, whereas 11, at 1.
119. See Regulation 1804/1999, art. 12, at 6.
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A. The United States Humane Slaughter Act
Inhumane slaughtering conditions became an issue of public
concern in the United States following the publication of The Jungle
by Upton Sinclair in 1905.'° In this landmark novel, Sinclair vividly
described the deplorable conditions of a Chicago meatpacking house
and the threat such abominable conditions posed to consumers.'21
In 1906, the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and the Food and
Drug Act were passed to address these problems. 2' Section 603(b)
of FMIA, the progeny of the Meat Inspection Act of 1906 as
amended, provides that USDA is authorized to appoint inspectors to
examine slaughtering methods in slaughtering establishments as a
means of preventing the inhumane slaughter of livestock.'2 The
United States Congress has explicitly declared that slaughtering and
handling of livestock in connection with slaughter is to be carried
out only by humane methods.2 4 Humane methods of slaughter
prevent needless suffering, result in safer and better working
conditions for the persons employed in the slaughter industry, and
improve products and economies in slaughtering operations.'25
In furtherance of its policy for humane slaughtering of livestock,
Congress enacted the Humane Slaughter Act of 1958.16 In Section
1902, Congress has enumerated the methods of slaughter found to
be humane.2 7 In the case of cattle and calves, animals are rendered
insensible to pain by a single blow, gunshot, electrical, or chemical
means that is rapid and effective. 2 ' This stunning must occur before
the livestock is shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut.'29 In addition,
this Act authorizes slaughtering in accordance with the ritual
requirements of the Jewish faith or any other religious faith that
prescribes a method of slaughter in which the animal suffers loss of
120. FSIS, Agency History (2005), at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/AboutFSIS/Agency
-History/ index.asp (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 21 U.S.C. § 603(b) (2000).
124. 7 U.S.C. § 1901 (2000).
125. Id.
126. Id. §§ 1901-1907.
127. Id. § 1902.
128. The Humane Slaughter Act also applies to horses, mules, sheep, swine, and
other livestock. Id. § 1902(a).
129. 7 U.S.C. § 1902(a).
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consciousness by anemia of the brain caused by the simultaneous
and instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries.1 30
Under Section 1904, USDA is authorized and directed to
conduct research and experimentation using current methods and
scientific knowledge to develop methods of slaughter and handling
of livestock in connection with slaughter that are practicable in speed
and scope of operations and are also humane.13' Section 1906
contains the caveat that nothing in the Humane Slaughter Act is
intended to be construed to prohibit or hinder the religious freedom
of any person or group. 3 ' In order to protect religious freedom,
ritual slaughter and the handling and preparation of livestock for
ritual slaughter are exempted from the terms. 3  Similar provisions
are found in the E.U. instrument on humane methods of livestock
slaughter.
B. E. U. Rules on Humane Methods of Slaughter
Council Directive 93/119/EC was established in 1993 to set forth
a framework of rules on the humane slaughter of animals.'34 Annex
A of this Directive clearly details the rules to be implemented by
Member States. 31 These rules apply to cattle, among other
animals. 136
With the aim of avoiding unnecessary pain and suffering, Annex
A provides that animals in slaughterhouses must be protected from
extreme weather, and the condition of the animals must be
inspected at least every morning and evening.'37 In addition, non-
ambulatory animals must not be dragged to slaughter. 3 ' Instead,
such animals must be killed where they lie or transported on a
trolley to a place of emergency slaughter. 39 Unloading equipment
must have non-slip flooring and railings to prevent animals from
130. Id.
131. Id. § 1904(a).
132. Id. § 1906.
133. Id. § 1906.
134. Council Directive 93/119, 1993 O.J. (L 340) 21-34 (EC).
135. Directive 93/119, ann. A, at 25-34.
136. Directive 93/119, at 21.
137. Directive 93/119, ann. A.I.4-5, at 21.
138. Directive 93/119, ann. A.I.6, at 21.
139. Council Directive 93/119, ann. A.I.6, 1993 O.J. (L 340) 21 (EC).
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falling, and animals must not be lifted by the head, horns, ears, feet,
or tail. 4° Blows and kicks to animals are prohibited. 4'
Annex A goes on to establish that drinking water must always be
available to animals that are not slaughtered immediately upon
arrival in the slaughtering facility.4 2 Animals that have not been
slaughtered within twelve hours of their arrival must be fed at
appropriate intervals, and animals kept more than twelve hours at a
slaughterhouse must be lairaged. 43
Annex B lays out rules for restraint of animals before stunning
and slaughter. Animals must be restrained such that unnecessary
pain, suffering or injury is avoided.'44 Particularly, animals' legs
must not be tied, and animals must not be suspended before
stunning or killing.'45 In the case of ritual slaughter, restraint of
livestock before slaughter using a mechanical method intended to
avoid pain, suffering, or injuries to the animals is obligatory.'46
Under Annex C, the following methods of stunning are
permitted: (i) captive bolt pistol fired into cerebral cortex; (ii) con-
cussion using a mechanically-operated instrument that strikes the
skull without fracturing it; and (iii) electronarcosis in which currents
pass through the brain.'47 Stunning must not be carried out unless it
is possible to bleed the animals immediately afterwards.'48 Annex C
also establishes that cattle may be slaughtered with the use of a free
bullet pistol or rifle, electrocution, and carbon dioxide gas."'
V. REGULATIONS ON BSE AND OTHER CONTAGIOUS DISEASES
Those familiar with the cattle industry can attest that infectious
diseases, which have decimated entire herds and spread to other
livestock and humans as well, have presented the industry with
formidable challenges for many years prior to the advent of Bovine
140. Directive 93/119, ann. A.II.1, at 21.
141. Directive 93/119, ann. A.II.4, at 21.
142. Directive 93/119, ann. A.II.9, at 21.
143. Directive 93/119, ann. A.I1.9-10, at 21.
144. Council Directive 93/119, ann. B. 1, 1993 O.J. (L 340) 21 (EC).
145. Directive 93/119, ann. B.2, at 21.
146. Directive 93/119, ann. B.1, at 21.
147. Directive 93/119, ann. C.II.1-3, at 21.
148. Directive 93/119, ann. C.II, at 21.
149. Council Directive 93/119, ann. C.I.1-4, 1993 O.J. (L 340) 21 (EC).
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Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE),' ° Strict measures have been
implemented in the United States and E.U. for the purpose of
curtailing the spread of communicable livestock diseases and the
contamination of the human food supply. This portion of the article
details the regulations on the spread of diseases that affect the beef
industry.
A. United States Regulation of Contagious Livestock Diseases
Before BSE, other diseases infected cattle and threatened the
wholesomeness of beef and beef products. 5' In response to this
problem, the Cattle Contagious Diseases Act (CCDA) was enacted in
1903. The purpose of CCDA was to curtail the spread of livestock
diseases and to protect the meat supply.'52
Section 113 of CCDA authorizes USDA to adopt measures to
prevent the exportation from any port in the United States to any
port in a foreign country of livestock infected with any
communicable disease. Transportation from one state to another
state of any livestock infected with a contagious, infectious, or
communicable disease is prohibited, unless such transportation is for
the purpose of slaughtering the diseased animals. 13 Section 114 (a)
is an example of the mandates created to prevent the spread of
contagious livestock diseases from one state to another state.'54 With
respect to tuberculosis and brucellosis, domestic animals that have
reacted positively to a test for paratuberculosis or brucellosis may be
shipped from one state to any other state only for immediate
slaughter. 5 Similar provisions exist in CCDA for other contagious
diseases. The animals must be tested for the commonly known
diseases according to established testing methods. Livestock that
150. See Marc Lappo & Britt Bailey, Mad About Beef, available at
http:/www.cetos.org/articles/madcow.html ("BSE is not the first disease that has
jumped species lines from bovines to humans. Brucellosis, a serious systemic
infection; E. coli 0157:H7 and salmonella, both cause potential fatal intestinal
diarrheas; bovine tuberculosis; and possibly lymphoma have all been documented to
transfer from beef or dairy cattle to humans.").
151. See id.
152. 21 U.S.C. §§ 112-122 (2000).
153. 21 U.S.C. § 115 (2000).
154. Id. § 114(a).
155. See id.
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test positive for infectious diseases and diseases harmful to humans
must be slaughtered immediately. 6
In addition to the requirements in CCDA, regulations have been
promulgated to ensure the identification of animals destroyed
because of tuberculosis for indemnification purposes. Cattle are
classified as infected with tuberculosis on the basis of an intradermal
tuberculin test applied by a Federal, state, or otherwise accredited
veterinarian.'57 In 2002, USDA, aiming to encourage destruction of
animals that are infected with, or at risk of being infected with
tuberculosis, amended the regulations on payment of indemnity for
livestock destroyed because of tuberculosis with an interim rule. 5 '
This rule provides that the Animal Plant and Health Inspection
Service (APHIS) of USDA will pay owners of the animals an
indemnity equal to the difference between the net salvage received
and the appraised value of the animals destroyed.'59 USDA will not
pay more than $3,000 per animal destroyed. 6 °
Pursuant to section 50.6(a) of USDA regulations, livestock
destroyed because of tuberculosis must be identified as follows: (1)
livestock'6' classified as reactors for tuberculosis must be identified
within fifteen days after being classified as reactors; (2) reactor cattle
must be identified by branding the letter "T" on the left hip and by
attaching to the left ear an approved metal ear tag bearing a serial
number and the inscription "U.S. Reactor;" (3) exposed cattle must
be identified by branding the letter "S" on the left hip and by
attaching to either ear a metal ear tag bearing a serial number.'62
Under section 50.7, livestock to be destroyed because of
tuberculosis must be given a permit to be shipped directly to
slaughter at a Federal or State inspected slaughtering establishment
or be disposed of by rendering, burial, or incineration.'63 Livestock
for which federal indemnity may be paid because of tuberculosis
must be destroyed and disposed of within fifteen days after the date
156. Id.
157. 9 C.F.R. § 50.4(a) (2005).
158. 9 C.F.R. §§ 50 & 77 (2005).
159. 9 C.F.R. §§ 50 & 77.
160. 9 C.F.R. §§ 50 & 77.
161. This title refers to cattle, bison, captive cervids, and other animals.
162. 9 C.F.R. § 50.6 (2005).
163. Id. § 50.7(a) (2005).
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of appraisal, unless the veterinarian in charge extends the time limit
for slaughter to thirty days. 64
Animals infected with or exposed to a communicable disease
must be slaughtered promptly after appraisal and disposed of by
burial or burning, unless otherwise provided in the Administrator's
discretion.16 An APHIS employee must supervise the slaughter and
disposal.166 An APHIS Administrator is authorized to agree, on
behalf of USDA, to pay fifty-percent of the expense of purchase,
destruction, and disposition of animals that must be destroyed
because of a communicable disease. 67
Under the Animal Health Protection Act, USDA may hold,
seize, quarantine, treat, destroy, or dispose of any animal that USDA
has reason to believe may carry, may have carried, or may have been
affected with or exposed to any pest or disease of livestock at the
time of movement. 6 ' Similarly, if USDA determines that an extra-
ordinary emergency exists due to the presence in the United States
of a pest or disease of livestock and that the presence of such
threatens the livestock of the United States, USDA may hold, seize,
treat, destroy, or dispose of any animal or article. 69 USDA may also
prohibit or restrict the movement within the United States of any
animal or article in order to prevent the dissemination of the pest or
disease. 7'
B. Measures for the Detection and Eradication of Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy
Since the initial detection of BSE in 1986, the United States
government has implemented various measures to prevent BSE from
entering the Unites States and to prevent the spread of the disease
in the event of its introduction into the Unites States.17' For
example, since 1989, APHIS has banned the importation of live
cattle and cattle products, such as rendered protein products, from
164. Id. § 50.7(b).
165. Id. § 53.2.
166. Id.
167. 9 C.F.R. § 53.2(b) (2004).
168. 7 U.S.C. § 8306(a) (2000).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. These measures were set forth by USDA and FDA.
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countries where BSE exists.12 Specifically, in 1989, APHIS banned
the importation of live ruminants and ruminant products from the
United Kingdom.' In 1997, APHIS extended the application of
these import restrictions to all European countries because of
concerns about widespread risk factors and what APHIS believes to
be inadequate surveillance for BSE in many European countries.'74
Beginning in December 7, 2000, APHIS implemented a
prohibition on imports of rendered animal protein products,
irrespective of species, from BSE-restricted countries.' This ban
resulted from apprehension that feed intended for cattle may have
been cross-contaminated with the BSE agent. 176 Previously, in 1997,
FDA prohibited the use of certain mammalian protein in the
manufacture of ruminant animal feed. 17 7 Under this prohibition,
firms must do the following: (1) keep specified records on the
manufacture of their feed; (2) prohibit co-mingling between
ruminant feed and non-ruminant feed containing materials prohi-
bited in ruminant feed; and (3) assure that non-ruminant feed
containing materials prohibited in ruminant feed is labeled
conspicuously with the statement "Do not feed to cattle and other
ruminants."'7 1 The purpose of these regulations is to prevent the
introduction and spread of BSE to American cattle through conta-
minated feed.
179
Thus far, only two animals in the United States have tested
positive for BSE. In June 2005, APHIS notified FDA that a twelve-
year-old cow from a Texas ranch, which was dead upon arrival at the
packing plant in November 2004, tested positive for BSE.8 ° Its
carcass was destroyed in November 2004.181 When the BSE positive
cow was discovered in 2005, APHIS, FDA, and other groups
172. See APHIS, USDA, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, at






177. FSIS Measures, supra note 1.
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. See FDA, REPORT ON FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION DALLAS DISTRICT
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conducted an extensive investigation. 82 They learned that the
infected animal was born prior to the implementation of the 1997
feed ban instituted by FDA, and that the ruminant feed ban was
being followed." During this investigation, APHIS attempted to
trace the adult cattle that left the Texas ranch after 1990 and any
offspring that will be born within two years of the BSE positive cow's
death. 84
APHIS also operates an interagency surveillance system for BSE
in the United States.'85 In conjunction with the FSIS, APHIS has
constructed an emergency response plan for use in the event of BSE
detection in the United States.'86 Other Federal agencies have
created contingency plans that work alongside the USDA plan. 187 In
particular, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
runs a surveillance system for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
(vCJD), a fatal neurodegenerative disease that affects humans and is
linked to the consumption of BSE-contaminated beef products.1
8
Since the detection of BSE in Canada in May 2003, USDA has
initiated additional measures, consistent with those taken by Canada,
to improve protections against BSE.'89 USDA has undertaken the
immediate implementation of a verifiable system of national animal
identification to accomplish across the board uniformity and
efficiency in the current national systems. 9 ° USDA has banned the
use of all "downer"'' cattle as human food. 92  Surveillance data




185. See APHIS & USDA, APHIS' BSE Surveillance Program, available at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/pubs/fsheet-faqnotice/faq..ahbsesurv.pdf.
186. See APHIS, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, available at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/bse-surveillance.html (stating that APHIS
has prepared an emergency response plan in the event of the introduction of BSE
into the United States).
187. See FSIS Measures, supra note 1.
188. Id.
189. News Release, USDA, Veneman Announces Additional Protection Measures to
Guard Against BSE (Dec. 30, 2003), at http://www.usda.gov/documents/News
Releases/ 2003/12/0449.doc (last visited Dec. 30, 2005) [hereinafter USDA News
Release].
190. Id.
191. "Downer" cattle are unable to walk or rise from a recumbent position. See
FSIS Measures, supra note 1.
192. See USDA News Release, supra note 189.
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cattle with clinical signs of a central nervous system disorder, dead
cattle, and "downer" cattle have a greater incidence of BSE.
193
FSIS inspectors must wait to mark cattle tested for BSE as
"Inspected and passed" until receipt of confirmation that the
animals have tested negative for BSE.'94 USDA has designated as
"specified risk" materials, the skull, brain, trigeminal ganglia, eyes,
vertebral column, spinal cord and dorsal root ganglia of cattle over
thirty months of age and the small intestine of cattle of all ages.1
95
Use of special risk material in food for human consumption will be
prohibited.'96 Tonsils from all cattle are already considered inedible
and, therefore, do not enter the food supply.'97
FSIS will require federally inspected establishments that
slaughter cattle to develop, implement, and maintain procedures to
remove, segregate, and dispose of these specified risk materials to
preclude their entrance into the human food supply. 9 Meat pro-
duction establishments must make records of this information avail-
able for review by FSIS inspection personnel.'99 FSIS has also
developed methods for verifying the age of cattle that are
slaughtered in official establishments, and they require state in-
spected plants to establish equivalent procedures. °° These measures
have been implemented because most of the cattle that have tested
positive for BSE have been at least thirty months of age. 0'
FSIS has regulated the advanced meat recovery (AMR) process
in order to protect the meat supply from disease contamination.2 2
AMR is a technological method that removes muscle tissue from the
bone of beef carcasses under high pressure without incorporating
bone material.203 FSIS has expanded the regulation prohibiting the
inclusion of the spinal cord in AMR products labeled as "meat. "204
This prohibition will ban the inclusion of dorsal root ganglia and
nerve clusters connected to the spinal cord. Like the spinal cord, the
193. See FSIS Measures, supra note 1.
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dorsal root ganglia may also contain BSE agents."°5 The vertebral
column and the skull in cattle thirty months and older is inedible
and can not be used for AMR.206
C. E. U. Rules on Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy
The E.U.'s provisions for the control of contagious diseases are
often folded into legislation that encompasses a wider range of
topics. However, E.U. has enacted specific rules in at least one case.
On May 22, 2001, the European Parliament and the European
Council passed Regulation No. 999/2001, an amendment to prior
regulations, to address the transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies (TSEs), including BSE.2 °7 This regulation applies
to the production, placing on the market, and exportation of live
animals and products of animal origin.20 8 Where cases of TSEs are
confirmed, Member States are required to draft guidelines
specifying the national measures to be implemented and indicating
responsibilities in accordance with the Community rules.2 19
Annex II of this Regulation lays down the criteria for the
determination of BSE status of a Member State, third country, or
their regions. 20 BSE status is to be determined based on multiple
factors. One factor is the outcome of a risk analysis that considers
the following factors: (1) whether bovine animals consume meat and
bone meal or greaves derived from ruminants; (2) whether meat and
bone meal or greaves are potentially contaminated by a transmissible
spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) or animal feed containing meat
and bone meal or greaves is imported; (3) whether animals or
ova/embryos potentially infected by a TSE are imported; (4) the
epidemiological status of a country or region in regard to animal
TSEs; (5) the extent of knowledge about the structure of the bovine
population in the country or region; and (6) the source of animal
waste, the processes for treating such waste, and the methods of
producing animal feed.2 '
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Council Regulation 999/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 147) 1 (amending Council
Directive 96/23, 1996 O.J. (L 125) 10-32).
208. Regulation 999/2001, art. 1(1), at 3.
209. Regulation 999/2001, art. 14(1), at 8.
210. Regulation 999/2001, ann. II, at 13-15.
211. Regulation 999/2001, ann. II, ch. B, at 13.
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A second factor of consideration is whether the Member State,
third country, or regions operate an education program that
encourages veterinarians, breeders, and those who transport, trade,
and slaughter bovine animals to report all cases of neurological
manifestations in adult bovine animals. 2  A third important factor
in determining BSE status is whether the compulsory reporting and
examination of all bovine animals showing clinical signs of BSE is
mandated.1 Another factor is whether a system of continuous
surveillance and monitoring of BSE with an obligation to retain the
results for seven years is implemented.2 14 The final factor is whether
the Member State, third country, or region requires examination of
encephala or other tissues collected under the surveillance system in
an approved laboratory.215
The BSE status of countries or regions is to be determined by
classification into the following five categories: (1) Category 1:
Country or Region free of BSE; (2) Category 2: BSE provisionally
free country or region where no indigenous case has been reported;
(3) Category 3: BSE provisionally free country where at least one
case of BSE has been reported; (4) Category 4: Country or Region
with low incidence of BSE; and (5) Category 5: Country or Region
with high incidence of BSE.2 6
Annex 3 establishes a system with minimum requirements for
monitoring BSE in bovines.217 Under this scheme, each Member
State carries out an annual program for monitoring BSE, which
includes rapid post-mortem screening. Such screening must be
performed on: (1) all bovine animals subject to "special emergency
slaughtering" or showing signs of any form of disease at the time of
ante-mortem inspection at the slaughterhouse; (2) all bovine animals
over thirty months of age slaughtered normally for human
consumption; (3) dead bovine animals that are not slaughtered for
human consumption and that are found dead on the farm or during
212. Council Regulation 999/2001, ann. II, ch. A(b), 2001 O.J. (L 147) at 13.
213. Regulation 999/2001, ann. II, ch. A(c), at 13.
214. Regulation 999/2001, ann. II, ch. A(d), at 13.
215. See Regulation 999/2001, ann. II, ch. A(e), at 13.
216. Regulation 999/2001, ann. II., ch. C, at 13-15.
217. Council Regulation 999/2001, ann. III, ch. A, 2001 O.J. (L 147) 16-19. The
system also monitors for scrapie in other animals. Regulation 999/2001, ann. III,
ch. B, at 17.
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transport; and (4) bovine animals displaying a neurological
disorder. 8
Member States may voluntarily carry out targeted surveillance
for TSE in higher risk animals.219 Higher risk animals include those
animals originating from countries with indigenous TSE, animals
that have consumed potentially contaminated foodstuffs, and
animals born or derived from TSE-infected cattle.2 Member States
must ensure that no parts of the body of animals being screened for
TSE are used for human food, animal feed, or fertilizers until the
laboratory examination has been concluded with negative results.22 '
Member States must submit reports on all detected cases of TSE
to the European Commission. 2 The information reported must
entail the number, age distribution, geographical distribution of
positive cases of BSE, as well as the year and month of birth should
be given for BSE cases born after the introduction of a ban on using
ruminant protein in animal feed.223
Annex 4 provides that Member States or regions grouped into
Category 5 are prohibited from feeding ruminant animals protein
derived from mammals.2 4  Under this prohibition, farm animals
must not be fed protein derived from mammals. 25 Member States
and regions are also prohibited from feeding ruminants the fat
rendered from ruminants.226
Depending on the category of the country or region, Annex 5
has designated the following tissues as specified risk material. As
regards Categories 3 and 4, the skull, brain, eyes, tonsils, spinal cord
of animals over twelve months old, and the intestines of bovines of
all ages are deemed specified risk material.2 7  With respect to
Category 5, the entire head, tongue, brain, eyes, trigeminal ganglia,
tonsils, thymus, spleen, and spinal cord of bovine animals over six
months old, and the intestines of animals of all ages are classified as
specified risk material. 22" All specified risk material must be
218. Regulation 999/2001, ann. III, ch. A.I.1.1, at 16.
219. Regulation 999/2001, ann. III, ch. A.III, at 18.
220. Regulation 999/2001, ann. III, ch. A.III, at 18.
221. Council Regulation 999/2001, ann. III, ch. A.IV, 2001 O.J. (L 147) at 18.
222. Regulation 999/2001, ann. III, ch. B.I.7, at 18.
223. Regulation 999/2001, ann. III, ch. B.I.6, at 18.
224. Regulation 999/2001, ann. IV.l(b), at 20.
225. Regulation 999/2001, ann. IV.l(a), at 20.
226. Council Regulation 999/2001, ann. IV.l(c), 2001 O.J. (L 147) at 20.
227. Regulation 999/2001, ann. V.1, at 21.
228. Regulation 999/2001, ann. V.1, at 21.
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removed at slaughterhouses, cutting plants, or similar premises
under the supervision of an agent appointed by the competent
authority.229 All specified risk material must also be marked upon
removal for identification purposes and immediately destroyed by
incineration or burial in an approved landfill.23°
Article 13 provides for the eradication of TSEs.23' When the
presence of a TSE has been officially confirmed, the following
measures must be taken: (1) all of the animal's body parts must be
completely destroyed; (2) an inquiry must be carried out to identify
all animals at risk; (3) an inquiry must be performed to identify all
embryos, ova, and the last progeny of a female animal in which the
disease has been confirmed and the embryos or progeny collected or
born up two years prior to or after the clinical onset of the disease;
and (4) all animals and products of animal origin that have been
identified as specified risk materials must be destroyed.232 Owners
must be compensated for the loss of animals that have been killed or
products of animal origin that have been destroyed pursuant to this
Directive. 3
In connection with the eradication of TSEs, Annex 7 lays out
additional terms. It requires the performance of an inquiry to
identify the possible origin of the disease and other farms and
holdings on which there are animals, embryos, or ova that may have
become infected by TSE or exposed to the same feed or
contamination source.234  The inquiry must also endeavor to
pinpoint the movement of potentially contaminated foodstuffs or
any other contamination sources.235
Annex 8 established provisions for the intra-Community trade
of live animals, embryos, and ova.236 It provides that bovine embryos
and ova must be derived from females that are not suspected of TSE
infection at the time of collection.3 7 This condition applies to the
229. Regulation 999/2001, ann. V.2, at 21.
230. See Regulation 999/2001, ann. V.3, at 21.
231. Council Regulation 999/2001, art. 13, 2001 O.J. (L 147) at 7-8.
232. Regulation 999/2001, art. 13(1)(a)-(c), at 7-8.
233. Regulation 999/2001, art. 13(4), at 8.
234. Regulation 999/2001, ann. VII, at 24.
235. Regulation 999/2001, ann. VII. l(a), at 24.
236. Council Regulation 999/2001, ann. VIII, ch. A, 2001 O.J. (L 147) at 25.
237. Regulation 999/2001, ann. VII. ch. A.I.1(2), at 25.
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movement of bovine embryos and ova irrespective of the category of
the Member State, third country, or region.3 8
The following conditions apply to movements of bovine animals
coming from Member States, depending on the category of the
State. Regarding Categories 3 and 4, animals must have been born
and raised in herds with no case of confirmed BSE for at least seven
years, or have been born after the date from which the prohibition
on the feeding of ruminants with protein derived from mammals has
been effectively enforced.239 With respect to Category 5, the animals
must have been born after the date from which the ban on the
feeding of ruminants with protein derived from mammals has been
effectively enforced and have been born and raised in herds with no
case of confirmed BSE for at least seven years. 40
Healthy live animals, their semen, embryos, and ova may be
placed on the market, provided that such articles are accompanied
by animal health certificates.2 41 Products of animal origin derived
from healthy animals may also be placed on the market.242 Annex 9
contains similar provisions in the context of exportation outside the
European Community.243
Annex 10 establishes the guidelines for national reference
laboratories, which are designated in order to ensure the uniformity
of scientific analysis and reliable results.244 The national reference
laboratories must be able to confirm the results of regional
laboratories, to identify the type and strain of TSE when the disease
is diagnosed, to verify diagnostic methods used in regional
laboratories, and to refer unidentifiable strains of TSE to the
Community reference laboratory.2 45 The Community reference
laboratory for TSE, or the Veterinary Laboratories Agency, is
responsible for coordinating the methods employed in the Member
States for diagnosing BSE and facilitating the training of diagnostic
experts in order to harmonize diagnostic techniques throughout the
Community.
246
238. Regulation 999/2001, ann. VIII, at 25.
239. Regulation 999/2001, ann. VIII, ch. A.II.3, at 26.
240. Regulation 999/2001, ann. VIII, ch. A.II.3, at 26.
241. Regulation 999/2001, art. 16(3), at 9.
242. Council Regulation 999/2001, ann. VIII, 2001 O.J. (L 147) 1, 26.
243. See Regulation 999/2001, ann. IX, at 30-33.
244. See Regulation 999/2001, ann. X, at 34-37.
245. Regulation 999/2001, ann. X. ch. A.l(b), at 34.
246. Regulation 999/2001, ann. X. ch. A.2(a), (c), at 34.
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VI. INSPECTION OF LIvE CATTLE, BEEF, BEEF FOOD PRODUCTS, AND
BEEF PRODUCTION ESTABLISHMENTS
Much importance is placed on the inspection of livestock
because inspection is the best way to ensure that unsafe and
unwholesome beef and beef products do not enter the human food
chain. Conscientious maintenance of quality and safety standards
must be monitored under reliable and trustworthy conditions. Both
the United States and E.U. require official inspectors to perform on-
site checks of farms and meat production plants. A summary of the
inspection regulations follows.
A. United States Federal Meat Inspection Act
As previously mentioned, in the interest of protecting the health
and welfare of consumers and preserving the market for meat,
Congress passed FMIA to ensure that wholesome, unadulterated,
247
properly packaged and labeled meat and meat food products enter
interstate and foreign commerce.248 This segment will summarize
the requirements set forth by FMIA as they pertain to cattle. 49
In order to prevent the use in commerce of adulterated meat
and meat food products, Section 603(a) empowers USDA to
authorize the appointment of inspectors to examine and inspect
cattle before they are allowed to enter into any slaughtering,
packing, meat-canning, rendering, or similar establishment.
250
Upon inspection, all cattle found to show symptoms of disease are to
be slaughtered separately from healthy cattle.25 '
USDA must authorize the appointment of inspectors to conduct
post-mortem inspections of carcasses and parts of carcasses to be
prepared at any slaughtering, meat-canning, salting, packing,
rendering, or similar establishment in any state, territory, or the
District of Columbia as articles of commerce to be used as human
247. The term "adulterated" refers to the condition of a carcass, meat, or meat
food product that contains a poisonous or deleterious substance in a quantity that
may render it injurious to health. 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(1) (2000).
248. Id. § 602.
249. FMIA regulates the inspection of meats derived from cattle, sheep, swine,
goats, horses, mules, and other equines. Id. § 603.
250. Id. § 603(a).
251. Id.
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food.25 The carcasses and parts found not to be adulterated must be
stamped as "Inspected and passed."25 Carcasses and parts found to
be adulterated are to be stamped as "Inspected and condemned." '54
Section 604 necessitates the destruction of all condemned carcasses
intended to be used as human food.255
Carcasses and parts of carcasses, the meat, or meat products of
such carcasses must be inspected and examined before they are
allowed to enter any slaughtering, meat-canning, salting, packing,
rendering, or similar establishment in which they will be prepared
for meat food products.256 Any such products, which after leaving
any slaughtering, meat-canning, salting, packing, rendering, or
similar establishment are returned to the same establishment, must
also be inspected.257
Pursuant to Section 606 of FMIA, USDA appoints inspectors to
examine and inspect all meat food products prepared for commerce
and export in any slaughtering, meat-canning, salting, packing,
rendering, or similar establishment.5 ' In order to carry out their
inspection duties as mandated by this law, inspectors must be
granted access at all times to every part of the establishment.259
Inspectors must mark all unadulterated meat food products
"Inspected and passed" and all adulterated food products
"Inspected and condemned. 2 60  Furthermore, false or misleading
marking or labeling on meat food intended for sale is prohibited
under Section 607.261
Competent inspectors must perform continuous sanitation
inspections of all slaughterhouses, meat-canning, salting, packing,
rendering, or similar establishments where cattle are slaughtered
and the meat and meat food products are prepared for commerce. 62
The inspections must be carried out with the aim of prescribing
252. 21 U.S.C. § 604 (2000).
253. Id. § 604.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. § 605.
257. 21 U.S.C. § 605 (2000).
258. Id. § 606.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. § 607.
262. 21 U.S.C. § 608 (2000).
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appropriate rules and regulations for the abovementioned establish-
ments. 63
When slaughter and preparation occurs at night, the examina-
tion and inspection of cattle and beef food products must be
undertaken during that time.264 Careful inspection of all cattle
offered for export to foreign countries is required by Section 615 in
order to ascertain whether such cattle are free from disease.
265
Thorough inspection of carcasses, parts of carcasses and fresh,
canned, salted, corned, packed, cured, or otherwise prepared meat
intended and offered for export to any foreign country is manda-
tory.266 In addition, inspectors must prepare an official certificate
clearly stating the condition of the inspected cattle.267
Unless and until the owner procures a certificate from an
inspector certifying that the cattle are healthy at the time of
inspection and that their meat is wholesome, no clearance will be
granted to any vessel carrying fresh, salted, canned, corned, or
packed beef meat for export to and sale in a foreign country from
any port in the United States. 26 ' However, USDA has discretion to
waive this requirement.
269
To avoid adulteration or contamination, animals, carcasses,
animal parts, meat and meat food products must not be prepared in
the same establishment in which cattle are slaughtered. Under
Section 620, no carcasses, meat or meat food products of cattle to be
used as human food, can be imported in the United States if such
articles are adulterated or misbranded. The carcasses and meat or
meat food products must comply with inspection standards and the
Humane Slaughter Act of 1958, as well as all other provisions of this
statute.272
Once carcasses, meat or meat food products are imported into
the United States, these articles will be deemed and treated as
263. Id. § 608.
264. Id. § 609.
265. Id. § 615.
266. Id.
267. 21 U.S.C. § 616 (2000).
268. Id. § 617.
269. See id.
270. Id. § 619.
271. See id. § 620(a). The term "misbranded" refers to any carcass, meat, or meat
food product with false or misleading labeling, or that omits labeling information
required by law. 21 U.S.C. § 601(n)(1) (2000).
272. Id. § 620(a).
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domestic articles subject to the other provisions of this chapter and
FDCA.273  These articles must be properly marked and labeled
according to FDCA and the regulations promulgated by FDA. 4
Section 620(b)(1) gives USDA authority to prescribe the terms
and conditions for destruction of all cattle carcasses, meat, and meat
food products that are imported contrary to this section. 75 Section
620(b)(2) stipulates that articles found to be non-compliant with this
chapter solely as a result of misbranding can be brought into
compliance under the supervision of representatives of USDA.276
Non-compliance can be cured in order to avoid the destruction of
the articles.277
Section 620 also provides that the same inspection, sanitary,
quality, species verification, and residue standards applied to
products produced for human food in the United States applies to
carcasses, meat and meat food products of cattle imported into the
United States.278 Random inspections for species verifications and
residues, and random sampling and testing of internal organs and
fat of the carcasses for residues at the point of slaughter by the
exporting country, may be conducted to facilitate enforcement of
this provision.279
Each foreign country that imports carcasses, meat and meat
articles into the United States is required to obtain certification from
USDA stating that the country uses reliable analytical methods to
maintain compliance with United States standards for residues in
meat articles.80 USDA must periodically review these certifica-
tions.28' The consideration of any application for a certification and
the review of certifications must include the inspection of individual
establishments to ensure that the inspection program of the foreign
country is satisfying United States standards. 82
Section 620(g) permits USDA to prescribe terms and conditions
under which cattle that have been administered an animal drug or
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. § 620(b)(1).
276. 21 U.S.C. § 620(b)(2) (2000).
277. Id. § 620(b)(2).
278. Id. § 620(f).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. 21 U.S.C. § 620(f) (2000).
282. Id.
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antibiotic banned for use in the United States may be imported for
slaughter and human consumption.28
Section 620(h)(2) governs reciprocal meat inspection.284 At the
behest of the Committee on Agriculture, the Committee on Ways
and Means of the House of Representatives, the Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, or the Committee on Finance
of the Senate, or an USDA initiative, USDA may act to determine
whether a particular foreign country applies standards28 5 for the
importation of meat from the United States "that are not related to
public health concerns about end-product quality that can be sub-
stantiated by reliable analytical methods. ' 2 6 Upon determination
that a foreign country applies such standards, USDA can begin
consultation with the United States Senate and within thirty days
after the determination, USDA and the United States Trade
Representative are free to recommend to the President whether
action should be taken to prohibit the country's importation into the
United States of its carcasses, meat and meat food products.8 7
Section 644 prohibits the buying, selling, transporting, or
importing of dead, dying, disabled, or diseased animals, or any part
of the carcasses of any animals that died otherwise than by
slaughter.8 8 While it also provides that USDA may authorize
regulations to allow such transactions, transportation, or importation
of the animals or their unwholesome parts are not to be used as
human food. 9
FSIS is responsible for ensuring that meat is safe, wholesome,
and correctly labeled and packaged. 9 ° Section 309 of the USDA
regulations contains several inspection provisions that govern FSIS
functions. Section 309.1 provides that all livestock offered for
slaughter in an official pen must be inspected on the day of or before
slaughter unless the FSIS Administrator has previously arranged for
283. Id. § 620(g).
284. Id. § 620(h)(2).
285. The term "standards" means inspection, sanitation, quality, species
verification, residue, and other standards that are applicable to carcasses, meat and
meat food products of cattle that are capable of use as human food. Id. §
620(h)(1)(B).
286. 21 U.S.C. § 620(h)(2) (2000).
287. Id. § 620(h)(3).
288. Id. § 644.
289. Id.
290. See generally FSIS, at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/About-FSIS/index.asp (last
visited Jan. 1, 2006).
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inspection to occur on a different day before slaughter.29  Before
livestock awaiting slaughter are permitted to enter into any depart-
ment of the official slaughtering establishment or any department
where edible products are handled, ante-mortem inspections must
be performed in pens of the establishment. 92
Pursuant to Section 309.2, livestock suspected to be diseased as
a result of ante-mortem inspection may be condemned after the
carcass undergoes a post-mortem inspection.293 When an ante-
mortem inspection of livestock reveals a disease that would cause
only part of the carcass to be condemned after post-mortem
inspection, the livestock must be identified as a suspect until the
final post-mortem inspection is performed. 294  If the post-mortem
inspection reveals disease, the carcass must be marked for identifica-
tion and disposed of accordingly.295
Seriously crippled or non-ambulatory disabled livestock must be
identified as "U.S. Suspects" and disposed of, unless they are
required to be classed as condemned. 296 Livestock that are diseased
with leptospirosis, anaplasmosis, tuberculosis, epithelioma of the eye,
or anasarca are to be identified as "U.S. Suspects" and destroyed. 297
Livestock suspected of anasarca infection can be set apart and
held for treatment under official supervision.298 If upon completion
of treatment the livestock is found to be disease-free, it may be
released for any purpose.299 If the livestock has diseases that the
inspecting official believes are curable, such diseases may be treated
under supervision, and if the livestock is found to be disease-free
after treatment, it may be released for slaughter or any other
purpose."'°
Each animal required to be treated as a US. Suspect is to be
identified as such by an FSIS employee with an official device that
can not be removed by anyone other than an FSIS employee.3'
Animals identified as U.S. Suspect on ante-mortem inspection must
291. 9 C.F.R. § 309.1(a) (2005).
292. Id. § 309.1(b).
293. Id. § 309.2(a).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. 9 C.F.R. § 309.2(b) (2005).
297. See id. § 309.2(c)-(f).
298. Id. § 309.2(g).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See 9 C.F.R. § 309.2(m) (2005).
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be isolated and slaughtered separately from other livestock kept at
that establishment.
30 2
Animals identified as U.S. Suspect on ante-mortem inspection,
must be sent to slaughter with a form MP 402-2 on which the
inspector is required to record the U.S. Suspect identification
number, a description of the animal, and the disease for which the
animal was categorized as suspect.0 3
When any animal identified as U.S. Suspect is released for any
purpose, the official suspect identification device must be removed
by an FSIS employee, who must report the removal to the area
supervisor.0 4 When a suspect is to be released, the operator of the
official establishment must first obtain permission for the removal of
the animal from the local, state, or federal livestock sanitary
official.305
Livestock found in a dead or dying condition at an official
establishment must be identified as "U.S. Condemned" and disposed
of as soon as possible.0 6 If the ante-mortem inspection of the
livestock reveals any disease that would cause condemnation of their
carcasses on post-mortem inspection, the livestock must be identified
as "U.S. Condemned" and disposed of without delay.0 7 Cattle with a
temperature of 105T or higher must be identified as U.S.
Condemned.0 8 If there is doubt about the cause of the temperature,
the livestock may be held for further observation before final
disposition of the livestock is determined. °9 A retained animal must
be re-inspected on the day of slaughter and must be condemned and
disposed of if its temperature is 1050 F or higher. 0
Livestock identified as U.S. Condemned, if not already dead,
must be killed. Such animals can not be taken into the official
establishment to be slaughtered or dressed, nor can they be taken
into any department of the establishment used for edible products. 2
The tags must not be removed, and the tag number must be
302. See id. § 309.2(n).
303. See id. § 309.2(o).
304. Id. § 309.2(p).
305. Id. § 309.2(p).
306. See 9 C.F.R. § 309.3(a) (2005).
307. See id. § 309.3(b).
308. See id. § 309.3(c).
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. See 9 C.F.R. § 309.13(a) (2005).
312. Id.
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reported to the veterinarian in charge by the inspector who affixed
the tag and also by the inspector who supervised the disposal of the
carcass."1 ' However, any livestock condemned because of a treatable
disease, such as ketosis, vesicular diseases, anasarca, anaplasmosis, or
pneumonia, may be isolated and held for treatment.314 The "U.S.
Condemned" tag will be removed following treatment if the animal
is found to be free of disease, and the animal can be used for any
purpose.315
During the slaughtering and preparation process, certain parts
of the carcass are detached or removed from it. The head, tongue,
tail, thymus gland, viscera, blood, and other parts severed from each
slaughtered animal to be used in the preparation of meat food
products or medical products must be identified with the rest of the
carcass, until the post-mortem inspection of the carcass and its parts
has been completed. 16  The retention of ear tags, back tags,
implants, and other identification devices affixed to the animal is
required.1 7
Testing procedures have been established to detect contamina-
tion with microorganisms. For example, official slaughtering
establishments must test livestock for Escherichia coli (E. coli).31 The
establishments must collect samples from all chilled livestock
carcasses, and the sampling frequency for cattle is 1 test per 300
carcasses, with a minimum requirement of one sample during eachweek of operation."' Exceptions are made for low volume establish-
ments with an annual slaughter of no more than 6,000 cattle.3
Salmonella testing is also performed on raw meat in slaughtering and
processing establishments. 21 In order to enforce the provisions for
microorganism detection, FSIS is authorized to sample raw meat
products in an individual establishment on an unannounced basis.3
313. See id.
314. Id. § 309.13(b).
315. Id.
316. 9 C.F.R. § 310.2(a) (2005).
317. Id.
318. Id. § 310.25(a)(1).
319. Id. § 310.25(a)(2)(iii)(A).
320. Id. § 310.25(a)(2)(v).
321. 9 C.F.R. § 310.25(b)(1) (2005).
322. Id. § 310.25(b)(2).
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B. E. U. Directives on Inspection of Various Beef Production
and Processing Facilities
Desiring to unite their countries politically and economically, six
European countries-Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg,
France, Italy, and the Netherlands-formed the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951.323 ECSC integrated the coal and
steel industries of Western Europe.324 In 1957, the six countries
further integrated additional sectors of their economies by signing
the Treaties of Rome which created the European Atomic Energy
Community (EURATOM) and the EEC in order to remove trade
barriers and form a "common market. ',325  In 1967, the three
communities were merged into a single Commission, a single
Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament.3 26 The 1992
Treaty of Maastricht introduced inter-governmental cooperation to
the existing community system and thus created E.U.
32 7
Directive 64/433/EEC, one of the earliest EEC directives, was
adopted in 1964. The Directive standardized health requirements
for meat in slaughterhouses and cutting rooms and during storage
and transportation. In order to standardize the health require-
ments and improve intra-Community trade in fresh meat, it is
necessary to eliminate differences between health requirements of
Member states, i.e. to create a common agricultural policy.
3 29
Article 1 establishes the health rules for the production and
placing on the market of fresh meat derived from domestic animals
and intended for human consumption.3 0 Article 3 requires each
Member State to ensure that carcasses, half carcasses, and quarter
cuts: (1) come from a slaughter animal inspected ante-mortem by an
official veterinarian, (2) have been slaughtered under satisfactory
hygiene conditions, (3) have been inspected post-mortem by an
official veterinarian, and (4) do not show any changes that would





328. The full title of this Directive is Council Directive 64/433/EEC of 26 June 1964
on health problems affecting intra-community trade in fresh meat. Council
Directive 64/433, 1964J.O. (121) 2012-2032 (EC).
329. See Directive 64/433, whereas 3, at 2012.
330. See Directive 64/433, art. 1, at 2013. Furthermore, Directive 64/433 applies to
bovine, swine, sheep, goats, and solipeds. See Directive 64/433, art. 1(1), at 2013.
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render the carcass unfit for human consumption or dangerous to
human health, and (5) bear a health mark. 31 Offal from carcasses
must also comply with these requirements, and any other
requirements for carcasses and smaller cuts of meat.3 '
With respect to transportation of carcasses, half carcasses, and
quarter cuts, Article 3 provides that these items must be
accompanied during transportation by an accompanying commercial
document.333  The document must be provided by the dispatching
establishment, bear the veterinary approval number of the approved
establishment and the month and year of freezing for frozen meat,
and be retained by the consignee so that it can be furnished upon
the request of the competent authority.3 4 A health certificate is
required for meat from a slaughterhouse in a restricted region or
meat to be sent to another Member State. 3 5
Cold storage fresh meat must be accompanied during
transportation to its destination point by the accompanying
commercial document or health certificate.36 The certificate must
be completed by the official veterinarian. In the case of importation,
the certificate is to state the origin of the fresh meat and the
veterinarian approval number of the cold store.3 7
Pursuant to Article 4, the official veterinarian or an auxiliary
must carry out post-mortem inspection of meat. When the meat has
lesions or appears to have deteriorated, the post-mortem inspection
must be carried out by the official veterinarian.3 8 Once inspected,
meat from the approved slaughterhouses and cutting rooms that has
been judged fit for human consumption must be marked with a
national stamp not to be confused with the Community Stamp and
not ovular in shape.3 9 The national stamp is not required for
unpackaged cuts.
340
Article 5 requires the official veterinarian to declare the
following meat from animals unfit for human consumption: (1)
331. See Directive 64/433, art. 3(c), at 2013-14.
332. See Council Directive 64/433, art. 3, 1964J.O. (121) at 2013-14.
333. Directive 64/433, art. 3(1)(g), at 2014.
334. See Directive 64/433, ann. I, ch. VIII, at 2024.
335. Directive 64/433, art. 3(1)(g), at 2014.
336. See Directive 64/433, ann. I, ch. VIII, at 2024.
337. Council Directive 64/433, ann. I, ch. VIII, 1964J.O. (121) at 2024.
338. Council Directive 91/497, art. 4, 1991 O.J. (L 268) 69 (EC) (amending Council
Directive 64/433, art 4, 1964J.O (121)).
339. See Directive 91/497, at 69.
340. See Directive 91/497, art. 4, at 69.
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meat from animals in which actinobacillosis, blackleg, tuberculosis,
rabies, tetanus, acute salmonellosis, acute brucellosis, or botulism has
been diagnosed; (2) meat showing acute lesions of broncho-
pneumonia, pleurisy, peritonitis, arthritis, pericarditis, enteritis, or
meningo-encephalo-myelitis and confirmed by a detailed inspection
and bacteriological examination and a search for residues with a
pharmacological effect;34' (3) meat infected by sarcocystosis,
cysticercosis; (4) meat producing a positive reaction to tuberculin;
42
and (5) and meat producing a positive reaction to brucellosis. 43
Article 5 establishes that the official veterinarian must declare
meat unfit for consumption that is derived from animals that are:
(1) dead, stillborn or unborn; (2) slaughtered too young with
edematous meat; (3) showing signs of emaciation or advanced
anemia; and (4) showing multiple tumors, abscesses or serious
injuries in different areas of the carcass or in different viscera. 44
The following must be declared unfit for human consumption: (1)
parts of the carcass showing signs of major serious hemorrhaging,
localized abscesses or localized contamination; (2) offal and viscera
with pathological lesions of infectious, parasitic, or traumatic origin;
(3) meat that is feverish, or shows serious abnormalities in color,
smell, consistency, or taste; (4) offal that has not undergone post-
mortem inspection; and (5) blood derived from any animal meat
declared unfit for human consumption or blood contaminated by
stomach contents.345  Article 5 further provides that the following
must also be declared unfit for human consumption by the official
veterinarian: (1) meat from animals that have been administered
any prohibited substances; (2) meat containing residues of
unauthorized substances, or residues of medicinal products,
antibiotics, pesticides, or other substances that are harmful to human
health; (3) the liver and kidneys of animals more then two years old
from regions where there is a generalized presence of heavy metals
341. Alternatively, where the special inspections and examinations are favorable,
the carcasses may be declared fit for human consumption after parts unfit for
consumption have been removed. Directive 91/497, art. 5, at 69.
342. Directive 91/497, art. 5, at 69. However, where tuberculous lesion has been
found in the lymph nodes of the same organ or part of the carcass only the affected
organ or part and the associated lymph nodes must be declared unfit for human
consumption. Council Directive 91/497, art. 5, 1991 O.J. (L 268) 69 (EC)
(amending Council Directive 64/433, 1964J.O. (121) 2012 (EC).
343. Directive 91/497, art. 5, at 69.
344. Directive 91/497, art. 5, at 69.
345. Directive 91/497, art. 5, at 69.
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in the environment; and (4) meat that has been treated with ionizing
or ultraviolet radiation.
46
The official veterinarian must subject cattle and meat food
products to examination for residues of substances with a
pharmacological action, the conversion products of such substances,
and for other substances harmful to human health. 47 If the
examination reveals traces of residues in quantities which exceed
permitted levels, the meat must be declared unfit for human
consumption 48  At least one reference laboratory must be
designated per Member State to carry out the examination for
residues.349
Article 9 requires that each Member State ensures the presence
of at least one official veterinarian in a slaughterhouse throughout
the ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections.350  An official
veterinarian must be present at least once a day in a cutting plant to
inspect the hygiene conditions and to record the fresh meat entering
and leaving the plant."1 Article 9 also necessitates the regular
presence of an official veterinarian in a cold store and in an
approved packaging center.352
Under Article 10, each slaughtering, cutting, cold store, and
packaging establishment must obtain approval from the competent
national authority of the Member State."3 ' Where hygiene is found
to be inadequate despite attempts to remedy the situation, the
competent national authority may be authorized by the Member
State to suspend approval.354 Following suspension of approval, if
the operator of the establishment does not remedy the situation
within the period specified, the competent national authority may
withdraw approval of the establishment. 55 The other Member States
346. Directive 91/497, art. 5, at 69.
347. Council Directive 91/497, art. 5, 1991 O.J. (L 268) 69 (EC) (amending Council
Directive 64/433, 1964 J.O. (121) 2012 (EC)).
348. Directive 91/497, art. 5, at 69.
349. Directive 91/497, art. 8, at 69.
350. Directive 91/497, art. 9, at 69.
351. Directive 91/497, art. 9, at 69.
352. Council Directive 91/497, art. 9, 1991 O.J. (L 268) 69 (EC) (amending Council
Directive 64/433, 1964J.O. (121) 2012 (EC)).
353. See Directive 91/497, art. 10, at 69.
354. Directive 91/497, art. 10, at 69.
355. Directive 91/497, art. 10, at 69.
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and the Commission are to be informed of the suspension or
withdrawal of approval of any establishment.356
Article 11 provides that Member States must delegate the task of
collecting the results of the official veterinarian's ante-mortem and
post-mortem inspections for diagnosis of diseases transmissible to
humans to a central agency. 57 Where such a disease is diagnosed,
this diagnosis must be communicated as soon as possible to the
competent veterinary authorities responsible for supervision of the
herd from which the animal originated.35 Member States must
submit to the Commission information on certain diseases,
particularly in cases where diseases transmissible to man have been
diagnosed. 5 9 In order to secure their access to establishments,
Article 12 enables veterinary experts to conduct on-site visits of
slaughtering, cutting, cold store, and packaging facilities to ensure
uniform application of the rules and regulations set forth in this
Directive.36° Where there is suspicion of non-compliance, Article 14
authorizes the official veterinarian to undertake any veterinary
inspection deemed appropriate to investigate the matter. 6 '
Clear rules have been laid out for ante-mortem health
inspections under Annex I, Chapter VI of Council Directive
64/433.62 Pursuant to Chapter VI animals must undergo ante-
mortem inspection less than twenty four hours after their arrival in
the slaughterhouse or less then twenty four hours before slaughter.363
Each animal intended for slaughter must bear a mark identifying its
origin.364
The ante-mortem inspection must determine whether the
animals have contracted or show symptoms of a communicable
disease and whether they show symptoms of a disease likely to
render their meat unfit for human consumption. If an animal is
suspected of having a disease that will render its meat unfit for
356. Directive 91/497, art. 10, at 69.
357. Council Directive 91/497, art. 11, 1991 O.J. (L 268) 69 (EC) (amending
Council Directive 64/433, 1964J.O. (121) 2012 (EC)).
358. Directive 91/497, art. 11, at 69.
359. Directive 91/497, art. 11, at 69.
360. Directive 91/497, art. 12, at 69.
361. Directive 91/497, art. 14, at 69.
362. Council Directive 91/497, ann. I, ch. VI, 1991 O.J. (L 268) 69 (EC) (amending
Council Directive 64/433, 1964J.O. (121) 2012 (EC)).
363. Directive 91/497, ann. I, ch. VI, at 69.
364. Directive 91/497, ann. I, ch. VI, at 69.
365. Directive 91/497, ann. I, ch. VI, at 69.
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human consumption, slaughter of the animal must be delayed until
the animal undergoes an in-depth examination and diagnosis.366 In
the event that a post-mortem inspection is needed to conclusively
diagnosis the animals, the official veterinarian can request that the
animals are slaughtered separately. 67
Chapter VII mandates that slaughter animals brought into
slaughter premises must be slaughtered immediately and bleeding,
flaying, dressing and evisceration must be carried out in a way that
avoids any contamination of meat.3 68 The chapter also provides that
blood intended for human consumption must be collected in clean
containers, and must be stirred with hygienic instruments.369
Uninspected carcasses and offal must not come in contact with
carcasses already inspected, and the blood or offal of several animals
collected in the same container before the completion of the post-
mortem inspection must be declared unfit for human consumption if
the carcass of one of the animals is declared unfit for human
consumption. 7 °
Chapter VIII provides that all animals, animal parts and blood
of animals must undergo a post-mortem inspection immediately
following slaughter to determine its fitness for human
consumption. 371 The following procedures must be performed
during the post-mortem inspection: (1) visceral inspection of the
slaughtered animal and its organs; (2) palpation of the organs; (3)
incision in the slaughter room of organs, which have lesions that may
contaminate the carcass; and (4) investigation of abnormal
consistency, odor, color, and smell. The official veterinarian must
conduct a visual inspection of head, throat, and internal organs.372
Chapter XI lays out the requirements for health marking.373
Health marking is done under the supervision of the official
veterinarian.374 The health mark must be an oval mark at 6.5
centimeters wide by 4.5 centimeters high bearing the initials of the
366. Directive 91/497, ann. I, ch. VI, at 69.
367. Council Directive 91/497, ann. I, ch. VI, 1991 O.J. (L 268) 69 (EC) (amending
Council Directive 64/433, 1964J.O. (121) 2012 (EC)).
368. Directive 91/497, ann. I, ch. VII, at 69.
369. Directive 91/497, ann. I, ch. VI, at 69.
370. Directive 91/497, ann. I, ch. VI, at 69.
371. Directive 91/497, ann. I, ch. VIII, at 69.
372. Council Directive 91/497, ann. I, ch. VIII, 1991 O.J. (L 268) 69 (EC) (am
ending Council Directive 64/433, 1964J.O. (121) 2012 (EC)).
373. Directive 91/497, ann. I, ch. XI, at 69.
374. Directive 91/497, ann. I, ch. XI, at 69.
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consigning country in capital letters and the veterinary approval
number of the establishment. 75
Council Directive 72/462 was adopted on December 12, 1972 in
order to specify the rules on importation of bovines, swine, and fresh
meat from countries that are not part of E.U., or third countries as
they are referenced in this Directive.376
Chapter 1, Article 4 of Directive 72/462 declares that E.U. will,
from time to time, amend lists of countries approved for importation
of bovine animals and fresh meat.177 In order to determine whether
a slaughterhouse, cutting plant, or cold store may appear an
approved list, consideration should include: (1) the third country's
guarantees to comply with this Directive; (2) the third country's
regulations pertaining to animals for slaughter and substances which
may affect the wholesomeness of the meat; and (3) the organization
of the meat inspection services of the third country.378
Article 5 authorizes on-the-spot inspections by veterinarians of
Member States and the European Commission to verify whether the
provisions of the Directive are being observed, and provides that
these inspection costs are to be paid by the European Community.
3 79
Chapter 2, Article 6 states that Member States must typically
authorize the importation of animals from non-Member States only
under the condition that the animals are free from any disease to
which animals are susceptible and the animals have been vaccinated
during the preceding twelve months against diseases that are
transmissible to other animals."' 0 Article 11 provides that Member
States can authorize the importation of bovine animals and swine
only on the production of a certificate drawn up by an official
veterinarian of the exporting non-Member State. 8 ' Pursuant to
Article 12, Member States must ensure that bovines and swine are
inspected by the official veterinarian when they arrive in the territory
of the Community.8 2
375.Directive 91/497, ann. I, ch. XI, at 69.
376.The full name of the Directive is Council Directive 72/462/EEC of 12 December
1972 on health and veterinary inspection problems upon importation of bovine
animals and swine and fresh meat from third countries. Council Directive 72/462,
1972 O.J. (L 302) 28-54 (EEC).
377. Directive 72/462, ch. 1, art. 4, at 28-54.
378. Directive 72/462, ch. 1, art. 4, at 28-54.
379. Directive 72/462, ch. 1, art. 5, at 28-54.
380. Directive 72/462, ch. 2, art. 6, at 28-54.
381. Council Directive 72/462, ch. 2, art. 11, 1972 O.J. (L 302) 28-54 (EEC).
382. Directive 72/462, ch. 2, art. 12, at 28-54.
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Article 12 prohibits animals from entering the Community if
during the inspection it is found that: (1) the animals do not
originate from the territory of a third country contained in the list;
(2) the animals are infected with or are suspected of being infected
with a contagious disease; or (3) the conditions established in this
Directive have not been complied with by the exporting non-
Member State.38 3 The Member State that inspected the animals
denied entry in the Community is allowed to take measures such as
slaughter, sending back animals, or quarantining animals to ensure
the health and safety of the animals within its borders. 84  In the
event that animals are denied entry and measures previously
mentioned are taken, the exporter or importer is liable for all
expenses incurred and will not be compensated from the State.385
Article 13 stipulates that imported animals must be slaughtered
not later than three working days after their entry into the
slaughterhouse.8 6 Chapter 3, Article 17 requires Member States to
authorize imports of fresh meat cut in halves or quarters only if the
parts can be reconstructed as the entire carcass of each animal.
38 7
This provision ensures that diseased parts have not been removed.
All fresh meat must have undergone a post-mortem health
inspection carried out by an official veterinarian to determine that it
is suitable for slaughter and exportation to the European
Community. 8 Such meat must be accompanied by a public health
certificate and stored and transported under satisfactory hygiene
conditions.389 The meat must also be inspected upon arrival into the
territory of the European Community.39 °
Article 20 requires that Member States prohibit the importation
of the following: (1) fresh meat containing residues of estrogenous
or thyrostatic substances, antibiotics, antimony, arsenic, pesticides or
other substances likely to render the meat harmful to human
health;391 (2) fresh meat treated with ionizing or ultraviolet rays; (3)
383. Directive 72/462, ch. 2, art. 12, at 28-54.
384. Directive 72/462, ch. 2, art. 12, at 28-54.
385. Directive 72/462, ch. 2, art. 12, at 28-54.
386. Council Directive 72/462, ch. 2, art. 13, 1972 O.J. (L 302) 28-54 (EEC).
387. Directive 72/462, ch. 3, art. 17, at 28-54.
388. Directive 72/462, ch. 3, art. 17, at 28-54.
389. Directive 72/462, ch. 3, art. 17, at 28-54.
390. Directive 72/462, ch. 3, art. 17, at 28-54.
391. Council Directive 72/462, ch. 3, art. 20, 1972 O.J. (L 302) 28-54 (EEC). These
substances must exceed permitted levels in order to be prohibited.
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fresh meat with any form of tuberculosis; and (4) fresh meat from
animals found to have tuberculosis or cysticerci.392 Article 22
provides that Member States must authorize fresh meat to be
imported only on presentation of an animal health certificate and a
public health certificate furnished by an official veterinarian of the
exporting country.3 93
Chapter 4, Article 28 provides that if a contagious animal
disease that could possibly endanger the health of the livestock of
one of the Member States, erupts in a non-Member country, the
Member State concerned is authorized to prohibit the importation of
animals whether imported directly or indirectly through another
Member. 94 An identical rule applies to a contagious animal disease
which can be carried by fresh meat and endanger the public health
or the health of the livestock in one of the Member States. 95
On December 14, 1994, Council Directive 94/65 was established
to create a framework for European Community regulation of
minced meat and meat preparations. 96 Conditions for inspection,
production, marking, labeling, and packaging are laid out in this
directive.
Article 3 requires that fresh minced meat obtained from bovine
animals must satisfy these requirements to be traded: (1) it must
have been inspected; (2) it must have been marked and labeled; (3)
it must be transported by an accompanying commercial document
from the dispatching establishment, and (4) frozen meat must bear
the veterinary approval number of the production plant and the
month and year of freezing.
3 97
Minced meat that is frozen or deep frozen must meet these
requirements: (1) it must come from fresh boned meat that has been
stored no longer than eighteen months;398 (2) the fresh meat source
of minced meat that has been chilled must be used within no more
392. Directive 72/462, ch. 3, art. 20, at 28-54.
393. Directive 72/462, ch. 3, art. 22, at 28-54.
394. See Directive 72/462, ch. 4, art. 28, at 28-54.
395. See Directive 72/462, ch. 4, art. 28, at 28-54.
396. Council Directive 94/65, 1994 O.J. (L 368) 10-31 (EC). The full title of the
Directive is Council Directive 94/65/EC of 14 December 1994 laying down the
requirements for the production and placing on the market of minced meat and
meat preparations.
397. Directive 94/65, ch. II, art. 3, at 10-31.
398. Directive 94/65, ch. II, art. 3, at 10-31. This rule applies to veal and beef.
Directive 94/65, art. 3, at 10-31.
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than six days after slaughter of the animals;.99 (3) it must have
undergone cold treatment within a period of not more than one
hour after wrapping; and (4) it must be packaged properly.4"0 Fresh
minced meat must be chilled and cooled to an internal temperature
below +2°C in the shortest time possible, and deep frozen minced
meat must be deep frozen and cooled to an internal temperature
below -18'C in the shortest time possible.40 '
Chapter I of Annex 1 contains special conditions of approval for
establishments processing minced meat. In order to receive
approval, production plants must have a room for mincing and
wrapping that is separate from the cutting room.40 2 The room for
mincing and wrapping meat must be equipped with a thermometer
or recording telethermometer.4 °3 However, only the competent
authority may authorize the approval of an establishment in which
meat is minced in the cutting room, provided that the mincing is
carried out in a clearly separate area of the cutting room.40 4 The
room for mincing and wrapping meat must contain refrigeration
equipment capable of reaching the cooling temperatures stated
above. 
405
Chapter II of Annex 1 requires examination of meat before
mincing occurs, and removal and condemnation of all soiled parts
before mincing.4 6 It further establishes that minced meat may not
be obtained from scrap cuttings, so as to ensure the quality and
wholesomeness of the meat produced.4 7 In particular, minced meat
may not be prepared from muscles of the head, the non-muscular
part of the linea alba, the carpus and tarsus region, and bone
399. Directive 94/65, ch. II, art. 3, at 10-31. With respect to boned, vacuum-
packed beef and veal, the time period extends to no more than fifteen days after
slaughter of the animals. Council Directive 94/65, 1994 O.J. (L 368), ch. II, art. 3,
10-31 (EC).
400. See Directive 94/65, ch. II, art. 3, at 10-31.
401. Directive 94/65, ch. II, art. 3, at 10-31.
402. Directive 94/65, ann. I, ch. I, 1(a), at 10-31.
403. Directive 94/65, ann. I, ch. I, 1(a), at 10-3 1.
404. Council Directive 94/65, ann. 1, ch. I, 1(a), 1994 O.J. (L 368) 10-31 (EC).
405. See Directive 94/65, ann. I, ch. I, 1(a), at 10-31. The fresh minced meat must
be chilled and cooled to an internal temperature below + 2°C in the shortest time
possible, and deep frozen minced meat must be deep frozen and cooled to an
internal temperature below -18'C in the shortest time possible. Directive 94/65, art.
5, at 10-31.
406. Directive 94/65, ann. I, ch. II, 1, at 10-31.
407. Directive 94/65, ann. I, ch. II, 2, at 10-31.
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408scrapings. The muscles of the diaphragm and of the masseter may
be used only after an investigation for cysticercosis. 0 9
Chapter IV of Annex 1 provides specific guidelines for the
production of meat preparations. The preparation of meat must
occur under temperature control, and meat preparations must be
wrapped in such a way as to obviate any risk of contamination.41°
Further, meat preparations may be deep-frozen only once, and they
are to be traded within an eighteen month time span.4 '
Pursuant to Chapter V, meat production plants in the business
of mincing meat and meat preparations must be inspected by the
competent authority to monitor the following: (1) the hygiene of the
premises and its staff; (2) sample collection of the products that meet
the aforementioned requirements; (3) the microbial condition of the
minced meat and meat preparations, (4) the appropriate health
markings; and (5) hygienic storage and transport conditions.412 In
addition, Chapter 6 provides that minced meat and meat
preparations must have a health mark on the wrapping or packaging
certifying that the items meet the requirements of this Directive.413
Chapter 7 establishes that minced meat and meat preparation
wrapping and packaging must be impenetrable in order to prevent
the entrance of substances that are harmful to human health.1 4
C. United States Provisions for Residue Testing
In addition to inspection, residue testing is also vital to the
production of safe, wholesome beef. Under FMIA, FSIS is
responsible for inspecting meat products to ensure consumer
safety.415 An essential part of the inspection program is the FSIS
Residue Program, which has been designed to detect and monitor
residues of animal drugs and other chemical contaminants in the
meat products.416 The FSIS Residue Program collects samples of
408. Council Directive 94/65, ann. 1, ch. II, 1994 O.J. (L 368) 10-31 (EC).
409. Directive 94/65, ann. I, ch. II, at 10-31.
410. See Directive 94/65, ann. I, ch. IV(a), at 10-3 1.
411. See Directive 94/65, ann. I, ch. IV(c), at 10-31.
412. See Directive 94/65, ann. I, ch. V(1)(a)(i)-(v), at 10-31.
413. Council Directive 94/65, ann. 1, ch. VI(1), 1994 O.J. (L 368) 10-31 (EC).
414. See Directive 94/65, ann. I, ch. VII, at 10-3 1.
415. FSIS Directive 10530.3, Contamination Response System (1993), at
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meat products at domestic slaughterhouses and analyzes them for
unacceptable residue levels. The residue analysis is conducted either
by one of the three field FSIS laboratories, by an accredited
laboratory, or by a laboratory under contract with FSIS.41 7
Section 138a(a) of 7 U.S.C. authorizes USDA to administer a
National Laboratory Accreditation Program that determines the
minimum quality and reliability standards for laboratories
conducting residue testing of agricultural products or making claims
to the public concerning chemical residue levels on agricultural
products.418 Further, the Secretary of Health and Human Services is
responsible for approving state agencies or private nonprofit entities
as accrediting bodies to implement certification and quality
assurance programs.419  To gain accreditation, a laboratory is
required to submit an application to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services.4"'
D. E. U. Rules for Monitoring Residues in Meat
Council Directive 96/23 was adopted on April 29, 1996 to
establish measures for monitoring substances and residues in live
animals and animal products.42' Article 3 prescribes monitoring
plans for the detection of residues or substances.422
The production process of animals and the production of
primary products of animal origin must be monitored for the
purpose of detecting the presence of residues and substances
categorized by "Group A" and "Group B" of this Directive in live
animals, their excrement, body fluids, tissue, animal products,
animal feed, and drinking water.4 23  Group A substances have an
anabolic effect.4 24 The unauthorized substances include stilbenes,
stilbene derivatives, stilbene salts and esters, antithyroid agents,
steroids, resorcylic acid lactones, zeranol, and beta-agonists.425
417. Id.
418. 7 U.S.C. § 138a(a) (2000).
419. Id. § 138a(c).
420. Id. § 138a(d).
421. Council Directive 96/23, 1996 O.J. (L 125) 10-32 (EC). The full title of the
Directive is Council Directive 96/23/EC of 29 April 1996 on measures to monitor
certain substances and residues thereof in live animals and animal products.
422. Directive 96/23, ch. II, art. 3, at 10-32.
423. Directive 96/23, ch. II, art. 3, at 10-32.
424. Directive 96/23, ann. I, at 10-32.
425. Directive 96/23, ann. I, at 10-32.
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Group B substances are divided into three categories of veteri-
nary drugs and contaminants.426  The first category includes
antibacterial substances such as sulphonomides and quinolones; the
second class comprises other veterinary drugs, such as antihelmin-
tics, anticoccidials such as nitroimidazoles, carbamates, pyrethoids,
sedatives, non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, and other
pharmacologically active substances; and the third category consists
of other substances and environmental contaminants, including
organochlorine compounds, organophosphorus compounds,
chemical elements, mycotoxins, and dyes.427
Article 4 requires Member States to designate the inspection
duties to a central public department, so that fraudulent use of
substances on stock farms may be discovered.4 2' According to Article
5 and Annex III, the inspection agency must adopt a residue control
plan aimed at revealing the reasons for residue hazards in food of
animal origin on farms and in slaughterhouses.429 Wherever official
samples are taken, sampling must be unforeseen, unexpected and
effected at no fixed time and on no particular day of the week, so as
to maintain the element of surprise.48 ° With respect to Group A
substances, inspections should be carried out with an eye toward
detecting illegal administration of prohibited substances and the
abusive administration of approved substances.4"1 The samples must
be identified in consideration of these minimum criteria: age, sex,
species, fattening system, available background information, and all
evidence of misuse and abuse of Group A substances.5 2 For Group
B substances, inspections should be carried out with the specific aim
of controlling the compliance with maximum residue limits for
residues of veterinary medicinal products and other contaminants.43
An E.U. guideline for monitoring residues in meat and meat
products was adopted on February 23, 1998. Commission Decision
98/179 prescribes the procedures for official sampling of residues
and substances that are illegally administered to cattle intended for
human consumption and for controlling compliance with the
426. Council Directive 96/23, ann. I, 1996 O.J. (L 125) 10-32 (EC).
427. Directive 96/23, ann. I, at 10-32.
428. Directive 96/23, art. 4(1), at 10-32.
429. Directive 96/23, art. 5(1), (2)(c) & ann. III, at 10-32.
430. Directive 96/23, ann. III(1), at 10-32.
431. Council Directive 96/23, ann. 111(2), 1996 O.J. (L 125) 10-32 (EC).
432. Directive 96/23, ann. 111(2), at 10-32.
433. Directive 96/23, ann. 111(3), at 10-32.
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maximum residue limits for residues of veterinary drugs and
maximum levels of pesticides.4"4 The Annex to the Decision lays out
the precise rules for monitoring residue and substance sampling as
follows. The competent authority is tasked with the duty of
designating an agency to take and organize the transport of the
official control samples.435 The analysis of the samples is to be
conducted in laboratories approved for official residue control, and
regular proficiency testing schemes must be implemented to
routinely check the competence of the laboratories.436
Section 2.1 of the Annex states that samples must be random
and unforeseen. All Member States must ensure the element of
surprise in the checks. Random sampling should be carried out at
varying intervals throughout the whole year, because a number of
substances are only administered in a particular season.
43 7
E. United States' Science-Based Production Control System
In 1998, USDA established the Hazard Analysis and Critical
Control Point (HACCP) program for meat processing plants to
prevent microbiological, chemical, and physical hazards.4"' HACCP
is a science-based process used by both FDA and USDA to determine
the potential danger points in food production and to define a strict
monitoring system.439 HACCP began in 1959 when the Pillsbury
Corporation cooperated with the Unites States Army and the
National Aeronautics Space Association (NASA) to create the "Modes
of Failure" program for the astronauts.44 The program was
designed to prevent hazards that could cause food-borne illnesses by
applying science-based controls from raw materials to finished
products."' The HACCP Final Rule went into effect for medium
and large slaughterhouses and meat production plants in 1998, for
small facilities in January 1999, and for very small facilities in
434. Commission Decision 98/179, 1998 O.J. (L 65) 31-34 (EC).
435. Decision 98/179, ann. I, 1.2, at 32.
436. Decision 98/179, ann. I, 2.1, at 32.
437. Council Directive 98/179, 1988 O.J. (L 65) 32 (EC).
438. Food Safety Research Information Office (FSRIO), A Focus on Hazard Analysis
and Critical Control Points (2003), at http://fsrio.nal.usda.gov/documentfsheet.php?
productid= 155 (last visited Jan. 3, 2006) [hereinafter FSRIO].
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id. FDA Backgrounder, HACCP: A State-of-the-Art Approach to Food Safety
(2001), at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-lrd/bghaccp.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2006).
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January 2000; they are now required by FSIS to systematically target
and reduce harmful bacteria.442
Meat processing plants must develop a HACCP plan for each
product.44  The seven principles of HACCP are: (1) analyze
hazards, which requires the identification of potential hazards
associated with a food and measures to control those hazards; (2)
identify critical control points, which requires the identification of
points in a food's production process at which potential hazards can
be controlled or eliminated; (3) establish preventive measures with
critical limits for each control point; (4) establish procedures to
monitor the critical control points; (5) establish corrective actions to
be taken when monitoring shows that a critical limit has not been
met; (6) establish procedures to verify that the system is working
properly; and (7) establish effective recordkeeping to document the
HACCP system.444 The HACCP Final Rule requires all slaughter
and processing plants to adopt a system of HACCP process controls
to prevent food safety hazards, to conduct microbial testing for
generic E. coli to verify that their control systems are working as
intended to prevent fecal contamination, to meet pathogen
reduction performance standards set by FSIS for raw meat products,
and to adopt and implement a written sanitation standard operating
procedure.445
F. E. U.'s Science-Based Quality Assurance System
After facing several food scares in the 1990s, such as BSE, E.U.
established the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) in 2002.446
EFSA provides independent scientific advice and risk assessments on
food and food safety matters.447
EFSA has five chief objectives: (1) to provide scientific opinions
and advice on food safety issues formerly addressed to EFSA by the
European Commission, the European Parliament, the Member
States, or EFSA itself; (2) to assess the risk factors for specific foods;
(3) to monitor specific risk factors and diseases in order to provide
442. See FSRIO, supra note 438.
443. 9 C.F.R. § 417.2(b) (2005).
444. Id. § 417.2(c)(1)-(7).
445. See FSRIO, supra note 438.
446. EFSA, Moving Towards Full Strength (2005), at http://www.efsa.eu.int/about_
efsa/catindexen.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2006).
447. Id.
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scientific opinions on tests and methods of controlling these risk
factors and diseases; (4) to prepare guidelines for the future
evaluation of food-related health claims; and (5) to apply and
promote new, harmonized scientific approaches for hazard and risk
assessment of food and feed.448
VII. COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES' AND THE E.U.'s
APPROACHES TO BEEF REGULATION
An examination of the United States and E.U. regulation of
cattle farming and beef production and processing reveals some
notable similarities and differences. This section entails a brief
comparison of the two systems. The analysis will explore the quality
of the legislative drafting, the likelihood of implementation, the
adequacy of consumer protections, the voluntary or compulsory
nature of the measures, and the requirement of record retention.
A. Animal Drug Regulatory Schemes
The first area of review is animal drug regulatory schemes. One
marked difference in the pertinent American and E.U. rules is that
the United States permits the administration of growth hormones to
cattle intended for use as human food,44 9 whereas the E.U. has
banned such practices.45° In this area of regulation, both the United
States and the E.U. have drafted well-written, clearly articulated, and
easy to comprehend rules.
FDA regulations list the hormones and growth promoters that
are federally approved, and specify the permissible uses and dosages
of the approved drugs. For example, estradiol valerate and
norgestomet can be implanted in combination to synchronize estrus
or ovulation.45' The laws are specific in many other respects as well.
They indicate whether the drugs are to be administered as injections
or implants. Express details provide that certain drugs are only to
be administered to certain types of cattle. For instance, 10
milligrams of estradiol benzoate may be administered to suckling
448. See generally id.
449. See supra Section II.A.
450. See supra Section II.B.
451. 12 U.S.C. § 522.850 (2000).
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beef calves, and 20 milligrams to steers and heifers fed in
confinement for slaughter.
45 2
E.U. also expressly states its proscriptions of the use of growth
hormones, and the specific methods of administration where the
utilization of hormones is permitted for therapeutic purposes. For
example, Member States may authorize the therapeutic
administration to livestock of testosterone, progesterone, and their
derivatives that readily yield the parent compound on hydrolysis
after absorption.45  The directives also clarify that hormonal,
thyrostatic, and beta-agonists are all prohibited for use as growth
enhancing drugs.454
With respect to the likelihood of implementation, both the
United States and the E.U.'s regulations contain loopholes that may
allow for abuse of the prohibitions and half-hearted implementation
of the rules. However, the E.U.'s laws are more likely to achieve the
desired prohibitions, because farmers are not authorized to possess
or administer hormonal drugs that are only allowed for therapeutic
use. 45 5  Only official veterinarians, their supervisees, and other
authorized persons are allowed to administer such drugs for
therapeutic purposes, and farmers are prohibited from processing
them.456
Growth enhancing drugs have permissible uses in both the
United States and E.U., hence they are available on the market and
can be purchased legally in some circumstances. Thus, the
possibility of them being used illegally in incorrect dosages, for
unintended uses, and by unauthorized persons exists in both places.
However, the E.U. enactments contain more detailed monitoring
provisions that mandate surprise inspections of animals, their
excrements, bodily fluids, drinking water, and stables in order to test
for residues of prohibited drugs and substances.457 This provides
more incentive for livestock producers to obey the rules.
The laws can also be compared according to their effectiveness
in consumer protection. The law in the United States prohibits the
administration of growth hormones in unsafe ways. For instance,
administration of estradiol valerate and norgestomet combinations
452. Id. § 522.841.
453. See Council Directive 96/22, art. 4, 1996 O.J. (L 125) 3, 5 (EC).
454. Directive 96/23, art. 4, at 3-5.
455. Council Directive 2003/74, 2003 O.J. (L 262) 17-21 (EC).
456. Council Directive 96/23, art. 4, 1996 O.J. (L 125) 10-32 (EC).
457. Directive 96/23, art. 8, at 10-32.
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are prohibited in cows that produce milk for human consumption.
This provision is included in order to preserve the quality and
wholesomeness of the milk supply.458 These implants must be
removed on the tenth day and collected and burned in order to
avoid exceeding the approved dosages for animals intended for
human consumption." 9
E.U. operates under the premise that growth promoting hor-
mones are dangerous to human health, and thus there are no
tolerable daily intakes for any of them.46° In order to prevent treat-
ment of cattle intended for human consumption, Council Directive
96/23 enumerates the hormones and their derivatives that are
banned, and prohibits the importation of beef and beef food
products treated with such drugs.4 6' The European Council has
drawn up such provisions with the aim of ensuring that the beef
supply of Member States is safe for human food.462
In the United States and E.U. the laws on animal drugs are
compulsory, and penalties apply to violators.46 ' Additionally, E.U.
has provisions for recordkeeping." Specifically, the official
veterinarian is required to maintain records of animals treated by
hormonal substances for therapeutic purposes.465 Farm animals
undergoing such treatment must be clearly identified, and such
treatment must be registered by the veterinarian responsible. 6 The
United States' rules do not contain such provisions.
B. Organic Livestock Production Regulations
The second area of comparison is the organic livestock produc-
tion regulations. With respect to the quality of legislative drafting,
the two systems are similarly adequate; but, the E.U. regulations
governing the actual livestock rearing process surpass the United
States regulations in terms of depth and detail. For example, the
United States' OFPA lacks provisions on free range and open air
458. 12 U.S.C. § 522.850 (2000).
459. Id.
460. See Europa Hormones, supra note 60.
461. Council Directive 96/23, 1996 O.J. (L 125) 3-9 (EC).
462. Directive 96/23, at 3-9.
463. Directive 96/23, art. 4, at 3-9.
464. Directive 96/23, art. 4, at 3-9.
465. Directive 96/23, art. 4, at 3-9.
466. Council Directive 2003/74, 2003 O.J. (L 262) 19 (EC).
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exercise, prohibitions on overstocking of cattle in pastures, and
advisory statements on the use of husbandry practices that
encourage resistance to diseases and infections.467
The likelihood of implementation of these rules is fair, because
both the United States and E.U. have implemented sufficient
monitoring mechanisms in order to increase the certainty of
implementation and to detect residues of prohibited substances and
drugs. OFPA is slightly more clear, comprehensive, and explicit
with respect to monitoring provisions than its European counterpart,
because the provisions are included in OFPA itself; whereas, E.U.
rules are contained in separate pieces of legislation, apart from
Regulation 1804/1999, that provide for inspection of production and
handling establishments and substance residue testing.46
For example, in the United States producers and handlers of
organic livestock must create an organic plan.469 OFPA establishes a
built-in check on the monitoring system because organic farmers
must not only certify to USDA, but also to the state official, and to
the certifying agent on an annual basis that all agricultural products
have been produced organically.47° OFPA provides for annual on-
site inspections by the certifying agent of each farm and handling
operation, and the rules require periodic residue testing by
certifying agents of agricultural products produced on certified
organic farms and in handling operations to determine whether they
contain pesticides or other nonorganic residues.47' OFPA requires
public access to certifying documents.472 Collectively, all of these
procedures increase the likelihood that the regulation will be
followed by organic livestock producers.
Concerning the adequacy of consumer protection, it is
important to note that E.U. Regulation 1804/1999 on organic
livestock production is less airtight than the American OFPA,
because it allows conversion of nonorganically produced cattle to
467. The United States federal legislation may be less detailed, because the
regulatory functions are shared by state and local governments such that areas that
are unaddressed in federal laws may be covered in state or local laws. See 7 U.S.C. §
450 (2000).
468. See, e.g., Council Regulation 1804/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 222) 1.
469. OFPA of 1990, 7 U.S.C. § 6506(a)(2) (2000).
470. Id. § 6506(a)(4).
471. Id. § 6506(a)(6).
472. Id. § 6506(a)(2).
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organically produced cattle.475 Plainly stated, livestock that was not
initially raised pursuant to the organic production regulation can
undergo a specified conversion process. Once that process is com-
pleted, the cattle can be classified and sold as organically produced.
Regulation 1804/1999 opens the door to abuse and consumers may
suffer, because there is a possibility that producers will market cattle
as organically produced that have not been held in conversion for
the required twelve month period.
Another shortcoming of the regulation is that it does not
require organic farmers to inform consumers that converted beef
was once subjected to nonorganic rearing methods before it under-
went the conversion process. If Regulation 1804/1999 contained
such a provision, this may improve the adequacy of consumer aware-
ness. Granted, in some ways providing consumers with relevant
information needed to make informed purchasing decisions is a
separate matter from protecting consumers from unsafe or un-
healthy products by regulating and monitoring the beef production
process. However, adequate consumer protection requirements may
include a provision on supplying consumers seeking organically pro-
duced food with full information on converted organic beef. Other-
wise, there are significant measures in place to bolster the likelihood
of implementation of the organic requirements.
Organic production is not compulsory in either system in the
sense that producers may elect nonorganic production. Once they
seek organic certification, however, the rules become compulsory.
Both systems require record retention that is subject to inspection by
the certifying agent. In E.U., records must be kept on all animals
that are treated with veterinary medicinal products.474 In the United
States, organic cattle farmers must keep records on all animals
treated with medicines, on all feeds fed to the livestock, and on all
animals so that they can be traced back to a specific farm.47 5
473. Council Regulation 1804/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 222) 1, 9-10 (EC).
474. Regulation 1804/1999, ann. III (4), at 25.
475. 7 U.S.C. § 6506(b)(1)(B) (2000).
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C. Humane Methods of Slaughter
The regulations on the humane methods of slaughter in the
United States and E.U. are very brief and substantially similar.
47 6
The quality of the legislative drafting in both is sufficient, because
they each succinctly and clearly state the approved methods of
slaughter allowing very little room for variance in interpretation.
The legislation in the United States and E.U. are both wanting
with regard to measures that increase the likelihood of implementa-
tion. Express provisions requiring random inspections of slaughter-
houses would improve upon this inadequacy. The rules in both
systems are compulsory, but they do not contain recordkeeping
provisions. From an economic efficiency standpoint, the United
States and E.U. may have more incentive to allocate governmental
resources to ensure safe and wholesome beef and beef products than
to tightly monitor humane slaughtering practices. After all, the
slaughtering practices in either system do not impact the quality and
integrity of the beef food supply.
D. Regulation of BSE and Other Contagious Diseases
The next topic of comparison is the regulation of BSE and other
contagious diseases. Both the United States and E.U. have skillfully-
drafted, easy-to-interpret legislation in this area. In the case of the
United States legislation, wide discretion is given to USDA to protect
the meat supply in the United States. CCDA and the BSE control
measures clearly state that cattle produced for human consumption
must be tested for the presence of communicable diseases,477 and
they provide for the seizure, treatment, and destruction of cattle
found to be diseased and unfit for human consumption.47 The
measures authorize USDA to prohibit the importation and exporta-
tion of diseased livestock. The United States policies on BSE signify-
cantly differ from those of E.U. in notable ways.
As regards the E.U. regulation of BSE, detailed rules are
established for the determination of a Member State, third country,
or region's BSE status, with a five category system of country
476. See, e.g., Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1958, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906
(2000); European Convention for the Protection of Animals for Slaughter, 1998 O.J.
(L 137) 27-38.
477. 21 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2000).
478. 7 U.S.C. § 8306(a) (2000).
[VOL. 1:26 9
AMERICAN & E.U. REGULATION OF BEEF INDUSTRY
classification ranging from BSE-free to high incidence of BSE.479
The regulation gives precise information on the measures that must
be taken to ensure that BSE is timely detected and eradicated.
480
Each Member State must carry out a yearly program for monitoring
4811BSE that involves rapid post-mortem screening. The screening is
to be performed on cattle showing signs of any form of disease or
neurological disorder, cattle over thirty months of age, cattle that are
found dead on the farm or during transport, and all animals
slaughtered for human consumption.4 2 Specified risk materials
have been designated under both systems to prevent these animal
parts from introducing BSE into the human food supply. 43 These
examples illustrate the comprehensiveness of the regulations. The
United States has not detected nearly as many positive cases of BSE
as has the E.U., which may explain the reason that there is no
extensive categorization system in the United States.
The likelihood of effective implementation is fairly great in the
United States and in the E.U. because regulations have become
more stringent in order to address the seriousness of the communic-
able diseases, such as BSE, that are currently threatening the cattle
population and the beef supply. In the United States and Europe,
the regulations provide official inspectors and veterinarians with
extensive authority to access production plants and slaughterhouses
at all times of the day and night for random unannounced checks.484
Specific rules governing sampling and testing during the ante-
mortem and post-mortem stages increase the likelihood of effective
implementation of the procedures. Surveillance systems for the
detection of BSE exist in America and Europe, and these systems
have been created to aid implementation of detection and eradica-
tion measures.485
Increased incentive to implement measures to detect and
destroy cattle and beef food products infected with BSE or other
diseases that render the meat dangerous to human health is
479. Council Regulation 999/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 147) at 13-15.
480. Regulation 999/2001, at 1.
481. Regulation 999/2001, art. 6, at 5.
482. Regulation 999/2001, at 16.
483. Regulation 999/2001, at 21; see also FSIS Measures, supra note 1, at 6.
484. See FSIS Measures, supra note 1, at 6; Council Regulation 999/2001, 2001 O.J.
(L 147) at 3.
485. See FSIS Measures, supra note 1, at 1, 3-4; Council Regulation 999/2001, 2001
O.J. (L 147) at 1.
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provided through government indemnity programs in the United
States and E.U. If farmers, handlers, and producers are indemnified
for their losses, they are more likely to destroy cattle and beef that
are found to be infected with diseases that cause them to be unfit for
human consumption. E.U. provides for compulsory reporting and
examination of all cattle that exhibit clinical signs of BSE and all
cattle that test positive for the disease.4"6
The adequacy of consumer protection against BSE and other
diseases is fairly decent in both the Unites States and E.U. Strict
detection and eradication standards have been implemented in both
countries. It is important to note that none of the measures provide
absolute guarantees that no infected beef will enter the food supply.
Samples are taken since it is economically infeasible to individually
test all livestock that are placed on the market. Therefore, not all
beef is tested for BSE and other diseases. However, as a general
matter, the safety and quality of the beef supply is amply protected
by the regulations in both systems.
In the United States and E.U., the law requires immediate
destruction of livestock that test positively for diseases that render
meat unfit for human consumption.4"7 In E.U., Member States must
ensure that no parts of the body of animals being screened for TSE
are used for human food, animal feed, or fertilizers until the labora-
tory examination has been concluded with negative results.488
Similar provisions have been implemented in the United States to
protect consumers.
Since 1989, APHIS has banned the importation of live cattle
and cattle products, such as rendered protein products, from
countries where BSE exists with the intention of protecting American
consumers from BSE exposure. In 2000, APHIS banned imports of
rendered animal protein products from BSE-restricted countries.489
In 1997, FDA prohibited the use of certain mammalian protein in
the manufacture of ruminant animal feed in order to prevent the
spread of BSE to cattle in the United States.4 90  APHIS has
formulated an emergency response plan for utilization if BSE is
486. Council Regulation 999/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 147) at 1.
487. 9 C.F.R. § 53.4 (2005); Council Regulation 999/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 147) at 24.
488. Council Regulation 999/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 147) at 18.
489. See APHIS, USDA, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, at http://www.aphis
.usda.gov/lpa/pubs/fsheetfaq-notice/fs-ahbse.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2005) [here-
inafter APHIS BSE].
490. See FSIS Measures, supra note 1.
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detected in the United States.4 9' These measures represent several
of the numerous steps that the United States has taken to ensure
consumer safety with respect to BSE.
In addition to the above-mentioned classification scheme,
monitoring and screening system, and indemnification programs,
E.U. has also instituted unique provisions to protect its citizens from
BSE. National Reference Laboratories and a Community Labora-
tory have been designated with the aim of ensuring uniformity and
reliability of scientific analysis.492
The regulations regarding BSE and other infectious diseases are
compulsory in the United States and E.U. Regulations in E.U. allow
Member States to undertake voluntary surveillance of TSE in higher
risk animals, such as those originating from countries with indigen-
ous TSE.493 This is an exception, because the relevant BSE and
infectious disease regulations are all compulsory in nature.
The requirements for record retention are equally stringent
under the United States and the E.U. regulations. In particular, all
detected cases of BSE must be recorded and reported to USDA, 9 in
the case of the United States, and to the European Commission,495 in
the case of the E.U. E.U. has defined rules for the reports of TSE.
For instance, the information reported must entail the number, age
distribution, geographical distribution of positive cases of BSE, as
well as the year and month of birth for BSE cases born after the
introduction of a ban on using ruminant protein in animal feed.496
Records of all positive cases in the E.U. must be retained for seven
years.497
E. Inspection Regulations in the United States and E. U.
The final subject is inspection regulations in the United States
and E.U. Regarding the quality of legislative drafting, the regula-
tions in both systems are well written. The rules clearly articulate
inspection requirements and permit very little, if any, room for
differing interpretations. In the United States and E.U., the laws are
491. See APHIS BSE, supra note 489.
492. Council Regulation 999/2001, ann. X, 2001 O.J. (L 147) 34.
493. Regulation 999/2001, ann. III, at 16.
494. See FSIS Measures, supra note 1.
495. Council Regulation 999/2001, ann. IV, 2001 o.J. (L 147) 20.
496. Council Regulation 999/2001, ann. IV, at 20.
497. Council Regulation 999/2001, ann. II, ch. A(d), at 13.
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fairly comprehensive in that they mandate inspections at various
stages of the slaughtering and meat production process.
For example, in the United States FMIA requires the following:
(1) ante-mortem inspections, (2) post-mortem inspections, and (3)
pre-packaging inspections.498 Subsequent inspections are required
before beef and beef products are offered for marketing, and sanita-
tion inspections are required for all slaughtering, canning, packing,
and similar establishments.4 9 FMIA expressly states that inspections
may be carried out randomly and without prior notice. °° Similar
provisions exists in the E.U. inspection regulations.0 '
Concerning the comprehensiveness of the E.U.'s inspection
regulations, Directive 64/433/EEC clearly states the requirements for
inspection at different stages of the meat production process. For
instance, Directive 64/433/EEC mandates ante-mortem and post-
mortem inspections by the official veterinarian.0 The drafting of
this Directive is slightly more specific than its American counterpart.
Directive 64/433/EEC explicitly mandates that meat affected
with certain conditions or derived from certain sources must be
declared unfit for human consumption. °  Specifically, it provides
that meat from animals with such diseases as actinobacillosis, black-
leg, rabies, tetanus, acute lesions of broncho-pneumonia, pleurisy,
peritonitis, arthritis, pericarditis, enteritis, meningo-encephalo-
myelitis must be declared unfit for human consumption. 4 Directive
64/433/EEC also provides that meat must be declared unfit for
consumption that is derived from animals that are stillborn, unborn,
slaughtered too young, and emaciated, to name a few of the
enumerated conditions.0 5
The likelihood of implementation of the inspection regulations
is fair in both systems. Mainly due to economic constraints that
hinder thorough inspection of each slaughterhouse and meat-pro-
cessing plant, derogations occur. However, the inspection regula-
tions of the United States and E.U. have built-in checks to increase
the likelihood of implementation.
498. See supra Section VI.A.
499. 21 U.S.C. § 604 (2000).
500. Id. § 620(f).
501. Commission Decision 98/179, ann. I, 2.1, 1998 O.J. (L 65) at 32 (EC).
502. Council Directive 64/433, 1964J.O. (121) 2012-2032 (EEC).
503. Directive 64/433, at 2012-2032.
504. Directive 64/433, at 2012-2032.
505. Directive 64/433, at 2012-2032.
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For example, there is continuous inspection of slaughterhouses
and meat-processing plants in the United States in order to ensure
compliance with federal regulations.5 °6 In the United States, several
provisions of FMIA are intended to monitor implementation of the
inspection regulations. For instance, the requirements for inspect-
tions at various stages of the meat production process are built-in
checks, which seek to ensure the safety and wholesomeness of the
beef supply through repeat inspections before the meat reaches
supermarkets. In addition, inspectors must prepare official certifi-
cates clearly stating the condition of inspected cattle.5"7 Owners
must obtain health certificates in order to gain clearance for vessels
carrying beef for export from the United States ports to foreign
countries.
5°8
Additional measures are contained in FMLA to verify imple-
menttation of the inspection provisions. USDA must grant
certification to all countries that import carcasses and beef products
into the United States so as to verify that the country employs
reliable analytical methods and comparable standards for detecting
residues in meat. The review of certification applications necessarily
entails the inspection of individual establishments to confirm that
inspection programs in foreign countries comply with United States
standards.0 9
Only designated employees are authorized to remove the
official suspect identification device of animals identified as "U.S.
Suspect" when the animals are released, and the removal must be
reported to the area supervisor.510 This provision is included in
FMIA as another built-in check intended to prevent the release of
animals suspected of harboring diseases that may render them unfit
for human consumption from entering the food supply.
When an animal identified as "U.S. Suspect" is released for any
purpose, the official suspect identification device may be removed
only by a Program employee, who must report the removal to the
area supervisor.51' When a suspect is to be released, the operator of
the official establishment must first obtain permission for the
removal of the animal from the local, state, or federal livestock
506. 21 U.S.C. § 608 (2000).
507. Id. § 617.
508. Id.
509. Id. § 620(f).
510. 9 C.F.R. § 309.2(n) (2005).
511. Id. § 309.2(o).
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sanitary official.51 2 Similarly, the tags for livestock identified as "U.S.
Condemned" must not be removed, and the tag number must be
reported to the veterinarian in charge by the inspector who affixed
the tag and also by the inspector who supervised the disposal of the
carcass.51 All of these provisions are included to increase the
likelihood of implementation.
In E.U., Directive 64/433/EEC has built-in checks to improve the
likelihood of implementation by Member States. For example,
carcasses and beef items must be accompanied during transport by
accompanying commercial documents. 4 These documents are
provided by the dispatching establishment and they must bear the
veterinary approval number of slaughtering or processing plant. 15
A health certificate is required for meat from a slaughterhouse in a
restricted region and meat that is sent from one Member State to
another Member State.516
Directive 64/433/EEC requires the presence of an official
veterinarian at least once a day in slaughterhouses, cutting plants,
and cold stores. 17 In each Member State, a central agency must
collect the results of the official veterinarian's ante-mortem and post-
mortem inspections for diseases transmissible to humans.1 In
addition, Directive 72/462/EEC authorizes on-the-spot inspections by
veterinarians of Member States and the European Commission to
verify whether the third countries that import fresh meat into the
E.U. meet specified standards, and provides that these inspection
costs are to be paid by the European Community.
19
Directive 94/65/EC requires that fresh minced meat that is to be
traded must be transported by an accompanying commercial docu-
ment from the dispatching establishment, and frozen meat must
bear the veterinary approval number of the production facility. 2°
Commission Decision 98/179/EC requires that all Member States
conduct surprise checks to sample for residues and substances that
512. Id. § 309.2(p).
513. Id. § 309.13.
514. Council Directive 64/433, 1964J.O. (121) 2012-2032 (EEC).
515. Directive 64/433, at 2012-2032.
516. Directive 64/433, at 2012-2032.
517. Directive 64/433, at 2012-2032.
518. Directive 64/433, at 2012-2032.
519. Council Directive 72/462, art. 5, 1972 O.J. (L 302) 28 (EEC).
520. Council Directive 94/65, 1994 O.J. (L 368) 10-31 (EC).
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are illegally administered to cattle.52' These checks must be random
and unforeseen, and they must be performed at intervals throughout
the year to test for substances that are only administered
seasonally. 22  These provisions are included to increase the
likelihood of implementation of the inspection regulations.
In the United States and E.U. the inspection regulations are
equally adequate with respect to consumer protection provisions. In
both systems, the requirements for inspection at various phases in
the meat production process are included in order to ensure that
safe and wholesome beef enters the food supply. Moreover, immedi-
ate destruction and disposal of animals, carcasses, and meat that is
found to be unfit for human consumption is required in the United
States and E.U.523 Animals that have been condemned must be
isolated and slaughtered separately in order to avoid contamination
of healthy animals intended to be slaughtered for human consump-
tion. 24
Both the United States and E.U. inspection regulations include
science-based quality control programs that strengthen consumer
protection measures. Particularly, the United States' Final provide
that all slaughter and processing plants must adopt a system of
HACCP process controls to prevent food safety hazards, conduct
microbial tests for E. Coli to ensure that factory control systems are
effectively preventing fecal contamination, meet pathogen reduction
performance standards established by FSIS for raw meats, and adopt
and implement a written sanitation standard operating procedure.525
Similarly, the E.U.'s EFSA evaluates the risk factors for specific
foods, monitors specific risk factors and diseases for specific foods to
provide scientific opinions on measures for controlling these risk
factors and diseases, composes guidelines for future assessment of
food-related health claims, and apply and promote harmonized
scientific approaches for hazard and risk assessment of food and
feed.
526
521. Commission Decision 98/179, 1998 O.J. (L 65) 31-34 (EEC).
522. Decision 98/179, at 31-34 (EC).
523. 9 C.F.R. § 53.2 (2004); Council Regulation 999/2001, art. 13(1)(a)-(c), 2001
O.J. (L 147) 1, 7-8.
524. 21 U.S.C. § 604 (2000); Council Regulation 999/2001, art. 13(1)(a)-(c), at 7-8.
525. See FSRIO, supra note 438.
526. EFSA, Moving Towards Full Strength (2005), at http://www.efsa.eu.int/about_
efsa/ catindexen.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2006).
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Considering the large volume of cattle and beef products that
enter and exit meat processing plants in the United States and the
E.U., it is impossible for each animal or product to be tested before
it is declared fit for consumption. For instance, in the United States
the sampling frequency requirement for official slaughtering
establishments testing cattle for E. coli is one test per 300 carcasses,
with a minimum requirement of one sample each week.5" 7 Clearly,
economic limitations prevent the United States and E.U. from
testing each cattle or beef article that is produced. Despite reason-
able economic justifications, there is still a small risk that contam-
inated meat will not be detected under these rules.
The E.U. regulations that aim to ensure consumer safety in
Directive 94/65/EEC require freezing and chilling meat in order to
avoid contamination with pathogens and microbes that would render
the meat dangerous to human health. For example, fresh minced
meat must be chilled and cooled to an internal temperature below
+2°C in the shortest time possible, and deep frozen minced meat
must be deep frozen and cooled to an internal temperature below -
18°C in the shortest time possible.12 Similar provisions are likely to
be present in the state and local inspection regulations in the United
States.
The inspection regulations in the United States and E.U. are of
a compulsory nature. For live cattle, beef, and beef food products to
be placed on the market, they must be inspected in order to ensure
that they are safe and disease-free. Therefore, mandatory imple-
mentation of the rules is needed to protect American and European
consumers.
Both the United States and E.U. have recordkeeping require-
ments that allow them to trace cattle, from which beef food products
are derived, back to the herd in case contagious diseases or other
conditions are found upon inspection.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Even though their approaches to regulation of the beef industry
differ in several ways, both the United States and E.U. have
established legislation and implementing regulations that are
generally effective in this area. This article has sketched an
527, 9 C.F.R. § 310.25 (2005).
528. Council Directive 94/65, art. 3, 1994 O.J. (L 368) 10-31 (EC).
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overview of the requirements for animal drugs, organic livestock,
humane slaughter methods, BSE and other contagious diseases, and
inspection of beef production facilities in both legal systems. A brief
comparison of the American and E.U. regulatory systems examined
the quality of legislative drafting, the probability of implementation,
the adequacy of consumer protections, the voluntary or compulsory
nature, and the requirement of recordkeeping. The analysis
revealed that the regulations in each system seek to achieve fairly
similar ends, though sometimes through different means.

THE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE'S LACK OF
STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND INSPECTION FOR
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH HACCP REGULATIONS
Dennis R. Johnson &Jolyda 0. Swaim*
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 25, 1996, the United States Department of Agriculture's
Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)' published a massive set of
regulations designed to take meat and poultry inspection into the
next century. Commonly referred to as the "Mega-Reg," these rules
were intended to move inspection away from the organoleptic
examination of animals, products, and facilities that had been the
procedure since the 1906 Meat Inspection Act2 to an inspection
system focused on the current public health risk-microbial
* Dennis R. Johnson is a principal at Olsson, Frank and Weeda, P.C. in
Washington, D.C., where he specializes in FDA enforcement issues. He was a Food
and Drug Law Institute Fellow at George Washington University's National Law
Center in 1982, where he earned his LL.M. degree. Since that time Mr. Johnson
has been very active in lobbying the FDA and has published other articles on
HACCP and other FDA enforcement issues.
Jolyda 0. Swaim is an associate at Olsson, Frank and Weeda, P.C. in
Washington, D.C., where she specializes in food safety law and regulation
representing large and small meat and poultry companies before the United States
Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service. She became an
attorney after spending years in the food industry-her last position as Corporate
Food Safety Director for Sara Lee Foods. She has "hands on" experience in the
areas of HACCP, sanitation, quality assurance, and production as it relates to the
food industry. Ms. Swaim graduated Cum Laude from Thomas M. Cooley Law
School in 2004.
1. FSIS is the agency within the Department of Agriculture authorized to
implement and to enforce the inspection acts. Even though the statutes themselves
refer to the Secretary of Agriculture, for ease, this article will only refer to FSIS. 9
C.F.R. § 300.2; see also FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICES (FSIS), About FSIS, at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/About FSIS/index.asp (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
2. 21 U.S.C. § 601 (2004).
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contamination-Listeria monocytogenes,3 Salmonella,4  and E. coli
0157:H7.'
In conjunction with the change in inspection regulations, a
change has been made in enforcement. If an inspected
establishment did not modify its procedures to comply with the new
rules, or was unable or unwilling to comply with the new regulatory
requirements, FSIS would take administrative action to "suspend"
inspectors at the establishment and if the establishment still could
not comply, FSIS would move, in an administrative proceeding, to
withdraw inspection. Since the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA)
and the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA)6 require inspection
for the processing of meat and poultry products, suspension or
withdrawal of inspection has the practical effect of closing a plant.
Since the implementation of the Mega-Reg, the agency has had
mixed success with its new enforcement procedures. Although most
establishments have chosen to work with FSIS to modify their
procedures to allay any concerns the agency had, on a few occasions,
no compromise was reached. In these cases, the establishment filed
suit in federal district court challenging the agency's authority to
remove inspectors for failure to comply with the Mega-Reg. In the
three cases where the agency's authority was challenged, the
establishment was successful and inspection was restored.7
The agency's lack of success has raised a question of whether
FSIS indeed has the enforcement authority it claims or whether the
agency merely failed to articulate the basis sufficiently in these cases.
Based on a review of the enabling statutes and past cases, it would
appear FSIS does have authority to suspend inspection but only in
certain well-defined circumstances. The inspection acts simply are
not sufficient to provide an enforcement basis for any and all non-
compliances with the Mega-Reg. Indeed, FSIS can suspend
inspection only if there are insanitary conditions at the facility, and
3. CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION (CFSAN), Foodborne
Pathogenic Microorganisms and Natural Toxins Handbook, available at http://vm.cfsan
.fda .gov/ -mow/chap6.html.
4. DIVISION OF BACTERIAL & MYCOTIC DISEASE, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTION (CDC), Disease Information: Salmonellosis, at http://www.cdc.gov/
ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/salmonellosis_g,htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2005).
5. DIVISION OF BACTERIAL AND MYCOTIC DISEASES, CDC, Disease Information:
Escherichia coli 0157:H7, at http:/Aww.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/
escherichiacoli g.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2005),
6. 21 U.S.C. § 451 (1999).
7. See infra Section V.
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those conditions have caused or could reasonably cause adulteration
of any product. Without such showing, the government simply
cannot suspend inspection.
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. The Statutory Language
In cases of statutory authority, it is best to begin with the plain
language of the authorizing legislation.' The only section which
speaks of suspension that could be relevant to this inquiry is Section
8 of FMIA.9 This section provides, in relevant part, "where the
sanitary conditions of any such establishment are such that the meat
or meat food products are rendered adulterated, [FSIS] shall refuse
to allow said meat or meat food products to be labeled, marked,
stamped, or tagged as 'inspected and passed."'10 Under the plain
language of this provision, FSIS must have a basis to conclude that
the insanitary conditions result in the products being "rendered
adulterated" to impose suspension."
FMIA also contains a section specifying what constitutes
adulteration. In the context of the Mega-Reg, FSIS has relied on the
adulteration provision dealing with insanitary conditions, which
provides that a food may be adulterated "[i]f it has been prepared,
8. See generally Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
9. 21 U.S.C. § 608 (1999). The inspection acts also permit FSIS to refuse or
withdraw inspection if:
* The establishment refused to destroy a condemned carcass, 21 U.S.C.
§ 604 (2004) (meat);
* The establishment refused to destroy condemned meat or meat food
product, 21 U.S.C. § 606 (2004) (meat);
o The establishment (or a responsibly connected individual) had been
convicted of certain crimes, 21 U.S.C. §§ 467 (1999) (poultry), 671
(2004) (meat); and
" A livestock slaughter facility is operating in violation of the Humane
Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 (1999).
10. Section 8 of FMIA, 21 U.S.C. § 608 (1999).
11. The actual language of FMIA does not technically provide for suspension of
inspection or the removal of federal inspectors. It only authorizes the refusal to
mark products "inspected and passed." The inspector must remain in the facility.
It is PPIA which speaks of "refusing inspection." 21 U.S.C. § 456(b) (2004).
However, for the purposes of this article, we will treat the refusal to mark products
the same as a suspension where the inspector actually leaves the facility.
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packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have
become contaminated with filth or whereby it may have been
rendered injurious to health."12  It would seem that the plain
language authorizes FSIS to refuse to mark products or, in effect,
suspend inspection if the cleanliness of the facility is so far below
standards that the product may be implicated. There was no
indication that a failure to comply with a Hazard Analysis Critical
Control Point (HACCP)13 regulation would be contemplated by the
language, nor was it contemplated by the legislative history.
B. Legislative History
The first mandatory federal meat inspection act is almost 100
years old. Since the first enactment, one major, permanent change
occurred in 1967. Amendments in 1986 would have resulted in
substantial changes had the provisions not expired in 1992. For
poultry, the inspection act developed separately, becoming a manda-
tory inspection program in 1957,14 with its one major revision
occurring in 1968, which made PPIA more consistent with the
changes to FMIA the previous year.
15
1. 1906 Meat Inspection Act
The first mandatory federal meat inspection program had its
genesis in fiction, specifically, The Jungle by Upton Sinclair. 6 The
book was written as an expos6 of working conditions in the cities;
only twelve pages of the book actually described the filth and animal
disease at slaughterhouses. However, the description of the
insanitary conditions and practices were enough to cause a public
outcry for change. The net result was the creation of a mandatory
federal meat inspection program as part of the Agricultural
Appropriations Act of 1906.1" The purpose of the program was the
"restoration of public confidence, not only in our own country but in
12. Section 8 of FMIA, 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(4). The identical language appears in
Section 4 (g)(4 ) PPIA, 21 U.S.C. § 4 53(g)(4 ) (1999).
13. 9 C.F.R. § 417.1 (2004).
14. 21 U.S.C. § 601 (2004).
15. Id.; Wholesome Meat Act, Pub. L. No. 90-201, 81 Stat. 584 (1967).
16. UPTON SINCLAIR, THEJUNGLE (Penguin Books 1985).
17. Agricultural Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 382, 34 Stat. 669 (1906) ch. 3913;
REP. 4935, 59th Cong. 1st Sess. (1906).
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other countries, in the purity and wholesomeness of American meat
and meat products."'"
The essence of the 1906 program has been virtually unchanged.
All slaughtering and processing of meat for interstate or foreign
commerce must be conducted under inspection by federal govern-
ment officials. Indeed, no product may enter commerce unless it
has been so inspected. Products found to be wholesome will be
labeled "inspected and passed," while products found unwholesome
shall be condemned and destroyed under the supervision of the
inspector. 9
The main focus of the 1906 Act was (and remains) the product
itself and the condition of the facility. In order for a product to
enter commerce, it cannot be "unsound, unhealthful, unwholesome,
or otherwise unfit. '20 As to facilities, there was no provision in the
1906 Act for the government to refuse to provide inspection at any
establishment. In order that sanitation be addressed, the Act simply
prohibited products to be marked "inspected and passed" if pro-
duced under insanitary conditions. According to the accompanying
congressional report, this provision "provides for a strict sanitary
inspection of all establishments, under the provisions of this law and
under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of
Agriculture."'" Interestingly, the original act did not contain any




In 1907, Congress codified the 1906 appropriations language
into the Meat Inspection Act. For the next sixty years, there were
no changes in terms of how meat was inspected under the law. Yet,
there were two developments in other acts which would have
implications for meat inspection.
The first development involved the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA).2 4 A predecessor statute, the Pure Food and
18. REP. 4935, 59th Cong. 1st Sess. (1906) at 7.
19. 21 U.S.C. § 607 (1999).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 602 (2004).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Meat Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 59-242, § 34 Stat. 1262 (1907).
24. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2004).
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Drugs Act, was adopted in 1906 along with the Meat Inspection Act.
However, the earlier statute did not address insanitary conditions
with regard to food production or distribution. To remedy that
deficiency, a definition of "adulteration" was introduced. A product
may be adulterated, and hence illegal, "if it has been prepared,
packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have
become contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have been
rendered injurious to health." 5 According to the legislative history
of this provision, the purpose of such a definition was to "require the
observance of a reasonably decent standard of cleanliness in handling
food products."26 This provision would generate numerous cases on
what constitutes "insanitary conditions." These cases would become
relevant to meat and poultry inspection when, in 1967 and 1968,
Congress adopted the identical definitions for the inspection acts.
The second development was the adoption of a mandatory
inspection program for poultry in 1957.28 Until that time, poultry
was primarily a local operation with consumers selecting live birds
which would be custom-slaughtered at the retail location. Any
company desiring federal inspection could request such service, but
it was a voluntary program run by a different division of the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA).29  However, as poultry
operations became less local, Congress enacted PPIA in 1957.3o
Although modeled after the Meat Inspection Act, the provisions
have never been completely consistent. For example, while manda-
tory post-mortem inspection of carcasses is required by both the
meat and poultry inspection acts, inspection of further poultry
processing is not mandated by the statute."' In the context of the
agency's authority with regard to sanitary conditions, PPIA provided
authority to "refuse to render inspection at any establishment whose
premises, facilities, or equipment, or the operation thereof, fail to"
25. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(4) (1999).
26. S. 2800, 73rd Cong. (1934) (emphasis added).
27. In adopting this language for the Meat Inspect Act, Congress intended that
"essentially the same criteria be applied in determining wholesomeness .... S.
REP. No. 90-799, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2188, 2203.
28. Poultry Products Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 85-172, 71 Stat. 441 (1957).
29. The Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, 7 U.S.C. § 1622(h) (2004).
30. Poultry Products Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 85-172, 71 Stat. 441 (1957).
31. 21 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2004).
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comply with the sanitary practices required by regulations of the
Secretary. 2
3. 1967-1968
In 1967, Congress amended the Meat Inspection Act. The
previous act only addressed products moving in interstate or foreign
commerce. Meat produced and sold solely within a state was not
covered by the mandatory federal program. To ensure national
uniformity, Congress enacted the Wholesome Meat Act 33 mandating
that meat in intrastate commerce must be produced under a state
inspection program at least equal to the federal program or the
facility must be inspected by the federal government. The Whole-
some Meat Act, when combined with the Meat Inspection Act,
became FMIA.34
In addition to addressing intrastate issues, Congress made other
revisions. First, it expressly specified certain instances when FSIS
could suspend or withdraw inspection.35  Second, it added a
definitional section which included definitions of adulteration,
including the provision related to insanitary conditions. Interesting-
ly, Congress did not amend the provision dealing with refusal to
mark products when produced under insanitary conditions; it
maintained the existing version which was inconsistent with the
poultry act.
In 1968, Congress adopted the Wholesome Poultry Act,36 which
made the same changes regarding the authority to suspend or
withdraw inspection and the definition of adulteration. Congress
32. Section 6 of the 1957 Act (currently codified at 21 U.S.C. § 456).
33. Wholesome Meat Act, Pub. L. No. 90-201, 81 Stat. 584 (1967).
34. Wholesome Meat Act, Pub. L. No. 90-201, 81 Stat. 584 (1967).
35. 21 U.S.C. § 608 (1999). The inspection acts also permit FSIS to refuse or
withdraw inspection if:
" The establishment refused to destroy a condemned carcass, 21 U.S.C.
§ 604 (2004) (meat);
" The establishment refused to destroy condemned meat or meat food
product, 21 U.S.C. § 606 (2004) (meat);
" The establishment (or a responsibly connected individual) had been
convicted of certain crimes, 21 U.S.C. §§ 467 (1999) (poultry), 671
(2004) (meat); and
" A livestock slaughter facility is operating in violation of the Humane
Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 (1999).
36. Wholesome Poultry Products Act, Pub. L. No. 90-492, 82 Stat. 791 (1968).
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again left untouched the provision dealing with refusal to provide
inspection for insanitary conditions.
4. 1986 Processed Products Inspection Improvement Act
In 1986, Congress amended FMIA to provide the government
with more discretion in allocating resources for inspection of
processed products.3 7 FMIA permitted FSIS to move away from less
than daily inspection of processing operations.3' Given the con-
troversy surrounding this change, the act would expire in six years
absent Congressional re-authorization, which it did on November
11, 1992.
As part of the package to permit less continuous inspection, a
new enforcement authority was added to Section 401 of FMIA.
Under this section, FSIS could suspend and/or withdraw inspection
for the repeated failure of an establishment to comply with agency
regulations if such non-compliance posed a direct and substantial
threat to public health. 9  However, in order to exercise this
authority, FSIS had to follow very precise procedural requirements.
In the conference report accompanying the legislation, Congress
made clear that the power to suspend inspection was an
"extraordinary power" and could only be exercised in extreme cases
and then only with full due process protections. 40  For reasons
unknown, though likely due to the procedural requirements, FSIS
never once sought to exercise this authority.
C. Recap of the Statutory Precedents
Several observations can be made regarding the statutory
provisions and legislative history summarized above. First, the plain
language does not easily support an expansion of the authority
regarding insanitary conditions as it relates to processing issues, such
as HACCP. The initial inspection act was designed to address the
sanitary condition of the facilities as reported in The Jungle, which
focused on the cleanliness of the facility (or lack thereof). Second,
the limited discussion of what constitutes "insanitary conditions"
37. Future Trading Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-641, 100 Stat. 3556 (1986).
38. PPIA already permitted such discretion, and hence was not part of the 1986
Amendments. 21 U.S.C. § 455(b).
39. Future Trading Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-641, 100 Stat. 3556 (1986).
40. H. CONF. REP. 99-995 at 37 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6066, 6083.
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would seem to imply that Congress intended the term be interpreted
according to its common meaning of "cleanliness." Third, and most
importantly, Congress was careful to restrict the authority to suspend
operations to those precise situations specified in the statutes.
4'
No matter how a court wishes to interpret the statutory
authority, it is undeniable that for FSIS to suspend inspections,
insanitary conditions must be demonstrated at the facility. This, in
turn, raises the issue of what constitutes "insanitary conditions."
III. INSANITARY CONDITIONS
In adopting the provisions dealing with sanitation, Congress did
not define what constitutes "insanitary conditions." However, in
practice, the government focused on the physical conditions of the
facility, at least initially. For example, in an old FSIS Directive just
recently revoked, FSIS defined sanitation by the performance
standard of: "look clean, feel clean and smell clean."
4
1
Not surprisingly, in all but one of the cases brought under the
insanitary conditions provision where the government was successful,
there was evidence of "visual" insanitary conditions at the facility.
43
41. See supra Sections II.A. & B.
42. FSIS Directive 11,000.1, § 4.2.1.2 (Jan. 25, 2000) (emphasis in original).
43. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 671 (1975) (noting visual evidence of
rodent activity); United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. 86 (1964)
(reflecting food in warehouse visually accessible to rodents, birds and insects);
United States v. King's Trading, Inc., 724 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1983) (showing visual
evidence of rodent activity); United States v. H.B. Gregory, 502 F.2d 700, 704-05
(7th Cir. 1974) (showing visual evidence of rodent activity); United States v. Cassaro,
Inc., 443 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1971) (demonstrating visual evidence of insect
infestation); United States v. Hammond Milling Co., 413 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1969)
(finding visual evidence of rodent activity); International Exterminator, 294 F.2d
270 (5th Cir. 1961) (placing poisonous liquid in close proximity to foods); Berger v.
United States, 200 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir. 1952) (reflecting visual evidence of
rodent and bird activity, and insect infestation); Triangle Candy Co. v. United
States, 144 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1944) (noting visual evidence of rodent activity and
insect infestation); United States v. Gel Spices Co., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1205
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (showing visual evidence of rodent activity and insect infestation);
G. A. Portello & Co. v. Butz, 345 F. Supp. 1204 (D.C. 1972) (reflecting visual
evidence of physical contamination of meat containers); United States v. 1200 Cans,
339 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (finding various visual insanitary conditions,
including failure to wash and sanitize eggs prior to breaking); United States v. 44
Cases, Etc., 101 F. Supp 658 (E.D. Ill. 1951) (showing visual evidence of insect
infestation and physical contamination); United States v. Roma Macaroni Factory,
75 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. Cal. 1947) (noting visual evidence of rodent activity); United
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The seminal case where the government failed to establish physical
contamination and, therefore, lost was United States v. General Foods
Corp.44  In that case, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
sought to establish insanitary conditions through the use of labora-
tory analysis of mold.4' The court rejected the FDA position noting
that the laboratory analysis of the mold on equipment was not
determinative, in part, because there was no visual evidence of build
up or "slime" on the equipment.46 Moreover, the court noted that
the mold could not be eliminated through normal good
manufacturing practices.47
Based upon the loss in General Foods, FDA adopted a policy that
it would not initiate any insanitary conditions cases based solely on
bacteriological analysis.4' Although FDA reserved the right to bring
actions based upon pathogens, in the years that followed, FDA
always included some evidence of visual contamination even when
the case was primarily brought due to pathogenic contamination.49
In only one case has the government been successful in the
absence of any visual contamination-United States v. Nova Scotia
Foods Products Corp.50 However, that case did not involve a regulatory
action against a product, rather it was brought by FDA to compel a
smoked fish processor comply with the FDA's regulation regarding
time-temperature-salinity (T-T-S) requirements for processing of
smoked fish."
States v. Lazere, 56 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Iowa 1944) (demonstrating visual evidence
of rodent activity and insect infestation).
44. 446 F. Supp. 740, 744 (N.D.N.Y.), affd 591 F.2d 1332 (2d Cir. 1978).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 752.
47. Id. at 754.
48. RICHARD A. MERRILL AND PETER BARTON HUTrr, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 27 (The
Foundation Press, Inc. 1980).
49. Continental Seafood, Inc. v. Schweiker, 674 F.2d 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (showing
visual evidence of insanitary conditions supporting finding of Salmonella in shrimp);
United States v. Blue Ribbon Smoked Fish, Inc. et al., 179 F. Supp. 30 (E.D.N.Y.
2001) (reflecting visual evidence of insanitary conditions supporting a finding of
Listeria monocytogenes in fish); United States v. Union Cheese, 902 F. Supp 778, 786
(N.D. Ohio 1995) (demonstrating visual evidence of insanitary conditions
supporting a finding of Listeria monocytogenes in cheese); United States v. 1200 Cans,
339 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (finding visual evidence of insanitary conditions
supporting finding of Salmonella in eggs).
50. 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
51. Id. at 242-43.
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Unlike the inspection acts, which grant FSIS the authority to
establish not only sanitary requirements but processing requirements
as well, FDCA does not grant FDA such authority.52 Hence, to justify
these types of regulations, FDA had to rely on the adulteration pro-
visions. In the case of the T-T-S regulation, FDA used the adultera-
tion provision dealing with insanitary conditions." In Nova Scotia,
the district court granted the FDA's request for an injunction,54 and
the processor appealed.5
For the purposes of the appeal, it was agreed by both parties
that there were no physical "insanitary conditions" in the plant. 6
Hence, the straightforward legal issue was whether FDA could
establish precise processing requirements under the statutory
provision dealing with insanitary conditions. The Second Circuit
held that FDA did have this authority.57 Although the court ruled in
the FDA's favor, the opinion evidences the court's recognition that it
was stretching the language to support its conclusion that FDA needs
such authority. For example, the court admitted "that on a first
reading the language of the subsection appears to cover only
'insanitary conditions,' 'whereby it [the food] may have been
rendered injurious to health' . . . and a plausible argument can be
made that the references are to insanitary conditions in the plant
itself . . .""
To justify its expansion beyond the plain language, the court
relied on a series of FDA cases which held that FDCA should be read
broadly to protect the public health.59 The court also relied on the
absence of any Congressional intent to limit FDA's authority, stating
that "in the absence of compelling evidence that such was Congress'
intention, [the court is] unwilling to prohibit administrative action
52. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2004).
53. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(4).
54. 417 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
55. Id.
56. Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 243.
57. Id. at 247.
58. Id. at 245 (emphasis in original). It should be noted that this decision was
rendered before Chevron, 467 U.S. 837. It is questionable whether under the
Chevron analysis the court could have ignored the plain language of the statute.
59. Id. at 246 (and cases cited therein).
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imperative for the achievement of an agency's ultimate purposes.""
Indeed, it found no evidence of Congressional intent on this issue.6 '
Beyond its statutory construction, the court marshaled other
practical arguments to support its novel interpretation.2 First, it
commented that "no lawyer at the knowledgeable Food and Drug
bar ever raised the question . . . or even hinted at" the lack of
statutory authority. Second, the court noted that Department of
Agriculture had such authority under the authority to establish
sanitary conditions.65 Under FMIA, similar standards have been
established under Section 608 (sanitary conditions).' Third, a
contrary holding would have implications far beyond the present
case, since it would invalidate other similar FDA regulations.
In short, the court in Nova Scotia wrote a result-oriented opinion
to justify its decision that FDA should have the authority to establish
processing requirements for public safety and enjoin processors who
refused to follow such regulations. As an interesting endnote,
however, the court did invalidate the T-T-S rule on procedural
grounds.65
IV. THE MEGA-REG
For over thirty years, there had been calls to take inspection into
the modern age. When first enacted in 1906, the focus was placed
upon animal diseases and insanitary conditions. The changes to
FMIA in 196766 and the adoption of PPIA67 still retained the focus
on organoleptic examinations.
60. Id. (quoting In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 780 (1968)).
61. Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d 240, 248. Consistent with the notion that the court
recognized it was proceeding beyond the plain language, it commented that "We
believe.., that it would be in the public interest for Congress to consider" expressly
addressing the issue of processing standards.
62. Id.
63. It is this reference that FSIS has relied upon to interpret Section 8 of
FMIA-a statement that was, at most dicta. Id.
64. Id.
65. Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 248.
66. 21 U.S.C. § 601 (2004).
67. 21 U.S.C. § 451 (1999).
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A. HACCP in General
In 1983, FSIS asked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)6"
to evaluate the inspection system and recommend changes to
enhance public health protection. In 1985, NAS issued a report,
"Meat and Poultry Inspection: The Scientific Basis of the Nation's
Program."69 The report identified microbial contamination as the
number one public health issue7-an issue with which the 1906
inspection system could not cope. To address pathogens, NAS
recommended that FSIS require all establishments to adopt and to
implement HACCP systems.7 This recommendation was reiterated
in two subsequent NAS studies: "Poultry Inspection: The Basis for a
Risk Assessment Approach"72 and "Cattle Inspection: Committee on
Evaluation of USDA Streamlined Inspection System for Cattle (SIS-
C)."
73
NAS was not alone in calling for change; the Government
Accounting Office (GAO) issued several reports, culminating in a
1994 report entitled "Food Safety: Risk-Based Inspections and
Microbial Monitoring Needed for Meat and Poultry, '74 which
recommended the adoption of HACCP systems at meat and poultry
establishments. Industry also called for adoption of HACCP systems
as did the government's premier advisory body, the National
Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods
(NACMCF).75 Indeed, NACMCF was the primary organization in
refining and disseminating HACCP.
68. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, About NAS, at http://www.nasonline.org/
site/PageServer?pagename-=ABOUTmainpage (last visited Sept. 18, 2005).
69. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Meat and Poultry Inspection: The Scientific
Basis of the Nation's Program (1985).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Poultry Inspection: The Basis for a Risk
Assessment Approach (1987).
73. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Cattle Inspection: Committee on Evaluation
of USDA Streamlined Inspection System for Cattle (1990).
74. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Food Safety: Risk Based Inspections and
Microbial Monitoring Needed for Meat and Poultry (1994).
75. Id.
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Initially developed to provide safe food for the space program
by Pillsbury,76 HACCP is a food safety approach which seeks to
prevent problems in processing rather than reacting to problems in
the finished product.77 An establishment identifies potential sources
of food safety hazards with regard to each of its processes and
products.78 It then assesses whether those hazards pose a true risk in
its operations-in other words, whether a hazard is reasonably likely
to occur in absence of control.79 The establishment also identifies
the steps that can prevent, eliminate, or reduce the hazard to
acceptable levels.80 Having identified the risk and the step to
eliminate the risk, the establishment completes the analysis by
identifying those critical controls which can be employed in the
process and then monitors those controls." For example, raw meat
may contain pathogens. It is reasonably likely that these pathogens
would remain in ready-to-eat (RTE) products unless eliminated by a
step in the process. Hence, in converting raw meat to RTE, the
establishment must include a step to eliminate this hazard. This
hazard elimination by cooking the meat at a particular time and
temperature is sufficient to destroy the pathogens. To ensure safety,
the establishment must only monitor the time and temperature of
cooking to ensure the product has received a sufficient lethality. All
of the analysis and the monitoring is documented so that with a
review of the records, the processor can ensure the safety of the food
so there would be no need to test every product for a pathogen.
B. FSIS's Initial Reluctance to Adopt HACCP Regulations
Notwithstanding the near universal support for HACCP by
scientists and industry, FSIS did not move rapidly towards adoption.
This reluctance was likely due to the fundamental change in
76. See Delilah Dill Schuller, Comment, Pathogen Reduction Through "HACCP"
Systems: Is Overhaul of the Meat Inspection System All It's Cut Out To Be?, 8 S.J. AGRIc. L.
REV. 77, 85 (1998).
77. See FEDERAL DRUG ADMINISTRATION, HACCP: A State of the Art Approach to Food
Safety (Oct. 2001).
78. See FEDERAL DRUG ADMINISTRATION & UNITED STATES DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE,
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMirEE ON MICROBIOLOGICAL CRITERIA FOR FOODS, HACCP
&Application Guidelines, Aug. 14, 1997, available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-comnx/
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approach, which would be required to transition from an active
organoleptic inspection system to a HACCP system where FSIS
inspectors basically review records and monitor activities.
The unique feature of the inspection acts is that they mandate
the continuous presence of a government inspector in the plant.8 2
This inspector, in theory, must make an affirmative decision
regarding each and every product as to whether or not it is
adulterated. If he or she has any questions or concerns, such
concerns must be addressed or the product will be retained or the
equipment and facilities rejected for use."3 As a result of this
authority, FSIS adopted approval requirements for all aspects of a
plant's operations including that the facility and equipment must be
approved prior to use, that the maximum line speeds for slaughter
operations must follow regulations, and that the product processing
and labeling must be approved prior to use.8 4 This system was
known as "command and control," which is an appropriate name
because virtually all aspects of a plant's operations were dictated by
FSIS."5
HACCP does not work that way. It is a plant's responsibility to
design its system based upon its unique facility and processes to
monitor its operations and document compliance with its program,
and to ensure no unsafe product enters commerce. 6 Placing the
responsibility on the plant leaves the FSIS inspector with little to do.
NACMCF published a report to address the issue of a regulator's
responsibilities in a HACCP environment. That report, "The Role
of Regulatory Agencies and Industry in HACCP,"' 7 recommended
that FSIS serve as a third-party monitor or auditor.88 The agency
could review the program and the records, conduct some limited
verification tasks, but if the plant was following a valid program, the
agency would be "hands off."89
The role of FSIS in HACCP effectively shifted its function from
an active role to a more passive one. Not surprisingly, many of the
in-plant inspectors opposed the change, as did many others in the




86. 9 C.F.R. § 417.2 (2004).
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agency. Moreover, many consumer activists were not enthusiastic
with what was perceived as handing over the food safety to industry
while "tying the hands" of the in-plant inspector.
C. Proposed Mega-Reg
It took a tragedy, the E. coli 0157:H7 outbreak in the Pacific
Northwest United States, to energize the government into action. In
late 1992 through early 1993, dozens of people became ill and
several died (primarily small children) due to the contamination of
the ground beef used by a quick service restaurant. The incoming
Clinton Administration recognized the need for action and
responded to consumer concerns by focusing upon the one pro-
cedure which could address microbial contamination-HACCP. 9
In 1995, USDA issued a proposed regulation which would
mandate that all establishments develop and implement HACCP
plans.91 However, the following proposed regulations addressed
more than just mandatory HACCP:
" To address consumer activist concerns, it required establish-
ments producing fresh products to test those products for
Salmonella and measure their effectiveness against a national
standard.92 The regulation called for the establishment to take
additional actions if it failed the standard. The question of
whether FSIS would take regulatory action in the event of a
failure was not addressed.
* To continue with its "command and control" style, it proposed
mandating that all establishments have at least one anti-
microbial treatment at slaughter9" and specified cooling require-
ments for red meat.94
90. See Kerri E. Machado, Comment, Unfit for Human Consumption: Why American
Beef Is Making Us Sick, 13 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 801 (2003).
91. Pathogen Reduction; Hazardous Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP), 60
Fed. Reg. 6774 (Feb. 3, 1995).
92. Proposed 9 C.F.R. § 310.25 (2004) (meat); proposed 9 C.F.R. § 381.79 (2004)
(poultry).
93. Proposed 9 C.F.R. § 310.25 (2004) (meat); proposed 9 C.F.R. § 381.69 (2004)
(poultry).
94. Proposed 9 C.F.R. § 318.25 (2001); proposed 9 C.F.R. § 381.66 (2001)
(poultry). Poultry already had such requirements.
[VOL. 1:337
FSIS & FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH HACCP
To ensure that establishments were accountable, FSIS asserted
the authority to suspend inspection at a facility which failed to
adopt a HACCP plan or if the agency determined the plan was
"invalid." The suspension would take effect immediately and
would remain until the establishment submitted an acceptable,
modified HACCP plan. If the invalidity involved an adulterated
product, the establishment would submit a testing plan to verify
the effectiveness of the modification.95
The proposal also would require all establishments to have a
sanitation standard operating procedure (SSOP). 96 Interestingly, the
proposal did not call for suspending inspection for SSOP non-
compliance. The inspector would merely apply a "U.S. Rejected"
tag to any equipment or room if there was an SSOP failure, and the
tag would remain until there was a reinspection by the inspector,
and the conditions were found acceptable.97 The name Mega-Reg
was coined as to describe the breadth of the regulation.
Given the magnitude of the changes, especially in terms of how
USDA would inspect meat and poultry establishments in the future,
FSIS held a variety of public meetings, both on the rule in general
and on particular aspects, such as testing. At one of the general
meetings, the entire "knowledgeable" FSIS bar challenged the
statutory authority of FSIS to suspend inspection for any reason
other than the finding of insanitary conditions at the facility.
Ironically, FSIS did not call for suspension for insanitary conditions
in the proposal rather the rejection of equipment or retention of
product.
D. Final Mega Reg
On July 25, 1996, FSIS published the final Mega-Reg.9" In
some regards, it was similar to the proposal in terms of mandating
HACCP and SSOPs. Yet, in regards to testing, it was substantially
changed. Moreover, the "command and control" components
dealing with anti-microbial treatments and cooling requirements for
red meat were dropped entirely.
95. Proposed 9 C.F.R. § 326.7 (1996) (meat).
96. 9 C.F.R. § 416.12 (2001).
97. Proposed 9 C.F.R. § 308.3 (2000) (meat).
98. 9 C.F.R. pt. 416 (2001).
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The four principal components of the final rule consisted of the
following:
* All establishments must develop and maintain written SSOPs,
designed to prevent direct product contamination.99 In the
preamble to the final regulation, USDA noted that SSOPs "are
important tools for meeting existing statutory sanitation
responsibilities . *..."100 FSIS did specify that SSOPs are a
condition for receiving inspection,"°' but at the time the final
rule was published, did not mention suspension of inspection
for SSOP non-compliance.
0 2
* All establishments must adopt and implement a HACCP plan.'0°
The regulations did specify what would constitute an "inade-
quate HACCP system, ' '  but suspension was not expressly
mentioned in the regulation, but was in the preamble.0 5
* Establishments that slaughter or produce raw products must test
to ascertain process control. 6 Although FSIS retained the
testing requirement, the organism changed from Salmonella to
generic E. coli.' °7 Moreover, in the preamble, FSIS clearly
linked repeated failure to comply with this performance
criterion as a basis for suspension.'
* FSIS will test for Salmonella, but now the testing will be
conducted by FSIS, and the results compared against a national
average.'0 9 The establishment's failure to meet the national
99. 9 C.F.R. pt. 416.11 (2001). In the final rule, FSIS combined the separate
HACCP and SSOP rules dealing with meat and poultry individually.
100. FSIS HACCP Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 38,806, 38,834 (july 25, 1996).
101. 9 C.F.R. § 304.3 (2001) (Meat); 9 C.F.R. § 381.22 (2001) (poultry).
102. In the preamble, FSIS noted that HACCP and SSOPs were different. HACCP
focuses upon the effectiveness of processes, 61 Fed. Reg. 38,818 (July 25, 1996),
whereas SSOPs focus upon meeting statutory sanitation responsibilities. 61 Fed.
Reg. 38,834.
103. According to FSIS, HACCP is not the same as SSOPs, "In a sense, the [SSOP
is] a prerequisite for HACCP." 61 Fed. Reg. 38,834.
104. 9 C.F.R. § 417.6 (2004).
105. 61 Fed. Reg. 38,806, 38,823 (July 25, 1996).
106. 9 C.F.R. § 310.25 (2004) (meat); 9 C.F.R. § 381.94 (2004) (poultry).
107. 9 C.F.R. § 310.25 (2004) (meat); 9 C.F.R. § 381.94 (2004) (poultry).
108. 61 Fed. Reg. 38,844 (July 25, 1996).
109. 9 C.F.R. § 310.25 (2004) (meat); 9 C.F.R. § 381.94 (2004) (poultry).
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standard on three consecutive tests "will cause FSIS to suspend
inspection services."
'" 0
In a 1999 ruling, FSIS added the last component of the new
inspection system-the general sanitation performance standard."'
These regulations basically streamlined the agency's existing sanita-
tion regulations. Importantly, not all of the general sanitation
regulations address direct product contamination or adulteration.
For example, some general regulations addressed the required
lighting at the facility." 2 The agency indicated it would take sus-
pendsion action in the event there were violations of these
standards."'
Although four of the five major components of the agency's
inspection modernization mentioned suspension of inspection either
in the text of the regulation or in the preamble, the final rules as
adopted did not contain any procedural regulations on how FSIS
would impose suspension. According to the preamble, "FSIS has
decided not to finalize the proposed Rules of Practice at this
time."" 4
In one regard, the agency was fortunate that it did not finalize
the proposed Rules of Practice on July 25, 1999. Just three days
earlier, a federal court had found FSIS had violated the Admini-
strative Procedure Act (APA)"5 by failing to provide an establishment
with prior notice before suspending inspection." 6 This case, In re
Velasam Veal Connection' "7 was the first of three FSIS losses in the
agency's attempt to suspend inspection.
The Rules of Practice were not finalized until November 29,
1999.118 At that time, FSIS was in the middle of the second of the
three cases, Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. USDA."' Although two of
the three cases began prior to the Rules of Practice, it is helpful to
110. 9 C.F.R. § 310.25(b)(3)(iii).
111. 9 C.F.R. §§ 416.2-416.8; 61 Fed. Reg. 56,400 (Nov. 1, 1996).
112. 9 C.F.R. § 416.2(c).
113. 61 Fed. Reg. 56,399, 56,400-56,401.
114. 61 Fed. Reg. 38,806, 38,823 (July 25, 1996).
115. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (2001).
116. 55 Agric. Dec. 300; 1996 WL 367077; 1996 WL 367076.
117. Id.
118. 9 C.F.R. pt. 500 (1999).
119. 113 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (N.D. Tex. 2000) affd 275 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2001).
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discuss FSIS enforcement and the Rules of Practice before analyzing
the trilogy of cases.
E. FSIS Rules of Practice for Enforcement of the
Mega-Reg and Other Regulations
In its Rules of Practice, FSIS specifies what type of regulatory
actions it will take, when each action is appropriate, and what
procedures govern each action. In essence, there are three basic
types of actions:
" "Regulatory Control Actions," where the in-plant inspector
unilaterally takes some immediate action based upon a non-
compliance with a regulatory requirement; 2 °
• "Suspension," where the agency removes its inspectors from a
part of the establishment or the entire establishment, in effect-
stopping operations. Suspension can be imposed with or
without prior notice depending on the allegations;' 2 ' and
* "Withdrawal," where the agency removes its inspectors
permanently or for some set period of time.'
1. Regulatory Control Actions
In the vast majority of cases, an enforcement action begins with
the in-plant inspector. 123  The in-plant inspector has significant
authority to deal with individual instances of non-compliance. In
regulatory parlance, the inspector can initiate "regulatory control
action."'124 He or she can retain (i.e., "tag") a product to prevent
shipment or further processing.1 25 Until the inspector removes the
tag, the product cannot move until it is brought into compliance.
26
The inspector can also reject equipment or the facility, prohibiting
its use until it is brought into compliance. In many situations,
120. 9 C.F.R. § 500.1(a)(2004).
121. 9 C.F.R. § 500.1(c) (2004); 64 Fed. Reg. 66,541, 66,543 (Nov. 29, 1999).
122. 9 C.F.R. § 500.1(b) (2004).
123. 64 Fed. Reg. 66,541, 66,543 (Nov. 29, 1999).
124. 9 C.F.R. § 500.1(a) (2004).
125. 64 Fed. Reg. 66,541, at 66,542-66,543.
126. 64 Fed. Reg. 66,541.
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production is stopped until the equipment or facility is made
acceptable to the inspector.
127
In terms of procedures, the inspector will act when he or she
determines such action is necessary. Long-existing regulations
provide for an appeal of any such decision through the inspector's
chain of command: the immediate superior, the front-line super-
visor, the District Office, and Field Operations Staff at headquarters
to the FSIS Administrator.
12
In addition to these regulatory control actions, most enforce-
ment actions involve the issuance of a non-compliance record
(NR). 29 A NR is to be written whenever the inspector determines
that the establishment has failed to comply with a regulatory
requirement, including HACCP.'30 If HACCP is a system that relies
primarily on records, then the primary record for regulatory
enforcement is the NR.'3 ' Not only does the NR document an
individual instance of non-compliance, but these documents are also
used by the agency to support a suspension. The NR form is
designed to facilitate a quick review of non-compliances so that
repetitive failures can be easily determined and combined to show
that the system is inadequate in operation.12 On every NR form the
following statement is found, in bold: "This document serves as
written notification that your failure to comply with regulatory
requirements could result in additional regulatory or
administrative action." The "additional" action is suspension and
withdrawal.'
2. Suspension
A suspension is the temporary removal of inspectors from the
establishment.'34 It may be imposed with prior notice or, in certain
circumstances, imposed without prior notice.'35 In either case, the
127. Id.
128. 9 C.F.R § 306.5 (2004) (meat); 9 C.F.R. § 381.35 (2004) (poultry).
129. 64 Fed. Reg. 66,541, 66,543 (Nov. 29, 1999).
130. 64 Fed. Reg. at 66,543.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 9 C.F.R. § 500.3 (2004); 9 C.F.R. § 500.4 (2004).
134. 9 C.F.R § 500.1(c) (2004).
135. 9 C.F.R. § 500.3 (2004); 9 C.F.R. § 500.4 (2004).
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agency's district managers are delegated the authority to suspend
inspection, with appeal rights to FSIS headquarters.136
Based on the Velasam'37 case, the Rules of Practice incorporate
the requirements of APA3 8 that prior notice and an opportunity to
demonstrate or achieve compliance be provided unless there has
been willful non-compliance or the non-compliance endangered the
public health.139  Pursuant to the regulations, prior notice will be
given, unless: (a) the establishment has produced or shipped
adulterated or misbranded products; (b) the establishment does not
have a HACCP plan or a SSOP; (c) the sanitary conditions at the
establishment would render products adulterated; and (d) the
establishment violated the terms of a regulatory control action. 40
Even when prior notice is given, the agency has specified a
variety of situations where FSIS could suspend inspection if the
establishment has not "demonstrated or achieved compliance,"
suspension of inspection could occur when (a) the HACCP system is
inadequate due to multiple or recurring non-compliances;' 4 1 (b) the
SSOP has not been properly implemented or maintained based on
multiple or recurring non-compliances; (c) the establishment is not
maintaining sanitary conditions under the general sanitation
performance standard;'42 (d) the establishment is not conducting the
required generic E. coli testing; and (e) the establishment has failed
to meet the Salmonella performance standard. These situations
represent the agency's interpretation of its statutory authority to
suspend and have little, if any, support by the statute.
136. 9 C.F.R. § 500.5 (2004).
137. 55 Agric. Dec. 300; 1996 WL 367077; 1996 WL 367076.
138. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (2001).
139. Id.
140. 9 C.F.R. § 500.3. The regulation provides three other bases not relevant
here-establishment personnel have harassed or intimidated an FSIS employee, the
establishment has refused to destroy a condemned carcass or product, and in the
case of livestock, the establishment has violated the Humane Slaughter Act.
141. 9 C.F.R. § 417.6 (2004) (identifying those instances when the agency will
deem a HACCP plan to be inadequate-the plan does not meet the regulatory
requirements, the establishment is not implementing the plan, with emphasis upon
corrective actions and recordkeeping, and the adulterated product is produced or
shipped).
142. 9 C.F.R. §§ 416.2-416.8 (1999).
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3. Withdrawal
Withdrawal is a more permanent suspension. 4 3 It involves the
removal of inspectors for a definite time or indefinitely. 44 The 1967
and 1968 amendments to the Inspection Acts1 45 authorized FSIS to
withdraw inspection from any establishment if the establishment or a
responsibly connected individual was convicted of more than one
misdemeanor involving transactions in food or any felony. 46 FSIS
has exercised this authority quite frequently and consequently, the
procedural rules have been well established.
FSIS follows the statutory requirement that an opportunity for a
hearing be provided prior to withdrawal. 47 Under the general
USDA Rules of Practice, 148 the agency would file a complaint with an
administrative law judge (ALJ) who would hold a formal hearing. If
the ALJ found for the agency, there would be an appeal directly to
the USDAJudicial Officer with federal court review. 49
Virtually all of the withdrawal cases prior to the Mega-Reg
involved the agency's statutory authority to withdraw inspection if
the establishment or a connected individual was convicted of any
felony or more than one misdemeanor involving transactions in
food. In these cases, the agency continued to provide inspection
throughout the proceedings. The other cases involved situations
where employees of the establishment had harassed or assaulted
inspection personnel. Obviously, with these cases, inspection was
suspended pending the litigation in order to protect FSIS
employees. In all of the litigated withdrawal cases, the company was
successful in only one instance, and such case was based upon
procedure, not substantive grounds.
1 50
In the new Rules of Practice, FSIS has greatly expanded the
situations where it will seek withdrawal of inspection. In essence, the
agency has asserted the right to seek withdrawal in the same
143. 9 C.F.R § 500.6 (2004).
144. Id.
145. 21 U.S.C. § 601 (2004).
146. 21 U.S.C § 467 (2001); 21 U.S.C. § 678 (2001) (meat).
147. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c)(1), (2) (2001).
148. 7 C.F.R. pt. I, subpart H.
149. FMIA authorizes the district court to review. 21 U.S.C. § 678 (2001); PPIA
authorizes the court of appeals. 21 U.S.C. § 467 (2001).
150. Cherin v. Lyng, 874 F.2d 501 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding FSIS failed to obtain
the individual's concurrence in a settlement agreement).
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situations where it has asserted the authority to suspend inspection.
The agency has authority to withdraw in the following situations:
" Non-compliance with the Mega-Reg (HACCP, SSOPs, generic
E. coli testing, the Salmonella performance standard, and the
general sanitation performance standard); and
* Shipment of adulterated product.'
F. Enforcement Actions Under the Mega-Reg Generally
Since the Mega-Reg became effective, there have been literally
hundreds of enforcement actions taken by FSIS. l' The most
common is a Notice of Intended Enforcement (NOIE).55 The
NOIE, consistent with the court's ruling in Velasam, provides an
establishment with notice and an opportunity to demonstrate or
achieve compliance with Mega-Reg requirements.'54  In most
occasions, the establishment will take action to allay any concerns the
agency might have and continue operations. In some cases, due to
an inadequate response or repeated positive laboratory findings, an
actual suspension may result, requiring additional actions on the
part of the establishment to respond to agency concerns.'55
If the thesis of this article is correct-that FSIS lacks the statutory
authority to suspend inspection for most violations of the Mega-
Reg-there have been hundreds of enforcement actions threatening
and/or imposing suspension; the question becomes why has there
been virtually no lawsuits? The answer may rest in several practical
issues which make litigation a less attractive course of action. First,
the NOIE has minimized the number of times actual suspension will
be imposed-an establishment may demonstrate or achieve com-
pliance by responding to issues raises in the NOIE without losing
151. 9 C.F.R. § 500.6 (2004). The regulation also includes harassment and assault,
refusal to destroy condemned product, non-compliance with the Humane Slaughter
Act, and refusal to conduct generic E. coli testing.
152. FSIS publishes a quarterly report of all enforcement actions taken. See FSIS,
available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/regulations_&_policies/quarterlyenforcement-
reports/index.asp.
153. Allison Beers, Industry Praises New Field Instructions, FOOD CHEM. NEws, Feb. 5,
2001 at 24.
154. See FSIS, USDA Food Safety & Inspection Services Quarterly Regulatory and
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production time or going to litigation.. Second, many of the
companies who have been involved in enforcement actions have a
brand name which they wish to protect-a challenge to FSIS when
the agency is alleging non-compliance with food safety regulations
could damage a company's brand name. Third, the establishment
may recognize it is placing itself at a competitive disadvantage by
resorting to litigation. Fourth, even if a company is successful in
litigation, it must not be forgotten that FSIS will continue inspecting
the establishment when the case is over. The agency retains
sufficient authority to increase the intensity of inspection and
increase product testing for adulterants which will make operating
under inspection more difficult. There have been three occasions
when these practical considerations were not sufficient to dissuade
the establishment from suing FSIS. In each of these cases, the
establishment won.
V. THE TRILOGY OF LITIGATED SUSPENSION CASES
The number of cases filed in response to suspension actions is
very limited. Indeed, the cases brought by establishments since the
federal inspection system was created are few and far between. The
practical factors must be weighed whenever litigation is considered
and generally mitigate against the litigation option.
In the trilogy of cases, the need to challenge the suspension
overcame the practical restrictions. In all of these cases, inspection
had already been withdrawn (or would have been withdrawn the next
day). Additionally, none of these firms had a recognizable brand
name. Furthermore, the establishments believed either there was no
violation or compliance was impossible. Finally, they recognized
their business would be destroyed by a suspension so that future
agency actions following the lawsuit would be moot if no lawsuit was
initiated.
A. Velasam and Procedural Due Process
Strictly speaking, In re Velasam Veal Connection'56 was not a Mega-
Reg case. The final Mega-Reg was not published until three days
after the decision. However, it was perceived by many that the
156. 55 Agric. Dec. 300; 1996 WL 367077; 1996 WL 367076.
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agency was testing its suspension authority in a case the agency
thought itwould win.
5 7
In early 1996, Velasam had entered a consent agreement with
FSIS concerning the alleged harassment of FSIS officials.' The
alleged harassment was linked to a 1995 recall of Velasam products
based upon laboratory tests showing the presence of sulfites in the
products. Sulfites cannot be added to meat directly since the
substance masks spoilage, but can be added if the sulfites are a
component of an ingredient. If added, the presence of sulfites need
not be declared on the label if present at a level of ten parts per
million (ppm) or less in the finished product.'59
In May 1996, the agency conducted a laboratory test of one of
Velasam's seasoning blends. The agency discovered the seasoning
contained extremely low levels of sulfites fourteen parts per million
(ppm). Without providing any notice or even the basis for its action,
FSIS filed a complaint with the ALJ and summarily suspended
inspection at Velasam on June 13, 1996.160
Velasam asserted that neither FMIA nor the previous consent
agreement authorized the summary suspension and moved that the
lawsuit be dismissed.' 6 ' Under USDA Rules of Practice, an ALJ can
grant any motion, except a motion to dismiss.'62 Accordingly, the
ALJ did not grant the motion. This decision was appealed to the
judicial officer who ruled that no motion to dismiss would be granted
until the hearing was conducted. Alleging final agency action and
irreparable harm, Velasam filed suit in the District Court for the
Northern District of California asserting both that FSIS was required
to provide notice and an opportunity to demonstrate or achieve
compliance as required by APA and that FSIS lacked the statutory
authority to suspend inspection. 6 '
In its decision, the court chose to rule on the procedural issue
thereby avoiding a ruling on the statutory authority. The court
found that Section 558(c) of APA requires notice and opportunity
157. Litigation Notes from Dennis Johnson regarding Velasam (on file with author)
[hereinafter Litigation Notes].
158. 55 Agric. Dec. 300, 1996 WL 367077 (U.S.D.A.); 1996 WL 367076 (U.S.D.A.).
159. FSIS Labeling Policy Memorandum 094B, Dec. 17, 1986, available at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/larc/Policies/PolicyMemos.pdf.
160. 55 Agric. Dec. 300, 1996 WL 367077 (U.S.D.A.); 1996 WL 367076 (U.S.D.A.).
161. Id.
162. 7 C.F.R. § 1.144 (2001).
163. See Litigation Notes, supra note 157.
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prior to any suspension of a license absent public health concern or a
willful violation.164  Since this opportunity was not granted to
Velasam, the court ordered FSIS to restore inspection during the
pendency of the administrative proceeding. Interestingly, in
discussing whether there was a willful violation, the district court
noted: "Even presuming there is substantial evidence that Velasam
added sulfites . . .the Court finds that at least a serious question is
raised as to whether or not the [FSIS sulfite] policy is clear
enough ....165 In light of the decision and the court's questioning
as to whether any violation occurred, FSIS and Velasam settled the
matter without hearing.
66
As noted above, the Velasam caused consternation within FSIS.
The agency officials were hoping to obtain a court decision
supporting their interpretation that the agency can impose a
suspension without any prior notice. The agency had included such
a provision in this Mega-Reg proposal. Although the Rules of
Practice were removed before the final rule published,'67 the Velasam
decision was immediately incorporated into agency practice and
ultimately incorporated in the rules regarding prior notice. Not
only was notice required, but also there could be no suspension if the
establishment could demonstrate or achieve compliance. Hence, the
NOIE was born, which benefits both industry and FSIS. It provides
establishments with due process, and by so doing, it helped
minimize the number of actual suspensions which could have
resulted in more frequent litigation challenging the suspension
authority.
B. Supreme Beef and the Requirement of Adulteration
FSIS promised to issue its Rules of Practice following the
promulgation of the final Mega-Reg, but FSIS did not do so for
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. As of this writing, Velasam is still in business, but lost most of its customers
forever. Velasam did file a Bivens action against several FSIS officials in there
personal capacity and won a judgment which is currently on appeal. Id.
167. Since the final rule was sent to the Federal Register on July 18, 1996, it could
not have been modified based on the Velasam opinion, but it would be fair to say the
Rules of Practice may not have been modified to provide notice had Velasam been
decided differently. The text of the prior notice section of the regulations (9 C.F.R.
§ 500.4) dealing with "opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance" are taken
verbatim from Section 558(c) of APA.
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several years. Meanwhile, FSIS initiated enforcement actions, but
did so consistently with Velasam-the agency provides notice and an
opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance. However, it was
simply a matter of time before a lawsuit was filed challenging the
agency's authority to suspend for non-compliance with the Mega-
Reg. When the first suit was filed, it did not challenge FSIS's
asserted authority to suspend for HACCP or SSOP non-compliance,
but rather the suspension for failure to meet the Salmonella
performance standard.
The Salmonella performance standards were based on a national
average incident rate. However, for ground beef, the national rate
was an average of two distinct geographic rates. The northern
plants"' accounted for seventy percent of the samples but only thirty
percent of the total positives. Conversely, the southern plants had
seventy percent of the positives, while only comprising thirty percent
of the samples.'69
Under the Mega-Reg, if an establishment failed the perfor-
mance standard on three consecutive tests, it was subject to suspend-
sion. 7 ° Given the ground beef standard's bias against southern
establishments, it was not surprising that the first triple failure
occurred in the south-specifically Texas.'7
In October 1999, when Supreme Beef Processors, Inc., a beef
grinder in Texas, failed its third set, FSIS issued an NOIE requiring
the company to take action to ensure compliance with the
standard. 72 As a result, Supreme took a variety of actions, and FSIS
started a fourth set of samples. When it became clear that Supreme
would fail the fourth set, FSIS notified Supreme that the agency was
suspending inspection the next day. In response, Supreme filed for
and received a temporary restraining order (TRO) requiring FSIS to
continue inspection at the facility.' The primary argument used by
Supreme was that FSIS lacked the statutory authority to suspend
168. See FSIS, Nationwide Federal Plant Raw Ground Beef Microbiological Survey, Aug.
1993-Mar. 1994, available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPHS/baseline/rwgrbeef.pdf.
169. Id.
170. 9 C.F.R. § 310.25(b)(3) (2004). A third consecutive failure "constitutes failure
to maintain sanitary conditions and failure to maintain an adequate HACCP plan."
171. Indeed, the second three set failure also occurred in Texas, but no litigation
arose since the company passed FSIS verification (fourth) series. Supreme Beef
Processors, Inc. v. USDA, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1051.
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inspection based on the results of the Salmonella performance
standard testing.
Although the performance standard regulation indicates that
three consecutive failures constitutes non-compliance with sanitation
and HACCP requirements,1 74 FSIS only defended its action on the
basis of the statutory provision dealing with insanitary conditions,
Section 8 of FMIA. There was no challenge or defense made on the
basis of the HACCP regulations. Hence, the agency's action could
be justified, if at all, on whether there were insanitary conditions at
the facility. 175 In this regard, the proceedings before the district
court did not go well for the agency. At the hearing following the
TRO, the Administrator of FSIS conceded during cross-examination
that the agency sought suspension simply because of the Salmonella
failures. Indeed, the Administrator basically admitted that there
were no insanitary conditions at Supreme.
176
The district court continued the TRO to allow both sides to brief
the matter. During that time, FSIS initiated an intensified testing
program at Supreme-not a testing program for Salmonella, but for
the adulterant E. coli 0157:H7. During the testing a product tested
positive for the adulterant, and a recall took place. 77  Notwith-
standing this positive test result, the court granted a preliminary
174. Id.
175. The agency did try to assert that Supreme had not exhausted its
administrative remedies. After the suit was filed, FSIS finally issued its Rules of
Practice. 64 Fed. Reg. 66,541, 66,543 (Nov. 29, 1999). The agency tried to argue
that under the rules, Supreme had to complete an administrative hearing before an
ALJ. This defense was rejected by the District Court.
176. Q. Is it correct to say Mr. Billy that the Notice of Suspension that Supreme
received about failure to maintain sanitary conditions is based solely on the alleged
failure of ground beef to meet the Salmonella performance standards?
A. It's based on the successive failure of three Salmonella sample sets.
Q. It is not based on inspectors making a judgment and determination that the
plant was in an insanitary condition?
A. There have not been significant problems with the sanitation practices in the
plant.
Q. Is that ayes?
A. Yes, it would be a yes. Yes.
R. 1237-1238 on appeal to the Fifth Circuit No. 00-11008, Supreme Beef Processors,
Inc. v. USDA, 275 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2001).
177. Recall Notification Report 062-99, Food Safety and Inspection Services, Dec.
26, 1999, available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/recalls/rnrfiles/rnr062-99.htm.
Interestingly, the company was apprised of the positive on Christmas day.
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injunction, holding that FSIS lacked the statutory authority to
suspend inspection on the basis of the Salmonella failure.
7 8
FSIS appealed, relying heavily on the Nova Scotia 179 case.
According to FSIS, the term "sanitation" can cover all food safety
controls at the establishment, and the Salmonella standard serves as a
proxy to assess the effectiveness of those controls.' The Fifth
Circuit rejected FSIS's argument. Without rejecting Nova Scotia, the
court found that the Salmonella performance standard did not fit
within the statutory provisions dealing with sanitation.' 8 ' First, the
salmonella performance standard "regulates the procurement of raw
materials," not conditions at the establishment, which is required by
the term "rendered" in the sanitary conditions provision.8 2 Cross-
contamination would not be sufficient.18  Second, the mere presence
of Salmonella does not render the product adulterated since
Salmonella itself is neither an adulterant in raw ground beef, nor is it
an indicator of adulterating pathogens." 4  Hence, the court
concluded that the sanitary conditions provisions could not justify
suspension.
181
The court was careful to distinguish Nova Scotia. The Fifth
Circuit referred to comments made by the Second Circuit indicating
178. 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1055.
179. 568 F.2d 240.
180. For virtually the entire time the case was pending, FSIS was conducting daily
testing of Supreme's product for E. coli 0157:H7. Agency testing of fresh product
puts a strain on a business for if the business ships, and there is a positive, the
product must be recalled, which is not conducive to good customer relations. If the
company holds the product for the five to seven days it takes to receive confirmed
results from the agency, much of the fresh product's shelf life is gone. In addition,
in the case of Supreme, it lost several government contracts due to the FSIS
allegations. This all combined to force Supreme into bankruptcy. Ironically, once
Supreme was in bankruptcy, FSIS moved to dismiss the appeal since it was moot in
that the company may be out of business and hence not need inspection. The Fifth
Circuit found that the case was not moot. Supreme Beef Processors, 275 F.3d 432, 438.
Moreover, it allowed the National Meat Association to intervene so that even if
Supreme did not resume its business, the case could be heard on appeal. Id.
181. Id. at 443.
182. Id. at 441.
183. Id. at 442.
184. Supreme Beef Processor, 275 F.2d at 442-43. Indeed, the court commented that
FSIS may not actually want such a result, for if Salmonella is an indicator of an
adulterant, it would mean that a raw product with Salmonella would be adulterated,
eliminating many raw products currently being sold. Id.
185. Id.
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a plausible argument could be made that the statute could apply
only to conditions, not processes.8 6 Moreover, unlike Nova Scotia,
where the government looked to operations in the plant, the
government in Supreme was focusing upon conditions outside the
facility (i.e., incoming raw materials), which was unprecedented.
8 7
In short, FSIS lost the case as a result of its inability to
demonstrate the statutory requirements of the insanitary conditions
provisions-the conditions must relate to the plant and there must
be product adulteration. The issue of whether sanitation could
encompass processing was not decided.
C. Nebraska Beef
The last of the "suspension cases," Nebraska Beef,' is very
unsatisfying for the legal scholar because it did not truly advance the
issue. Nebraska Beef had received an NOIE in 2002 due in part to
concerns with condensation and sanitary dressing practices at
slaughter. Moreover, Nebraska Beef was implicated in a positive E.
coli 0157:H7 test in ground product' 9
In January 2003, while the President of Nebraska Beef,
company counsel, and the company's trade association representa-
tive were meeting with the USDA Undersecretary for Food Safety,
the District Office suspended inspection at the facility. The
establishment promptly filed a request for a TRO to reinstate
inspectors. 9 °
In the complaint, Nebraska Beef alleged that its products were
safe, that FSIS lacked the statutory authority to suspend, and that
suspension imposed irreparable injury on the company. 9' The
district court issued the TRO with most of its discussion centering on
the economic harm caused by suspension. Instead of fighting the
issue, FSIS simply entered a consent agreement with Nebraska Beef,
stating that the company will comply with all FSIS regulations.1
2
186. Id. at 441.
187. Id. at 442 n.38.
188. Nebraska Beef. Ltd. v. USDA, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25104 (D. Neb, 2003);
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Although FSIS touted that the case supported its authority,
neither the opinion nor the settlement agreement supported such a
claim. It could be the case that FSIS was simply caught unaware.
Following Nebraska Beef, the agency embarked on an internal
program designed to ensure it had adequate documentation
throughout any enforcement proceeding.
VI. FSIS LACKS THE AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND FOR
MEGA-REG VIOLATIONS
Based upon the trilogy of cases, it is clear that FSIS simply lacks
the authority to suspend inspection for HACCP non-compliance, as
well as non-compliance with the Salmonella and general sanitation
performance standards. Even with SSOP non-compliance, the
agency must meet its burden of proof.
A. The Language of Statute Does Not Authorize Suspension
Once again, the starting point is the language of the statute.'93
The section which speaks of suspension provides, in relevant part,
"where the sanitary conditions of any such establishment are such
that the meat or meat food products are rendered adulterated,
[FSIS] shall refuse to allow said meat or meat food products to be
labeled, marked, stamped, or tagged as 'inspected and passed."'194
Under the plain language of this provision, FSIS must have a basis to
conclude the products are "rendered adulterated" as a precondition
to imposing suspension.195
In regards to the meaning of "rendered," all courts have held
that the conditions must be intrinsic to the establishment.' 96 Mere
cross-contamination is not sufficient.'97 As for the meaning of
"adulterated," the agency must demonstrate that the product would
193. See generally Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
194. Section 8 of FMIA, 21 U.S.C. § 608 (2004).
195. The actual language of FMIA does not technically provide for suspension of
inspection or the removal of federal inspectors. It only authorizes the refusal to
mark products "inspected and passed." The inspector must remain in the facility.
It is PPIA which speaks of "refusing inspection." 21 U.S.C. § 456(b) (2004).
However, this is more of a technical difference since the mere presence of an
inspector at the facility does not change the effect of a suspension.
196. Supreme Beef Processors, 275 F.3d 442 n.38.
197. Id. at 442.
[VOL. 1:337
FSIS & FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH HACCP
be adulterated as that term is specified by FMIA or PPIA. 9 s Hence,
findings of pathogenic organisms on raw products which do not
adulterate the product would be insufficient to justify the use of
Section 8's suspension authority. More specifically, the presence of
Salmonella on any raw product would not constitute adulteration and
could not be used to justify suspension.
In the cases under Section 8, FSIS would need to establish
adulteration under Section 1(m)(4) of FMIA.199  This section
provides that a product is adulterated "[i]f it has been prepared,
packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have
become contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have been
rendered injurious to health." Under this section, actual contamina-
tion of product need not be shown. 200  However, the government
must show that the food was processed under conditions whereby
there is a reasonable possibility that the product was contaminated
from the insanitary conditions.20 '
Accordingly, to meet its burden of proof, FSIS must establish
that insanitary conditions existed at the establishment and there is a
reasonable possibility that the food will become contaminated with
filth or rendered injurious as the result of those insanitary condi-
tions. 202 Addressing the latter factor first, in the absence of a nexus
between the conditions and the product, no adulteration could
occur. Non-compliance with the FSIS general sanitation perfor-
mance standard alone, which unlike the SSOPs does not deal with
198. Id. at 438-39.
199. 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(4) (2004).
200. United States v. H. B. Gregory, 502 F.2d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 1974); United
States v. General Foods Corp., 446 F. Supp. 740, 752 (N.D.N.Y.), affd 591 F.2d
1332 (2d Cir. 1978). Many of the cases cited in this article interpret the identical
language from FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(4). In adopting this language for the
FMIA, Congress intended that "essentially the same criteria be applied in
determining wholesomeness .... S. REP. No. 90-799, reprinted in 1967
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2188, 2203.
201. United States v. International Exterminator Corp., 294 F.2d 270, 271 (5th
Cir. 1961); Berger v. United States, 200 F.2d 818, 821 (2d Cir. 1952); General Foods
Corp., 446 F. Supp. at 752.
202. 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(4) (2004); Gregory, 502 F.2d at 704.
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direct contamination, would not be grounds for suspension. 3
Hence, the critical issue is the meaning of "insanitary conditions."' 04
B. The Case Law Does Not Support Suspension Absent Visible Evidence of
Insanitary Conditions at the Facility
Based upon the thorough review of the case law regarding
insanitary conditions, in order for the government to be successful, it
must introduce evidence of visible, insanitary conditions of the
facility. There is one exception-Nova Scotia. In that case, the court
expanded the definition of insanitary conditions to include pro-
cessing as opposed to the physical condition of the facility.0" How-
ever, the Nova Scotia case is so readily distinguishable that it does not
support FSIS's asserted suspension authority.
As an initial matter, the court in Nova Scotia recognized it was
expanding the definitions of insanitary conditions beyond the
normal meaning.206 However, the court was willing to read the
statutory provision expansively for a number of reasons: (a) a public
health statute should be read broadly, (b) Congress gave no
indication to read the provision narrowly, (c) the "knowledgeable"
bar had never challenged FDA's authority, (d) FSIS had established
similar standards, and (e) invalidating this rule would invalidate
other rules. 207  On each of these points above, FSIS's asserted
authority to suspend for reasons other than insanitary plant condi-
tions fails to meet the reasons used by the court in Nova Scotia to
justify its expansive reading.
First, FMIA and PPIA are public health statutes and should be
read broadly.20° However, the issue before the court in Nova Scotia
was not whether an agency can suspend inspection. In Nova Scotia,
the issue was whether FDA could regulate the processing in the first
203. 9 C.F.R. § 500.4 (2004). United States v. International Exterminator Corp.,
294 F.2d 270, 271 (5th Cir. 1961); Berger v. United States, 200 F.2d 818, 821 (2d
Cir. 1952); General Foods Corp., 446 F. Supp. at 752.
204. 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(4) (2004).
205. Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 245.
206. Id. The court admitted that "on a first reading the language of the subsection
appears to cover only 'insanitary conditions,' 'whereby it [the food] may have been
rendered injurious to health' . . . And a plausible argument can be made that the
references are to insanitary conditions in the plant itself . Id.
207. Id. at 246-48.
208. Id. at 246.
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instance to protect the public health.20 ' Here, the issue is not
whether FSIS can adopt HACCP regulations since such authority is
clearly granted in the inspection acts. 10 The issue was whether FSIS
can suspend inspection for the failure to follow such regulations.
Suspension simply is not necessary to achieve the public health goal.
Indeed, FSIS has sufficient statutory authority to protect the public
health by seeking an injunction "to prevent and restrain violations"
of a public health requirement-the same injunctive authority
sought by FDA in Nova Scotia.21
The second basis of the Nova Scotia decision is congressional
intent. On the issue of suspension, Congress clearly did not intend
to provide the agency with unfettered discretion when it came to
suspension of inspection. Not only did Congress prescribe precisely
when such authority could be exercised, but also it specified how it
should be exercised. For example, in the case of withdrawal based
upon convictions, the statute provides the due process require-
ments. 2  More importantly, in the 1986 Amendments (which
expired in 1992), Congress called the power to suspend an "extra-
ordinary authority" and should be exercised only in a federal district
court proceeding with full due process protections for the
establishment. 21 Third, in the public meetings on the Mega-Reg,
every lawyer present testified that, with the exception of insanitary
conditions at the plant resulting in adulterated product, FSIS lacked
the authority to suspend for HACCP and Salmonella performance
standard failures.1 4
In response to the last two justifications, FMIA does give FSIS
the authority to promulgate processing standards, and the
"knowledgeable bar" is in agreement with this authority. The only
regulations which would be invalid here are those Sections of the
Rules of Practice in 9 C.F.R. Part 500, which are not within FSIS's
statutory authority. In sum, the reasons which led the court in Nova
209. Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 242-43, 245.
210. Section 21 of FMIA provides the "all inspections and examinations ... shall
be made in such a manner as described in the rules and regulations prescribed by
"FSIS." 21 U.S.C. § 621 (1999); see also Section 14(b) of PPIA, 21 U.S.C. § 463
(1999).
211. Section 21 of PPIA, 21 U.S.C. § 467(c); Section 404 of FMIA, 21 U.S.C. § 674.
212. Section 18 of PPIA, 21 U.S.C. § 467; Section 401 of FMIA, 21 U.S.C. § 671
(2004).
213. H.R. REP. 99-624 at 37 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N 6066, 6083.
214. H.R. REP. 99-624 at 37 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N 6066, 6083.
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Scotia to abandon the plain language of the statute do not apply in
the case of FSIS' authority to suspend inspection in cases other than
"traditional" insanitary conditions.
C. FSIS's Previous Actions Have Demonstrated the Need For Judicial
Involvement in Suspension Matters
Beyond these legal arguments, there is a policy argument to
support the conclusion that FSIS lacks the authority asserted-the
need to ensure suspension is imposed only when it is justified. It
should be noted that under the Rules of Practice FSIS can suspend
inspection without any external review outside the agency. It can
even withdraw inspection based on the review of an ALJ.
Without the requirement of a disinterested third party review,
which would occur if FSIS requested an injunction from a federal
district court, there can be errors. Indeed, there have been errors.
The one thread linking the three "suspension cases" is that the
agency could not justify its actions to the court.
In Velasam, 1 5 the court noted that FSIS had no evidence that
there had been a violation.2" 6 Yet, Velasam was closed for over a
month. In Supreme, FSIS testified that there were no problems with
sanitation at Supreme. Yet, Supreme would ultimately file for
bankruptcy.217 In Nebraska Beef,218 though it will never be known, the
speed with which FSIS settled and the initiation of a new internal
procedure at the agency to handle enforcement cases creates an
inference that the agency was ill-prepared to defend its actions
calling into serious question whether the suspension should have
been imposed in the first instance.
As an endnote to Velasam and Nebraska Beef, following the sus-
pension, both companies filed a federal claims action against various
FSIS personnel in their individual capacities. Velasam received an
award in its case, and Nebraska Beef's case is still pending.219
215. 55 Agric. Dec. 300; 1996 WL 367077; 1996 WL 367076.
216. Id.
217. Although Supreme won its case, it lost the war-FSIS began testing all
product for E. coli 0157:H7 on a daily basis, an unprecedented action which raises
the appearance of vindictiveness. Ultimately, the delay in shipping posed by this
intensified testing resulted in Supreme's bankruptcy.
218. Nebraska Beef. Ltd. v. USDA, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25104 (D. Neb. 2003);
Nebraska Beef, Ltd. v. USDA, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4993 (D. Neb. 2003).
219. Id.
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FSIS has chosen never to institute an injunction against an
inspected establishment for the failure to follow the regulations.
Indeed, when FSIS had the authority to suspend under the 1986
Amendments, but only through a district court proceeding, it never
exercised the authority. It would seem that FSIS would rather act
unilaterally as prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner than make a
case before a federal judge. Based upon the agency's track record, it
is easy to understand why.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is a truism of administrative law that an agency cannot take
action except as authorized by statute.22 ° In the case of the
inspection acts, Congress has provided FSIS with the authority to
suspend only in discrete circumstances, none of which authorize
suspension for an inadequate HACCP program or the failure to
comply with a Salmonella performance standard or the general
sanitation performance standards. To assert that FSIS has such
authority is not only contrary to the plain language of the statute,
Congressional intent, and case law, but is also simply ill-advised.
220. See generally Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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PREEMPTING FOOD SAFETY: AN EXAMINATION OF
USDA RULEMAKING AND ITS E. COLI 0157:H7 POLICY




From early times, people have relied on the skill and care of
others to catch, grow, gather, preserve, prepare, and provide
much of the food and drink indispensable to survival. Whether
paid for with a beaver pelt, a copper coin, or a modern dollar,
food has always been the single most important product bought
and sold by human beings .... Because pure food is necessary to
survival, rendering most persons extraordinarily dependent for
their health, safety, and very lives on the care and skill of food
providers, the rules that govern liability for selling defective food
and drink have long stood apart from those concerning other
types of products.'
* Denis Stearns is a principal at Marler Clark, LLP, a Seattle-based law firm
that, for over eight years, has focused its practice on the representation of persons
injured in foodborne illness outbreaks or other pathogen-created unsafe conditions.
For more information, please see http://ww.marlerclark.com. Marler Clark
represented several plaintiffs in the Sizzler outbreak litigation discussed in this
article, and principals of the firm have previously represented parties on both sides
of the litigation arising from the Jack in the Box outbreak. The views expressed in
the Article are solely the Author's own and are not made on behalf of his law firm or
on behalf of any former or current client.
1. The correct case-name citation, according to THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM
SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005), Rule
10.2.1(a), would be Estate of Kriefall ex rel. Kriefall v. Sizzler USA Franchise, Inc.
Because Sizzler USA was aligned with the interests of the plaintiffs on appeal, and
for sake of emphasis, the case will be cited throughout as Estate of Kriefall ex rel.
Kriefall v. Excel.
2. David G. Owen, Manufacturing Defects, 53 S.C. L. REv. 851, 884 (2002).
Summarizing the law as it relates to manufacturing defects, Professor Owen reminds
us that the origin of the rules of product liability are in defective food and drink
cases, concluding that: "Responsibility for manufacturing defects is the most
fundamental obligation of product manufacturers. The law governing production
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Before the lawsuit levy broke and its alleged fraud on the public
revealed, the cigarette industry must have been the envy of
consumer product manufacturers everywhere. The cigarette
industry offered a product that caused near-incalculable harm to
generations of its users, but for decades cigarette manufacturers
enjoyed immunity from all forms of product liability claims.'
Examining the strategy of the cigarette industry, the meat industry
appears intent on using the authority of the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) to promulgate rules pursuant to
the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA)4 and its stamp of inspection5
to preempt state tort or product liability claims, and thus gain
immunity from liability for the manufacture or sale of many kinds of
unsafe meat.6
errors is now quite settled, and it remains the first pillar of modern products liability
law." Id. at 905.
3. M. Siegel et al., Preemption in Tobacco Control. Review of an Emerging Public
Health Problem, 278 J. AM. MED. ASS'N, Sept. 10, 1997, (No. 10) at 860-63
(concluding that preemption of state and local tobacco regulations is an important
strategy that undermines the public health and arguing that preventing the
enactment of new preemption laws and repealing existing ones should become a
public health priority). See also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 531
(1992) (applying federal preemption doctrine to a product liability case and holding
that certain state law failure-to-warn claims arising out of the sale of cigarettes were
preempted by state law).
4. 21 U.S.C. §§ 601- 695 (2000).
5. 21 U.S.C. § 606 (2000) (declaring that "inspectors shall mark, stamp, tag, or
label as 'Inspected and passed' all such products found to be not adulterated; and
said inspectors shall label, mark, stamp, or tag as 'Inspected and condemned' all
such products found adulterated").
6. Here and throughout this article, the term "unsafe meat" will be used to
describe meat that causes injury to a person as a proximate result of it being
contaminated with a pathogen. It should also be noted that the term
"contaminated" is to be distinguished from "adulterated." As typically used, the
term "contaminated" is legally neutral; it describes a product that has a pathogen or
foreign substance in or on it. In contrast, the term "adulterated" is used when the
contamination involves an "adulterant," as defined by statute. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.
§ 601 (m)(1) (defining "adulterated" as "bear[ing] or contain[ing] any poisonous or
deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health"). Cf. Supreme Beef
Processors, Inc. v. USDA, 275 F.3d 432, 438-39 (5th Cir. 2001) (enjoining FSIS's use
of Salmonella performance standards, noting that since 1974, Salmonella has not
been deemed an adulterant per se when present in or on meat and poultry); but see
Blake B. Johnson, The Supreme Beef Case: An Opportunity to Rethink Federal Food Safety
Regulation, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 159, 174 (2004) (concluding, without noting
the irony, that "it would appear that meat packing associations and their contingent
[VOL. 1:375
AN EXAMINATION OF USDA RULEMAKING
A glimpse of this strategy can be found in the approach taken by
the Excel Corporation in a case arising from an outbreak of E. coli
0157:H7 infections linked by a health department investigation of
two Sizzler restaurants in the area of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.7 In that
case, Excel, one of several defendants in the case, successfully moved
for summary judgment dismissal of all state tort claims against it on
the grounds that the claims were preempted by FMIA. s The grant of
summary judgment was reversed by a decision of the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals in Estate of Kriefall ex rel. Kriefall v. Excel.9 Excel
petitioned first the Wisconsin Supreme Court and then the United
States Supreme Court for appeal, but both petitions were denied."0
With the exhaustion of appeals, the decision of the Court of Appeals
became the law and provided persuasive authority against any future
attempt to use FMIA to preempt state tort law.
Notably, at all stages of the litigation-from summary judgment
to the petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court-Excel was joined and supported by briefs filed by amici
curiae representing the interests of the meat and poultry industry."
interest groups are willing to fight against regulation designed to protect the
public").
7. Wisconsin Division of Public Health, Final Report, Investigation of an Outbreak
of E. coli 0157:H7 Infection at the Layton Avenue Sizzler Restaurant, Milwaukee, WI;
July-August, 2000, (Oct. 6, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Final Report].
8. Decision on Excel Corporations [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment, In re
Consolidated E. coli 0157:H7 Cases, No. 00-CV-006503 (Milwaukee Cir. Ct. May
15, 2002) (granting summary judgment dismissing all claims).
9. 665 N.W.2d 417, 437 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that language in FMIA,
21 U.S.C. § 678, that prohibited a state from imposing requirements with respect to
the premises, facilities, and operations of a federally-inspected meat processing
facility did not preempt state tort claims based on the sale of contaminated meat).
Excel had sought to have the decision on summary judgment made in a federal
forum, removing the cases under the Federal Officers Removal Statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1442(a)(1), but this procedural stratagem failed when the U.S. District Court
granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand. See infra notes 135-37 and accompanying
text. It is commonly thought that federal courts are more receptive to preemption
arguments, thus Excel's desire for a federal forum. See David G. Owen, Federal
Preemption of Products Liability Claims, 55 S.C. L. REv. 411, 412-14 (2003) ("In
general, federal courts are more willing than state courts to find preemption.").
10. Estate of Kriefall ex rel. Kriefall v. Sizzler USA Franchise, Inc., 671 N.W.2d
849 (Wis. 2003) (denying petition for review); Excel Corp. v. Estate of Kriefall, 541
U.S. 956 (2004) (denying Excel's petition for writ of certiorari).
11. See, e.g., Memorandum of Amici Curiae In Support of Excel's Motion for
Summary Judgment, In re Consolidated E. coli 0157:H7 Cases, No. 00-CV-006503
(Milwaukee Cir. Ct. May 15, 2002) [hereinafter Amici Memorandum]. The amici
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In the brief filed in support of Excel's motion for summary
judgment, the amici described their "substantial interest" in the
litigation as follows:
Over ninety-five (95) percent of all beef, chicken, turkey, pork,
lamb and veal products sold in the United States are produced by
the members of the Amici associations. An adverse decision here
would allow states (and individual courts) to adopt differing
adulteration standards. This would create chaos for the more
than 6,000 inspected establishments and would disrupt the
Nation's food supply. 2
Given the unanimity of support provided by the Meat Industry for
Excel's legal strategy, and its position on FMIA preemption of state
tort law, Excel's efforts may be interpreted as representing the views
of the Meat Industry. In sum, Excel's position was the Meat
Industry's position; they were in this preemption fight together.
This article will use the Kriefall decision to examine USDA
rulemaking and its still-evolving E. coli 0157:H7 policy. Part II of
the article will briefly describe the development and implementation
of the USDA E. coli 0157:H7 policy as a reaction to an enormous
and widely-publicized outbreak of E. coli infections that occurred in
1993-the so-called Jack in the Box outbreak.' Following the
outbreak, E. coli 0157:H7 was declared by USDA to be an adulterant
per se according to FMIA."4 It was also at this time that the first
steps were taken by USDA to move from a "command and control"
inspection model to the current "science-based" Hazard Analysis
Critical Control Point (HACCP)"5  model."1 These actions
were the American Meat Institute (AMI), the National Chicken Council, the
National Meat Association, the National Turkey Federation, the North American
Meat Processors Association, and the Southwest Meat Association. Id. Excel is listed
as a member of AMI on its website. See AMI, at http://www.meatami.com/Content/
NavigationMenu/BuySell/AMIMemberCompanyLinks/GeneralMemC-E.htm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2006). See also Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d 417, 420-21 n.1 (Wis. Ct. App.
2003) (acknowledging that a "joint amici curiam brief has been filed").
12. Amici Memorandum, supra note 11, at 2. Except when reference is being
made to Excel alone, hereinafter "Meat Industry" shall be used to collectively refer
to the industry interests represented by Excel and the amici trade associations.
13. See infra Section II.B.l.
14. See Jean M. Rawson, IB10037: Meat and Poultry Inspection Issues, July 22,
1999, available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Agriculture/ag-30.cfm.
15. See id. This is an acronym (generally pronounced as "hass-sup") standing for
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Plan. For a succinct overview of the development
of the HACCP paradigm and its adoption by the Food and Drug Administration
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represented a fundamental shift in how USDA operated, and
demonstrated a renewed ability to put public interests ahead of
traditional deference to Meat Industry concerns. This deference-
best described as "agency capture" 7 -had put public safety at risk
and eroded the legitimacy of USDA food safety actions, especially its
continued reliance on an organoleptic inspection system that was
incapable of detecting dangerous microbial pathogens. 8
Section III of the article will describe and discuss the 2000
Sizzler E. coli outbreak and the resulting litigation. Focus will be
placed upon Excel's effort to use FMIA as a shield against liability
under state law. While Excel did not ultimately prevail, the history
of the litigation reveals much about what the Meat Industry appears
to believe is at stake. Notably, while enjoying considerable freedom
under the current HACCP-based regulatory scheme, Meat Industry
rhetoric continued to describe-or more accurately, exaggerate-the
extent of government control as if each inspected facility was under
(FDA) and USDA as the primary conceptual framework for food safety reform
efforts, see Michael R. Taylor, Preparing America's Safety System for the Twenty-First
Century--ho is Responsible for What When it Comes to Meeting the Food Safety Challenges
of the Consumer-Driven Global Economy? 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 13, 20-23 (1997)
(arguing that the federal government's adoption of HACCP was only a first step,
and that much remains to be done to ensure the food system's future success). The
basic reference for HACCP is not FDA or USDA, but the National Advisory
Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Food (NACMCF). See NACMCF, Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Point Principles and Application Guidelines, 61 J. FOOD
PROTECTION (No. 9) 1246-59 (1998). "Under the current structure, HACCP is a
different system at FDA and USDA." Caroline Smith DeWaal, Food Safety Inspections:
A Call for Rational Reorganization, 54 FOOD & DRUG. L.J. 453, 456 (1999) (criticizing
the FDA's HACCP program as "in effect, an industry honor system," and calling for
greater standardization and coordination among the agencies). Among the USDA
inspectors, the acronym HACCP has achieved a telling alternate meaning-"Have a
Cup of Coffee and Pray." Kerri E. Machado, Comment, "Unfit for Human
Consumption": Why American Beef is Making Us Sick, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 801, 817
(2003).
16. Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP)
Systems, 61 Fed. Reg. 38,806, 38,806-38,989 (July 25, 1996), codified at 9 C.F.R. pts.
304, 308, 310, 320, 327, 381, 416, & 417 [hereinafter HACCP Final Rule].
17. Machado, supra note 15, at 825 ("Agency capture means that the private
interests of the meatpackers have taken control over and influence regulatory
agencies.").
18. Id. at 816 (stating that "with continuing developments in science and
technology, the mere visual, tactile, and olfactory inspection of animals became
clearly outdated").
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government occupation. This exaggeration forms the basis of the
Meat Industry's preemption argument.
Section IV of the article argues against regulatory preemption of
state tort claims, like that sought in Kriefall. The article will suggest
that in the absence of civil lawsuits that force meat processors to bear
the cost of the injuries caused by their unsafe and mismanufactured
products, regulatory compliance will be the primary and less
effective incentive for food safety innovation and investment. USDA
should therefore make clear that unless and until Congress expressly
decides otherwise, USDA does not intend for its regulations to
preempt state law tort claims premised on an alleged defect in a
meat product. 9 Only a policy against preemption will create
sufficient additional incentives for the Meat Industry to continue to
invest in further food safety innovations beyond that which is
required by USDA.
The article will conclude by contending that the USDA's E. coli
O157:H7 policy should be one of zero-tolerance on all meat and
poultry products. By failing to take into account common food-
handling practices, and the substantial risk of cross-contamination
between raw meat and other food items intended for immediate
consumption, USDA endangers the public by allowing the Meat
Industry to distribute intact meat contaminated with E. coli
0157:H7. Having declared E. coli 0157:H7 as an adulterant per se
based upon "the low infectious dose [it] associated with foodborne
disease outbreaks and the very severe consequences of an E. coli
19. A detailed discussion of how courts should decide the issue of preemption is
beyond the scope of this article. It should be emphasized, however, that the
continuing chaos of preemption jurisprudence is an important additional reason for
an agency to be cognizant that its own failure to speak clearly on the issue of
preemption will only add to the existing chaos. See Owen, supra note 9, at 412-13
and nn.3-11 (2003) (concluding that the doctrine of federal preemption "continues
to wallow in a state of utter chaos" and noting that other commentators agree). Also
beyond the scope of this Article is the question of whether, how, or when agency-
action should result in the preemption of state tort claims. For an excellent
discussion of this question, see David A. Herrman, To Delegate or Not to Delegate-
That is Preemption: The Lack of Political Accountability in Administrative Preemption Defies
Federalism Constraints on Government Power, 28 PAC. L.J. 1157, 1190-97 (1997)
(pointing out that the main reason administrative preemption is able to avoid
federalism restraints is because Congress blurs its own responsibilities for
controversial lawmaking by delegating this responsibility away).
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0157:H7 infection, °2 0 the Agency should not accede to the Meat
Industry's efforts to create a trace-tolerance level for the pathogen.
In order to meet the goal of FMIA to protect the consuming public,
a zero-tolerance policy for E. coli 0157:H7 should be mandated.
II. THE USDAE. COLI 0157:H7 POLICY: FROM REACTION TO
RETRENCHMENT
The development and implementation of the Agency's E. coli
0157:H7 policy continues to evolve, driven by the demands of the
public for safe meat, but ultimately shaped by meat industry's
influence and resistance to regulation and pathogen-testing. 21 The
starting point for any discussion of this policy must begin with the
unique dangers posed to the public-especially children-by this
pathogen.
A. E. coli 0157:H7: A Decidedly Deadly Pathogen
E. coli 0157:H7 is one of hundreds of strains of the bacterium
Escherichia coli.2 2 Most strains of E. coli are harmless and live in the
intestines of healthy humans and animals. 23 The E. coli bacterium is
among the most extensively studied microorganisms. 4  The
combination of letters and numbers in the name of the E. coli
0157:H7 refers to the specific markers found on its surface and
20. Beef Products Contaminated with Escherichia coli 0157:H7, 64 Fed. Reg. 2803
(Jan. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Non-Intact Meat Policy Statement].
21. See generally MARION NESTLE, SAFE FOOD: BACTERIA, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND
BIOTERRORISM 62-85 (2003) (describing the twenty years of consistent and often
successful efforts to block regulations that might adversely affect the meat industry's
commercial interests, the denial of responsibility for outbreaks of foodborne illness,
and the invocation of science as a means to prevent unwanted oversight).
22. E. coli bacteria were discovered in the human colon in 1885 by German
bacteriologist Theodor Escherich. Peter Feng, Stephen D. Weagant, & Michael A.
Grant, Enumeration of Escherichia coli and the Coliform Bacteria, in BACTERIOLOGICAL
ANALYTICAL MANUAL (8th ed. 2002), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-ebam/
bam-4.html. Dr. Escherich also showed that certain strains of the bacteria were
responsible for infant diarrhea and gastroenteritis, an important public health
discovery. Id. Although the bacteria were initially called Bacterium coli, the name
was later changed to Escherichia coli to honor its discoverer. Id.
23. NESTLE, supra note 21, at 40-41.
24. JAMES M. JAY, MODERN FOOD MICROBIOLOGY 21 (Aspen Publishers, Inc. 6th
ed. 2000) ("This is dearly the most widely studied genus of all bacteria.").
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distinguishes it from other types of E. coli.25 The testing performed
to distinguish E. coli 0157:H7 from its other E. coli counterparts is
referred to as serotyping." Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis
(PFGE),27 sometimes also referred to as genetic fingerprinting, is
used to compare E. coli 0157:H7 isolates to determine whether the
strains are distinguishable."
E. coli 0157:H7 was first recognized as a pathogen in 1982
during an investigation into an outbreak of hemorrhagic colitis
29
associated with consumption of hamburgers from a fast food
restaurant. 30  Retrospective examination of more than 3,000 E. coli
cultures obtained between 1973 and 1982 found only one isolation
with serotype 0157:H7, and this culture pertained to a 1975 case."'
25. Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), Escherichia coli 0157:H7, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/
dbmd/diseaseinfo/escherichiacolig.htm.
26. Beth B. Bell et al., A Multistate Outbreak of Escherichia coli 0157:H7-Associated
Bloody Diarrhea and Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome from Hamburgers: The Washington
Experience, 272J. AM. MED. ASS'N (No. 17) 1349, 1350 (Nov. 2, 1994) (describing the
multiple step testing process used to confirm, during a 1993 outbreak, that the
implicated bacteria were E. coli 0157:H7).
27. See JAY, supra note 24, at 220-21 (describing in brief the PFGE testing
process).
28. See id. Through PFGE testing, isolates obtained from the stool cultures of
probable outbreak cases can be compared to the genetic fingerprint of the outbreak
strain, confirming that the person was in fact part of the outbreak. Bell et al., supra
note 26, at 1351-52. Because PFGE testing soon proved to be such a powerful
outbreak investigation tool, PulseNet, a national database of PFGE test results was
created. Bala Swaminathan et al., PulseNet: The Molecular Subtyping Network for
Foodborne Bacterial Disease Surveillance, United States, 7 EMERGING INFECT. Dis. (No. 3)
382, 382-89 (May-June 2001) (recounting the history of PulseNet and its
effectiveness in outbreak investigation).
29. "[A] type of gastroenteritis in which certain strains of the bacterium
Escherichia coli (E. coli) infect the large intestine and produce a toxin that causes
bloody diarrhea and other serious complications." MERCK MANUAL ONLINE
MEDICAL LIBRARY, Hemorrhagic Colitis, at http:/www.merck.com/mmhe/secO9/ch122/
ch 122b.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).
30. Lee W. Riley et al., Hemorrhagic Colitis Associated with a Rare Escherichia coli
Seroype, 308 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 681, 684-85 (1983) (describing investigation of two
outbreaks affecting at least forty-seven people in Oregon and Michigan both linked
to apparently undercooked ground beef); Chinyu Su & Lawrence J. Brandt,
Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Infection in Humans, 123 ANNALS INTERN. MED. (Issue 9),
698, 698-707 (1995) (describing the epidemiology of the bacteria, including an
account of its initial discovery).
31. Riley et al., supra note 30 at 684-85. See also Patricia M. Griffin & Robert V.
Tauxe, The Epidemiology of Infections Caused by Escherichia coli 0157:H7, Other Entero-
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In the ten years that followed, approximately thirty outbreaks were
recorded in the United States. 2 However, this statistic is somewhat
misleading because an E. coli 0157:H7 infection did not become a
reportable disease in any state until 1987 when Washington became
the first state to mandate its reporting." As a result, only the most
geographically concentrated outbreak of the deadly pathogen would
have garnered enough notice to prompt further investigation.3 4
The virulence of E. coli 0157:H7 is a result of its ability to
produce Shiga-like toxins.33 It was theorized that generic E. coli
acquired this deadly ability to produce Shiga-like toxins through
horizontal transfer of virulence genes from the Shigella bacteria. 6
Genome sequencing of E. coli 0157:H7 has since confirmed that
gene transfer did in fact occur, and the evolution of even more
virulent forms of bacteria is likely to continue to occur.3 7 CDC has
hemorrhagic E. coli, and the Associated Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome, 13 EPIDEMIOLOGIC
REVS. 60, 73 (1991).
32. Peter Feng, Escherichia coli Serotype 0157:H7: Novel Vehicles of Infection and
Emergence of Phenotypic Variants, 1 EMERGING INFECT. DIS. (No. 2), 47, 47 (Apr.-Jun.
1995) (noting that, despite these earlier outbreaks, the bacteria did not receive any
considerable attention until ten years later when an outbreak occurred in 1993 that
involved four deaths and over 700 infected people). See discussion infra at Section
II.B.
33. William E. Keene et al., A Swimming-Associated Outbreak of Hemorrhagic Colitis
Caused by Escherichia coli 0157:H7 and Shigella Sonnei, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 579
(Sept. 1, 1994). See also Stephen M. Ostroff, John M. Kobayashi & Jay H. Lewis,
Infections with Escherichia coli 0157:117 in Washington State: The First Year of Statewide
Disease Surveillance, 262 J. AM. MED. Ass'N (No. 3) 355, 355 (July. 21, 1989) ("It was
anticipated that the reporting requirement would stimulate practitioners and
laboratories to screen for the organism.").
34. See Keene et al., supra note 33, at 583 ("With cases scattered over four
counties, the outbreak would probably have gone unnoticed had the cases not been
routinely reported to public health agencies and investigated by them."). With
improved surveillance, mandatory reporting in forty-eight states, and the broad
recognition by public health officials that E. coli 0157:H7 was an important and
threatening pathogen, there was a total of 350 reported outbreaks from 1982-2002.
Josefa M. Rangel et al., Epidemiology of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Outbreaks, United
States, 1982-2002, 11 EMERGING INFECT. DIs. (No. 4) 603, 604 (Apr. 2005).
35. See Griffin & Tauxe, supra note 31, at 61-62 (noting that the nomenclature
came about because of the resemblance to toxins produced by Shigella dysenteriae).
36. See id. at 62 (using the more technical term "phage-mediated transfer").
37. Nicole T. Perna et al., Genome Sequence of Enterohaemorrhagic Escherichia coli
0157:H7, 409 NATURE 529-30 (Jan. 25, 2001) (finding that E. coli 0157:H7 has
1,387 genes not found in non-pathogenic E. coli). See also Robert V. Tauxe,
Emerging Foodborne Diseases: An Evolving Public Health Challenge, 3 EMERGING INFECT.
Dis. 425 (Oct.-Dec. 1997) (arguing that the epidemiology of foodborne disease will
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emphasized the prospect of emerging pathogens as a significant
public health threat for some time.38
Foods of a bovine origin are the most common cause of both
outbreaks and sporadic cases of E. coli 0157:H7 infections. 39 Surveys
performed on feed lots have demonstrated that cattle may become
infected with E. coli 0157:1H7 through close contact and in muddy
conditions.4" The prevalence of E. coli 0157:H7 among cattle in
feed lots can reach magnitudes of 63-100% of the lot, especially
during the summer.4' The prevalence of E. coli 0157:H7 in the
summer is a significant public safety risk.4"
According to a recent study, an "estimated 73,480 illnesses due
to E. coli 0157 infection occur each year in the United States,
leading to an estimated 2,168 hospitalizations and sixty-one
deaths.,4 3 The hemorrhagic colitis caused by E. coli 0157:H7 is
characterized by severe abdominal cramps, bloody stool, but
sometimes little or no fever.44 The typical incubation period, the
time from exposure to the onset of symptoms, is reported as three to
eight days.45 Infection can occur in people of any age but is most
continue to change, requiring increased collaboration of regulatory agencies and
meat industry, and the strengthening of surveillance and research efforts).
38. Tauxe, supra note 37, at 427 ("After [fifteen] years of research, we know a
great deal about infections with E. coli 0157:H7, but we still do not know how best
to treat the infection, nor how the cattle (the principal source of infection for
humans) themselves become infected."). FSIS failed to respond to the problem of
microbial pathogens in the ten years after the 1982 E. coli 0157:H7 outbreak even
though a 1985 report by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that the
Agency's organoleptic inspection methods were inadequate to detect pathogens like
E. coli 0157:H7. See General Accounting Office, Food Safety: Risk-Based Inspection
and Microbial Monitoring Needed for Meat and Poultry, GAO-94-1 10, at 5.
39. CDC, Multistate Outbreak of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Infections Associated With
Eating Ground Beef-United States, June-July 2002, 51 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WKLY REP. (No. 29) 637, 638 (July 26, 2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
preview/mmwrhtml/mm5129al.htm [hereinafter CDC].
40. Id. See also NESTLE, supra note 21, at 44-45 ("Animals from many locations
arrive at the slaughterhouse together and remain in close contact until killed; their
carcasses remain in close contact until processed. Contact alone favors the spread of
pathogens.").
41. CDC, supra note 39, at 638.
42. See id.
43. Rangel et al., supra note 34, at 603.
44. Griffin & Tauxe, supra note 31, at 63
45. Robert V. Tauxe et al., Foodborne Disease, in MANDELL, DOUGLAS & BENNETT'S
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE 1150, 1152 (5th ed. 2000). See also
PROCEDURES TO INVESTIGATE FOODBORNE ILLNESS 107 (IAFP 5th ed. 1999)
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common in children. 6 The duration of an uncomplicated illness can
range from one to twelve days. 7 In reported outbreaks, the rate of
death is 0-2%, with rates running as high as 16-35% in outbreaks
involving the elderly.48
E. coli 0157:H7 infections can lead to a severe, life-threatening
complication called hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS).49  HUS
accounts for the majority of the acute and chronic illnesses and
deaths caused by the bacteria.5" HUS occurs in 2-7% of victims,
primarily children, with an onset of five to ten days after diarrhea
begins.5  It is the most common cause of renal failure in children. 2
Approximately half of the children who suffer HUS require dialysis,
and at least five percent of those who survive have long term renal
impairment.5 3  The same number suffer severe brain damage.54
(identifying incubation period for E. coli 0157:H7 as "1 to 10 days, typically 2 to
5"). In the Sizzler outbreak, the mean incubation period was 4.04 days, with a range
of two to twenty-four days. Final Report, supra note 7, at 10.
46. Su & Brandt, supra note 30, at 705 (stating that "the young are most often
affected").
47. Tauxe et al., supra note 45, at 1152.
48. Id.
49. See Griffin & Tauxe, supra note 31, at 65-68. See also Rangel et al., supra note
34, at 603 (noting that HUS is characterized by the diagnostic triad of hemolytic
anemia-destruction of red blood cells, thrombocytopenia-low platelet count, and
renal injury--destruction of nephrons often leading to kidney failure).
50. Beth P. Bell et al., Predictors of Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome in Children During a
Large Outbreak of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Infections, 100 PEDIATRICS (No. 1) 1, 1
(July 1, 1997), available at http://www.pediatrics.org/cgi/content/full/100/1/el 2.
51. Tauxe et al., supra note 45, at 1152. See also Nasia Safdar et al., Risk of
Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome After Treatment of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Enteritis: A
Meta-analysis, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS'N (No. 8) 996, 996 (Aug. 28, 2002) (stating that
"[E. coli] serotype 0157:H7 enteric infection has been recognized as the most
common cause of HUS in the United States, with 6% of patients developing HUS
within [two] to [fourteen] days of onset of diarrhea"); Amit X. Garg et al., Long-Term
Renal Prognosis of Diarrhea-Associated Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome: A Systematic Review,
Meta-analysis, and Meta-regression, 290 J. AM. MED. AsS'N (No. 10) 1360, 1360 (Sept.
10, 2003) ("Ninety percent of childhood cases of HUS are .. due to Shiga toxin-
producing Escherichia coli").
52. Su & Brandt, supra note 30, at 700.
53. Craig S. Wong et al., The Risk of Hemolytic-Uremic Syndrome After Antibiotic
Treatment of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Infections, 26 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1930 (June 29,
2000), available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/short/342/26/1930 (conclud-
ing that administration of antibiotics to children with E. coli 0157:H7 appeared to
put them at higher risk for developing HUS).
54. Richard L. Siegler, Postdiarrheal Shiga Toxin-Mediated Hemolytic Uremic
Syndrome, 290J. AM. MED. ASs'N (No. 10) 1379, 1379 (Sept. 10, 2003).
2005]
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
While rare, serious injury to the pancreas can also occur and may
result in death or the development of diabetes. 5 Currently, no cure
exists for HUS.56 Tragically, as the parents of Brianna Kriefall can
attest, many children with HUS die. 7
The low infectious dose, coupled with the difficulty of combating
the bacteria, make E. coli 0157:H7 truly and decidedly deadly.5"
Unlike Salmonella, for example, which usually requires something
approximating an "egregious food handling errors," E. coli 0157:H7
found slightly undercooked in ground beef can result in infection. 9
55. Pierre Robitaille et al., Pancreatic Injury in the Hemolytic-Uremic Syndrome, 11
PEDIATRIC NEPHROLOGY 631, 632 (1997) (stating that "mild pancreas involvement in
the acute phase of HUS can be frequent").
56. Nasia Safdar et al., Risk of Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome After Antibiotic Treatment
of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Enteritis, 8 J. Am. MED. ASS'N 996 (Aug. 28, 2002); see
also Siegler, supra note 54, at 1379 ("There are no treatments of proven value, and
care during the acute phase of the illness, which is merely supportive, has not
changed substantially during the past [thirty] years.").
57. Su & Brandt, supra note 30, at 700 (stating that "the mortality rate is 5
tolO%"); see also Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 421 ("[T]hiee-year-old Brianna Kriefall died
from eating food that everyone party to this appeal . . . recognize[s] was cross-
contaminated by E. coli 0157:H7 bacteria from meat sold by Excel."). To gain
insight into the impact of HUS on the parents of children who have died from an E.
coli 0157:H7 infection, read the speeches and testimony that can be found at the
website for Safe Tables Our Priority (STOP), a non-profit grassroots organization
devoted to advocacy of foodborne illness prevention through the public, media,
government, and the scientific community, at http://www.safetables.org/
Policy_&_Outreach/PublicComments/index.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
58. Griffin & Tauxe, supra note 31, at 72 ("The general patterns of transmission
in these outbreaks suggest that the infectious dose is low."); V. K. Juneja et al.,
Thermal Destruction of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 in Hamburger, 60 J. FOOD
PROTECTION. (vol. 10). 1163-66 (1997) (demonstrating that, if hamburger does not
get to 1301F, there is no destruction, and at 140'F, there is only a 2-log reduction of
E. Coli).
59. Griffin & Tauxe, supra note 31, at 72 (noting that, as a result, "fewer bacteria
are needed to cause illness than for outbreaks of salmonellosis"); NESTLE, supra note
21, at 41 ("Foods containing E. coli 0157:H7 must be cooked at temperatures high
enough to kill all of them.") (emphasis in original). The use of the term
"undercooked" should be recognized as its tautology-i.e., undercooked means
cooking food leaving enough bacteria to survive and to cause infection. While
"undercooked" can imply negligence on the part of the person preparing the
ground beef, especially as the term is used by the Meat Industry, this implication
ignores the complexity of the heat destruction of this bacteria in a non-homogenous
medium like ground beef. For example, after telling cooks for years to use color as
an indicator of doneness, in June 1997, USDA issued a press release retracting its
previous advice and recommended that a thermometer should be used to ensure
"thorough" cooking. See FSIS Technical Publication, Color of Cooked Ground Beef as it
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As few as twenty organisms have been said to be sufficient to infect a
person and possibly even kill them."0 And unlike generic E. coli, the
0157:H7 serotype multiplies at temperatures up to I1 F sustains
heat, resists drying, and can survive short exposures to acidic
environments.6'
To further an already dangerous threat, E. coli 0157:H7
bacteria are easily transmitted by person-to-person contact.62  A
serious risk of cross-contamination between raw meat, ready-to-eat
(RTE),6" and raw vegetables and fruits exists, including the
watermelons in the Sizzler outbreak.64 Indeed, a primary criticism of
USDA is the fact that the Agency has consistently failed to focus
Relates to Doneness, available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/pubs/colortech.htm (citing
the studies that prompted the changed recommendation). The USDA's current
recommendations are still not without some learned and well-respected critics. See,
e.g., 0. Peter Snyder Jr., The Dangerous Bi-Metallic Coil Thermometer, available at
http://www.hi-tm.com/ Documents200l/hamburger-temp.pdf ("USDA-recommend-
ed bimetallic coil thermometer is an inaccurate, awkward, and complicated device
for measuring the temperature of the highly contaminated, government-inspected
and approved, raw foods that cooks must pasteurize.").
60. Patricia M. Griffin et al., Large Outbreak of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Infections
in the Western United States: The Big Picture, in RECENT ADVANCES IN VEROCYTOTOXIN-
PRODUCING ESCHERICHIA COLI INFECTIONS, at 7 (M.A. Karmali & A. G. Goglio eds.
1994) ("The most probable number of E. coli 0157:H7 was less than [twenty]
organisms per gram."). There is some inconsistency with regard to the reported
infectious dose. Compare Chryssa V. Deliganis, Death by Apple Juice: The Problem of
Foodborne Illness, the Regulatory Response, and Further Suggestions for Reform, 53 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 681, 683 (1998) (stating it can be "as few as ten") with NESTLE, supra
note 21, at 41 (stating it can be "less than 50"). Regardless of these inconsistencies,
everyone agrees that the infectious dose is, as Dr. Nestle has put it, "a miniscule
number in bacterial terms." Id.
61. NESTLE, supra note 21, at 41.
62. Griffin & Tauxe, supra note 31, at 72. "The apparent ease of person-to-
person transmission . . . is reminiscent of Shigella, an organism that can be
transmitted by exposure to extremely few organisms." Id. As a result, outbreaks in
places like daycare centers have proven relatively common. Rangel et al., supra note
34, at 605-06 (finding that 80% of the 50 reported person-to-person outbreaks from
1982-2002 occurred in daycare centers).
63. A RTE product is a product that is in a form that is edible without additional
preparation and is not required to bear a safe-handling instruction. See 9 C.F.R. §
430.1 (2005).
64. Final Report, supra note 7, at 14 (concluding that "cross-contamination of
fresh watermelon with raw meat product was the mechanism by which the vehicle
became contaminated, and the raw sirloin tri-tips were the source of E. coli 0157:H7
organisms in this outbreak"). Because litigation is still pending, it should be noted
that Excel continues to deny that this conclusion as to causation is correct.
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upon the risks of cross-contamination versus improper cooking. 5
With E. coli 0157:H7, ultimately no real margin of error exists and
the cost of error can be death.
B. Origins of the USDA's E. coli 0157:H7 Policy:
Reactionary Rulemaking
The history of food safety legislation and rulemaking in the
United States is largely one of reaction. The first laws were
prompted by the reaction to Upton Sinclair's The Jungle and its
exposure of filthy conditions and practices in the meat-packing
industry.66 Since then, little has changed. As one commentator has
aptly stated, "[t]he Jungle tipped off a century of charlatanism,
65. See, e.g., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, Escherichia coli 0157:H7 in Ground
Beef: Review of a Draft Risk Assessment, Executive Summary, at 7 (noting that the lack
of data concerning the impact of cross-contamination of E. coli 0157:H7 during
food preparation was a flaw in the Agency's risk-assessment), available at
http:/Avww.nap.edu/books/0309086272/html/7.
66. NESTLE, supra note 21, at 50-51 (stating that "complacency ended abruptly in
1906 when Upton Sinclair published his dramatic expos6 of the meat industry");
Machado, supra note 15, at 802 (noting, somewhat hyperbolically, like much of the
article that The Jungle "propelled an investigation.., to quell public fears along with
the mass hysteria that resulted"); Sharlene W. Lassiter, From Hoof to Hamburger: The
Fiction of a Safe Meat Supply, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 411, 446-47 (1997) (stating that
The Jungle "graphically illustrated the unsanitary conditions of the meat packing
industry . . . ultimately inspirting] Congress to enact legislation to provide for
independent inspection of packing plants and slaughterhouses"); Roger I. Roots,
Other Rising Legal Issues: A Muckraker's Aftermath: The Jungle of Meat-Packing
Regulations After a Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2413, 2420 (2001) ("Upon the
precedent established by Sinclair's novel, federal inspection controls have ebbed
and flowed along with periodic public outrages."); Delilah D. Schuller, Pathogen
Reduction Through "HACCP" Systems: Is Overhaul of the Meat Inspection System All It's
Cut Out to Be? 8 S.J. AGRI. L. REV. 77, 79 (1998) ("The expose was the catalyst for the
first federal meat industry reforms."); Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer,
Organizing Federal Food Safety Regulation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 61, 79 (2000) ("The
publication of Upton Sinclair's The Jungle helped persuade President Theodore
Roosevelt to support, and Congress to pass the [Pure Food and Drug Act] and the
[Meat Inspection Act] on the same day in 1906."); Neil D. Fortin, The Hang-Up with
HACCP: The Resistance to Translating Science into Food Safety Law, 58 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 565, 584 (2003) ("The modern U.S. system of national food law began with
enactments in Theodore Roosevelt's administration when public outrage vented on
the meat industry after publication of Upton Sinclair's The Jungle."); Dion Casey,
Comment, Agency Capture: The USDA's Struggle to Pass Food Safety Regulations, 7 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 142, 143 (1998) ("The Jungle ... sparked a public outcry which
ultimately led to the passing of the Federal Meat Inspection Act.").
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heavy-handed punditry, and political patronage in federal meat
regulation. Upon the precedent established by Sinclair's novel,
federal inspection controls have ebbed and flowed along with
periodic public outrages."67 As a consequence, the "federal regula-
tory system for food safety did not emerge from a comprehensive
design but rather evolved piecemeal, typically in response to
particular health threats or economic crises."6 The end result has
been a federal food safety system that has been described as
"breathtaking in its irrationality."69
1. The 1992-1993 Multistate E. coli 0157:H7 Outbreak: Dying
for Change
One instance of a particular health threat sparking public
outrage is the multi-state outbreak of E. coli 0157:H7 infections that
occurred from November 15, 1992 through February 28, 1993.70
67. Roots, supra note 66, at 2420.
68. Statement of Robert A. Robinson, Managing Director, Natural Resources and
Environment, FOOD SECURITYAND SAFETY: Fundamental Changes Needed to Ensure
Safe Food: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management,
Restructuring and the District of Columbia, Committee on Governmental Affairs, GAO
Report 02-47T, at 3 (Oct. 10, 2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d0247t.pdf (remarking on the "resulting organizational and legal patchwork"). It
was argued that "creating a single food safety agency to administer a uniform, risk-
based inspection system is the most effective way for the federal government to
resolve long-standing problems . . . and ensure the safety of the nation's food
supply." Id. at 16.
69. NESTLE, supra note 21, at 55 (describing the system as "famously absurd," and
noting that it is comprised of twelve agencies housed in six cabinet-level
departments, coordination efforts governed by more than fifty inter-agency
agreements). It is not surprising then that nearly all requests for reform of the
federal food safety system advocate either the creation of a single federal food safety
agency, or some form of increased consolidation. Merrill & Francer, supra note 66,
at 66 and n.15 ("In the last fifty years, more than a dozen expert panels inside and
outside government have called for the consolidation of the federal agencies that
exercise and share food safety responsibilities."). Also not surprising is the near-
uniform pessimism that such reforms will ever occur. Id. at 163 (concluding that
consolidation is likely to remain merely an idea).
70. Update: Multistate Outbreak of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Infections from
Hamburgers-Western United States, 1992-1993, 42 MORBIDrrY AND MORTALITY WKLY
REP. (No. 14) 258 (Apr. 16, 1993), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/mm5129al.htm (summarizing the findings from an ongoing
investigation that identified a multistate outbreak resulting from consumption of
one restaurant chain) [hereinafter Update]. This outbreak is nearly always referred
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Initial reports indicated there were more than 500 laboratory-
confirmed infections and four associated deaths that occurred in
Washington, Idaho, California, and Nevada.71 The State of
Washington had made E. coli 0157:H7 infections a reportable
disease in 1987, and as a result, by 1993, most clinical laboratories
had the ability to culture stools to detect the bacteria.72
The Jack in the Box outbreak was notable in many respects, not
the least of which was the immense suffering that resulted; the
outbreak was the largest outbreak of E. coli 0157:H7 infections
reported to date. 73 Over one-quarter of the outbreak victims were
hospitalized, 7.5% developed HUS (mostly children), and four
died.74 With the benefit of only about one year of hindsight, one
high-ranking CDC official wrote:
The impact of this outbreak has been impressive. E. coli
0157:H7 has become a household word. Food safety became a
hot topic. National television and newspapers intensively covered
the outbreak and its consequences. President Clinton was shown
visiting an affected family. Parents of affected children gave
presentations before U.S. government officials and on national
television shows. And consumer groups, some newly formed
because of the outbreak, became very involved in food safety.
The impact on [USDA] has been unprecedented. It announced a
Zero Tolerance program for fecal matter on raw beef carcasses, as
to as the "Jack in the Box outbreak." See, e.g., NESTLE, supra note 21, at 74 ("The
consequences of the Jack in the Box outbreak were immediate."). The outbreak is
so-called even though the implicated hamburger patties were extensively
contaminated with E. coli 0157:H7 during processing. See Bell et al., supra note 26,
at 1352 (Nov. 2, 1994) (stating that "[a] large portion of 1 day's production of
hamburger patties was contaminated with a single strain of E. coli 0157:H7").
71. Update, supra note 70, at 258-61 (reporting that 477 persons met the case
definition in Washington, fourteen in Idaho, thirty-four in California, and fifty-eight
in Nevada, for a total of 583 cases). See also Griffin, supra note 60, at 7 ("Over 700
ill persons were reported, mostly children.").
72. Griffin et al., supra note 60 at 7-8 (noting that "this was different from the
situation in the rest of the United States ... and was important for the events that
followed").
73. Bell et al., supra note 26, at 1353. The Jack in the Box outbreak would be
surpassed three years later when approximately 10,000 people in Japan, including
over 6,000 school children, were infected by eating contaminated radish sprouts.
Yoshiyuki Watanabe et al., Factory Outbreak of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 in Japan, 5
EMERGING INFECT. Dis. (No. 3) 424, 424 (May-Jun. 1999).
74. Griffin et al., supra note 60, at 7.
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well as a Pathogen Reduction Program. It also mandated safe
handling labels for meat. It re-directed $5.7 million dollars [sic]
of funds to food safety .... USDA's new focus on public health
has been hotly contested by industry, and the final outcome is
unknown. 75 Those who had long called for an overhaul of the
meat inspection system caught the right wave of politics and
problems, and the groundwork for HACCP was put into place.76
2. E. coli 0157:H7: An Adulterant Per Se in Meat and Poultry
The fact that the Jack in the Box outbreak resulted in relatively
prompt and significant changes to the federal food safety
regulations, including the adoption of a HACCP-based meat
inspection scheme, is widely acknowledged.77 Of course, the Jack in
the Box outbreak would certainly not be the last to prompt
reactionary changes by USDA or other food safety agencies.78
75. Id. at 12. See also NESTLE, supra note 21, at 90 ("In contrast, and rather a
surprise in view of its past history, the USDA moved quickly [in the wake of the Jack
in the Box outbreak] to introduce HACCP under the more consumer-friendly
leadership appointed by President Clinton .... True to form, some meat industry
groups objected.").
76. Roderick M. Hills Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
National Legislative Process, at 17, available at http://www.law.umich.edu/
centersandprograms/olin/abstracts/discussionpapers/2003/Hills%2003007.pdf ("Like
a surfer, the policy advocate has to wait for the right wave of problems and politics
before he can move.") Mr. Hill argues, among other things, that "the best way to
[focus] Congress' attention on the question of victim compensation is to force
interest groups favoring preemption of tort claims to bear the burden of urging
preemption of those claims before Congress." Id. at 37.
77. Johnson, supra note 6, at 164 (stating that the HACCP program "followed
widespread publicity of an E. coli outbreak in 1993"); Fortin, supra note 66, at 581
(stating "it was only after public outrage and loss of consumer confidence that USDA
finally acted to reduce E. coli 0157:H7 contamination of meat products and
proposed regulations to require meat HACCP-as the [National Academy of
Science] had recommended a decade earlier"); Schuller, supra note 66, at 85 ("The
Uack in the Box] outbreak focused attention on the current meat-inspection system.
Parents, consumer groups, even members of the meat industry pushed for reform.
The government initially responded with promises of more inspectors. Ultimately,
the government, with the help of others, developed and finalized HACCP."); Casey,
supra note 66, at 148 ("It was only in the wake of this public outrage ... that the
USDA and the FSIS were finally prodded into action.").
78. See, e.g., Deliganis, supra note 60, at 693 (discussing E. coli 0157:H7 in the
context of the Odwalla outbreak, which the author familiarly describes later in the
article as "not just a story about the difficulties faced by one particular company, but
rather a wake-up call to an entire industry"); Michael T. Roberts, Mandatory Recall
2005]
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
Nevertheless, at least initially, the regulatory changes prompted by
the outbreak were significant. Foremost among the changes and the
first to occur, was the USDA decision to declare E. coli 0157:H7 as
an adulterant within the meaning of FMIA. This USDA decision was
the first time a foodborne pathogen on raw product was declared an
adulterant under FMIA.79
One might reasonably assume that a declaration of such
importance might have been promulgated as a regulation, or at a
minimum be published in the Federal Register; however, this did
not occur. Instead, on September 28, 1994, FSIS Administrator,
Michael Taylor, announced that the Agency would begin treating
any raw ground beef product bearing or containing E. coli 0157:H7
to be adulterated within the meaning of FMIA. ° The announcement
was made in a speech given at the annual convention of AMI. a' On
October 11, 1994, the Agency circulated a "final draft" of a FSIS
Notice stating how the ground beef sampling and testing program
functioned as a way to detect E. coli 0157:H7.2 On October 19 that
Authority: A Sensible and Minimalist Approach to Improving Food Safety, 59 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 563, 574-76 (discussing the ConAgra outbreak and recall and the widespread
publicity and criticism that prompted calls for changes that, in characteristic
fashion, FSIS largely shrugged off); CDC, Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Outbreak Linked
to Commercially Distributed Dry-Cured Salami-Washington and California, 1994, 44
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY REP (No. 9) 157, 157-58 (Mar. 10, 1995), available
at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtm/ 00036467.htm (prompting USDA
to enact regulations to ensure the safety of shelf-stable fermented sausages); FSIS
Backgrounder, FSIS Strategies for Addressing Listeria monocytogenes, (Feb. 1999,
updated May 2000), available at http://www.fsis.usda. gov/OA/background/bklisteria
.htm (responding to Listeria outbreak in which several people died, stating that
"FSIS is concerned about the recent, nationwide outbreak of listeriosis associated
with meat and poultry products. The Agency believes this is an appropriate time to
reconsider government and industry approaches to addressing Listeria monocytogenes
in order to further reduce the risk of human illness.").
79. NESTLE, supra note 21, at 80 ("By the early 1990s, USDA officials had argued
for two decades that ... [it] did not have legal authority to set limits on microbial
contaminants in meat and poultry because pathogens like Salmonella were 'inherent'
in raw meat.").
80. Id. at 81.
81. Id.
82. FSIS NOTICE, Microbiological Testing Program for Escherichia coli in Raw
Ground Beef (Final Draft, Oct. 11, 1994) (stating that "[tlo stimulate a reduction in
the presence of [E. colil 0157:H7 in raw ground beef, FSIS will commence on
October 17, 1994, a microbiological testing program for E. coli 0157:H7") (on file
with author). See also E-mail from from Robert A. LaBudde, President of Least Cost
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same year, FSIS issued a "Constituent Alert" documenting Mr.
Taylor's previous declaration concerning E. coli 0157:H7 as an
adulterant per se.8" In addition to declaring that E. coli 0157:H7 is
an adulterant, the FSIS Notice also announced that it was going
forward with a testing program for E. coli 0157:H7 in ground
beef.84 As described by the court called upon to rule on the Agency's
authority to institute the testing program:
The notice announced that the FSIS would collect and test five
thousand (5,000) samples of raw ground beef from federally-
inspected establishments and retail stores. Any of these samples
testing positive for the pathogen E. coli would be treated as
"adulterated" under [FMIA] and referred to FSIS headquarters
for regulatory action. Prior to this announcement, the USDA had
treated pathogen-contaminated meat as unadulterated under the
FMIA.s8
Of course, in the absence of testing, the only way that USDA had an
opportunity to learn about meat contamination was when an
outbreak occurred.
While the announced testing program was specific to ground
beef, it has never been clear that the agency considered E. coli
0157:H7 to be an adulterant only in ground beef. For example, in
the HACCP Final Rule, USDA stated that "some pathogens, such as
[E. coli] 0157:H7, are so virulent that a small number of organisms
can pose a significant hazard. s6 Indeed, on that basis the agency has
determined that any amount of [E. coli] 0157:H7 will adulterate a
meat or poultry product.,8 7 It was only in its later statements that
USDA began to characterize-or, more accurately, recharacterize-
its 1994 anouncement that E. coli 0157:H7 was an adulterant per se
as having applied solely to ground beef.88
Formulations, Ltd. since 1979, to the Author (Sept. 7, 2005, 11:40 PST) (on file
with author) [hereinafter LaBudde E-mail].
83. LaBudde E-mail, supra note 82, at 1. After more than ten years of trying, the
Author has still not been able to find a copy of the Constituent Alert in question.
84. Id.
85. Texas Food Industry Ass'n v. Espy, 870 F. Supp. 143, 145 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
86. HACCP Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,835.
87. Id. at 38,835.
88. See, e.g., Non-Intact Meat Policy Statement, 64 Fed. Reg. 2803, 2803 ("In
1994, FSIS notified the public that raw ground beef products contaminated with
pathogen [E. coli] 0157:H7 are adulterated under the [FMIA]."). USDA-FSIS, White
Paper on Escherichia coli 0157:H7, Nov. 1999, Attachment to FSIS Constituent
Update, November 5, 1999, available at http://www.nasda.org/joint/ecolipaper.htm
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Once announced, the meat industry predictably filed suit
seeking a preliminary injunction to block the testing program on the
grounds that it was not promulgated through appropriate
rulemaking procedures, that it was arbitrary and capricious, and that
it exceeded the USDA's regulatory authority under the law. 9 The
court ruled that the USDA's decision to consider E. coli 0157:H7 an
adulterant was an "interpretative rule," and therefore not subject to
the requirement of formal rulemaking.9 ° The court then rejected
the arguments that the rule was arbitrary and capricious, finding
that:
There is certainly a rational basis for the USDA to conduct some
sort of testing in order to educate itself about this problem.
Furthermore, the evidence indicates that the program has been at
least partially successful in spurring industry to take greater
preventive measures. Moreover, in light of the common cooking
practices of most Americans, there is at least a rational basis for
treating E. [c]oli differently than other pathogens. Finally, the
court finds that [USDA's] changing policy is a rational response to
an emerging problem.9'
The court therefore accepted the rationale that, because ordinary
cooking temperatures could not reliably eliminate E. coli 0157:H7
from ground beef, USDA had good reason to deem the bacteria as
an adulterant and to test for their presence.9"
3. From "Command and Control" to HACCP: Shifting the
Blame
With freedom comes responsibility, and such responsibility was
placed with HACCP. The goal was to make the Meat Industry
responsible for product safety and have FSIS move away from
"command and control" to an oversight role. Such a shift of
responsibility had been tried before without much in the way of
success.93  As a result of the public uproar and media attention
("In 1994, FSIS declared that E. coli 0157:H7 is an adulterant in ground beef and
instituted a testing program for the pathogen.").
89. Texas Food Industry Ass'n, 870 F. Supp. at 145.
90. Id. at 147.
91. Id. at 148.
92. See id. at 149.
93. See Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Implementation of Federal Regulations, 13
YALE. J. ON REG. 535 (Summer 1996) (describing how the mandatory HACCP
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caused by the Jack in the Box outbreak, HACCP offered something
different. FSIS would put in place a true science-based system to
confront and finally solve the problem of microbial pathogens.94 No
longer would "poke-and-sniff' inspection systems suffice to protect
the American public and its food supply.9" All federally-inspected
processors and slaughterhouses would be required to adopt HACCP
systems to identify potential sources of pathogen contamination and
establish procedures to prevent contamination.96 According to
USDA, "HACCP is the best system currently available for
maximizing the safety of the nation's food supply."97
Explaining the elimination of regulations that had "assign[ed]
to FSIS responsibility for the means used to produce safe food in a
sanitary environment," the Agency announced:
As part of its regulatory reform initiative, FSIS has undertaken
the conversion of current command-and-control regulations to
performance standards. Command-and-control regulations, and
the Inspection System Guide that FSIS inspectors use to enforce
those regulations, resulted from the perceived need to achieve
uniformity among federally inspected meat and poultry establish-
program proposed by FSIS was preceded by two different programs involving self-
enforcement that achieved limited, if any, success). See also NESTLE, supra note 21, at
71-72 (describing the failure of the Agency's "streamlined" discretionary inspection
program that it tried implementing from 1986-1989 before then abandoning it).
94. See 60 Fed. Reg. 6774, 6784 (Feb. 3, 1995).
95. See id.
96. HACCP Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,814 ("This final rule requires the
federally-inspected establishments implements HACCP systems to address hazards
that are reasonably likely to occur in their operations.") The publication of the
HACCP Final Rule was preceded by the Proposed Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 6774-6889
(Feb. 3, 1995). A discussion of the details of how HACCP is intended to work, and
the specifics of the HACCP Final Rule is beyond the scope of this Article, and is, in
any case, unnecessary given the more than adequate discussion of these subjects
elsewhere. See Stephen R. Crutchfield et al. Economic Research Service/USDA, An
Economic Assessment of Food Safety Regulations: the New Approach to Meat and Poultry
Inspection, at 5-8 (AER-755 1997), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/
aer755/ (situating the enactment of the HACCP Final Rule, summarizing what the
Rule requires, and stating that the "new rules represent a comprehensive strategy
on the part of FSIS to modernize the 90-year old inspection program"); Schuller,
supra note 66, at 85-91 (providing a brief but thorough review of the history of
HACCP and the requirements of the Final Rule); Fortin, supra note 66, at 566-68
(setting forth the seven HACCP principles, the development of HACCP in
conjunction with NASA and detailing the superiority of it as a food safety system).
97. HACCP Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,814. See also Fortin, supra note 66, at
565 ("HACCP... is widely recognized as the best food safety system available.").
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ments. Technological advances introduce a new imperative,
however. If establishments are to innovate, using new technolo-
gies to improve food safety, they cannot be impeded by a one-
size-fits-all regulatory system. Under contemporary conditions,
affording establishments the flexibility to make establishment-
specific decisions outweighs the advantages of uniformly
applicable rules.
98
What was thus to result was a single regulation that created a non-
uniform regulatory scheme. In effect, once implemented, HACCP
plans would be the law of a given plant, but no other.
Moreover, "[u]nder the new system, industry assumes full
responsibility for production decisions and execution." 99 And the
regulations:
represent a fundamental shift in FSIS's regulatory philosophy
from, "command and control," to performance standards, which
allow for more flexibility. Industry is being required by the
regulation to develop plans for controlling food safety hazards
that can affect their products. If the plans they design are
effective in eliminating health and safety hazards, and if the
establishment executes the plan's design properly, then the
resulting product should be safe for consumers. Instead of FSIS
determining the means by which establishments will meet their
responsibility to produce safe, wholesome, and properly labeled
products, FSIS will set performance standards that establishments
must meet. This means that FSIS will no longer be attempting to,
"inspect quality into a product." Inspection's role has become one
of regulatory oversight."°
In short, FSIS inspectors will no longer be working "shoulder-to-
shoulder" in the plant to ensure the safety and wholesomeness of the
meat there produced. Rather, the inspectors will be looking over the
shoulder of the meat industry as it tries to get it right. And the end
98. Id. at 38,808 (emphasis added). The use of the passive voice in describing the
"perceived" need for uniformity is telling in that it hides the fact that the perception
was plainly shared by the Agency and the Meat Industry. That the disavowal of this
perception was here passively described demonstrates the Agency's failure to take,
at least in part, express responsibility for the past failure of its inspection scheme.
99. Id.
100. Supenrisoy Guideline for the Pathogen Reduction!HACCP Regulatory Requirements,
at 2 (1998), at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/09/haccp/regreq98.pdf (last visited Oct. 21,
2005) [hereinafter HACCP Guidelines].
[VOL. 1:375
AN EXAMINATION OF USDA RULEMAKING
result, of course, at least in theory, is that it is not USDA's fault if
unsafe meat makes it into distribution.
C. The Intact Meat Exception to the E. coli 0157:H7 Adulteration
Standard: An Agency Apparently Recaptured
The increased focus upon E. coli 0157:H7 and meat safety
began to erode not long after it started.'0 1 As one commentator
stated, "when the outcry faded, the industries recaptured the
agencies by pressuring the courts and Congress."10 2  The Meat
Industry, for example, was able to persuade USDA to exclude intact
meat from its E. coli 0157:H7 policy, treating such meat as
unadulterated.' The resulting change in policy was, however, far
from clear.
101. NESTLE, supra note 21, at 84, 90-97 (describing the Meat Industry's ultimately
unsuccessful efforts to derail the adoption of the Final HACCP Rule, while noting
that it still managed to weaken the Rule and slow its adoption); Casey, supra note
66, at 150-54. See also Fortin, supra note 66, at 581 (stating that "the regulations
were watered down before promulgation. Moreover, the meatpacking industry
fought, and avoided, an effort to grant the government authority to order the recall
of tainted food .... A number of writers argued that USDA retreated from its food
safety mission in the face of [meat] industry pressure.").
102. Casey, supra note 66, at 142. See also Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier,
Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027, 1064-68 (1990) (discussing Meat
Industry capture of agency charged with regulating the Meat Industry); Peter L.
Kahn, Regulation and Simple Arithmetic: Shifting the Perspective on Tort Reform, 72 N.C.
L. REv. 1129, 1182-84 (1994) (arguing that administrative agencies have limited
resources available to properly and fully police product risks within their scope);
Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability
Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1147-48 (1988) (discussing Meat Industry control of
information needed by agency to regulate effectively hampers agency decision-
making process).
103. Non-Intact Meat Policy Statement, 64 Fed. Reg. at 2803. The Meat Industry
would no doubt disagree with any characterization of this new policy as a success,
given the "shock, disbelief, and anger" that was expressed when it was first
announced. NESTLE, supra note 21, at 103-04 (noting that "the reactions to this
proposal demonstrated that the beef industry was determined to oppose any
expansion of pathogen testing, no matter how limited or beneficial to the public").
However, the Meat Industry's subsequent embrace of the policy as being an
exemption of substantial category of meat products from USDA's E. coli 0157:H7
adulteration standards, and as a basis for federal preemption of state tort law, is but
another example of how the Meat Industry tries to make victory from defeat.
2005]
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
Following Texas Food Industry v. Espy,"° USDA stated in its Non-
Intact Meat Policy Statement, published in the Federal Register on
January 19, 1999, that the Agency believes the status under FMIA of
beef products contaminated with E. coli 0157:H7 must depend on
whether there is adequate assurance that subsequent handling of the
product will result in food that is not contaminated when
consumed. 15 In its policy statement, the Agency provided no
statutory basis for Agency authority to define adulteration on a
product-specific basis. Nor did the Agency expressly state that E. coli
0157:H7 was no longer an adulterant per se. Instead, it stated that:
[USDA] believes that with the exception of beef products that are
intact cuts of muscle that are to be distributed for consumption as
intact cuts, an E. coli 0157:H7-contaminated beef product must
not be distributed until it has been processed into a ready-to-eat
product-i.e., a food product that may be consumed safely
without any further cooking or other preparation.'°6
Accordingly, based on the input it received, the Agency announced
that it would consider expanding its sampling and testing program
to include non-intact beef products or intact cuts of meat that are to
be further processed into non-intact cuts. 7
The corollary of the Agency's position was that, while it would
treat non-intact meat as "adulterated" if contaminated with E. coli
0157:H7, it would not treat intact meat as "adulterated" if it was
identically contaminated.0 ' Essentially, the Agency created an
exception to its E. coli 0157:H7 policy for an entire product-
category-intact meat. The Agency defined the category as "cuts of
muscle include steaks, roast, and other intact cuts (e.g., briskets, stew
beef, and beef 'cubes for stew', as well as thin-sliced strips of beef for
104. 870 F. Supp. 143 (finding it reasonable to treat E. coi 0157:H7 differently
than other pathogens "in light of the common cooking practices of most
Americans").
105. Non-Intact Meat Policy Statement, 64 Fed. Reg. at 2803.
106. Id. at 2804.
107. Id. ("The Agency may reconsider its sampling and testing program, as well as
the scope of products deemed adulterated, in response to any comments received
on the Agency's position regarding the application of the FMIA's adulteration
standards.").
108. Id. (stating that "such intact products that are to be distributed for
consumption as intact cuts are not deemed adulterated.").
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stir-frying) in which the meat interior remains protected from
pathogens migrating below the exterior surface."'0 9
The definition of "intact meat" is explicit in its reliance on the
deliberations of the National Advisory Committee on Micro-
biological Criteria for Foods (NACMCF)" ° and the work it did for
FDA and USDA in their joint development of the 1999 Food
Code."' One such task was to determine the "appropriate cooking
temperatures for, among other things, intact beef steaks for the
control of vegetative enteric pathogens."' 2 As stated in the Non-
Intact Meat Policy Statement regarding intact product:
Due to a low probability of pathogenic bacteria being present in
or migrating from the external surface to the interior of beef
muscle, cuts of intact muscle (steaks) should be safe if external
surfaces are exposed to temperatures sufficient to effect a cooked
color change. In addition, the cut (exposed) surfaces must
receive heat to effect a complete sear across the cut surfaces ....
The Committee's definition of "Intact Beef Steak" limited the
applicability of this conclusion to "[a] cut of whole muscle[s] that
has not been injected, mechanically tenderized, or
reconstructed."
13
Therefore, intact meat is any meat that is not non-intact, and vice
versa.
Recognizing the utility of excluding entire product-categories
from the USDA's E. coli 0157:H7 policy, the Meat Industry soon
began to press the Agency to also exclude mechanically-tenderized
meat from the policy. The Meat Industry sponsored research
intended to show the relative safety of this second category of meat
products when cooked."4
In response to meat industry lobbying, the Agency asked
NACMCF to "answer several questions with regard to E. coli
109. Id.
110. Non-Intact Meat Policy Statement, 64 Fed. Reg. at 2803.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2803-2804. See also 1999 Model Food Code, 3-201.11(E), available at
http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/fc99-3.html (defining "whole-muscle intact beef
steaks" as those "that are intended for consumption in an undercooked form
without a consumer advisory").
114. Wendy Warren, Characterization of E, coli 0157:H7 on Subprimal Beef Cuts Prior
to Mechanical Tend erization: Project Summary (Aug. 2002), at http://www.beef.org/
uDocs/E.%20coli%20Mech%20Tenderization_Warren 6 6 03.pdf (stating on title
page "Funded by America's Beef Producers") (last visited Jan. 11, 2006).
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0157:H7 in blade-tenderized, non-intact beef."' 15  For its part,
"NACMCF concluded that non-intact, blade tenderized beef steaks
could potentially contain an infective dose of E. coli 0157:H7 in
their interior."'" 6 As a result, on October 7, 2002, USDA announced
in a policy statement that:
FSIS is reviewing the NACMCF report and its draft risk
assessment for E. coli 0157:H7 in intact and non-intact (blade
tenderized) steaks and will consider NACMCF's conclusions and
the conclusions from the risk assessment with regard to the policy
announced for non-intact products in the January 19, 1999
Federal Register .... At this time, FSIS believes that the public
health hazard presented by E. coli 0157:H7 and the prevalence of
E. coli 0157:H7 in these products continues to support
application of the policy announced in the January 19, 1999,
Federal Register. There is a lack of data on industry and
consumer practices for cooking pinned, needled, and blade
tenderized steaks (e.g., grilling, oven broiling, or frying) and a
lack of data on the proportion of [meat] industry outlets and
consumers that prepare these products according to each of these
different methods. If FSIS obtains substantial and reliable data
showing that [meat] industry and consumers customarily cook
pinned, needled, and blade tenderized products in a manner that
destroys E. coli 0157:H7, FSIS would consider modifications to its
policy.., in these products," 7
As a result, the focus continued to be placed upon cooking and
nothing else. The extremely low infectious-dose made cross-
contamination as big a risk as undercooking. At least in the case of
cross-contamination risk, the Agency remained steadfast in its
position.
115. E. Coli 0157:H7 Contamination of Beef Products, 67 Fed. Reg. 62,325,
62,333 (Oct. 7, 2002).
116. Id. This conclusion two years later proved correct, in the usual tragic fashion
with this pathogen, when an outbreak of E. coli 0157:H7 infections was linked to
non-intact blade tenderized steaks. See Ellen Swanson Laine et al., Outbreak of
Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Infections Associated with Nonintact Blade-Tenderized Frozen
Steaks Sold by Door-to-Door Vendors, 68 J. FOOD PROTECrION (No. 6) 1198, 1200, 1202
(2005) (describing an outbreak in which one fifty-two year-old HUS victim was
hospitalized for twenty-five days and suffered permanent brain injury, and
concluding that the "USDA should consider reevaluating the microbiologic hazards
of technologies used in the production of nonintact steaks").
117. Id. at 62,334.
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Thus, the focus continued to be placed upon cooking and
nothing else when determining whether a category of meat products
would be deemed adulterated. The extremely low infectious-dose
made cross-contamination as big a risk as undercooking, but this was
ignored. The responsibility for meat safety was undergoing another
shift, this time from the Meat Industry to the consumer. After
having first set forth a zero-tolerance policy for this deadly
pathogen, because "any amount of [E. coli] 0157:H7 will adulterate a
meat or poultry product,""' 8 the Agency now appeared in retreat.
III. KRIEFALL V. EXCEL MEAT CORPORATION: THE BATTLE FOR
PREEMPTION BEGINS
The litigation that resulted from the Sizzler outbreak is
exemplary in two ways. First, the outbreak itself is a perfect example
of why the USDA E. coli 0157:H7 policy on intact meat is evidence
of agency capture, where "an agency moves too far toward
accommodating a single interest while moving away from its statu-
tory mission.""' 9 Second, the resulting litigation clearly demon-
strated the Meat Industry's intent to invest whatever resources
necessary to obtain an authoritative ruling that USDA regulations
and policy statements can preempt state tort claims premised on an
allegation that a meat product was unsafe and caused injury as a
result.
A. The 2000 Sizzler E. coli 0157:H7 Outbreak:
Cross-contamination Matters
The Sizzler outbreak started with an outbreak of E. coli
0157:H7 infections that occurred in the Milwaukee area six years
ago. According to the outbreak investigation report issued by the
Wisconsin Department of Health, over sixty-two confirmed cases
were linked to food eaten at a local Sizzler restaurant.1 20 Twenty-
three individuals were hospitalized, 121 including four who developed
118. HACCP Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,835.
119. See Fortin, supra note 66, at 582 (pointing out that agency capture need not
be blatant in that it "may provide a measure of public good, but regulators' care is
balanced more for the industry's benefit than for the public's").
120. See Final Report, supra note 7, at 9.
121. Id.
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HUS. 122 Tragically, one child, Brianna Kriefall died. I23 In addition
to confirmed cases, there were 551 probable cases reported, linked
by strong epidemiological evidence, and another 122 possible
cases. 124
In an attempt to explain how this huge outbreak occurred, the
State Department of Health set forth its conclusions with surprising
directness:
Based on the results of the case-control study, the test results of
the opened and intact food samples from the restaurant and the
conclusions of the restaurants inspections, it is most probable that
the watermelon was the vehicle for infection, cross-contamination
of fresh watermelon with raw meat product was the mechanism by
which the vehicle became contaminated, and the raw sirloin tri-
tips were the source of E. coli 0157:H7 organisms in this
outbreak. 1
25
An extension of the scientific conclusions, however, remains the
human element; there lies the real tragedy, and death. As the
mother of Brianna Kriefall put it, "Our daughter was a miracle child




123. See id. See also Joby Warrick, An Outbreak Waiting to Happen: Beef-Inspection
Failures Let In a Deadly Microbe, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2001, at Al (reporting that:
Wisconsin health investigators later concluded Brianna Kriefall died from
eating watermelon that Sizzler workers had inadvertently splattered with
juices from tainted sirloin tips. The meat came from a Colorado
slaughterhouse where beef repeatedly had been contaminated with feces,
[E. coli]'s favorite breeding ground. Federal inspectors had known of the
problems at the plant and had documented them dozens of times. But
ultimately they were unable to fix them.).
124. Final Report, supra note 7, at 9.
125. Id. at 14. This was not the first time that cross-contamination between raw
meat and other food items had caused an outbreak of E. coli 0157:H7 infections at a
Sizzler restaurant. See, e.g., Lisa A. Jackson et al., Where's the Beef? The Role of Cross-
Contamination in 4 Chain Restaurant Associated Outbreaks of Escherichia Coli 0157:H7
in the Pacific Northwest, 160 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2380, 2385 (Aug. 14, 2000)
(finding that "relatively subtle lapses in food-handling procedures might be
sufficient to result in an outbreak," and that "[t]hrough cross-contamination, meat
can be a source of E. coli 0157:H7 infection even if it is later cooked properly").
126. Warrick, supra note 123, at Al.
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B. The Start of Litigation
The first lawsuit was filed on August 1, 2000, naming the Sizzler
franchisor as the defendant.' 27  The complaint was amended on
August 24, 2000 to add the Excel Corporation as a defendant.128
Among its allegations, the First Amended Complaint alleged that
Excel "manufactured meat contaminated with E. coli 0157:H7, and
that this meat was used in the preparation of food at the Sizzler
restaurant . . .and was the source of the bacteria that injured the
plaintiff, Ervin Lesak, and caused his E. coli 0157:H7 infection.1 29
Based on this and other allegations, the plaintiffs asserted four state
law claims: (1) strict liability, (2) negligence per se, (3) negligence,
and (4) breach of warranty.' 0
Instead of filing an answer, Excel removed the actions to federal
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The statute was enacted
because "Congress has decided that federal officers, and indeed the
Federal Government itself, require the protection of a federal
forum."'' 3' Excel alleged that its plants were, in fact, an extension of
the federal government, that its employees were government agents,
and that removal was proper because the "amount of federal
oversight, regulation, supervision and control exerted by FSIS over
Excel is as pervasive as it is complex."'' 3 2 Excel further argued that
Congress has empowered FSIS to supervise and control meat
production facilities, while enforcing its detailed and comprehensive
regulatory scheme, to protect the health and welfare of consumers,
create uniform national standards, and to eliminate burdens to
interstate commerce. Because Excel conducts virtually all of its day-
to-day operations pursuant to the detailed supervision and control of
FSIS, plaintiffs' claims against Excel will directly interfere with the
operation of FMIA and FSIS's implementation of its corresponding
127. Complaint, Lesak v. E & B Mgmt. Co., Waukesha Inc. et al., No. 00-CV-
006360 (Aug. 1, 2000).
128. First Amended Complaint, Lesak v. Excel Corp. et al., No. 00-CV-006360 (Aug.
24, 2000).
129. Id. at 5.
130. Id. at 4-9.
131. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969). The Court also noted that,
historically, "the removal provision was an attempt to protect federal officers from
interference by hostile state courts." Id. at 405.
132. Notice of Removal, at 3, Lesak v. E & B Mgmt. Co. Waukesha, Inc. et al., No.
00-CV-006360, (Nov. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Notice of Removal].
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federal policies.133 According to Excel, as a matter of law it was
entitled to a federal forum because its operation of a USDA-
inspected meat processing facility made it "directly involved in the
implementation of federal policy."' 14 In short, according to Excel, it
was essentially a government contractor.
The United States District Court Judge Charles N. Clevert
rejected Excel's arguments, and its description of pervasive control
and direct physical supervision. The court stated, "Notwithstand-
ing Excel's representations regarding the presence of federal
officials in its plant, it does not appear that the FMIA or the FSIS
exercises the type of control or supervision justifying removal."'
3 5
The court also rejected Excel's attempt to make the possibility
of federal preemption a basis for removal. The court wrote:
Because Excel did not meet its burden in demonstrating that it
was acting under an agency or officer, the court need not decide
whether it has a colorable federal defense to the plaintiffs' claims.
A significant portion of Excel's oversized brief focuses on this
defense. That Excel might ultimately prove that plaintiffs' claims
are [preempted] does not establish that they are removable to
federal court.3
6
The court thus ruled that Excel had failed to satisfy its burden of
establishing the existence of removal jurisdiction.'37 As a result,
Excel was forced to make its preemption argument in state court-a
forum that it had wrongly assumed would be hostile to its
arguments.
C. Excel's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Opposition to It
Excel's Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment
were filed on February 22, 2002, along with a supporting
Memorandum of Law. 13 The argument Excel made was exceedingly
133. Id. at 4 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
134. See Notice of Removal, supra note 132, at 3.
135. Lesak v. E & B Mgmt. Co. Waukesha, Inc. et al., No. 00-C-1508, at 8 (E.D. Wis.
Apr. 30, 2001) (granting plaintiffs' motion to remand).
136. Id. at 11 (citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)).
137. See id.
138. Excel Corporation's Notice of Motion, Motion for Summary Judgment, and
Memorandum of Law in Support of Summary Judgment, In re Consolidated E. coli
0157:H7 Cases, No. 00-CV-006503 (Milwaukee Cir. Ct. May 15, 2002) [hereinafter
as Excel's Memorandum].
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simple, and essentially captured the following points: (1) only USDA
(and not the States) can define what constitutes "adulterated" within
the meaning of FMIA; (2) USDA does not deem "intact products that
are to be distributed for consumption as intact products" as
"adulterated" within the meaning of FMIA if surface-contaminated
with E. coli 0157:H7; (3) the Excel meat contaminated with E. coli
0157:H7, which caused the outbreak that gave rise to the present
lawsuit, were intact cuts of meat when distributed; and therefore, (4)
Wisconsin state law is preempted to the extent that it treats as
"adulterated" what USDA, as the agency charged with interpreting
FMIA, has decided not to so treat.
The argument that Wisconsin law was preempted was supported
by a lengthy discussion of express preemption, based primarily on a
Michigan Court of Appeals case, Boulahanis v. Prevo's Family
Market,1"9 and the critical need for national uniform standards and
deference to the USDA's determination that E. coli 0157:H7 was not
an adulterant when present on meat that was intact at the time it left
the federally-inspected establishment. 141 Summarizing its position,
Excel hit all the points the Meat Industry would emphasize
throughout the litigation. It wrote:
Given the importance of preserving the integrity of our national
food supply, the federal government has spent decades
developing extensive regulations and uniform national standards
governing every aspect of the production and distribution of meat
in interstate commerce ....
The uniform national standards governing the production of raw
meat expressly provide that whole-intact meat containing E. coli
may be distributed for consumption in interstate commerce. This
is because, although pathogenic bacteria (such as E. coli) occurs
naturally in the production of meat (and is virtually impossible to
avoid, safe food-handling readily destroy the bacteria. Instead of
requiring meat producers to do the impossible (by completely
eliminating pathogenic bacteria), the federal government relies
on the end-user to follow safe food-handling practices to avoid
the dangers associated with raw meat.'41
139. 583 N.W.2d 509, 512 (1998) cert. denied 530 U.S. 1203 (2000) (holding
ground beef containing E. coli 0157:H7 was not defective under state law because
USDA had not declared it an adulterant under FMIA).
140. Excel Memorandum, supra note 138, at 2-3.
14 1. Id. at i-ii.
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In short, according to Excel and its Meat Industry cohorts, the
federal government affirmatively authorized the distribution of meat
contaminated with E. coli 0157:H7, and provided that it was the
consumer's responsibility to ensure the safety of the meat consumed.
The plaintiffs argued that (1) the Non-Intact Meat Policy
Statement was an interpretive rule that could not preempt state law,
(2) there was a question of fact whether the tri-tips implicated in the
Sizzler outbreak were non-intact meat within the meaning of Agency
policy, and (3) the court owed no deference to a policy that
irrationally treated non-intact meat further processed in a federally-
inspected establishment different than that further processed at
retail (like that which happened at the Sizzler restaurant).,12 The
latter argument was premised on the notion that USDA could not,
within the authority delegated to it, interpret the meaning of
"adulterated" under FMIA in a way that was inconsistent with the
intent of the Act to protect the public from unsafe and unwholesome
meat.'43
D. The Trial Court Grants Excel Summary Judgment on all Claims
The order granting Excel's Summary Judgment Motion was
signed and filed on May 15, 2002.144 The circuit court granted
summary judgment because it agreed with Excel that Congress had
delegated to the USDA the exclusive role of determining when meat
is safe and unadulterated.'45 Moreover, the court found that, in its
Non-Intact Meat Policy Statement, USDA had determined that
"intact meat containing surface E. coli 0157:H7 bacteria should not
be considered adulterated under federal law because the bacteria is
destroyed when the surface of the intact cuts are broiled in
142. Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, In re Consolidated E. coli
0157:H7 Cases, No. 00-CV-006503, at x-xiv, and 10-18 (Milwaukee Cir. Ct., May 15,
2002).
143. Id. at 18 and n.22 (stating that "even if the FSIS had intended to issue such a
policy [as that alleged by Excel], and assuming arguendo that it has the legal
authority to do so, this [c]ourt would be bound to reject it") (emphasis in original).
144. In re Consolidated E. coli 0157:H7 Cases, No. 00-CV-006503 (Milwaukee Cir.
Ct. May 15, 2002) (granting summary judgment dismissing all claims).
145. Id. at 2 (noting that "[p]art of the USDA's job is to determine when meat is
'safe, wholesome, and not adulterated."') (quoting Armour & Co. v. Ball, 468 F.2d
76, 81 (6th Cir. 1972)).
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establishments like Sizzler's Steak House."'4 6 This meant that the
plaintiffs were barred from bringing a civil suit against a meat
processor like Excel because "Congress has expressly preempted the
states from establishing meat standards different from federal
ones."'147  Consequently, the court concluded that the express
preemption provision in the FMIA "overcomes any state law to the
contrary."'141 Explaining its conclusion, the court stated the
following:
The policy behind preemption in this area makes sense. Excel's
processing plant is an "official establishment" governed by the
Federal Meat Inspection Act. The federal government has acted
in this area to provide national standards so that properly
handled and cooked meat products are safe for human
consumption. These standards protect the meat processors also,
so that they know what is expected of them in regard to their
products that are distribute[d] among the many states. In an area
of such great national concern, it is essential that the rules be
uniform. Federal inspectors are in these meat plants, testing the
meat and monitoring the processing programs of companies like
146. Id. (citing 64 Fed. Reg. 2803, 2804 (1999)). The court went on to quote the
Non-Intact Meat Policy Statement to the effect that "[i]ntact steaks, and other cuts of
muscle with surface contamination are customarily cooked in a manner that ensures
that these products are not contaminated with E. coli 0157:H7 when consumed."
Id. The court did not address, however, the fact that the case did not involve
persons injured by the consumption of surface-contaminated meat. Thus, like
USDA, the court ignored the implications of the risk of cross-contamination on the
determination of whether meat should be deemed adulterated. One can only
speculate whether the court's approach might have differed if Excel had been the
only available defendant. The court suggested as much at the end of its decision
when it wrote that "[i]t is important to note that this decision does not deny the
plaintiffs their day in court. They may continue against the restaurant whose
employees handled the food as well as against the restaurant's national franchisor,
who is alleged to have improperly trained and supervised its local franchisee." Id. at
3.
147. Id. at 2. As quoted by the court, the FMIA preemption clause reads in
pertinent part:
Requirements ... with respect to premises, facilities and operations of any
establishment . . . which are in addition to, or different than those made
under this chapter may not be imposed by any State ... Marking, labeling,
packaging, or ingredient requirements in addition to, or different than,
those made under this chapter may not be imposed by any State ...
21 U.S.C. § 678 (2000).
148. In re Consolidated E. coli Cases, No. 00-CV-006503, at 2 (citing Boulahanis, 583
N.W.2d at 511-12).
2005]
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
Excel. The federal regulatory scheme is so long-standing and so
comprehensive that I conclude it preempts any state laws to the
contrary. That includes bringing civil suits against meat
processors like Excel.' 49
To call the trial court's ruling on Excel's motion for summary
judgment a clear victory for the Meat Industry would, by any
measure, be an understatement. This victory would prove short-
lived, however. The Court of Appeals proved a much more skeptical
audience.
E. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals Reverses:
Reopening the Courthouse Doors
In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to
Excel, the Court of Appeals first set forth the most important fact,
and defined the issue before it:
In July of 2000, a number of persons were injured and three-year
old Brianna Kriefall died from eating food that everyone party to
this appeal, the plaintiffs, Sizzler USA, and Excel, recognize was
cross-contaminated by E. coli 0157:H7 bacteria from meat sold
by Excel. Although some of the parties' arguments on appeal
focus on both to what extent the E. coli contamination was a cause
of Brianna's death and the other injuries, and whether Excel was
either negligent or sold a dangerously defective product, the only
issue we need decide on this appeal is whether the claims against
Excel are preempted by federal law.' 5 °
The court then announced its decision "that federal preemption
does not close the doors of Wisconsin's courts to the claims against
Excel."'
5'
After summarizing the basics of preemption analysis, the court
turned to the question of whether state tort claims were
"requirements... with respect to premises, facilities and operations"
within the meaning of FMIA's preemption clause.'52 Instead of
answering the question, however, the court "assume[d], without
deciding, that the word 'requirements' encompasses state common-
149. Id. at 2-3.
150. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 421.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 422-23 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 678).
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law claims, although the law on this is not yet entirely settled.' ' 53
The court noted that the United States Supreme Court in Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr 54 had failed to resolve the question, even though some
courts incorrectly referred to Justice Steven's plurality opinion,
rejecting the view "that any common-law cause of action is a
'requirement' which alters incentives and imposes duties 'different
from, or in addition to,"' the applicable federal standard, as having
stated the view of the Court. 55
The court continued its analysis, as it should have, by addressing
"Congressional intent concerning the interstate sale of meat." ''6
Noting that Congress had intended FMIA to accomplish more than
one thing, the court concluded that the "overriding congressional
purpose is ... public-safety-as evidenced by not only the section's
direct statements to that effect but also by one of the stated
rationales underlying the concurrent congressional desire to
preserve fair competition for those who sell wholesome and properly
packaged and labeled meat."' 57
Having identified public safety as the primary purpose of FMIA,
the court next turned to its preemption analysis. First, it noted that
FMIA did not have an "all-encompassing clause" that delegated to
the Secretary authority to make such rules and regulations necessary
to carry out the provisions of the Act.' The court therefore
concluded that:
[A]lthough the Secretary has a wide berth in implementing the
congressional mandate to inspect meat-processing plants, the
153. Id. at 422 n.3. The court also assumed, without deciding, that if the "claims
asserted here against Excel would, if successful, affect Excel's 'operations' by
encouraging Excel to change those 'operations' in order to avoid future liability
caused by E. coli contaminated meat." Id. at 423 n.3. This assumption is only true,
however, if one also assumes that the change made to the operation would be
intended to improve the safety of the meat produced, because that would be the
only way to avoid future liability. As is discussed in Section IV, effecting such
improvements is a strong argument against preemption because civil lawsuits are an
important incentive for food safety innovation and investment.
154. 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (holding that, absent an express congressional statement
to the contrary, federal law did not preempt general common law duties).
155. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 422 n.3.
156. Id. at 423 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 602).
157. Id. at 424.
158. See id. at 424. "In contrast to some other delegations of authority by
Congress to administrative agencies, Congress's delegation here is focused." Id. at
425.
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Secretary has only limited authority to affect the congressional
definition of "adulterated," other than in the area of labeling (21
U.S.C. § 601(m)(5), (7)-(9)). And that limitation ... is critical in
this case because of Excel's argument that the Secretary views
intact meat contaminated with [E. coli] 0157:H7 as not
"adulterated." 59
The question then became whether the Secretary's treatment of E,
coli 0157:H7-contaminated intact meat as not "adulterated" was
consistent with the Congressional definition of the term and the
intent of FMIA.
Answering this question, the court noted that the "[E. coli] strain
that killed Brianna and made others sick is a 'deleterious substance
which may render [meat] injurious to health.' There is no dispute
about this."'' 60  It further noted that meat is, by definition,
"adulterated" if it "bears or contains" E. coli 0157:H7-a deleterious
substance. 6 ' This meant, the court said, intact meat contaminated
with E. coli 0157:H7 is "adulterated" within the meaning of FMIA
even if it "can be rendered non-'injurious to health' by cooking
thoroughly.' 62
The court also rejected Excel's contention that it was legally
significant that the meat arrived at the Sizzler restaurant as intact
cuts of meat and that the boxes containing the meat bore warning
labels. 6 ' As the court pointed out, Excel was required by the
HACCP Final Rule to consider "the intended use or consumers of
the finished product.' ' 164 In the case of the Sizzler outbreak, it was
the intended use of the meat products-i.e., the cutting and
mechanically-tenderizing of the meat into steaks-that was said to
have been the cause of the outbreak.'6 5 Therefore, it could not be
said that the presence of E. coli 0157:H7, even on the surface of the
meat, complied with the regulations Excel had invoked as the basis
for preemption. 66 In other words, you could not use a regulatory
159. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 425.
160. Id. at 425 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(l) (emphasis and bracketed material in
original).
161. See id. at 426.
162. Id. (emphasis in original).
163. Id. at 428.
164. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 428 (citing 9 C.F.R. § 417.2(a)(2)).
165. See Final Report, supra note 7, at 13.
166. See Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 428 (stating that "to be able to determine the
adequacy of their [hazard-analysis] plans, establishments that produce intact beef
products need to determine whether their products will be used to produce raw,
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standard to preempt a state tort claim based on it if you had not, in
fact, complied with the standard.
Despite reaching a point in its analysis that might have by itself
been dispositive of the issue, the court continued to conduct an
exhaustive analysis of the USDA's adoption and implementation of a
HACCP-based inspection system to determine if the fact of such
inspection impliedly preempted the plaintiffs' claims.1 67 The court
began by stressing that FSIS had "delegated to the meat processors
themselves the responsibility of coming up with procedures . . .
adapted to the processors' own circumstances, to safeguard the
wholesomeness of the meat they produce.""16 This fact alone belied
Excel's assertions that preemption was necessary to preserve
uniform, national regulations. As the court stated:
[I]nsofar as the preemption doctrine implicates a federal need for
uniformity of regulation .. . the federal inspection scheme here
eschews uniformity in favor of non-uniform plant-by-plant Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control plans developed by the plant
operators themselves. Simply put, rather than a nation-wide
uniform, one-size-fits-all approach present in so many
preemption cases, the Food Safety and Inspection Service now
lets meat processing plants monitor themselves with only
comparatively minimal federal oversight.169
In the absence of a countervailing need for uniformity, the court
concluded that "a claim premised on damages resulting from the
sale of 'adulterated' meat," in the words of Medtronic, "merely
provides another reason for manufacturers to comply with identical
existing 'requirements' under federal law.'
170
non-intact product.") (quoting E. coli 0157:H7 Contamination of Beef Products, 67
Fed. Reg. 62,325, 62,329 (Oct. 7, 2002)). How USDA expects establishments to
make this determination has never been explained, given that, except for product
being sent to another federal establishment for further processing, intact meat
products could presumably end up anywhere for further processing. Of course, with
regard to subprimals, like the tri-tips implicated in the Sizzler outbreak, which
average three to five pounds each, one might always safely assume that further
processing of some kind is going to occur.
167. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 429-33.
168. Id. at 429.
169. Id. at 435 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
170. Id. at 434 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 495). Accord Bates et al. v. Dow
Agrosciences, 544 U.S. _, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1802 (2005) (holding that state law tort
claims were not preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA), and finding that "[p]rivate remedies that enforce federal misbranding
2005]
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
Finding that USDA had used its delegated power to declare E.
coli 0157:H7 as an adulterant per se in all raw meat products, and
that it "consider[ed] an acceptable reduction for E. coli 0157:H7 to
be a reduction to an undetectable level," 1 71 the court rejected Excel's
argument that USDA authorized it to distribute contaminated meat
just because the meat was intact at the time it left its meat-processing
facility. In doing so, it deferred to the USDA's recognition of the
"intolerable public health problem"1 7 posed by E. coli 0157:H7, and
the fact that if its "presence can be prevented, no amount of
temperature abuse, mishandling or under-cooking can lead to
foodborne illness., 171 What the court called the USDA's zero-
tolerance policy for E. coli 0157:H7 was therefore upheld-much to
Excel's displeasure. 4
F. Attacking the Kriefall Decision and Seeking to Overturn It
The Meat Industry pulled out all the stops seeking to have the
Kriefall decision overturned, first petitioning the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, and then the United States Supreme Court. It cannot be said,
of course, that this denial of further review is an affirmative
upholding of the Court of Appeal's analysis, since factors other than
the correctness of a ruling can dictate whether review is granted.1
7
1
requirements would seem to aid, rather than hinder, the functioning of FIFRA").
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens, in terms plainly applicable to the Meat
Industry's position in Kriefall, criticized the defendant for "greatly overstat[ing] the
degree of uniformity and centralization that characterizes FIFRA." Kriefall, 665
N.W.2d at 434.
171. Id. at 432 (citing Contamination of Beef Products, 67 Fed. Reg. 62,325,
62,329 (Oct. 7, 2002) (codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 419)).
172. Id.
173. Id. (citing HACCP Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,962).
174. Whether there is a zero-tolerance policy for E. coli 0157:H7 is arguably open
to question, but only because USDA utterly fails to speak clearly on the subject. If
forced to, USDA very likely might state that it does not have a zero-tolerance policy
for E. coli 0157:H7 on all meat products. That the court in Kriefall nevertheless
managed to ably build the case for the existence of a zero tolerance E. coli 0157:H7
policy "concomitant" with "what the agency called 'zero tolerance' for fecal
contamination," Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 435, should be proof enough that Agency
policy is far from sufficiently clear.
175. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 809.62(1) ("Supreme Court review is a matter ofjudicial
discretion, not of right, and will be granted only when special and important
reasons are presented."). Excel sought review from the Wisconsin Supreme Court
on two bases: that the case presents a "significant question of federal preemption,"
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However, the Kriefall decision was not overturned, and to that
extent, its holding and analysis now stand as precedent in Wisconsin,
ans as persuasive authority elsewhere. The same thing cannot be
said of the arguments made by the Meat Industry, all of which were
rejected, and which can be summarized as follows.
1. The FMIA's Preemption of State Law is Well-Settled, and
USDA's Power to Promulgate Adulteration Standards is Virtually
Unlimited
The Meat Industry claimed that "courts interpreting [FMIA]
have concluded that FSIS enjoys broad rulemaking authority," and
that this broad grant of authority "enables the agency to issue
uniform national standards for meat products."'76 While the Meat
Industry's position was replete with citations to case-law, including
sixteen decisions of the United States Supreme Court,'7 7 only one
cited case involved the issue of FMIA preemption of state law tort
claims, Boulahanis v. Prevo's Family Market.17  Yet, as the Court of
Appeals pointed out, the Boulahanis case was "irrelevant to our
decision.' ' 79 Additionally, no single published court opinion held
that FMIA or the rules promulgated pursuant to it preempts state
tort claims involving beef products. All of the other FMIA
preemptions cases cited by Meat Industry dealt with misbranding.8 0
and that the "court of appeals' decision conflicts with the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court and of other courts." See Petition for Review, at 4-27, Kriefall,
671 N.W.2d 849 [hereinafter Petition for Review].
176. See Petition for Review, at 21, Kriefall, 671 N.W.2d 849.
177. Petition of Review, at i-ii, Kriefall, 671 N.W.2d 849.
178. 583 N.W.2d 509 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) cert. denied 530 U.S. 1203 (2000)
(holding that FMIA preempted state claims for injuries caused by the sale of ground
beef contaminated with E. coli 0157:H7). The reliance on Bouhalanis was strange,
and almost wistful-like a fan of the Chicago Cubs consoling itself after another lost
pennant race with a reminder that the team had in fact won a World Series at least
once before. Near-nostalgically, Bouhalanis is a reminder that there was once no E.
coli 0157:H7 rule and no USDA retail sampling program.
179. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 436 (criticizing the decision for the "paucity of its
analysis" and questioning whether finding preemption in agency inaction was viable
in light of the United States Supreme Court's Sprietsma decision).
180. See Petition for Review, at 25-27 (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519 (1977) (holding that state law pertaining to the labeling by weight of packaged
foods at retail was is in conflict with, and preempted by, FMIA; see also National
Broiler Council v. Voss, 44 F,3d 740 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding California law that
regulated the use of the term "fresh" on labels for poultry was preempted by Poultry
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The only other cases cited by the Meat Industry were equally
misplaced because none of them involved FMIA section 601(m)(1),
the definition of "adulterated" at issue in the case.''
Products Inspection Act); Pacific Trading Co. v. Wilson & Co., 547 F.2d 367 (7th
Cir. 1976) (affirming without discussion the dismissal of claims in a breach of
contract action that alleged private right of action for civil damages based on
violation of several federal laws, including FMIA); Armour & Co. v. Ball, 468 F.2d 76,
88 (6th Cir. 1972) (holding that Michigan labeling requirement for sausages were
preempted because "Congress has unmistakably so ordained . . . preemptive
language provides 'marking, labeling.., or ingredient requirements"' prescribed
by the Secretary preempt this field of commerce.); American Nw. Selecta, Inc. v.
Munoz, 106 F. Supp. 2d 223 (D. Puerto Rico 2000) (holding that regulation that
required poultry inspection date to appear on federal inspection certificate was
invalid as in conflict with federal regulations on official marks and certificates);
Mario's Butcher Shop & Food Ctr. v. Armour & Co., 574 F. Supp. 653 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (discussing in dictum FMIA preemption while holding that a violation of
federal "misbranding" laws could support a claim under the Illinois Deceptive
Practices Act).
181. See Petition for Review, at 21-23, Kriefall, 671 N.W.2d 849 (citing Michigan
Meat Ass'n v. Block, 514 F. Supp. 560 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (holding that the FMIA
did not violate the plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment substantive due-process rights); see
also American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953) (interpreting
road safety rules promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to
the Motor Carriers Act of 1935); Houston v. St. Louis Indep. Packing Co., 249 U.S.
479 (1919) (upholding USDA regulation prohibiting use of the term "sausage" as
false and deceptive when applied to products with added cereal in-excess of two-
percent and added-water in-excess of three-percent); Grocery Mfrs. of Am. v.
Gerace, 755 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1985) (addressing federal labeling requirements for
alternative cheese products and meat product containing them); Community
Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 749 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding USDA labeling
regulations under Section 6 1 0(d) allowing the use of mechanically de-boned meat in
processed meat food products with a label that described bone content in terms of
the calcium the product contained); Public Citizen v. Foreman, 631 F.2d 969 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (affirming district court ruling that nitrites in bacon and other cured
meats are exempt from the provisions of the FDCA); Meat Inst. v. Bergland, 459 F.
Supp. 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (denying AMI's motion for preliminary injunction to
enjoin a rule setting forth procedures for monitoring the processing of bacon and
regulating the presence of nitrosamines); Armour & Co. v. Ball, 468 F.2d 76 (6th Cir.
1972) (holding that federal ingredient standards issued by the Secretary pursuant to
Section 607(c) for sausages preempt conflicting state standards); U.S. v 1,500 Cases
More or Less, Tomato Paste, 236 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1956) (interpreting the FDCA
Section and finding that confiscated product was misbranded because it contained
levels of mold above the "tolerance levels" that FDA had set for mold pursuant to
FDCA Section 341(a)(3), which is the equivalent to FMIA section 602(3) and (4),
both inapplicable here); W. B. Wood Mfg. Co. v. United States, 286 F. 84 (7th Cir.
1923) (interpreting in a confiscation libel case the FDCA "added deleterious
substance" section and finding that confiscated product was misbranded because it
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The Congressional power that the Meat Industry invoked in its
description of FMIA is impressive; but not nearly as impressive as
the meat-inspection system it purports to describe. According to the
meat industry, "Congress specifically prohibits any meat from
leaving an official establishment until FSIS affirmatively determines
the meat is 'not adulterated."" 2  If this were only true, the
thousands of children and adults injured or killed in outbreaks
caused by contaminated meat would be a lot happier and alive.
Just as it did in the Court of Appeals, the Meat Industry tried to
sell a version of federal inspection and regulation in which each and
every meat product is closely inspected and certified safe before it
leaves the meat plant. Apparently hoping that the careful analysis of
the current HACCP-based meat inspection process in Kriefall would
be ignored, seeking further appellate review, the Meat Industry
continued to insist that USDA, in essence, runs every federally-
inpected meat processing facility in the country. This was the
primary argument rejected by the Kriefall court, however, and
probably also the reason that the meat industry's position lacked
credibility. As the Kriefall court had explained:
Effective January 26, 1998, for meat processors with more than
500 employees, the Food Safety and Inspection Service delegated
to the meat processors themselves the responsibility of coming up
with procedures, designated as a Hazard Analysis and Critical
Control Point system, adapted to the processors' own
circumstances, to safeguard the wholesomeness of the meat they
produce. (citing and quoting 9 C.F.R. § 417.2(a)(1); Pathogen
Reduction, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,869.)
contained an unapproved food coloring); American Nw. Selecta, Inc. v. Munoz, 106 F.
Supp. 2d 223 (D. Puerto Rico 2000) (presenting a preemption case involving
regulation in conflict with FMIA labeling standard involving what information must
appear on federal certificate of inspection); Cook Family Foods, Ltd. v. Voss, 781 F.
Supp. 1458 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (calculating the effect of added water in determining
the labeled-weight of hams sold in California); Kircos v. Holiday Food Ctr., Inc.,
477 N.W.2d 130 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (providing a non-controlling opinion of the
Michigan Court of Appeals involving trichinosis in pork); Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc.
v. Rockland County Dep't of Weights and Measures, No. 01 Civ. 6980, 2003 WL
554796 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding in a labeling and misbranding case that the FMIA
regulations governing food label net-weight statements preempted conflicting
county regulations); Gorton v. American Cyanamid Co., 522 N.W.2d 746 (Wis.
1995) (addressing the issue of FIFRA preemption involving herbicide labeling)).
182. See Petition for Review, at 7, Kriefall, 671 N.W.2d 849 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 602)
(emphasis added).
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As further summarized by the Department in a June 2000 report
issued by its Office of Inspector General, the new program was
designed to "reverse[]" the arrangement under which "the
production of meat and poultry products was monitored at every
stage by Government employees" to a system that "allowed a
plant to monitor itself." U.S.D.A. Rep. No. 24001-3-At, at 1
(2000). Thus, the new plan, as phrased by the report, "gave
[meat] industry, not Government, the primary responsibility for
ensuring the safety of meat and poultry products."'
'83
Yet, the Meat Industry's continued insistence that FSIS controls all
aspects of its operation and guarantees that no adulterated meat
leaves its facility seems in the end to be little more than self-serving
rhetoric divorced from reality. If the Meat Industry's position was
true, there would be no need for product-recalls because no
adulterated meat would ever leave a meat-processing facility and
enter the stream of commerce.
The Meat Industry twisted language and logic in a failed
attempt to explain how E. coli 0157:H7, which is indisputably an
adulterant, is nonetheless not an adulterant if it sits only on the
surface of meat that happens to be intact at the time it leaves the
processing plant. Put another way, the Meat Industry asked us to
accept the notion that the presence of an adulterant on meat does
not make the meat "adulterated." To do so, it repeatedly invoked
word plays like "the circumstances" under which raw meat is
adulterated, and the "quantity of the poisonous" substance required
to "'ordinarily' render the product injurious."' 4 But this word play
ignores just how limited the Kriefall decision really was. Without
questioning the USDA's authority to interpret or enforce FMIA, the
court simply ruled that USDA "has only limited authority to affect
the congressional definition of 'adulterant,' other than in the area of
labeling."' 5 As the Supreme Court recently pointed out in Bates v.
Dow Agrosciences, a statute that "preempts competing state labeling
standards . . . does not, however, preempt any state rules that are
fully consistent with federal requirements," including particularly
state tort claims premised on a claim of misbranding.'
183. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 430.
184. See Petition for Review, at 9 & 11, Kriefall, 671 N.W.2d 849 (emphasis
added).
185. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 425 (emphasis added).
186. Bates, 544 U.S. at _, 125 S.Ct. at 1803.
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The Kriefal1 decision therefore gets it right by recognizing a
crucial distinction between the preemptive effect of the agency's
authority to establish uniform labels, and its authority to declare (or
not declare) a pathogen as an adulterant. This made unnecessary
any analysis of the spin that the Meat Industry was putting on the
Non-Intact Meat Policy Statement.
8 7
2. E. coli 0157:H7 as Natural, and Inevitable, to Meat
In its castigation of the Court of Appeal's decision, the Meat
Industry assumed that E. coli 0157:H7 is not an "added substance"
under FMIA.8 s But it is. Unlike the fish-bones and oyster shells that
were deleterious, but not added, pathogens can be readily
distinguished. Cattle become infected with E. coli 0157:1H7, and it
can then spread throughout a herd, multiplying and propagating,
and infecting other cattle. 9 As infected cattle excrete feces, the E.
coli 0157:H7 contaminates the cattle's hides. 19 ° The E. coli 0157:H7
contaminating the hides, and in the feces and ingesta, then cross-
contaminate the carcasses of other animals during the production-
process. 9' There is, as a result, nothing "natural" about the
presence of E. coli 0157:H7 in meat; it is both an adulterant and a
deadly "added substance."
Ignoring the foregoing, the Meat Industry still continued to
argue that "E. coli is a natural inhabitant in the intestines of
animals... [and] cannot always be avoided."'92 But FSIS has always
disagreed with this argument and excuse, explaining that:
Several commentators, including [meat] industry groups ... were
opposed to the concept that beef that test positive for E. coli
0157:H7 be considered adulterated because the organism may
187. See Non-Intact Meat Policy Statement, 64 Fed. Reg. 2803.
188. See 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(1) (2000). The "ordinarily injurious to health"-a less
strict standard that allows for tolerance levels--only applies if the poisonous or
deleterious substance "is not an added substance." Id. (emphasis added).
189. E. coli 0157:H7 Contamination of Beef Products, 67 Fed. Reg. at 62,327.
190. Id. See also HACCP Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,837 (stating that "fecal
contamination of carcasses is the primary avenue for contamination").
191. HACCP Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,837 ("Pathogens may reside in fecal
material, ingesta, both within the gastrointestinal tract and on the exterior surfaces
of the animals going to slaughter.").
192. See Petition for Review, at 10, Kriefall, 671 N.W.2d 849 (emphasis in original).
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be inherent in raw meat and poultry when produced under
current technology.
Under FMIA, a product is "adulterated" if "it bears or contains
any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it
injurious to health; but in case the substance is not an added
substance, such article shall not be considered adulterated under
this clause if the quantity of such substance does not ordinarily
render it injurious to health .... " (21 U.S.C. 601(m)(1))
Because beef products contaminated with [E. coli] 0157:H7 are
often cooked in a manner that may not prevent illness, this
pathogen is a substance that renders "injurious to health" even
products that many consumers consider to be properly cooked.'
Therefore, the Kriefall decision was right to reject the Meat
Industry's argument in finding that the "goal of the Food Safety and
Inspection Service and the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Point plans it implements is to 'prevent' fecal contamination and E.
coli contamination-what the agency called 'zero tolerance' for fecal
contamination and the concomitant reduction of the E. coli




3. Consumer Responsibility vs. Meat Industry Responsibility:
Just Cook It
The Kriefall decision is also buttressed by the FSIS's prior
rejection of the meat industry's argument, repeated by Excel in its
Petition, that it is the consumer's responsibility to make the meat it
purchases safe to eat-a sort of caveat esor, or eater beware,
policy.'95 FSIS notes:
Several industry commentators stated that consumers should
assume more responsibility for their safety and expressed the
need for consumer awareness programs regarding the impor-
tance of cooking beef products thoroughly.
193. Recent Developments Regarding Beef Products Contaminated with E. coli
0157:H7, 65 Fed. Reg. 6881, 6884 (Feb. 11, 2000).
194. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 435 (citing 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,850; 67 Fed. Reg. at
62,329).
195. See Petition for Review, at vii, Kriefall, 671 N.W.2d 849 (stating that "the
dangers are easily avoided in intact meat through proper handling and cooking")
(emphasis in original).
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Industry can reduce or eliminate risk associated with [E. coli]
0157:H7 through various controls and interventions... that can
be incorporated into HACCP systems. Because industry has the
means to reduce or eliminate the hazard, consumers should not be
expected to assume all the responsibility for preventing
foodborne illness associated with [E. coli] O157:H7. "
The Meat Industry's caveat esor policy was thus rightly rejected by
the Court of Appeals. The Meat Industry was predictably outraged
at the court's elevation of public interest in the safety of the meat
supply over purely economic concerns. Indeed, in its amicus brief
filed with the United States Supreme Court, the Meat Industry
claimed that the court's focus is "on people's health and safety ...
blinded [it] to the other statutory objectives [of FMIA]-namely,
promoting the national market for wholesome meat and protecting
the meat industry from losses.1 97 A better "us versus them"
statement by the Meat Industry would be hard to find, the crux of
which plainly is: more death and illness is the cost of doing business,
and the cost should be borne by consumers, not the Meat Industry.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that, despite its insistence on
consumer responsibility, and its preference for consumer education
above all, the Meat Industry has impeded more than helped
providing accurate and complete information to the public. For
example, when in the wake of the Jack in the Box outbreak USDA
wanted to put warning labels that included the temperature to which
ground beef should be cooked to, the Meat Industry sued to stop
it. '9 And while the Meat Industry and USDA has stepped-up
consumer education efforts, the information continues to be either
inadequate or inaccurate. For example, consumers are told to use a
meat thermometer, but the bi-metallic coil thermometer indicated
196. 65 Fed. Reg. 6881, 6884 (emphasis added).
197. Brief of Amici Curiae, at 20, Kriefall, 541 U.S. 956 (2004) (citing 21 U.S.C. §
602) [hereinafter Brief of Amici].
198. NESTLE, supra note 21, at 77 (noting that the Meat Industry "did not want
package labels to suggest that anything might be inherently wrong with their
product."). See American Pub. Health Ass'n v. Butz, 511 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(in a divided decision, ruling that the USDA need not require warning labels with
cooking instruction on meat and poultry). For a helpful discussion of this decision,
and the USDA's support for the Meat Industry's position against warning labels, see
NESTLE, supra note 21, at 65-67. Of course, in the wake of the Jack in the Box
outbreak, the Meat Industry changes its position. Id. at 76-78. And now the Meat
Industry uses the existence of these labels to buttress its argument that it is the
consumer's sole duty make meat safe to it.
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on the USDA warning-label is ineffective and inaccurate, and using it
"can jeopardize public health, particularly the health of the young,
elderly, and immune-compromised portion of the population.' 19
And recent research continues to show that, while consumers have a
high level of concern about food safety, they do not have a
correspondingly high awareness of the practices required for safe
food production.0° Moreover, "data suggest that many consumers
are unaware that food safety problems are likely to occur in their
homes, believing that the responsibility for food safety lies instead
with food manufacturers and restaurants. 2 1
IV. AGAINST PREEMPTION: ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL
I must confess that my trust is in the jury and the tort law whose
operations I can see, rather than in an administrative body, whose
fairness and comprehensiveness I can only pray for. Preemption
by regulation is a doctrine that makes me nervous in a world of
rapidly developing technological dangers and wonders. 2
Foodborne illness remains an overwhelming problem in the
United States. The best and most recent estimate concluded that
foodborne diseases cause approximately 76 million illnesses,
325,000 hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths in the United States each
year.203 Compared to other regulated products, even those subject
to mandatory recall authority, food products cause more deaths each
199. 0. Peter Snyder, Food Temperature Variations Along The Stem Of The Bimetallic-
Coil Thermometer, 19 DAIRY FOOD ENVIRON. SANrATION (no. 7) 477, 481, 483 (1999)
("The data show that it was difficult to assess when the hamburger was done without
the use of a thermocouple.").
200. Elizabeth C. Redmond & Christopher J. Griffith, Consumer Food Handling in
the Home: A Review of Food Safety Studies, 66 J. FOOD PROTECTION (No. 1) 130, 136
(2003) (noting, for example, that responses to surveys "have shown that [forty
percent] of consumers did not know or were not consciously aware that they were
using unsafe practices").
201. Id.
202. Jack B. Weinstein, Symposium: The Restatement of Torts and the Courts, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 1439, 1442 (Apr. 2001). Mr. Weinstein is Senior Judge, United States
District Court, Eastern District of New York. Id. at 1439.
203. Paul S. Mead et al., Food-Related Illness and Death in the United States, 5
EMERGING INFECT. DIs. (No. 5) 607, 614 (1999). Also finding that unknown agents
account for eighty-one percent of foodborne illnesses and hospitalizations, and
sixty-four percent of deaths. Id. at 616.
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year than other regulated products." 4 "In fact, contaminated food
products caused more deaths each year than the combined totals of
all 15,000 products regulated by the [United States] Consumer
Product Safety Commission. "205
"Despite regulatory efforts to improve the safety of the U.S.
food supply, foodborne E. coli 0157:H7 outbreaks remain common.
Ground beef remains the most frequently identified vehicle.
'206
Thus, notwithstanding the Meat Industry's claim that allowing state
tort claims premised on FMIA adulteration standards will do
"violence to an effective and proven statutory and administrative
scheme, 20 7 there is no evidence the current scheme is either effective
or proven. In fact, there is much evidence to the contrary.208
Moreover, there is both evidence and cogent arguments
demonstrating that lawsuits can (and should) provide important and
needed feedback to the Meat Industry about the safety of its
products. 209 Such lawsuits also create needed economic incentives to
204. Jean C. Buzby et al., Economic Research Service/USDA, Product Liability and
Microbial Foodborne Illness, at 1 (AER-799 2001), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/
publications/aer799/aer799b.pdf ("Pathogen contaminated foods.., represent an
important cause of unintentional injury and death.").
205. Id.
206. Rangel et al., supra note 34, at 606.
207. Brief of Amici, supra note 197, at 20. See also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
at 3, Excel Corp. v. Estate of Kriefall, 541 U.S. 956 (2004) [hereinafter Petition for
Writ] (stating "the decision below significantly undermines an important regulatory
system"). That USDA has, in the time since the Kriefall decision upheld, continued
on with its regulatory activities without any apparent disruption or change, not even
abandoning its policies regarding E. coli 0157:H7 on intact cuts of meat, further
reveals the in terrorem nature of the Meat Industry's arguments.
208. General Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry, U.S. SENATE, MEAT AND POULTRY- Better USDA Oversight
and Enforcement of Safety Rules Need to Reduce Risk of Foodborne Illnesses, GAO-02-902,
at 4, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02902.pdf. "FSIS is not ensuring
that all plants' HACCP plans meet regulatory requirements and, as a result,
consumers may be unnecessarily exposed to unsafe foods that can cause foodborne
illness."
209. Buzby et al., supra note 204, at 9 (suggesting "economic theory suggests that
foodborne illness litigation provides signals to firms to invest more in food safety,
ultimately resulting in a lower incidence of foodborne illness and an increase in
general social welfare."). But see Lassiter, supra note 66, at 417 ("civil action through
consumer lawsuits seeking monetary damages have failed to shift the cost-benefit
analysis for the [Meat Industry] enough to alter the status quo."). Professor
Lassiter's conclusion that foodborne illness litigation cannot "provide sufficient
incentive for meat producers to provide a safe meat supply to the public," is more
20051
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invest in improved food safety technology and innovation."1 That
food safety innovation is desirable should arguably go without
saying: "Widespread diffusion of food safety innovation not only
increases choice and economic efficiency, it also saves lives and
improves health .... Innovation and the adoption and diffusion of
food safety improvements will help combat foodborne illness and
improve the quality of life for all Americans." '' But innovation is
not occurring in sufficient measure to sustain further food safety
improvement given the persistence of E. coli 0157:H7 and other
deadly pathogens in our food supply.
One commentator calls the resistance to investment in food
safety innovation "the paradox of an industry committed to safety,
but also not wanting to spend the money for safety improvements
because it is perceived as unprofitable.21 This perception exists
even though the USDA Economic Research Service determined that
the annual cost to plants of HACCP compliance has increased no
asserted than proven. Accord Roots, supra note 66, at 2431-32 (criticizing Professor
Lassiter's reliance on cited authorities that do not in fact support her position, and
describing as absurd her contention that the multimillion dollar settlements that
were obtained in the Jack in the Box outbreak cases had no effect upon corporate
conduct). A complete rebuttal of Professor Lassiter's flawed analysis, including its
failure to take into account the application of strict liability to defective food cases,
and to distinguish between outbreak versus sporadic cases in the proof of causation,
must await another article.
210. See Buzby et al., supra note 204, at 9; Bates, 544 U.S. at __, 125 S. Ct. at 1802
(stating that "the specter of damage actions may provide manufacturers with added
dynamic incentives to continue to keep abreast of all possible injuries stemming
from the use of their product so as to forestall such actions through product
improvements").
211. Elise Golan et al., ERS/USDA, Food Safety Innovation in the United States:
Economic Theory & Empirical Evidence From the Meat Industry, at 2 (AER-831 Apr.
2004) (finding that while foodborne disease outbreaks spur the demand for safety
and innovation, overall the core drivers of innovation are relatively weak for food
safety).
212. Fortin, supra note 66, at 574 (proposing the enactment of a Citizen's Food
Protection Act that would, inter alia, create judicial review of administrative action
and a private right of action for even those not injured by unwholesome food to sue
to enjoin "conduct that has, or is likely to have, the effect of adulterating or
impairing the cleanliness, safety or wholesomeness or food"). Id. at 591. Without
taking a position on the need or likely efficacy of the Act in improving food safety, I
strongly agree with Mr. Fortin that "access to the courts can provide the best
solution to the risk of agency capture, inadequate government resources, and the
dilemma of the insider perspective." Id. at 587.
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more than one-third of one cent per pound, and increased the cost
of meat and poultry products less than one-percent.1
Another reason for the resistance to voluntary investment in
food safety innovation is the absence of an obvious profit-motive.
Consumers cannot detect food safety, making it difficult for a
manufacturer to market safety as a product attribute, or more
importantly, for which to charge a premium. 4 As one economic
analysis performed by USDA found:
Consumers do not have complete information about the safety of
products they buy because producers have no direct incentive to
provide this information. Since it is not clear whether consumers
can distinguish different safety levels in food products, firms may
not wish to incur the cost of providing more than the minimum
required level of safety in the food products they market.215
Consequently, except for the compelled investments required to
achieve regulatory compliance, the desire to avoid the unwanted
costs associated with the manufacture and sale of an unsafe product,
including liability for product-related injury, is the only other
remaining compelling reasonincentive for voluntary investement in
food safety innovation. 6
The resistance (or disinclination) to voluntarily invest in food
safety is highest for commodity-like products such as ground breef
213. Michael Ollinger et al., USDA-ERS, Meat and Poultry Plants' Food Safety'
Investments: Survey Findings, Summary, at iii (2004), available at http://www.ers.usda
.gov/publications/tb 1911/tb 1911 .pdf.
214. Id. at 3; Golan, supra note 211, at 6 (noting for example that consumers
cannot tell by looking at it whether ground beef contains E. coli 0157:H7). See also
Nigol Manoukian, The Federal Government's Inspection and Labeling of Meat and Poultry
Products: Is it Sufficient to Protect the Public's Health, Safety, and Welfare, 21 W. ST. U. L.
RE'. 563, 563 (1994) ("A meat inspector can't see it, smell it, or feel it. Neither can
a chef nor someone cooking hamburger on a backyard barbecue. Microbiological
contamination, the most serious public health threat to the nation's food supply,
cannot be detected by the human senses."). Of course, if the consumer is infected
there is likely to be more than sufficient evidence of the defective nature of the
product after the fact of purchase, which is to say, when it is too late to make a
difference to the consumer's choice of the product.
215. Crutchfield et al., supra note 96, at 1-2.
216. Id. See also Buzby et al., supra note 204, at 8 (noting that "[t]hese are
'negative incentives' or adverse consequences for firms responsible for selling
pathogen-contaminated food").
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and subprimals sold for further-processing at retail.21 7 Products like
these are not subject to the market incentives applicable to
manufactured products with detailed contract specification, those
that are inspected for foreign export and those that are sold under
the manufacturer's brand name.1 8 As a result, if the manufacturers
of such products could not be held financially responsible under
product liability law, the only food safety incentive left would be the
need for regulatory compliance.
Ultimately then, the argument against preemption is the
argument against letting the Meat Industry shift the costs of its
manufacturing mistakes to those injured as a result.2 9 How much to
invest to improve the safety of the manufacturing process is a cost-
benefit analysis that manufacturers have nearly always faced. While
the Meat Industry has tried to argue that the challenges it faces are
unique, and "that a failure to apply federal preemption will subject
the meat-processing industry to intractable dilemmas," 220 this
argument must be rejected, just as the court in Kiefall did, aptly
noting:
[A]II manufacturers confront difficult cost/benefit choices when
balancing expense and methods of production on one hand,
against, on the other hand, potential liability for injuries that may
be caused by their products; we see no special burden on Excel or
other meat processors beyond that faced by anyone who puts
potentially dangerous products into the stream of commerce.
221
217. Ollinger et al., supra note 213, at 14. The tri-tips that were the subject of the
Sizzler E. coli 0157:H7 outbreak, and the resulting litigation, are an example of a
subprimal.
218. Id.
219. It is not, however, just the injured person who must shoulder the costs
associated with foodborne illness. It has been shown that some costs are shifted to
parties other than the person who became ill, including health insurance companies
for those insured, including the government for those on Medicare or Medicaid,
health care providers and taxpayers for those not insured, and employers through
sick-pay and in productivity losses. Buzby et al., supra note 204, at 7 (noting that
"these cost-shifting mechanisms may reduce the economic incentives for ill
individuals to seek compensation from those responsible for causing their illness.").
The Author's experience handling foodborne illness damage claims strongly
supports the theory that in any outbreak there will be a percentage of persons who
decide that their injuries are not serious enough to justify the decision to proceed
with a claim. This decision-making process merits empirical research.
220. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 436 n.7.
221. Id.
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The Meat Industry believes itself to be unique among regulated
industries and thus entitled to its own rule on preemption. It is
difficult to dispute that the Meat Industry is not at least unique in
appearing "relentless and self-serving.
222
It is primarily through our system of tort laws that those injured
by others are compensated, and tortfeasors are forced to pay the full
social costs of their activities.228 Such liability is intended to motivate
manufacturers to use their exclusive control of information about the
manufacturing process to reduce the occurrence of product-related
accidents.2 4 In addition to the information advantage they possess
over consumers, manufacturers are afforded a deliberate choice
about the level of investment in production quality and control
processes. 25 While regulations require certain things of all USDA-
inspected establishments, including a HACCP plan, the details of
such plans, including the technologies and interventions used,
remain solely in the control of the meat industry. For example, no
one requires the meat industry to run line-speeds as fast as they
do.2 6 This was a fact not lost on the Kriefall court, which noted:
222. NESTLE, supra note 21, at 103 (commenting on a statement made by
Rosemary Mucklow, the Executive Director of the National Meat Association,
accusing USDA of proposing a change in its E. coli 0157:H7 testing policy as a
means by the White House of diverting attention from the scandal involving
President Clinton and Monica Lewinsky). The author of this article is not surprised
at Ms. Mucklow's statement having attended a USDA sponsored conference on
pathogen reduction where, during a comment period, she stood at the microphone
and said something to the effect, "if pathogens in meat is really such a problem, I'd
like to be shown where the bodies are buried." Nancy Donley, whose child died as a
result of an E. coli 0157:H7 infection caused by adulterated ground beef, offered to
show Ms. Mucklow where at least one such body was buried.
223. Weinstein, supra note 202, at 1439 (arguing that the compensatory and
inhibitory aspects of tort law are particularly important in the area of mass torts and
public nuisances).
224. 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 5.2 (3d ed. 2000). This
rationale was the one most often emphasized by Chief Justice Traynor in those early
cases holding in favor of strict product liability. See, e.g., Escola v. Cola Cola
Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1964) (Traynor, J., concurring). See also Roger
W. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN.
L. REv. 363 (1965) (setting forth Justice Traynor's rationale in favor of the
imposition of strict liability).
225. Owen, supra note 2, at 855.
226. Machado, supra note 15, at 812. "Microbes become introduced into the meat
because of fast and sloppy slaughter practices. For example, an average line speed
slaughters three hundred cattle per hour, or one cow every three seconds." Id.
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The record here demonstrates in a concrete way how the claims
asserted against Excel supplement the protection afforded by the
meat inspection program and what the Food Safety and
Inspection System has recognized are the significant limitations
of the "organoleptic examination by inspectors." Only two
federal inspectors oversee a meat fabrication area in Excel's
plants where several hundred workers daily cut the approximately
seven-foot-long, 350 pound split carcasses into some 8,000 intact
cuts of beef weighing approximately two to four or three to five
pounds each. Federal inspectors do not inspect each one of these
smaller cuts of beef. Moreover, the seven-foot-long carcasses
arrive at the fabrication area after whizzing by the Service
inspection station at a rate of one side every six seconds." 7
Thus, plainly, the fact that meat is stamped with the words
"inspected and passed" does not mean that inspection actually
occurred or that it was effective.
Defects happen and unsafe meat gets through into interstate
commerce, even with strict regulatory compliance. 2 ' No rational
policy or regulation should assume the absence of defects, while also
allowing preemption based on such an assumption. Doing so risks
leaving those injured by real defects without a remedy. As long as
one views compensatory damages as serving a cost-internalization
process, no reason exists to think that damage awards contradict a
federal safety regulation intended to protect the public health. 29
Preempting the rights of persons injured by unsafe meat based on
the legal fiction that it was not adulterated because it was "inspected
and passed" accomplishes no objective except to immunize the Meat
Industry from liability for product defects. Such preemption also
ignores that cases involving regulatory compliance generally involve
products defective in design, or defective due to inadequate
227. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 435-36.
228. Michael, supra note 93, at 555-56 (emphasizing that in regulatory regime
based on voluntary compliance, "there will be failures, even if the program is
functioning perfectly. The relevant comparison is not to zero faults, but the results
using any alternative regulatory technique.") As such, if too many defects are
created as a result of a given regulatory technique, and the regulated entity remains
liable for defect-related damages, then that entity is more likely to cooperate further
to improve how well the regulations work.
229. Hills, supra note 76, at 35 (arguing that "compensatory damages can be
explained by the state's judgment of corrective justice that, whatever the social
benefits of some activity, the actor ought to restore person's injured by the activity
to the position that they would have occupied but for their injuries.").
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warnings.2" A company might convincingly argue that its product
information was not legally deficient because it contained all
information required by the agency that approved it. The same
cannot be said for a company that argues, as Excel did, that meat
contaminated with a deadly pathogen cannot be treated as
defective-which is to say, unsafe beyond that reasonably expected
by an ordinary consumer-under state tort law solely because it came
from a federally-inspected meat-processing facility.
Adulteration standards should therefore be viewed for what they
are-minimal safety standards. 23' To require compensation under
state law does nothing to undermine those standards. A successful
product liability lawsuit does not impose a recall on a company or
subject it to increased regulation or enforcement.232 As is the case
with strict product liability involving manufacturing defects, the
230. Richard C. Ausness, The Case For a "Strong" Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55
MD. L. REV. 1210, 1226 (1996) ("In recent years, manufacturers have argued that
tort claims should be barred by the preemption doctrine when their products
comply with applicable federal labeling and design requirements."). See also
Schwartz, supra note 102, at 1128-29 (offering cogent criticism of tort "reform"
proposals that would make compliance with federally-issued product safety
standards a complete defense to a product liability claim, and arguing that such
standards should continue to be treated as minimum, not maximum, standards of
care). See also Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as The
Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903 (1996) (arguing that
"Cipollone makes the most sense if interpreted as announcing a federal common law
rule accepting the government standards defense rather than as a true preemption
defense available in tort actions.").
231. Weinstein, supra note 202, at 1442 (claiming "administratively-determined
product safety standards . . . should merely provide minimum standards, not
supplant tort law."). See also Lisa Lovett, Food for Thought: Consistent Protocol Could
Strengthen Food Supply Security Measures, 10 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 465, 471 (2004)
(making the interesting, albeit probably over-optimistic, argument regarding the
number of pits allowed in a can of "pitted" cherries, that "in practice, USDA
standards are not as rigorous as what cautious fruit based manufacturers would
require in order to maintain their customer base, and although deemed 'pitted' by
the USDA, these manufacturers would likely further screen these cherries before
processing them."). Whether Ms. Lovett is correct in her prediction about the
cherry-processor, however, it seems safe to assume that no extra care or further
processing would be used if it was certain that the USDA standards preempted state
tort claims and there was no risk of being held liable for injuries caused by a pit in
"pitted" cherry.
232. The author is unaware of any food recall ever prompted by the filing of a
lawsuit. Lawsuits follow recalls and foodborne illness outbreaks; they do not
precede them.
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defect in the product represents a departure from its specification,
and it is this departure for which the manufacturer is held strictly
liable.33 By continuing to allow the Meat Industry to be held liable
for the injuries caused by meat made unsafe because of a processing
defect, the Agency is doing what courts and modern tort law have
long done-making a tortfeasor pay for the damages it caused as a
result of its failure to use the care necessary to avoid creating the
defect that caused the injury.
Given the chaos involved with preemption analysis, and the
Agency's proclivity for ambiguous policy statements and sudden
policy-changes in the face of public outrage or political pressure,
regulatory preemption of state tort laws is likely to be no more
uniform than what exists at present. Consequently, the goal of
uniformity is not in conflict with the purpose of protecting the public
health, but a policy of implied preemption is. "Court decisions on
preemption are inconsistent and appear to have little predictive
value." '234
An explanation for such inconsistency may rest with the fact that
too often regulatory silence will be ambiguous and even close
scrutiny of the regulatory history may not reveal a clear answer. A
recent General Accounting Office study of several health and safety
agencies found that the basis for regulatory decisions frequently was
unclear. Because agencies do not intend or expect their regulations
to be used to define tort liability, it is unsurprising when these
regulations are not drafted in ways that assist the court. 35 Agencies
should expect though, especially USDA in light of the decision in
233. Strict liability exists in some form in all fifty states. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY 1 (1998). Not all states, however, call it strict liability.
For example, in Michigan, such liability is still treated as a form of implied
warranty. See, e.g., Vincent v. Allen Bradley Co., 291 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1980) (holding
that a breach of implied warranty is established on proof of injury caused by a defect
in the product, attributable to the manufacturer, that made the product not
reasonably fit for its intended use).
234. Ausness, supra note 230, at 1234 ("Thus, manufacturers who believe that
federal safety standards preempt tort liability must engage in lengthy and expensive
litigation in order to obtain an authoritative decision from the courts on the issue.
This failing greatly reduces the value of the preemption doctrine as a 'safe harbor'
for manufacturers whose products satisfy federal regulatory standards.").
235. Schwartz, supra note 102, at 1132 (footnotes omitted). While the use of
regulations to seek preemption of state tort claims may have been unsurprising at
the time of Professor Schwarz's article, it would be surprising for an agency to be
unaware of this issue now.
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Kriefall, that the meat industry intends to use its rules and policies as
a preemption defense.
Agencies charged with protecting the public should not
impliedly preempt the rights of those injured by unsafe meat to seek
compensation under state law.236 If we must accept that an agency
has the power to preempt, it should, at a minimum, accept the same
limits as those that apply to Congress, the source of its authority.
This means USDA, like Congress or any other agency, must be
accountable to the public, rather than deferential to the Meat
Industry it regulates. 2 137 It also means that the decision process must
be transparent, and the decision made that it makes be clear and
consistent.238 To-date, the E. coli 0157:H7 policy decisions made by
USDA have been none of these things.
In Kriefall, for example, the court might have avoided a direct
ruling on the scope of Agency authority by simply finding that the
Agency's policy statement was not sufficiently clear to preempt state
law that might be to the contrary.2 39 The Agency's statements
concerning intact meat and E. coli 0157:H7 had hardly been
consistent.210 By its own admission, the policy statement was part of
a continuing reassessment that was subject to subsequent change.
Indeed, since the policy statement first issued, and the appeals in
Kriefall had come to an end, the Agency has continued to do a
substantial amount of work in the area of intact versus non-intact
meat.241 Given this changing landscape, one might reasonably ask
236. See Ausness, supra note 230, at 1237-38 (discussing failures of preemption as
method of promoting product safety).
237. See Herrman, supra note 19, at 1197 ("A necessary premise to our system of
federalism is the notion that administrative rulemaking must somehow be
accountable to the American people in order to preserve a constitutionally
mandated balance in the area of preemption.").
238. See Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort
Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1997) (criticizing what she calls the Supreme Court's
"schizophrenic approach" to preemption analysis, and arguing that courts should
require an unmistakably clear intent from Congress before dismissing state tort
claims as preempted).
239. The court seemed to recognize this when it noted that "even the
Department's own regulations defining the word 'adulterated,' as opposed to its less
formal pronouncements, make no distinction between contaminated intact meat and
contaminated non-intact meat." Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 429 (emphasis added).
240. See discussion supra notes 82 & 83 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., FSIS Notice 32-05, Verification of Establishment's Reassessment of
HACCP Plans to Address Mechanically Tenderized Beef Products (June 1, 2005)
(stating that the reassessment was necessary because of "three recent outbreaks of
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on what basis a state tort claim should be dismissed with prejudice if,
at some later point in time, the regulatory position that formed the
basis of the dismissal is reversed. Accordingly, it makes little sense to
premise a preemption decision on policy that is in anyway unclear
evolving, or otherwise subject to possible future change.
Finally, if the Agency believes that its effective regulation
requires the preemption of state tort claims premised on FMIA, then
it should make its case public and go about the task of issuing a final
rule on the subject. Early statements by the Agency indicated that
the HACCP Final Rule was not intended to have any preemptive
effect. The Agency stated that an "establishment's liability to civil
lawsuits should not be adversely affected by this rule precisely
because it is an establishment's process, not individual lots of
product, that is being assessed, for inspection purposes, on the basis
of this testing." '42 Since then, however, the Agency has been silent
on the issue of preemption, despite the high profile efforts of the
Meat Industry to use its E. coli 0157:H7 policy, among other things,
to obtain immunity from civil lawsuits. "The door is wide open for
federal agencies to exert far greater influence on the preemption
question. '  The Agency should therefore speak up, and do so
clearly, on this issue. Clarity may not stop the Meat Industry's
efforts to immunize itself from liability for the harm caused by
unsafe meat, but it will at least make the effort less likely to succeed.
V. CONCLUSION
In enacting FMIA, Congress intended "to protect the
consuming public from meat and meat food products that are
adulterated or misbranded and to assist in efforts by State or other
Government agencies to accomplish this objective."2" The goal of
disease from [E. coli 0157:H7] associated with the consumption of mechanically
tenderized beef.") One of the outbreaks mentioned was the Sizzler outbreak.
242. HACCP Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,806, 38,854. The Kriefall court did
not give this statement any weight, and it was not the basis of its decision. The court
noted, however, that "it is far from settled that an agency's view of the preemptive
effect of a statute is given any deference." Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 437 (emphasis in
original).
243. Scott A. Smith & Duana Grage, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability
Actions, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 391, 416 (2000). Smith and Grage state that "the
preemption defense is almost certain to remain highly politicized." Id. at 415.
244. 21 U.S.C. § 661 (2000).
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the Agency should be to enact regulations that result in the removal
of pathogens from the meat supply, farm to table. The fact that this
is a difficult goal to fully achieve is no reason to change it. Agency
policy making regarding the issue of E. coli 0157:H7 has been a
case-study in reactionary rulemaking and agency capture. The
Kriefall decision makes plain that the Meat Industry intends to use
preemption to try to create de facto uniform standards that will
endanger the public while leaving people injured by unsafe meat
without a remedy.
To avoid such a result, the Agency should provide a clear
directive on the subject of preemption, while also changing course
on its E. coli 0157:H7 policy. Only a zero-tolerance policy for E. coli
0157:H7 applied to all meat will achieve Congress' objective. The
court in Kriefall found that such a zero-tolerance policy currently
exists, but the USDA's conflicting and ambiguous statements on the
subject call the existence of such policy into serious question. Until
we fully understand this decidedly deadly pathogen, there is simply
no room for error in protecting the public. We should therefore
commit ourselves and the resources of our government to ensuring
that E. coli 0157:H7 never contaminates meat of any kind, any
quantity, and in any way.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2004 and again in October 2005, tort reform
advocates and the food industry tasted a temporary victory when the
United States House of Representatives passed the Personal
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, popularly titled the
"Cheeseburger Bill."' The purpose of the measure was to prevent
lawsuits against food manufacturers, marketers, distributors,
advertisers, sellers, and trade associations for alleged injuries or
1, See HR. Res. 339, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. Res. 554, 109th Cong. (2005); see
also Project Vote Smart, Food Industy Lawsuits-Passage Member Vote List, at http://
www. vote-smart.org/issuekeyvotemember.php?voteid=3375 (last visited Oct. 9,
2005),
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health conditions stemming from weight gain or obesity.2 However,
in both legislative sessions, the victory by tort reform advocates was
short-lived as the United States Senate allowed the Cheeseburger
Bill's companion measure, the Commonsense Consumption Act, to
die in committee.3 This defeat came as no surprise. The Senate had
previously blocked other House-passed measures intended to cap
legal damages and limit tort lawsuits against American industries.
4
Nevertheless, with current public opinion favoring the notion
that individuals should not be able to sue the food industry5 for their
2. H.R. Res. 339, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. Res. 554, 109th Cong. (2005).
3. S. Res. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003); S. Res. 908, 109th Cong. (2005).
4. Liza Porteus et al., House Passes "Cheeseburger Bill," FOXNews.com, Mar. 11,
2004, at http://www.foxnews.com/printer friendlystory/0,3566,113836,00.html (last
visited Oct. 9, 2005); see also Carl Hulse, Vote in House Offers a Shield In Obesity Suits,
The New York Times on the Web, Mar. 11, 2004, at http://www.wirestaurant.org/
news/obesity/67.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2005) (providing examples of Republican-
led House measures to give legal immunity to certain industries, such as gun
manufacturers and dealers, producers of a gasoline additive blamed for water
pollution, the tobacco industry, and producers of vaccines, that were ultimately
defeated in the Senate).
5. This Comment does not attempt to identify any particular member or group
of members of the food industry that might constitute proper defendants in lawsuits
seeking damages for obesity. However, it is acknowledged that such a determina-
tion is necessary for the suggested obesity lawsuits to be a viable option of enforcing
regulations imposed upon the food industry. Various authors and attorneys have
begun the process of identifying the proper members of the food industry from
which to seek damages for obesity. The plaintiffs attorney in the class action of
Barber v. McDonald's Corp. named the following defendants: McDonald's Corp.,
Burger King Corp., KFC Corp. d/b/a Kentucky Fried Chicken, and Wendy's
International, Inc. No. 23145/2002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County filed July 26,
2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/mcdonalds/barbermcds72302
cmp.pdf [hereinafter Barber Complaint]. The plaintiffs attorney in Pelman v.
McDonald's Corp. named only McDonald's Corp. as the defendant. 237 F. Supp.
2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). One book uses the term "food industry" to refer to
companies that produce, process, manufacture, sell, and serve foods, beverages, and
dietary supplements. MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: How THE FOOD INDUSTRY
INFLUENCES NUTRITION AND HEALTH 11 (2002). In a larger sense, the term
encompasses all enterprises involved in the production and consumption of food
and beverages: producers and processors of food crops and animals (agribusiness);
companies that make and sell fertilizer, pesticides, seeds, and feed; those that
provide machinery, labor, real estate, and financial services to farmers; and others
that transport, store, distribute, export, process, and market foods after they leave
the farm. Id. In yet another sense, the food industry could be defined as the food
service sector-food carts, vending machines, restaurants, bars, fast-food outlets,
schools, hospitals, prisons, and workplaces-and associated suppliers of equipment
and serving materials. Id. Another approach might be to define "Big Food" as the
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obese condition,6 the battle over tort reform against the food
industry is far from over. In particular, state legislatures are
introducing measures that mirror the federal Cheeseburger Bill in
an attempt to reach the same results.7 With strong support from the
powerful food industry, such efforts have not been without success!
more high-profile members of the food industry such as: AFC Enter., Inc. (operates
Church's Chicken and Popeyes); Altamira Corp. (operates Arby's); Burger King
Corp.; Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc. (operates Rally's Burgers); Chick-il-A,
Inc.; Dairy Queen Corp.; Domino's Pizza, L.L.C.; Jack in the Box, Inc.; The Krystal
Co.; McDonald's Corp.; Papa John's Int'l, Inc.; Schlotzsky's, Inc.; Sonic Corp.;
Whataburger Corp.; Wendy's Int'l, Inc.; Yum! Brands, Inc. (operates Kentucky Fried
Chicken, Pizza Hut, Taco Bell, Long John Silvers, and A&W); Krispy Kreme, Inc.;
Coca-Cola Co.; and Pepsi Co. See Jeremy H. Rogers, Note, Living on the Fat of the
Land: How To Have Your Burger and Sue It Too, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 859, 861 n.17
(2003). One alternative might be to sue the members of major food industry
professional organizations such as the National Restaurant Association that serve as
representatives of the industry as a whole. See generally infra note 8. This Comment
contends that the main criteria for selecting the proper defendants should be to
target companies that prioritize the generation of profits first and foremost without
regard for the consequences of over-consumption of their products and do not take
an active role in preventing obesity among America's population.
6. H.R. Rep. No. 108-432, at 13 (2004), 2004 WL 409208 (2004) (citing Gallup
Poll, Analysis, Public Balks at Obesity Lawsuits, (July 21, 2003) (basing its results on
telephone interviews using a randomly selected national sample of 1,006 adults
(eighteen years and older), conducted July 7-9, 2003)).
7. National Conference of State Legislatures, 2003-2004 State Legislation on Civil
Immunity for Food Vendors, at http:/www.ncsl.org/programs/healthlFvmemo.htm (as
of October 1, 2004) (last visited Oct. 10, 2005). See Appendix A.
8. Representative Richard Anthony Keller (R. Fla.), the primary sponsor of H.R.
339 is well supported by the food industry. See Hulse, supra note 4 (listing the
National Restaurant Association and the National Federation of Independent
Businesses as backers of the bill). See also Michele Simon, Junk Food/Obesity Lawsuits
Alarm U.S. Food Giants (Apr. 1, 2004), at http:/www.organicconsumers.org/
foodsafety/obesity042004.cfm (last visited Oct. 9, 2005); James R. Carroll, Senator
Opposes Obesity Lawsuits, Courier-Journal.com (July 15, 2003) at http://www.courier-
journal.com/localnews/2003/07/15ky/wir-front-fatO715-7101.html (last visited Jan.
17, 2005) (stating that Rep. Keller's district includes the headquarters of the
company that owns the Red Lobster, Olive Garden, Bahama Breeze, and Smokey
Bones restaurant chains). Similarly, Senator McConnell (R. Ky.), the primary
sponsor of S. 1428, has received more than $200,000 in campaign contributions
from companies operating restaurants and bars, food processing companies, food
stores, and food and beverage firms, according to Federal Election Commission
records analyzed by the Center for Responsive Politics, a Washington-based group
that monitors political contributions and spending. See id. Among the
contributions were $5,000 from the National Restaurant Association, $2,000 from
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As of February 16, 2005, bills have been introduced in thirty-five
states and enacted in thirteen of those states.9
However, not all states are convinced that legislative action is
needed. Wisconsin Governor James E. Doyle, vetoed the state's
version of the bill in March 2004, and food vendor lawsuit immunity
legislation failed to pass in several states including California and
New Hampshire. l0 Still other states, such as Arkansas, have not yet
decided how to address the issues involved but have begun to
address the issue by taking the initial step of enacting measures to
study the problem of obesity.1
The Cheeseburger Bill legislation, at both the federal and state
levels, comes on the heels of two recent tort lawsuits filed in the State
of New York.12 In both cases, overweight individuals turned to the
courts to seek compensation for injuries caused by their obese
condition. 3 In addition to seeking compensation, some of the
plaintiffs hoped that successful tort claims against the food industry
would force the industry to take more responsibility for reducing the
prevalence of obesity in America.14
This comment contends that tort liability can complement
legislative and administrative government regulation of the food
industry, providing sellers and manufacturers of food with an incen-
tive to prevent consumers from over-consumption and becoming
obese. Specifically, this comment supports the proposition that after
government regulations are promulgated by Congress, claims should
be allowed by state attorneys general to recoup Medicaid costs
incurred in treating health conditions and illnesses caused by
obesity. 15 The legislature is the proper branch of our government to
determine the legislation and regulations needed to regulate the
McDonald's Corp., and $3,000 from Yum Brands, Inc., the parent company of KFC,
Taco Bell, Pizza Hut, A&W, and LongJohn Silver's. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Alyse Meislik, Note, Weighing In On the Scales of Justice: The Obesity Epidemic
and Litigation Against the Food Industry, 46 ARiz. L. REv. 781, 796 (2004) (referring to
an article detailing state study finding forty percent of Arkansas school children are
obese).
12. See Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d 512; Barber Complaint, supra note 5.
13. See generally Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d 512; Barber Complaint, supra note 5.
14. See generally Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d 512; Barber Complaint, supra note 5.
15. See Rogers, supra note 5, at 883 (proposing that states should be allowed to
sue fast food companies to recoup Medicaid costs incurred as a result of caring for
overweight and obese citizens).
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food industry, thus a thorough discussion of all possible measures to
regulate the food industry is beyond the scope of this paper.
Unlike the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA)'reached by
the states with the tobacco industry which has been described as
"largely toothless" in regulating the tobacco industry,' 7 the tort
system, by means of liability exposure, can discourage manufacturers
and sellers of food products from focusing solely on the generation
of profits and attempting to circumvent regulatory measures
authorized by Congress to govern the food industry. Tort liability
can provide the incentive needed for manufacturers and sellers of
food to take responsibility for the harm that over-consumption of
their products imposes on the scarce financial resources of the states'
Medicaid budgets.
II. OBESITY IS A NATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY CONCERN
The fiscal ramifications of obesity have thrust the issue onto the
public policy agenda, triggering a debate between those who view
obesity solely as a matter of personal responsibility and those who do
not.' 8 In 2001, the United States Surgeon General issued a "Call to
Action to Prevent and Decrease Overweight and Obesity,"1 9 thereby
bringing national attention to the issue of obesity. In this report, the
Surgeon General compared the health effects of obesity directly with
those caused by smoking cigarettes. 20 According to Roland Strum,
16. See infra Section IV.A.
17. Alan E. Scott, The Continuing Tobacco War: State and Local Tobacco Control In
Washington, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1097, 1104 (2000); Robert L. Kline, Tobacco
Advertising After the Settlement: Where We Are and What Remains To Be Done, 9 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 621, 634 (Summer 2000).
18. See generally Lou Marano, Is Obesity a U.S. Public Policy Issue, United Press
International, May 14, 2003, available at http:www.upi.conVview.cfm?StorylD=
20030513-101626-5081r (interviewing Shannon Brownlee, Senior Fellow at the New
America Foundation). For additional information, visit the website of George
Washington School of Law Professor John F. Banzhaf III at http://banzhaf.net (last
visited Oct. 9, 2005).
19. United States Dep't of Health & Human Services (DHHS), The Surgeon
General's Call to Action to Prevent and Decrease Overweight and Obesity (2001), available at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity.
20. Id. Though the original Centers for Disease Control (CDC) report estimated
the number of deaths linked to overweight and obesity to be about 400,000 per
year, in a letter and correction published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association, CDC has since reduced its estimate to about 365,000 per year. See
Betsy McKay, CDC Cuts Estimate of Deaths From Obesity, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2005, at
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the health economist who conducted the study giving rise to the
Surgeon General's report, "[o]besity appears to have a stronger
association with the occurrence of chronic medical conditions,
reduced health-related quality of life, and increased health care and
medication spending than smoking or problem drinking.,
21
A. The Statistics of Obesity
22
Being overweight or obese is an epidemic among Americans.
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) determines whether persons
are overweight or obese by calculating their body mass index
(BMI).23 The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) estimates that 64%,
or approximately two out of three American adults, are either over-
weight or obese.24 NIH estimates the number to be ninety-seven
million Americans. 25 In 1991, only four of forty-five states partici-
D7, 2005 WL-WSJ 59838170. Nonetheless, this correction does not change the fact
that obesity is the second leading cause of preventable death. Id.
21. Jonathan S. Goldman, Comment, Take That Tobacco Settlement and Super-Size
It!: The Deep-Frying of the Fast Food Industry?, 13 TEMP. POL. & Crv. RTS. L. REV. 113,
129 (2003) available at http:/Aww.surgeongeneral.gov/news/pressreleases/pr -
obesity.htm) (citing Press Release, DHHS, Overweight and Obesity Threaten U.S.
Health Gains (Dec. 13, 2001)).
22. See Rogers, supra note 5, at 862 (citing David Satcher, DHHS, Foreword to Call
To Action To Prevent and Decrease Overweight and Obesity, available at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/calltoaction/foreward.htm); Ali H.
Mokdad et al., The Spread of the Obesity Epidemic in the United States, 1991-1998, 282J.
AM. MED. AsS'N 1519 (1999); Overweight, Obesity Threaten U.S. Health Gains, FDA
CONSUMER, Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 8); see also Goldman, supra note 21, at 129.
23. Rogers, supra note 5, at 863 (citing NIH, Clinical Guidelines on the Identification,
Evaluation, and Treatment of Overweight and Obesity in Adults: The Evidence Report, NIH
Publication No. 98-4083 at xiv, available at http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/
obesity/obgdlns.pdf) [hereinafter Clinical Guidelines]). BMI is calculated as:
[[weight (in pounds) / height (in inches) x 2] x 703]. Id. BMI is categorized as
follows: Underweight (BMI < 18.5); Normal Weight (BMI = 18.5 - 24.9);
Overweight (BMI = 25.0 - 29.9); Obesity I (BMI = 30.0 - 34.9); Obesity II (BMI =
35.0 - 39.9); Obesity III [Morbid Obesity] (BMI = 40). Id.
24. Richard H. Carmona, United States Surgeon General, Statement on His
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Competition, Infrastructure, and Foreign
Commerce, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the United
States Senate, available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/news/testimony/child
obesity03O22004.htm. See also CDC, REPORT ON OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY-
DEFINING OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/
obesity/defining.htm.
25. Rogers, supra note 5, at 862 (citing Clinical Guidelines, supra note 23, at vii).
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pating in a survey conducted by CDC had obesity prevalence rates26
of 15-19% and no state had a prevalence rate greater than 20% of its
population.27 In 2001, twenty states had obesity prevalence rates of
15%-19%; twenty-nine states had prevalence rates of 20-24%; and
one state reported a prevalence rate of more than 25%.28 As a result,
obesity has been recognized as a disease by NIH, the National
Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine, the Federal Trade
Commission, the Maternal and Child Health Bureau, the World
Health Organization, the American Heart Association, the American
Academy of Family Physicians, and the American Society of Bariatric
Physicians.29
Most recently, in July 2004, the Secretary of DHHS, announced
that Medicare was removing language in its Coverage Policy Manual
indicating that "obesity is not an illness." 30 This language had pre-
viously meant that no payments could be made for obesity treatment
because, by statute, Medicare only pays for the treatment of illnesses
and accidents.31 The DHHS policy change indicates that Medicare
will now 3pay for treatments of obesity which are reasonable and
effective. Effectiveness of treatments will be decided by the
established Medicare process.
33
The Medicare Coverage Advisory Committee (MCAC) held a
hearing on November 4, 2004, to review Medicare's Coverage Policy
Manual which approves gastric bypass surgery when used for
treating diseases caused by obesity.3  MCAC was persuaded that
surgeons should follow the 1991 NIH Consensus Conference
protocol, which provides surgery to persons with a BMI greater than
26. CDC, REPORT ON OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY-1991-2001 PREVALENCE OF




29. Rogers, supra note 5, at 863 n.30.
30. AOA, Treatment: Medicare and Obesity: Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.
obesity.org/treatment/medicarefaq.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2005). DHHS did not
definitively say obesity is a disease, rather, it removed the language which said
"obesity is not a disease," and added language that Medicare would pay for




34. AOA, supra note 30.
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forty, and persons with a BMI greater than thirty-five with comorbid
conditions.3
It is now the task of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) to make national coverage determinations (NCDs)
which will provide what will be covered under the national rules for
Medicare.3 The American Society of Bariatric Surgery (ASBS) is
preparing to ask CMS for a new NCD based on the strong support
for surgery expressed at the November 4, 2004 hearings.37 The
American Obesity Association (AOA) is considering filing a petition
with CMS to cover physician counseling and services incident to
physician services consistent with the existing Medicare program.38
In addition, AOA is planning a return to Congress to seek the
inclusion of drugs to treat obesity in the Medicare pharmaceutical
benefit NCD. 39  The American Dietetic Association (ADA) is
contemplatinj what to do regarding the Medical Nutrition Therapy
benefit NCD.
Historically, what Medicare decides to cover is also selected for
coverage by the federal-state Medicaid program and by private,
commercial insurance providers.4 ' By removing the language from
the Coverage Policy Manual, Medicare officials have "opened the
door almost as far as they can go. Everything now is a techni-
cality."42 A decision to cover obesity treatments under Medicaid
could create the possibility for state attorneys general to recoup costs
for treating obesity-related illnesses from the food industry.43
When Congress first enacted Medicaid by passing the State
Plans for Medical Assistance Act, the statute provided that partici-
pating states must include in their administration plan a procedure
for recovering funds from third parties liable for the injuries of





39. AOA, supra note 30.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Marguerite Higgins, Obesity Policy Will Benefit Trial Lawyers, WASH. TIMES, July
17, 2004, available at http://washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID
=20040716-114333-6943r (quoting Professor Banzhaf).
43. Id.
44. Cliff Sherrill, Comment, Tobacco Litigation: Medicaid Third Party Liability and
Claims for Restitution, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 497, 501 (1997) (citing 42
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discretion of the states, and the administration plan adopted by the
participating state must include proper recovery procedures.45
B. The Costs of Obesity
According to a study of national costs attributed to obesity,
direct medical expenses accounted for 9.1% of the total United
States medical expenditures in 1998, an amount estimated to be as
high as $78 billion.46 Further, the National Governors Association
(NGA) estimates that the nation spends $56 billion on indirect costs
related to obesity.47 The burden of paying these expenses fell
squarely on American taxpayers, as approximately half of these costs
were paid by Medicaid and Medicare. Obesity is now estimated to
cost our society approximately $117 billion in direct and indirect
costs, second only to the costs associated with tobacco use.
49
A 2004 study focused on state-level estimates of total Medicare
and Medicaid medical expenditures attributable to obesity.5" State-
level estimates ranged from $87 million in Wyoming to $7.7 billion
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25) (1996)). The state's administration plan must take all
"reasonable measures to ascertain the legal liability of third parties." Id. at 501
n.35.
[I]n any case where such a legal liability is found to exist after medical
assistance has been made available on behalf of the individual and where
the amount of reimbursement the State can reasonably expect to recover
exceeds the cost of such recovery, the State... will seek reimbursement for
such assistance to the extent of such legal liability .... Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a (a)(25)(B) (1996)).
45. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25) (1996); Health Care Financing
Administration State Fiscal Administration Rule, 42 C.F.R. § 433.138 (1996)).
46. CDC, REPORT ON OVERWEIGHT AND OBEsITY-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/economic-consequences.htm
[hereinafter ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES] (citing a 2003 study by Finkelstein,
Fiebelkorn, and Wang).
47. Rogers, supra note 5, at 867 (citing NGA, NGA Highlights States Efforts to
Combat Obesity, available at http://www.nga.org/nga/newsroom/1,1169,C_PRESS_
RELEASE;D_3995,00.html).
48. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, supra note 46.
49. Carmona, supra note 24. "Direct costs" include preventive, diagnostic, and
treatment services related to obesity. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, supra note 46.
"Indirect costs" relate to morbidity and mortality costs. Id. "Morbidity costs" are
defined as the value of income lost from decreased productivity, restricted activity,
absenteeism, and bed days, whereas "mortality costs" are the value of future income
lost by premature death. Id.
50. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, supra note 46.
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in California.5' Medicare expenditure estimates attributable to
obesity range from $15 million in Wyoming to $1.7 billion in
California, and Medicaid expenditure estimates attributable to
obesity range from $23 million in Wyoming to $3.5 billion in New
York.5
Research studies have shown that obesity increases the risk of
developing numerous health complications including type 2
diabetes, hypertension, coronary heart disease, ischemic stroke,
colon cancer, post-menopausal breast cancer, endometrial cancer,
53gall bladder disease, osteoarthritis, and obstructive sleep apnea.
Further, adults who are overweight are considered to be at a greater
risk for disability and premature death.54
It is estimated that more than nine million children-one in
every seven children-are at increased risk of weight-related chronic
diseases.55  Pediatricians are diagnosing a greater number of
children with type 2 diabetes, formerly known as adult-onset
diabetes, and research indicates that one-third of all children born in
2000 will develop type 2 diabetes during their lifetime. 6 These
statistics are alarming because complications are likely to appear
much earlier in life for those who develop type 2 diabetes in
childhood or adolescence, and people with type 2 diabetes are at an
increased risk of developing heart disease, stroke, kidney disease,
and blindness.5 7
Thus, health problems associated with obesity clearly have a
significant economic impact on the economy of the United States. It
is equally clear that these costs are only going to increase. The issue
of who is going to pay for these costs is what is at stake in the current
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C. Obesity is a Public Policy Issue Requiring Government
and Judicial Intervention
Prevention of obesity has been an explicit goal of our national
public health policy since 1980.58 Although public policy regarding
obesity has historically been assigned to DHHS, the implementation
of obesity objectives has been distributed among several different
agencies within DHHS, with no single agency taking lead
responsibility.
59
CDC was to encourage the adoption of a model school criteria,
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was to develop a mass-
media campaign to educate the public about food labels, and NIH
was to sponsor workshops and research obesity. 6°  Further, in
response to increasing obesity in America, the United States Public
Health Service (PHS) developed successive ten-year plans to reduce
behavioral risks for obesity through specific and measurable health
objectives. However, while the various agencies continue to
encourage and publicize, their efforts to achieve national obesity
objectives have been curbed due to lack of sufficient funds.62
Nevertheless, obesity among American citizens may have little to
do with failed government efforts.63 Rather, it may be due to the
capitalistic economics of our nation's food system.64 In a competitive
marketplace, food companies must meet shareholder demands for
profits by encouraging more people to consume their products.65
58. Marion Nestle & Michael F. Jacobson, Halting the Obesity Epidemic: A Public
Health Policy Approach, 115 PUB. HEALTH REPORTS 12, 15 (Jan./Feb. 2000) (citing
DHHS, Promoting Health/Preventing Disease: Objectives for the Nation, Washington:
Government Printing Office (1980)).
59. Id. (citing DHHS, Promoting Health/Preventing Disease: Public Health Service
Implementation Plans for Attaining the Objectives for the Nation, PUB. HEALTH REPORT
SuPP. (Sept./Oct. 1983)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 15-16 (citing DHHS, Healthy People 2000: National Health Promotion and
Disease Prevention Objectives, Washington: Government Printing Office (1990);
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Healthy People 2010:
Understanding and Improving Health, Washington: Government Printing Office
(2000)).
62. NESTLE, supra note 5, at 22.
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On an annual basis, the food industry spends approximately
$33 billion on direct and indirect media advertisements.66 In 1999,
McDonald's spent $627.2 million, Burger King $403.6 million, Taco
Bell $206.5 million, and Coca-Cola $174.4 million on advertising.67
Such figures dwarf the $300 million that the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture spends annually on nutrition education, 6r the
National Cancer Institute's $1 million annual investment to increase
consumption of fruit and vegetables, 69 and the $1.5 million dollar
budget of the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute's National
Cholesterol Education Campaign.7 °
The economics of food industry spending in relation to
government spending on problems related to obesity are not
functioning on an equal basis. The food industry receives an
enormous part of our country's economic resources;71 however, those
funds are not being used to counter the negative impact that over-
consumption of the food industry's products has on our society.
III. SOCIAL TORT LITIGATION AGAINST THE FOOD INDUSTRY
A. Social Tort Litigation
An emerging trend is the use of mass tort litigation to regulate
corporate behavior. 72 The social impact of law is a legal research
inquiry that was first suggested in 1915 by Roscoe Pound in his
66. Id. at 22. See also Nestle & Jacobson, supra note 58, at 18 (citing A.E. Gallo,
The Food Marketing System in 1996, AGRIL. INFO. BULL. No. 743, Washington: United
States Department of Agriculture (1998)).
67. NESTLE, supra note 5, at 22.
68. Id.
69. Nestle & Jacobson, supra note 58, at 18 (citing Government and Industry Launch
Fruit and Vegetable Push, But NCI Takes Back Seat, 22.26 Nutrition Week 1,2 (1992)).
70. Id. (citing Lenfant C. Cleeman II, The National Cholesterol Education Program:
Progress and Prospects, 280.20 J. Am. MED. ASS'N 99-104 (1998)).
71. The American public spends more than $110 billion annually purchasing
food industry products. ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF
THE ALL-AMERICAN MEAL 3 (2002). Other estimates are as high as $800 billion.
NESTLE, supra note 5, at 11.
72. See generally Michael L. Rustad, Smoke Signals from Private Attorneys General in
Mega Social Policy Cases, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 511 (2001); Francis E. McGovern, Class
Actions and Social Issue Torts in the Gulf South, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1655 (2000); Richard P.
Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, The Tobacco Litigation,
and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1859 (2000).
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theory of social interests in the law.73 The modern trend of
regulation by litigation first arose during state Medicaid recoupment
lawsuits against the tobacco industry.74
During the tobacco litigation, trial courts deviated from tradi-
tional legal principles in order to allow state governments to achieve
their public policy goals through litigation.75 The tobacco litigation
reallocated the financial burden of caring for tobacco users, and
increased the accountability of the tobacco industry in its marketing
76 Sca opractices. Social policy tort lawsuits serve the public interest in
three ways. First, they reallocate the burden of caring for consumers
harmed by industries profiting from such consumers. Second, such
actions increase the accountability of such industries. Third, they
help to eliminate defective products and corporate practices.77
B. Comparing Potential Litigation Against the Food Industry With
Litigation Against the Tobacco Industry
In evaluating the future viability of the obesity lawsuits in
forcing the food industry to take a more active role in preventing
obesity, obesity litigation should be compared with the litigation that
devastated the tobacco industry and ultimately resulted in the
tobacco industry's MSA.7' Litigation against the tobacco industry
may have expanded the field of products liability.79 Similar to the
cases against the tobacco manufacturers, the likelihood of success
against food companies would significantly increase if hidden
manufacturing or marketing strategies are discovered through
73. Rustad, supra note 72, at 514 (citing Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28
HARv. L. REV. 343 (1915)). Professor Rustad was Of Counsel for the Amicus Curiae
Brief of the Coalition for Consumer Rights and University Scholars and Law
Professors in Illinois v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 759 N.E.2d 906 (Ill. 2001). Id. at n.al.
74. Id. at511-12.
75. Victor E. Schwartz, The Remoteness Doctrine: A Rational Limit on Tort Law, 8
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 421 (1999). States passed legislation to facilitate their
victory in court. See FLA. STAT. § 409.910 (1997); 1998 Vt. Acts & Resolves 142
(codified in part at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 1904, 1911 (1998); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. I § 15-120 (West 1998). See generally Robert A. Levy, Tobacco Medicaid
Litigation: Snuffing Out the Rule of Law, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 601 (1998).
76. Schwartz, supra note 75, at 421.
77. Rustad, supra note 72, at 514.
78. See infra Section IV.A.
79. Meislik, supra note 11, at 801-02.
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industry whistleblowers or the discovery process.80 While it cannot
be predicted at this time whether the states would be victorious in
litigation against the food industry, it would be unwise for the food
industry to underestimate the possibility of such litigation.81
1. Similarities Between Litigation Against the Food Industry
and Litigation Against the Tobacco Industry
There are several similarities between litigation against the
tobacco industry and litigation against the food industry. The same
lawyers who successfully engineered the litigation against the tobacco
companies are also the lawyers supporting litigation against the food
industry. 2 The starting point for both movements is also the same. 3
In 1964, United States Surgeon General Luther L, Terry began the
anti-smoking movement by calling cigarette smoking a "health
hazard of sufficient importance in the United States to warrant
appropriate remedial action. " Similarly, in 2001, Surgeon General
David Satcher issued a "Call to Action" against obesity,85 and since
that declaration the fight against obesity has continued to grow
throughout the United States. 6 Further, the advertising campaigns
used by both industries are very similar.
8 7
80. Id. at 802.
81. See id. (citing Laura Bradford, Fat Foods: Back in Court: Novel Theories Revive
the Case Against McDonald's-and Spur Other Big Firms To Slim Down Their Menus,
TIME ONLINE EDITION, Aug. 3, 2003, at http://www.time.com/time/insidebiz/article/
0,9171,1101030811-472858,00.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005)). David Adelman, a
consumer-food analyst at Morgan Stanley who covered the tobacco industry
litigation contends "[ilt would be a mistake to underestimate the creativity of
plaintiffs' lawyers." Meislik, supra note 11, At 802 n.214.
82. Id. at 802 (citing John Alan Cohan, Obesity, Public Policy, and Tort Claims
Against Fast-Food Companies, 12 WIDENER L.J. 103, 110 (2003) ("Lawyers who




85. See supra Section II.
86. Meislik, supra note 11, at 802.
87. Id. at 804.
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2. Differences Between Litigation Against the Food Industry
and Litigation Against the Tobacco Industry
Unlike the tobacco industry, it has not been established that the
food industry preyed on unknowing consumers, so the food industry
may lack the "diabolical reputation associated with tobacco manufac-
turers., 88 Even so, supporters of litigation against the food industry
are slowly working to eliminate this difference.8 9 In cases against the
tobacco companies, plaintiffs discovered documents revealing that
the tobacco industry "had prior knowledge of the dangers of tobacco
[and there had been] a long pattern of concealment, denial, and
even manipulation of the addictive component of tobacco."90
Further, evidence obtained in the tobacco industry litigation
revealed that the tobacco industry intentionally sought to addict
young consumers in order to ensure lifelong customers. 91
Unlike the tobacco manufacturers, there is no evidence that
food companies intentionally increased the addictive nature of their
products or intentionally misled consumers about the dangers of
their products.92 Further, those who oppose litigation against the
food industry contend that food is not addictive like nicotine, and
even if some foods are discovered to be addictive, the addictive
effects are not as harmful as the addictive effect of nicotine.93
However, without first being allowed to complete the discovery
process, it is impossible to know exactly what the food companies
know about their products or do to make their products more
dangerous.94 Meanwhile, researchers are investigating whether food
is addictive and can trigger cravings similar to drug addictions. 95
The Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine (PCRM) claims
there is biochemical evidence that the craving of unhealthy foods
88. Id. (citing Franklin E. Crawford, Note, Fit for Its Ordinary Purpose? Tobacco,
Fast Food, and the Implied Warranty of Merchantability, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1165, 1219
(2002)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 804-05 (quoting Jonathan Turley, A Crisis of Faith: Tobacco and the
Madisonian Democracy, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 433, 447 (2000)).
91. Meislik, supra note 11, at 805 (citing Crawford, supra note 88, at 1219).
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing Crawford, supra note 88, at 1219-20).
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing Crawford, supra note 88, at 1219-20); Forrest Lee Andrews,
Comment, Small Bites: Obesity Lawsuits Prepare To Take On the Fast Food Industry, 15
ALB. L.J. Sci. &TECH. 153, 164-66 (2004)).
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originates more from a physical addiction to those foods than from a
lack of willpower.96 PCRM asserts that researchers have found
certain foods are "seductive foods"-foods that are "similar to drugs
in that they cause the release of opiate-like compounds that
stimulate the brain's pleasure center."97
Another difference is that food is essential and we cannot live
without it; however, people can live without tobacco. Food has
health benefits, but "there is no such thing as a healthy diet of
smoking or smoking in moderation."" In addition, unlike tobacco
users who tend to be loyal to particular brands, it will be difficult to
prove causation for liability purposes among food addicts because
they tend to eat unhealthy products from a variety of sources. 99
Causation also becomes difficult because people who eat unhealthy
foods at restaurants also may eat poorly at home. 1"°
C. Primary Limitation of Litigation Against the Food Industry:
The Enigma of Causation
With adverse case law and an industry that appears to be acting
responsibly, state attorneys general seeking to hold the food industry
liable for obesity must confront several obstacles. First, employing a
class action lawsuit to force defendant food companies to choose the
cheaper route of settlement over costly litigation requires the crea-
tion of a suitable class. Second, even if enough plaintiffs are found
so as to allow for the creation of a class, the fatal flaws of traditional
causes of action still exist.
In order to successfully mount a class action, the plaintiff class
bears the burden of proving causation. While scientific evidence
satisfactorily establishes that obesity results from consumption of
calories in excess of that used as energy by the body, prevention of
obesity requires individuals to balance the calories they consume
with the calories they burn through metabolic and muscular
96. Meislik, supra note 11, at 805 (citing Press Release, PCRM, Nutrition Expert
Provides New Ammunition for Fast-Food Lawsuits (June 3, 2003), available at
http://www.pcrm.org/news/health03O6O3.html).
97. Id. at 806 (citing Press Release, PCRM, Health Advocates Condemn Proposed
Bill to Shield Junk Food Industry (June 16, 2003), available at http://www.pcrm.org/
news/health030616.html).
98. Id. at 808 (citing Bradford, supra note 81).
99. See id.; see also infra Section 11I.D.
100. See infra Section III.D.
2005]
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
activity.' O' Nevertheless, the precise relationship between the diet
and activity in order to prevent obesity is still being researched.' 02
In April 2003, at a scientific conference of the Federation of
American Societies for Experimental Biology, findings were pre-
sented which demonstrated that over the past twenty years, teen-
agers have, on average, increased their caloric intake by 1%.103 The
report also showed that during that same period, the percentage of
teenagers who said they engaged in some physical activity for at least
thirty minutes a day dropped from 42% to 29%.'0 4 If these findings
are true, then the drop in physical activity might be the major factor
causing increased obesity in this country. Nevertheless, there is
scientific evidence supporting the counter-argument that the level of
energy-expending activities that Americans engage in has remained
relatively constant.'0 5 Under this premise, the gap leaves over-
consumption of food products as the most probable cause of
excessive weight gain.' °6
Currently, in the context of traditional causes of action against
the food industry, the primary bar to successful litigation is the
legally required consideration of the number of other factors which
could have contributed in producing the harm and the extent of the
effect which such factors have in producing the harm. 07 A second
consideration is whether a particular food company has created a
force or series of forces which is in continuous and active operation
up to the time of the harm.'0 8
Even if food industry practices play a role in obesity, surely
other factors such as genetics, inactivity, and cultural differences do
101. NESTLE, supra note 5, at 8.
102. Nestle & Jacobson, supra note 58, at 12 (citing United States Preventative
Services Task Force, Guide to Clinical Preventative Services, 2d ed. Alexandria (VA):
International Medical Publishing (1996); S. Dalton, Overweight and Weight
Management, Gaithersburg (MD): Aspen Publishing (1997)).
103. H.R. Rep. No. 108-432, at 10.
104. Id.
105. Rogers, supra note 5, at 881 (citing Mokdad et al., supra note 22, at 1521
("[Olur data demonstrate that a major contributor to obesity-physical inactivity-
has not changed substantively at the population level between 1991 and 1998").
"[S]urveys do not report enough of a decrease in activity levels to account for the
current rising rates of obesity." See NESTLE, supra note 5, at 8.
106. NESTLE, supra note 5, at 8.
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 433 (1965).
108, Id.
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as well. 1°9 Nonetheless, despite these many obstacles, the ingenuity
of the American legal system to create legal theories in order to
fairly distribute tort costs should not be dismissed.
D. Eliminating Proof of Specific Causation Against Any Single Food
Industry Company or Product
Under current law, regardless of the theory under which the
action is brought, ° plaintiffs must prove that a particular food
company or product caused the obesity for which they claim
damages."' Causation is the central, decisive factor in mass tort
litigation.11 2  To understand why the causation requirement is
detrimental in litigation against the food industry, an understanding
of how causation is proved is essential.
In ordinary products liability cases, a plaintiff explains the
causal link that produced the plaintiffs injury." 3 Similarly, in toxic
tort cases, proof of causation against any specific food industry
company or product is extremely difficult to show for obvious
reasons. Generally, exposure to a single food company or food
product is not a necessary cause of obesity. 114 In the case of obesity,
it would be almost impossible to prove that an individual's obesity is
109. Scott M. Grundy, Multifactorial Causation of Obesity: Implications for Prevention,
67 AM.J. CLINICAL NUTR. 563S, 566S-67S (1998).
110. Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory
offustice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2117, 2120 (1997) (stating that plaintiffs
can rely on a variety of legal theories including strict liability, negligence, design
defect, failure to warn, and nuisance).
111. Id. (citing Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85
GEO. L.J. 295, 317 n.100 (1996) ("In contrast to the variations in state tort law on
other questions, there is no reason to believe that any jurisdiction deviates from the
requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate general causation.")).
112. Id. (citing JUDGE JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT
LITIGATION 148 (1995) ("The only real liability issue becomes causation: was this
manufacturer's product a substantial cause of this plaintiffs medical problems-
however we define them?")).
113. Grundy, supra note 109, at 566S-67S.
114. Berger, supra note 110, at 2121. Of course, tort law requires only a but-for
cause, not a necessary cause, in order to establish liability. Id. at 2121 n.15. It is
easier, however, to prove a but-for cause when the defendant's product is necessarily
implicated in plaintiffs harm. Id. Establishing a but-for relationship is also not
problematic when the plaintiff suffers from harm that is uniquely or almost always
caused by exposure to a defendant's product. Id.
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attributable to a particular food product or company."l 5 Plaintiffs
must therefore produce sufficient scientific evidence which
establishes a probability-based inference that the food product in
question was capable of causing the obesity in question (i.e., general
causation). After establishing general causation, the plaintiff must
then establish that the exposure to the defendant's product was the
specific cause of the obesity (i.e. specific causation). 1 6  In many
instances of toxic tort litigation, the factfinder must determine the
sufficiency of causation even though the causal mechanism is not
fully understood.' 17 Nonetheless, it is the responsibility of the finder
of fact to determine the sufficiency of causation."'
In the context of a single company or product being found
liable for obesity, it is unlikely that any sufficient statistical
association between that particular company or product and the
plaintiffs obesity can be sufficiently demonstrated to compel a court
to concede a causal connection.1 9 In the case of obesity, it would be
nearly impossible for a plaintiff to produce sufficient scientific
evidence from which a probability-based inference could be drawn
that a particular food company or product caused the plaintiffs
obesity.'2
115. Id. at 2122 (citing David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure
Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 859-60 (1984)
for the proposition that liability should be imposed in proportion to the probability
of causation attributable to the substance in issue, whether or not the probability is
above or below 50%).
116. Berger, supra note 110, at 2122 (citing Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. V.
United States Mineral Prod., 52 F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Causation in toxic
torts normally comprises two separate inquiries: whether the epidemiological or
other scientific evidence establishes a causal link between [x and y], and whether
plaintiff is within the class of persons to which inferences from the general causation
evidence should be applied." [citations omitted])). "Plaintiffs typically prove
specific causation by calling a physician to testify that a differential diagnosis (as
opposed to introducing affirmative evidence of causation) of plaintiff revealed no
other explanation for plaintiff's disease." Id. at 2122 n. 18.
117. Id. at 2121 n.15. For a discussion of necessary and sufficient causes see id.
(citing Sorell L. Schwartz, An Overall Conceptual Approach to the Problem of Causation, 3
SHEPARD'S EXPERT & Sci. EVIDENCE Q. 1 (1995)).
118. Id.
119. Berger, supra note 110, at 2121.
120. Grundy, supra note 109, at 566S-567S. As discussed above, obesity may result
from the interaction of multiple factors including genetic susceptibility,
environmental factors, and other company's food products. See supra note 115 and
accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, for the purpose of lawsuits brought by state
attorneys general against the food industry as a whole, courts should
be willing to concede the causal connection between obesity and the
food products manufactured and sold by the food industry. In the
case of "signature diseases," the sufficiency of the statistical associa-
tion between the product and a particular harm is so compelling that
courts and scientists are willing to concede a causal connection. 12'
Courts have been willing to ascribe causation in cases of a signature
disease because the number of persons who will be compensated
undeservedly is low, and because denying meritorious compensation
to the injured would be unfair to so many. 22 The consequence is
that the food industry will be liable provided plaintiffs can prove a
sufficient exposure to products manufactured and sold by the food
industry.1
2 1
Because causation would be an essential element of food
industry liability, scientific proof against the food industry must meet
the two prong test set forth in the United States Su reme Court
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. First, the
evidence must be scientifically valid, meaning it is derived from
scientific practices that are methodologically sound. 25 Second, the
expert's evidence must fit the facts of the case, or in other words be
relevant. 26 In various toxic tort cases, plaintiffs have traditionally
relied on four different types of scientific evidence to prove
causation: (1) structure-activity analysis; (2) in vitro analysis; (3) in
vivo analysis; and (4) epidemiological analysis. 27 However, none of
these forms of scientific evidence can conclusively prove a cause and
121. Berger, supra note 110, at 2121. Although some would restrict the term
"signature disease" to a disease that is associated uniquely with exposure to a
particular agent, lawyers often use the term to refer to a disease that is "caused
almost exclusively" by a particular exposure. Id. (citing Linda A. Bailey et al.,
Reference Guide on Epidemiology, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 121,
177 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. Ed., 1994); Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and
Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845, 859-60
n.38 (1987)).
122. Berger, supra note 110, at 2121 n.16.
123. Id.
124. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
125. Berger, supra note 110, at 2122-23 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590).
126. See generally id. at 2123 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591).
127. Id. (citing Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is There a Rational Solution
to the Problem of Causation?, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 189, 217-26 (1992)).
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effect relationship between a plaintiff's health condition and a
plaintiffs exposure to a defendant's product.
2 1
Perhaps the only realistic way to overcome the causation barrier
is through a modification in the specific causation requirement for
Medicaid recoupment suits against the food industry. Similar
modifications have previously occurred with respect to toxic tort
cases as some legal commentators have used the difficulty of jurors
in properly assessing the aforementioned uncertainty as a basis for
modifying the causation requirement in toxic tort cases.
129
Similar to obesity cases against the food industry, toxic tort cases
run contrary to the rationale of requiring proof of specific causation
and the view that specific causation is key to determining the link
between the act and the resulting harm. 130 The plaintiffs in toxic tort
cases cannot be determined in advance of a harm, the causes of
injury are frequently not known or cannot be precisely determined
by scientific methods, and the lapse of time between the act and the
harm caused creates an incentive for people to avoid an act whose
adverse consequences may not manifest until many years later."I
The characteristics of toxic torts, as well as cases linking obesity to a
particular company or product, mesh poorly with the notion of
corrective justice that actors should be liable only for irresponsible
choices that are foreseeable.'
32
"[C]ausation is often fortuitous and thus morally arbitrary. To
erect sharp disparities of treatment on such a foundation violates the
requirement of equal treatment implied by the conception of equal
dignity and respect. '133 From this perspective, it has been proposed
that in order to minimize the risks to society caused by uncertainty
and inconclusive proof of causation, tort law should focus on
creating a standard of care regarding a corporation's duty to keep
itself informed about the risks of its products.' As a result,
128. Id. at 2123-29.
129. Id. at 2130, 2131-32.
130. Berger, supra note 110, at 2132.
131. See id. at 2132-33.
132. Id. at 2133.
133. Id. at 2134 (quoting Christopher H. Schroeder, Causation, Compensation,
and Moral Responsibility, in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 347, 348 n.1
(David G. Owen ed., 1995); Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability
for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 439 (1990)).
134. Id.
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[i]f a corporation fails to exercise the appropriate level of due
care, it should be held liable to those put at risk by its action,
without regard to injuries that eventually ensue; it is culpable
because it has acted without taking into account the interests of
those who will be affected by its conduct.
35
Arguably, current law encourages corporations to engage in
behavior that keeps them from investigating the risks caused by their
products because the future likelihood that a causal connection can
be proven between the corporation's acts and a plaintiffs harm is
perceived as minimal when compared to the cost of present
compliance. 136 Uncertainty about the future with respect to proof of
causation, coupled with the lapse of time before definitive harm will
emerge, usually creates incentives for management of a corporation
to decide in favor of maximizing short-term objectives. 137 To compel
corporations to obtain earlier and better information about the
potential adverse health effects of their food products, such
companies must be convinced that it is in their best interest not to
suppress unfavorable research results or other data showing the
adverse health effects brought about by their food products.
38
One way to accomplish this goal is to impose liability in
negligence for failure to provide substantial information relating to
the potential risks of a company's product, and to eliminate the
requirement of proving specific causation. 139  Under this model,
once a plaintiff proves the defendant's negligence in failing to reveal
substantial information relevant to assessing the potential risks of
exposure, a prima facie case of liability would be made out for those
able to substantiate exposure and injury, provided the defendant
either did no research or did not reveal negative research.'4 The
end result would be compensation for plaintiffs exposed to a product
and who suffered a health impairment that the defendant could not
prove was not attributable to its products.1
4 1
Eliminating causation in toxic tort cases is not anti-scientific.
Rather, it compels corporations to engage in more scientific
research, "not to win lawsuits, but to protect society against the risks
135. Berger, supra note 110, at 2134.
136. Id. at 2134, 2139.
137. Id. at 2140.
138. Id. at 2141.
139. Id. at 2143.
140. Berger, supra note 110, at 2144.
141. Id. at 2146.
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posed by their products."'142 In this scenario, in litigation against the
food industry for recoupment of Medicaid costs, scientific evidence
would only need to establish the common sense fact that over-
consumption of food products is linked to obesity. 43 Liability would
depend upon the aforementioned model on proving that the food
industry failed to develop and disclose substantial information that is
needed to assess obesity risks related to consumption of their
products.'44
Another legislative method to achieve the goal of eliminating
proof of causation against the food industry is for state legislatures to
enact legislation to that effect. 145 In its litigation against the tobacco
industry, the State of Florida enacted legislation that permitted the
use of statistics to prove causation and damages. 146 Further, though
the provision was subsequently declared unconstitutional,' 47 the
Florida statute originally allowed the state to proceed in large claim
cases without identifying individual Medicaid recipients.
148
Conditioning liability on a plaintiff's ability to prove that the
product of a single food industry company caused the plaintiff's
obesity is counterproductive. The insistence on causation linked to a
particular company or product creates incentives on the part of food
companies to avoid research information that may disclose the
extent of the harmful nature of its products.
IV. THE PROPER ROLE OF THE TORT SYSTEM IN REGULATING
THE FOOD INDUSTRY
A. The Tort System as a Complement to Legislative
and Administrative Regulation
The judicial treatment of the prior New York cases brought by
individual plaintiffs seeking to hold the food industry liable for
obesity creates a burden to define a role for the tort system in
142. Id. at 2152.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Sherrill, supra note 44, at 502-03 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(9)
(West 1996)).
146. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(9) (West 1996)).
147. Id. (citing Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus., 678 So.2d
1239, 1255-56 (Fla. 1996)).
148. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(9)(a) (West 1996)).
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regulating the food industry. This Comment suggests that courts
have an important role to play in enforcing the regulation of the
food industry-complementing the efforts of legislatures and the
regulatory agencies that carry out their mandates.1 49
Legislatures and administrative agencies have important limita-
tions which courts do not have. First, an industry may exert signify-
cant lobbying resources toward legislators as well as the admini-
strative agencies that govern the industry.15° Second, regulatory
enforcement of the food industry could be severely limited because
of a lack of agency resources. 5' The threat of tort liability would
provide an incentive for the food industry to police itself. In the
modern regulatory environment, the tort system plays an essential
role in complementing the work of legislatures and administrative
agencies.
The fear of a "tobacco-style legal quagmire" has compelled
some members of the food industry to disclose more nutritional
information and offer more healthy choices on their menus.
15 2
Several companies are voluntarily setting up public health programs
and modifying their marketing strategies, such as airing public-
service announcements about health and eating in moderation and
funding new in-school physical fitness programs.
1 53
Critics of allowing litigation against the food industry suggest
that the threat of litigation may be alleviated as more food com-
panies go the "healthful route" and provide consumers with more
information about their products. 54 However, it must be remem-
bered that food companies did not begin acting voluntarily until
149. For a discussion of the complementary role of courts in efforts to regulate
tobacco products, see Peter D. Jacobson & Kenneth E. Warner, Litigation and Public
Health Policy Making: The Case of Tobacco Control, 24 J. OF HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L.,
769, 770 (1999); in regulating gun manufacturers, see Timothy D. Lytton, Tort
Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-Related Injuries: Defining a Suitable Role for
the Tort System in Regulating the Firearms Industry, 65 Mo. L. REv. 1 (2000).
150. See generally NESTLE, supra note 5, at 95-110. See also PETER BELL & JEFFREY
O'CONNELL, ACCIDENTAL JUSTICE 97 (1997) (discussing the concept of "agency
capture"); Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of
Products Liability, 60 Mo. L. REv. 1, 65 (1995).
151. See discussion supra Section II.C.
152. Meislik, supra note 11, at 799-801.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 811-12 (citing David Phelps, The Bottom Line; Legal Threats Haunt Fast-
Food Industry; Few Rushing to Court Yet, but the Specter of Lawsuits Already is Changing
the Menu, STAR TRIB. (Minn.), Oct. 12, 2003, at 3A).
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2003 in their effort to avoid negative publicity and potential litiga-
tion. 155 This comment contends government regulation of the food
industry is needed and tort liability for Medicaid recoupment should
be imposed to ensure compliance with government regulation.
Prior to the 1998 MSA, 5 6 in June 1997 an unsuccessful attempt
at a "global settlement" with the federal government was pro-
posed.' 7  Though Congress considered various versions of the
global settlement, Congressional approval was given to provisions of
the global settlement that would have included regulation of the
tobacco products by FDA and industry immunity from private
lawsuits. 15' However, when the terms of the global settlement
became unacceptable to the participating tobacco manufacturers, the
manufacturers withdrew its support and engaged in heavy lobbying
which killed the settlement proposal in 1998.15
After the federal proposal was defeated, state attorneys general
continued to meet with tobacco industry representatives to discuss a
less comprehensive settlement.16° In 1998, the attorneys general and
the participating tobacco manufacturers announced the MSA. 16 1 The
MSA was a positive step in the regulation of the tobacco industry.
The participating tobacco manufacturers agreed to pay approxi-
mately $8 billion per year to various states as reimbursement for
medical expenses paid by the states.' 62 They also agreed to certain
advertising restrictions and to pay $250 million to create a national
foundation that funds health studies and pays for anti-tobacco
advertising.
163
155. Id. at 799.
156. The original participating manufacturers to the MSA were Philip Morris, Inc.;
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.; Lorillard Tobacco Co.; and Brown Williamson Tobacco
Corp. Scott, supra note 17, at 1101 n.33. Since the agreement, other tobacco
manufacturers have subsequently followed suit. Id.
157. Id. at 1101.
158. Id. (citing S. Res. 1415, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998) (McCain Bill endorsed
by Senate Commerce Committee)).
159. Id. (citing Jonathan D. Salant, Tobacco Company's Lobbying Costs Drop,
Associated Press On-Line, Sept. 28, 1999 (reporting that the tobacco industry spent
$37 million in lobbying and $40 million in advertising in 1998 to defeat the federal
settlement proposal, and that lobbying costs dropped 70% in 1999 when the
battleground shifted to the courts)).
160. Scott, supra note 17, at 1101.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1103 (citing MSA § IX).
163. Id. (citing MSA §§ III, VI). The national foundation is known as the American
Legacy Foundation. Id. at 1103 n.48.
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More specifically, the MSA bans all advertising using characters
but not human figures.' 64 Tobacco ads on billboards, buses, and
subway cars are banned, but outdoor ads smaller than fourteen
square feet are permitted. 165 Tobacco advertising in sports arenas
and venues is banned, but tobacco companies are each allowed to
sponsor one sporting event a year for each brand they manufac-
ture. 166
Further, in the MSA, participating tobacco manufacturers state
that they are "committed to reducing underage tobacco use.
'67
However, no MSA provisions regulate self-service displays, point-of-
sale advertising, or vending machines. 6 The participating tobacco
companies agreed not to target underage tobacco users, but are not
required to print additional and unequivocal health warnings on
their packages. 169
Most pertinent to this comment is the fact that the MSA
contained no "look-back" provisions which set industry targets and
penalties for the failure to conform and achieve the goals of the
MSA.170 The MSA was not a result of legislative enactment and thus
is not subject to federal agency control. As a result, the MSA has
been described as "largely toothless" in regulating the tobacco
industry. 7' This comment contends that Congress should focus its
efforts on promulgating appropriate legislative measures to regulate
the food industry and curb the obesity epidemic. Enforcement of
such regulations should be left to the tort system. Specifically, states
should be allowed to bring Medicaid recoupment claims against the
food industry if the industry attempts to circumvent such
regulations.
164. Scott, supra note 17, at 1103 (citing MSA §§ 111(b), III(c)(2)).
165. Id. at 1101 (citing MSA §§ 111(d), 11()).
166. Id. (citing MSA §§ 111(d), III(c)(2)).
167. Id. (citing MSA § I).
168. Id.
169. Scott, supra note 17, at 1101 (citing MSA § 111(a)).
170. Id. at 1103.
171. Id. at 1104.
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B. Enforcing Regulations Imposed on the Food Industry: State
Medicaid Recoupment Claims For the Costs of Obesity
1. Borrowing Strategies From Litigation Against the Tobacco
Industry
The two fatal flaws of the original litigation against the tobacco
industry were (1) the plaintiffs' inability to match the tobacco
companies' "war chests" and (2) juries' lack of sympathy for plaintiffs
who willingly exposed themselves to harm.172 However, the eventual
litigation against the tobacco industry embodied innovative solutions
to those problems. 173 The most successful of these solutions were
lawsuits filed by state attorneys general, allied with private attorneys,
seeking recovery of damages for the costs incurred by their state
Medicaid programs in treating tobacco-related illnesses. The
benefits of this new strategy quickly became apparent to other
attorneys general, and soon the tobacco industry faced Medicaid
suits from nearly every state in the country. 75 The legal strategies
employed during the final stages of litigation against the tobacco
industry produced several unique methods of recovery that can be
applicable in the potential litigation against the food industry today.
On May 23, 1994, the Attorney General of Mississippi, Michael
Moore, in conjunction with private attorney Richard Scruggs,
launched an attack on the tobacco industry by filing the first
Medicaid recoupment lawsuit against the tobacco industry.76 By
172. Bryce A. Jensen, From Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond-A Critique of Lawsuits
Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1334, 1343 (2001) (citing Tucker
S. Player, Note, After the Fall: The Cigarette Papers, the Global Settlement, and the Future
of Tobacco Litigation, 49 S.C. L. REv. 311, 313, 316 (1998)).
173. Id. (citing Ingrid L. Dietsch Field, Comment, No Ifs, Ands or Butts: Big Tobacco
Is Fighting for Its Life Against a New Breed of Plaintiffs Armed With Mounting Evidence, 27
U. BALT. L. REV. 99, 114-16 (1997); Susan E. Kearns, Note, Decertification of Statewide
Tobacco Class Actions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1336, 1340 (1999)).
174. Id. at 1344 (citing Kearns, supra note 173, at 1340). See generally Sherrill,
supra note 44; Margaret A. Little, A Most Dangerous Indiscretion: The Legal, Economic,
and Political Legacy of the Governments' Tobacco Litigation, 33 CONN. L. REv. 1143, 1147
(2001).
175. Jensen, supra note 172, at 1344 (citing Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A Morality Play's
Third Act: Revisiting Addiction, Fraud and Consumer Choice in "Third Wave" Tobacco
Litigation, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 465, 476-77 (1998)).
176. Id. (citing David A. Hyman, Tobacco Litigation's Third-Wave: Has Justice Gone
Up in Smoke?, 2 J. HEALTH CARE L, & POL'Y 34, 36-37 (1998); Adam Bryant, Who's
Afraid ofDickie Scruggs?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 1999, at 46, 49).
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using the "blameless" state agency, Medicaid, as the plaintiff, the
tobacco companies were denied their previously successful assump-
tion of the risk defense. 17  The complaint asserted theories that
served as a template for subsequent actions filed by other states.
17
Most of the complaints filed against the tobacco industry alleged
the traditional causes of action: conspiracy, fraud or fraudulent
misrepresentation, breach of warranty, negligent undertaking of a
voluntary duty, design defect, nuisance, violations of state consumer
protection laws, violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act,179 and, most significantly, unjust
enrichment.8 The theory of unjust enrichment is defined as "[a]
benefit obtained from another, not intended as a gift and not legally
justifiable, for which the beneficiary must make restitution or
recompense."' 181 The remedy for unjust enrichment is restitution. 2
Subsequent to the filing of the Mississippi litigation, the Florida
legislature passed the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act (MTPLA),
thus allowing similar suits to be brought in Florida. 83  This
unprecedented legislation denied the tobacco industry defendants
their previously successful common law affirmative defenses. The
legislation allowed the application of market share liability, replaced
the concepts of causation and damages with "statistical analysis," and
removed the requirements that the state identify individual
recipients whose illnesses were treated through the state's Medicaid
program.
184
Another approach, exemplified by the state of Minnesota,
involved state litigation accompanied by a suit by the state's Blue
Cross/Blue Shield health insurer, working closely with the Attorney
177. Id. (citing Hyman, supra note 176, at 37 and n.19).
178. Little, supra note 174, at 1147. Little was counsel for Philip Morris
Companies, Inc. and briefed and argued a constitutional and statutory challenge to
the State of Connecticut's contingency fee contract with counsel suing the tobacco
companies in Connecticut's recoupment action against the tobacco companies. Id.
at n.al.
179. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1970).
180. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 506-07. Copies of the states' complaints are
available at http:/www.stic.neu.edu/Libraries.html.
181. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1573 (8th ed. 2004).
182. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 507.
183. Little, supra note 174, at 1147 (citing Florida Medicaid Third-Party Act, FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 409.9 10 (West 1995)).
184. Id.; see also Sherrill, supra note 44, at 502-04.
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General's office.8 5 This approach created an entirely new category
of lawsuits that eventually resulted in many state-regulated Blue
Cross/Blue Shield organizations filing actions against the tobacco
industry as well.
18 6
By 1999, the tobacco industry was facing concerted recoupment
litigation at every level of political organization (federal, state,
county, and municipal) in the United States.8 7 The tobacco industry
was also litigating with non-governmental entities which filed similar
claims.18 8  Further, foreign governments also entered the fray by
filing recoupment suits in American courts as well as courts in their
own countries.'8 9
Inevitably, the sheer weight of the Rending litigation resulted in
a settlement with the tobacco industry.F9o The participating tobacco
companies first settled with four states that were approaching trial
under agreements valued at approximately $40 billion. 191 This was
followed by the MSA in which forty-six states entered into a $206
billion settlement to be paid over the following twenty-five years.
192
The tobacco companies also committed to contributing $1.5 billion
to an anti-smoking education and advertising campaign and $250
185. Little, supra note 174, at 1148.
186. Id. This approach was not entirely effective. See infra Section IV.B.3.c.
187. Little, supra note 174, at 1148-49.
188. Id. Phillip Morris was defending 530 lawsuits by the end of 1997: 375
individual personal injury cases, fifty class action cases including second-hand
smoke cases, and 105 health care recoupment cases, mostly brought by governments
and unions. Id. at 1148 n.28 (citing Jerry Bulow & Paul Klemperer, The Tobacco
Deal, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS, Nov. 1998, at
323, 332). R.J. Reynolds was defending 540 cases by March 3, 1998, as compared
with fifty-four cases at the end of 1994. Id.
189. Little, supra note 174, at 1148-49 (citing Hanoch Dagan & James J. White,
Governments, Citizens and Injurious Industries, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 363 (2000)).
190. Jensen, supra note 172, at 1344; Little, supra note 174, at 1143.
191. Little, supra note 174, at 1171. Minnesota, Mississippi, Texas, and Florida
were the original four states reaching settlements with the tobacco industry. Jensen,
supra note 172, at 1345 n.82. These four states that settled earlier received more
money than they would have under the national settlement, as well as non-monetary
concessions that the remaining forty-six states did not receive. Id. (citing Michael V.
Ciresi, An Account of the Legal Strategies That Ended an Era of Tobacco Industry
Immunity, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 439, 441-42 (1999); Richard A. Daynard &
Graham E. Kelder Jr., The Many Virtues of Tobacco Litigation, TRIAL, Nov. 1998, at
42).
192. Little, supra note 174, at 1171 (citing the MSA, available at
http://www.naag.org/tobac/cigmsa.rtf).
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million for a foundation dedicated to reducing underage smoking.'93
These settlements are reported to represent the largest privately-
negotiated redistribution of wealth in world history.'9 4
2. Application of Tobacco Litigation Strategies to Medicaid
Recoupment Suits Against the Food Industry
a. Lessons Learned
As previously discussed, engaging private counsel on a
contingency fee basis would result in a no-lose situation for state
attorneys general against the food industry.'9 Other than arriving
at an agreement between the state and private attorney, there are no
apparent restrictions on the ability of attorneys general to appoint
outside counsel. 196 If the states prevail, the states are likely to collect
billions of dollars that could then be used to help fight obesity. On
the other hand, if the claims fail, the states would not be required to
pay legal fees because the private attorneys would have been
retained on a contingency basis.
The inclusion of state governments in a lawsuit brings credibility
and a "moral authority" to the cause. 197 As a result, an industry that
initially appears blameless begins to be perceived as culpable in the
public's opinion as public authorities align themselves against it,' 98
b. The Doctrine of Parens Patriae
As noted above, the Medicaid statute requires a state that
participates in Medicaid to develop a procedure for recovering funds
from third parties liable for the injuries of Medicaid recipients.' 9
However, the recovery provision created by the state does not create
a new federal right of recovery for the state, but rather is dependent
193. Id.
194. Id. (citing Michael E. DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and Separation of
Powers in State Governments: Repairing the Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 1, 2-3
(2001)).
195. See, e.g.,Jensen, supra note 172, at 1344.
196. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 516.
197. Jensen, supra note 172, at 1370.
198. Id.
199. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 501 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25) (1996)).
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upon the substantive law of the state in which recovery is sought.2°°
The Medicaid statute does not require participating states to
recognize any particular theories of liability for the recovery of
Medicaid funds. °1 Only where it is available under state law is it
required that a state pursue recovery against a liable third party.20 2
The legal theories against the tobacco industry varied from state
to state.20 3  While some state legislatures may be willing to enact
measures similar to the Florida statutes against the tobacco industry
(giving the state attorney general statutory authority to bring suit
against the food industry) undoubtedly other state legislatures will
not. For those attorneys general who cannot derive authority for a
cause of action against the food industry from their state statutory
schemes, another source of authority can be derived directly from
individual state sovereignty.2°4
The State of Louisiana's claim for damages against the tobacco
industry is particularly instructive. 205 Though no legal theory against
the tobacco industry was ever tested in court, the principles of the
parens patriae doctrine employed by Louisiana's trial team serve as
an example for potential actions by attorneys general against the
food industry.2 °6
A state's actionable interests may be sovereign, quasi-sovereign,
or proprietary. 20 7 Food industry conduct that violates criminal law,
civil law, or other regulatory provisions compromises the sovereignty
of a state and can be the subject of a civil action brought in the
state's name. 20 ' As a sovereign, the state has authority to do more
than merely enforce its laws; a state exists to promote the health,




203. See discussion supra Section IV.B.1.
204. See generally Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1859. Ieyoub was the
Louisiana Attorney General who led the trial team that sued the tobacco industry on
behalf of the state. Id. at 1859 n.al. Eisenberg served as a consultant to the
Louisiana private counsel who represented the State of Louisiana in its action
against the tobacco industry. Id.
205. See generally id.
206. Id. at 1862.
207. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1863.
208. Id. (citing Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600-01
(1982)).
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safety, and welfare of its citizens. 2°9  A state's quasi-sovereign
interests include its citizen's health, safety, welfare, as well as, a
healthful environment for those citizens.2' ° In contrast, a state's
proprietary interests are those that the state asserts on its own behalf
as any other legal entity.2 1
Lawsuits brought on behalf of states' sovereign and quasi-
sovereign interests are sometimes referred to as parens patriae
actions. 12 However, the Latin label is not always used.213  Parens
patriae literally means "parent of the country. 214 Regardless of the
label used, under parens patriae a state may recover costs or
damages incurred because of acts that threaten the health, safety,
and welfare of the state's citizens. 5 Parens patriae actions are
infrequently litigated because it is rare that a breach of duty is on
such a scale to warrant civil state involvement.
216
Courts uniformly recognize a state's authority to protect its
interests under the doctrine of parens patriae.217 The principles of
the parens partriae doctrine have been approved by the United
States Supreme Court and endorsed by the states.21 8 The doctrine
generally follows the same principles in both federal and state
courts.2 ' State court cases brought under the theory of the doctrine
of parens patriae regularly rely on federal precedents.220
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601-02).
212. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1863 (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600-01).
213. Id. The doctrinal labels used to support states' actions on behalf of their
citizenry vary, and sometimes no doctrinal labels are used. Id. (citing Wyandotte
Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 193 (1967) (allowing the United States
to sue to "protect its interests" in a cause of action for costs of cleanup)). Sometimes
the state's action is framed as one brought by the trustee of property for the benefit
of the public. Id. (citing State v. City of Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ohio
1974) (allowing a cause of action for damages to the environment)). Sometimes
cases to protect the public are labeled actions brought under the state's power as
parens patriae. Id. (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607-08 (allowing Puerto Rico to
proceed as parens patriae in a suit to protect the economic interests of a class of
workers)).
214. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1863 (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1864.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1871.
219. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1864.
220. Id. (citing e.g., State ex rel. Ieyoub v. Bordens, Inc., 684 So. 2d 1024, 1026 (La.
Ct. App. 1996) (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 592)).
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The United States Supreme Court reviewed the history of the
parens patriae doctrine in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico.221
In that case, the Court recognized a state's "quasi-sovereign"
interests.222 However, what is a quasi-sovereign interest is less clear
than what is a sovereign interest.223  Quasi-sovereign interests
represent the state's concern for the well-being of its citizens. 224 "A
quasi-sovereign interest must be sufficiently concrete to create an
actual controversy between the [s]tate and the defendant. The
vagueness of this concept can only be filled in by turning to
individual cases." 225 After considering several parens patriae cases,
the United States Supreme Court summarized the doctrine as
follows:
In order to maintain [a parens patriae] action, the [s]tate must
articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private
parties, i.e., the [s]tate must be more than a nominal party. The
[s]tate must express a quasi-sovereign interest. Although the
articulation of such interests is a matter for case-by-case develop-
ment-neither an exhaustive formal definition nor a definitive
list of qualifying interests can be presented in the abstract-
certain characteristics of such interests are so far evident. These
characteristics fall into two general categories. First, a [s]tate has
a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being-both
physical and economic-of its residents in general. Second, a
[sitate has a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily
denied its rightful status within the federal system.226
Therefore, the only requirement is the inclusion of public health
interests for many possible attorney general causes of action; the
interests qualifying as quasi-sovereign interests "extend well beyond
the prevention of such traditional public nuisances.,
227
Of the many state causes of action filed against the tobacco
industry, only one case expressly considers a state's authority to
vindicate its sovereign interest under the parens patriae doctrine in
order to maintain a cause of action for harm to the health, safety,
221. Id. (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600-06).
222. Id. at 1866 (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601-02).
223. Id. at 1866-68.
224. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1866 (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602).
225, Id. (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602).
226, Id. at 1867-68 (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607).
227. Id. at 1868 (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 605).
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and welfare of its people.228 In Texas v. American Tobacco Co.,229 the
district court sustained the state's authority to bring such a cause of
action.23° The district court directly considered whether the State of
Texas could maintain a common-law parens patriae action without
statutory authority. 231 Relying on Snapp, the judge concluded that
the State of Texas could maintain such an action. 232 The district
court expressly noted that the United States Supreme Court had
sustained actions by states to protect quasi-sovereign interests and
that these "interests can relate to either the physical or economic
well-being of the citizenry., 233 The district court then found that the
State of Texas had a sufficient quasi-sovereign interest to maintain
its cause of action, stating:
First, it is without question that the [s]tate is not a nominal party
to this suit. The [s]tate expends millions of dollars each year in
order to provide medical care to its citizens under Medicaid.
Furthermore, participating in the Medicaid program and having
it operate in an efficient and cost-effective manner improves the
health and welfare of the people of Texas. If the allegations of
the complaint are found to be true, the economy of the [s]tate
and the welfare of its people have suffered at the hands of the
Defendants. It is clear to the Court that the [s]tate can maintain
this action pursuant to its quasi-sovereign interests found at
common law.
234
In cases against the food industry for recovery of Medicaid
expenditures related to obesity, the American Tobacco Co. ruling has
implications for actions brought by state attorneys general. As
American Tobacco Co. demonstrates, a food company's alleged
wrongdoing can give rise to a viable cause of action absent any
statutory authorization.235  The states' quasi-sovereign interests,
228. Id. at 1870 (citing Texas v. American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956 (E.D.
Tex. 1997)).
229. 14 F. Supp. 2d 956 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
230. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1870 (citing American Tobacco Co., 14 F.
Supp. 2d at 962).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. (citing American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d at 962).
234. Id. at 1870-71 (citing Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d at 962-63 (citation
omitted) (footnote omitted)).
235. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1871.
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standing-alone, give the states authority to prosecute an action
against the food industry.
236
In the tobacco litigation, the states' authority to sue under the
doctrine of parens patriae was important for several reasons.237 The
doctrine of parens patriae (1) established the authority of attorneys
general and the states to sue; (2) limited the scope of potential
industry defenses and statutory preemptory claims; and (3) provided
an additional basis for monetary and injunctive relief.238 Whether
these benefits will assist attorneys general in cases against the food
industry will depend on the harms they seek to remedy, the other
legal theories available to them, and the defenses that may be
available to potential food industry defendants.239
Because most of the leading cases were decided during the early
1900s, the modern limits of the parens patriae doctrine are
unknown.240 In assessing the scope of a modern use of the parens
patriae doctrine by attorneys general, three kinds of limitations have




In determining whether to exercise the states' parens patriae
power against the food industry, state attorneys general should242
consider at least two prudential factors. First, actions brought
under the parens patriae doctrine should be limited to circumstances
that demonstrate substantial and serious harm to a state's citizens.243
Wrongdoing against individuals or small groups usually will not
require use of the doctrine. 244 The tobacco litigation exemplifies the
massive harm that warrants action under the parens patriae
doctrine.245
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1875.
238. Id. at 1875-79.
239. Id. at 1875.
240. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1879.
241. Id. at 1880.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1880.
244. Id.
245. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1880.
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Second, other available remedies and causes of action available
to attorneys general must be inadequate in some respect.24 The
tobacco litigation again serves as an example.247 The lawsuits against
the tobacco companies were not battles that individual citizens could
or should be expected to fight against the tobacco industry's massive
marketing, scientific, public relations, and legal resources. 24 The
harms caused to states were independent of those harms caused to
individual smokers and were interests that only the states could
vindicate. 249
2. Practical Limits
Perhaps the single most important practical limit in using the
doctrine of parens patriae against the food industry will be the
willingness of state attorneys general to act in concert.25° Perhaps
the most important lesson to be learned from the tobacco litigation
is that states can be most effective when they act in unison.2 1  State
attorneys general did not always present a united front against the
tobacco industry. 2 2  Actions by state attorneys general were not
taken seriously when only a few states brought suits against the





250. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1881.
251. Id.
252. Id. (citing David S. Samford, Note, Cutting Deals in Smoke-Filled Rooms: A Case
Study in Public Choice Theory, 87 KY. L.J. 845, 868, 869 (1998-1999)).
253. Id. The tobacco industry's aggressive tactics against state attorneys general
discouraged Colorado from filing suit. Id. at 1881 n. 116 (citing Joan Beck, Deadly
Defense, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 26, 1996, at 1 lA). Wisconsin's attorney
general stated that he would wait to see how the other states did before filing suit.
Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1881 n.l 16 (citing Paul Norton, Doyle: Wait,
See on Tobacco Suit, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison), Feb. 26, 1996, at 1A). New
Hampshire's attorney general said that New Hampshire could just sit it out and sign
on when and if the states win. Id. (citing Norma Love, Democrats: New Hampshire
Should Sue Tobacco Companies, AP POL. SERVICE, Apr. 2, 1996, available at 1996 WL
5375466). Ohio's attorney general stated that "[miany of the legal theories being
used in the lawsuits are untested and unproven." Id. (quoting Bob Van Voris, AG's
Claims Mere Smoke?, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 28, 1997, at Al). The Alabama attorney
general's task force concluded that the legal arguments being made by other state
attorneys general were "at best weak and at worst bizarre." Id.
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turning point at which unified state action began to pressure the
tobacco industry into settlement negotiations. Before this first
settlement, only six states had sued the tobacco industry.255 By 1997,
a set of separate state actions had evolved into a nation wide action
against the tobacco industry and national settlements followed.256
3. Legal Limits
Legal limits of the parens patriae doctrine are a question of
state law.257 State legislatures can define the scope of their respective
state's parens patriae doctrine to be as broad or as narrow as the
state legislature sees fit, subject to federal and state constitutional
limitations. 258 Further, several types of state laws can be viewed as
statutory embodiments of parens patriae principles, such as an
unfair and deceptive trade practices statute. " Similarly, some states
may have the power through their state constitution to limit
assertions of the power of the parens patriae doctrine or judicial
recognition of that power.260 Assuming that states bringing suit
against the food industry to recover Medicaid costs choose to adhere
to currently existing case law governing the parens patriae doctrine,
the following sets forth a summary of the established legal limita-
tions.
First, as stated above, a state's action against the food industry
under the parens patriae doctrine requires that the state not be
acting in a proprietary capacity. 261 Only when the state itself is
harmed by tortious or contractual misconduct can it directly
vindicate its interests as fully as any other litigant.262 Second, states
cannot be acting simply as enforcement agencies for small collec-
tions of private individuals against the food industry.263  A state
interest beyond that of private parties must exist to give rise to a
254. Id. at 1881 (citing Lynn Mather, Theorizing About Trial Courts: Lawyers,
Policymaking, and Tobacco Litigation, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 897, 923 (1998)).




259. Id. at 1882 (citing, e.g., Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1401-1418 (Supp. 2000)).
260. Id.
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sustainable action against the food industry under the parens patriae
doctrine .26'
c. Recoupment of Medicaid Costs Incurred Treating Obesity
Related Health Problems is a Quasi-Sovereign State Interest
As indicated above, the United States Supreme Court has not set
out the exact nature of a quasi-sovereign state interest.265 However,
the states' interest in the health, safety, and welfare (physical and
economic) of their citizens has supported such actions in the past,
specifically against the tobacco industry.266 Although such actions
are available to attorneys general against the food industry today,
causes of action under the parens patriae doctrine are not means b
which states can avoid other important prerequisites to legal relief.
2 7
In particular, the requirement remains that members of the food
industry breach some legal duty that harms a state's parens patriae
interest.
268
While the parens patriae doctrine helps articulate a state's legal
interest against the food industry, it does not define the defendant's
legal duties.269 State litigation that relies on the parens patriae
doctrine must be within the limits of the doctrine and demonstrate a
breach of legal duties by the potential defendants.270
As mentioned above, Congress has mandated that states partici-
pating in the Medicaid program must include in their administra-
tion plan a procedure for recovering funds from third parties that
264. Id.
265. See supra notes 222-27 and accompanying text.
266. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1866, 1883.
267. Id. at 1883.
268. Id.
'U]udicial relief sometimes may be granted to a quasi-sovereign state under
circumstances which would not justify relief if the suit were between private
parties....' But, in general, the cases involve misbehavior by defendants
that likely would give rise to liability under some nuisance or other tort
theory .... And it 'must appear that the state has suffered a wrong
furnishing ground for judicial redress or is asserting a right susceptible of
judicial enforcement.' Id. at 1864 n. 18 (citing Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S.
12, 16-17 (1927)).
269. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1883. The tobacco litigation complaints
generally contained several allegations of breach of legal duties. Id. at 1883 n. 124
(citing e.g., American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d at 965-74 (alleging product liability,
RICO, antitrust, consumer, nuisance, and fraud claims)).
270. Id.
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are liable for the injuries of Medicaid recipients.271 This principle of. . .. P "272
restitution is not subject to the discretion of the states. The
statutory scheme enacted by the participating state must include
recovery procedures.273
However, a state's statutory recovery provision does not create a
federal right of recovery; rather, the right of recovery is dependent
on the substantive state law in which recovery is sought.274 If state
law does not recognize a particular cause of action, the Medicaid
statute does not require the creation of such a cause of action.275 In
contrast, where liability is available under state law, the state must
pursue the action against the third party.
276
Thus, the first step for a state's attorney general will be to
consult that state's Medicaid statutory scheme to determine the
possible causes of action available to them in their recoupment
actions against the food industry. 7  Similar to the litigation against
the tobacco industry, state attorneys general should focus on the
theory of unjust enrichment 27 8-the remedy for which is restitu-
tion.27'
As the discussion above demonstrates, the food industry is
primarily focused on successfully generating large profits by selling
its products to consumers without assuming any responsibility for the
harmful consequences. Thus, state attorneys general should argue
that the states are indirectly conferring a benefit upon the food
industry by paying the health care costs related to obesity through
271. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 501 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25) (1996)). The
state plan must take all "reasonable measures to ascertain the legal liability of third
parties." Id. at 501 n.35.
[W]here such a legal liability is found to exist after medical assistance has
been made available on behalf of the recipient, and where the amount of
reimbursement the State can reasonably expect to recover exceeds the cost
of such recovery, the state will seek reimbursement for such assistance to
the extent of the legal liability .... Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(B)
(1996)).
272. Id. at 501.
273. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25) (1996); HCFA State Fiscal Administration
Rule, 42 C.F.R. § 433.138 (1996)).
274. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 502 (citing Philip Morris, 942 F. Supp. at 694).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 507.
278. Id.
279. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 507.
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state funds, which are soon will directly include state Medicaid
funds.28 °
3. Anticipating Food Industry Defense Tactics
In an effort to increase the ability of each state to recover
Medicaid expenses from tobacco companies, some states passed
third-party Medicaid liability acts in the battle against the tobacco
industry. The legislation enacted in Massachusetts was relatively
limited and only provoked minor attacks during removal pro-
ceedings brought by the tobacco companies.282 While the state was
expressly given a separate and independent cause of action against
cigarette manufacturers, no special provisions eliminated the
tobacco industry's traditional defenses.28 3  Though the tobacco
industry may have argued against the statute on the grounds of
equal protection because of the act's singular specification of
cigarette manufacturers, this issue was not addressed by the
Massachusetts federal district court in its decision to remand the case
to state court.28 4
In contrast, Florida's statute was the most aggressive in increase-
ing the potential liability of the tobacco industry and, as a result, it
quickly encountered direct constitutional attacks.285 Florida's statute
eliminated affirmative defenses of the tobacco industry, including
assumption of risk and comparative negligence. 286  Further, the
statute eliminated the defense of statute of repose,287 applied joint
280. Id. (citing Michael C. Moore & Charles J. Mikhail, The Fight Against Tobacco: A
New Attack on Smoking Using an Old-Time Remedy, 111 DHHS Pub. Health Rep. 192,
May 1996)).
281. See generally id. at 502-05.
282. Id. at 502 (citing Philip Morris, 942 F. Supp. at 691-92).
283. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 504 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118E, § 22
(West 1996) and 1994 Mass. Acts ch. 60, § 276).
284. Id. at 504-05 (citing Philip Morris, 942 F. Supp. at 690).
285. Id. at 502 (citing Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus., 678 So.
2d 1239 (Fla. 1996)).
286. Id. at 502-03 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(1) (West 1996)). "Principles of
common law and equity as to... comparative negligence, assumption of the risk,
and all other affirmative defenses normally available to a liable third party, are to be
abrogated to the extent necessary to ensure full recovery by Medicaid from third-
party resources .... " Id. at 502 n.45 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.9 10(1)).
287. Id. at 503 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(12)(h)).
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and several liability to any recovery, 2ss allowed the market share
theory of liability,2 9 permitted treble damages in cases of criminal
violations, 290 permitted the use of statistics to prove causation and
damages, 291 and eliminated the need to identify individual recipients
in large claims.292
a. Discovery Tactics
Successful litigation against the food industry may ultimately
depend on the limits placed on discovery.293 If precedent holds, the
food industry will attempt to force the states to identify each
Medicaid recipient for whom the state claims restitution.294 The
intent of the food industry will be to controvert the issue of
causation, thereby introducing the issue of whether the states can
prove particular food products or food companies caused the obesity
related health problems for which the Medicaid recipient was
treated.295 As discussed previously, causation is perhaps the first and
foremost important issue which must be resolved before state
attorneys general begin filing suits against the food industry for
recoupment of Medicaid costs incurred as a result of treating health
related problems caused by obesity.29
The tobacco litigation suggests that courts may be willing to
limit such discovery. 29 Another step in the right direction occurred
288. Id. at 502-03 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.9 10(1)).
289. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 503 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(9)(b)).
290. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(19)).
291. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(9)).
292. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(12)(h)).
293. Id. at 509.
294. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 509 (citing Discovery Battle Still Rages in Mississippi's
Medicaid Reimbursement Case, 10 MEALEY's LITIG. REP.: TOBACCO No. 11 (Oct. 3,
1996)).
295. Id. In Florida, the district court refused to allow the tobacco industry's
discovery request, finding that investigation and/or deposition of named Medicaid
patients was not necessary under the Florida Third Party Liability Act. Id. at 509
n.99 (citing State Can Submit Patient ID Numbers in Medicaid Reimbursement Suit, Court
Says, 4 Health Care Policy Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at D-28 (Oct. 28, 1996) [hereinafter
Health Care Pol'y Rep.]).
296. See supra Section III.C. 1.
297. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 509 (citing Henry Weinstein & Jack Nelson, Untested
Theory Becoming Tobacco Firms' Top Threat, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1996, at Al (reporting
that Minnesota and Mississippi courts issued orders allowing the tobacco industry to
take depositions from only twenty Medicaid recipients)).
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when the Florida Supreme Court struck down the provision of the
state's statute that allowed the state to proceed against the tobacco
industry without identifying individual Medicaid recipients who were298-- -
harmed. The court based its decision on the grounds that the
provision was a violation of constitutional due process because it
created a statutory presumption that Medicaid payments were
properly made without providing defendants an opportunity to
rebut the presumption.299 However, a subsequent court ruling held
that the identification numbers of Medicaid patients satisfied the
state's discovery burden.300 Though the subsequent ruling did not
eliminate the state's burden of proving causation, it did limit the
tobacco industry's ability to depose and discover medical informa-
tion.30 1
b. Procedural Tactics
Indications from the tobacco industry litigation suggest further
that the food industry might not be successful in its attempt to
remove the cases from state to federal courts.30 2 In Massachusetts v.
Philip Morris Inc., the tobacco companies made two unsuccessful
arguments in their removal efforts which will undoubtedly be
attempted again in litigation against the food industry.30 3
First, the tobacco companies argued that the federal require-
ment of a recovery provision in a state's Medicaid statutory scheme
against liable parties brought the cases under federal question
jurisdiction.3° Second, the tobacco companies argued that because
the federal government would receive a share of any successful state
Medicaid recoupment, the federal government was an "unnamed
plaintiff with a real interest in the suit. '30 5  However, the court
rejected both arguments, finding that the states were acting under
298. Id. at 503 (citing Associated Indus., 678 So. 2d at 1255-56).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 504.
301. Id. (citing Health Care Pol'y Rep., supra note 295).
302. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 510. Federal courts in Connecticut, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, and Mississippi remanded suits back to state courts. Id. at
510 n.103.
303. Id. (citing Philip Morris, 942 F. Supp. at 692).
304. Id. (citing Philip Morris, 942 F. Supp. at 692).
305. Id.
2005]
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
state law and were not roceeding as agents of, or on behalf of, the
federal goverment.
3°6
In addition, tobacco companies filed preemptive suits seeking
an injunction against the filing of a restitution suit by the state.3 °7 In
the District Court of Connecticut, Philip Morris claimed the
Medicaid suits were (1) unduly burdensome on interstate commerce,
(2) violative of due process and equal protection guarantees, and (3)
inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution due to preemption.3 8
However, federal courts uniformly rejected this tactic and
refused to enjoin the Medicaid suits.3a 9  The District Court of
Connecticut applied the Younger Abstention Doctrine 310 when it
dismissed a preemptive suit filed against Connecticut's attorney
general, finding that an important state interest was at issue.
c. Plaintiff Party Limitations
In the tobacco litigation, the defendant parties were generally
the same in each case. 312 However, in attempting various approaches
306. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 510 (citing Philip Morris, 942 F. Supp. at 696). See
also Connecticut Medicaid Case Remanded Back to State Court, 10 MEALEY'S LIIC. REP.:
TOBACCO No. 13 (Nov. 1, 1996)),
307. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 510 (citing e.g., Philip Morris, Inc. v. Blumenthal,
No. 396CV01121 (D. Conn. filed June 28, 1996); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger,
No. 95-12574-GAO (D. Mass. filed Nov. 28, 1995); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Morales,
No. 95-14807 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Travis County filed Nov. 28, 1995)). Maryland, New
Jersey, Utah, and Hawaii were also targeted for preemptive strikes. Id. at 510 n. 107
(citing Andrew Blum, Tobacco Industy Tries Pre-emptive Lawsuits, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 23,
1996, at A6).
308. Id. (citing Complaint, at para. 23, Philip Morris, Inc. v. Blumenthal, No.
396CV0112 1).
309. Id. (citing Andrew Blum, Tobacco Industry Tries Pre-emptive Lawsuits, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 23, 1996, at A6).
310. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S, 37 (1971).
311. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 510-11 (citing Steven Fromm, Tobacco Takes a Hit,
CONN. L. TRIB., Jan. 6, 1997, at 1 (noting the judge determined that Connecticut's
Fair Trade Act was at issue and the defendants had a fair opportunity for review of
constitutional matters in the state court; the judge determined that Younger
Abstention Doctrine was applicable due to the preemptive nature of the filing)).
312. Id. at 511. Defendant manufacturers included The American Tobacco Co.,
Liggett Group, Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., and United States Tobacco Co. Id.
at 511 n. 112. Other cases included as defendants the tobacco trade associations:
The Council for Tobacco Research-U.S.A., Inc. and The Tobacco Institute, Inc. Id.
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to litigating against the tobacco industry, different plaintiff party
configurations were tested.313
One partially unsuccessful configuration was when the State of
Minnesota joined with the Blue Cross / Blue Shield of Minnesota as
named plaintiffs.314  In Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc.,"' the
Minnesota Supreme Court found Blue Cross / Blue Shield lacked
standing to pursue a claim of negligent undertaking of a voluntary
duty against the tobacco industry; however, that the organization
had standing to pursue claims arising under Minnesota's state
consumer protection and antitrust statutes.31 6 The court concluded
that the Minnesota legislature had the authority to expand the
potential proper parties for statutory causes of action, but that tort
claims required more direct damages.
3 17
State attorneys general should also be aware of a second issue
that arose amidst plaintiff parties against the tobacco industry was
whether it is the responsibility of the attorney general's office or the
governor's office to bring such actions against the food industry
within their respective states. 318 For example, the Governor of
Mississippi filed suit to prevent that state's attorney general from
pursuing the Medicaid recoupment suit against the tobacco
industry.319 It was asserted that the Mississippi Attorney General
lacked authority to act in opposition to the Governor's expressed
policy as the state's chief executive officer.3 20
d. Rebutting the Slippery Slope Objections
Litigation against the food industry is not frivolous if the
evidence presented establishes the causal connection between obesity
and food consumption.321 If a cause of action has any legal merit, it
The tobacco industry public relations firm Hill & Knowlton, Inc. was also named as
a defendant in other cases. Id.
313. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 511.
314. Id.
315. 551 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 1996).
316. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 511 (citing Philip Morris, 551 N.W.2d at 495).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. (citing Complaint, Fordice v. Moore, No. 96-M-114 (Miss. filed Feb. 17,
1996)).
320. Id.
321. See Rogers, supra note 5, at 880 (citing John Wade, On Frivolous Litigation: A
Study of Tort Liability and Procedural Sanctions, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 433, 464 (1986)).
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is not frivolous.322 Nonetheless, the court in Pelman v. McDonald's
Corp. has noted the judiciary's concern over the slippery slope effect
of allowing such cases against the food industry to proceed.323
A "slippery slope" argument invokes the fear that once a right is
infringed upon, it will keep being infringed upon until there is
nothing left of it.32 4 A classic example of this type of argument is the
National Rifle Association's position that any prohibition of weapon
ownership will lead to the banning of all guns, including hunting
rifles.325 An example of a slippery slope argument in the First
Amendment arena is that permitting the government to ban any
type of speech (e.g., false advertising) will lead to the erosion of the
protection of other types of speech, including the prohibition of core
political speech, such as opposition to government policies.326
322. Id.
323. Id. (citing Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 518 ("Even if limited to that ilk of fare
dubbed 'fast food,' the potential for lawsuits is great .... ).
324. Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARv. L. REV. 361, 361-62 (1985)
(stating "the phenomenon referred to [by the term "slippery slope"] is that a
particular act, seeming innocuous when taken in isolation, may yet lead to a future
host of similar but increasingly pernicious events.").
325. See James Weinstein, A Constitutional Roadmap to the Regulation of Campus Hate
Speech, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 163, 183 (1991) (citing Jervis Anderson, A Reporter at
Large: An Extraordinary People, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 12, 1984, at 159-60).
326. See id. See also Joseph E. Olson & David B. Kopel, All the Way Down the Slippery
Slope: Gun Prohibition in England and Some Lessons for Civil Liberties in America, 22
HAMLINE L. REV. 399 n.3 (1999) (listing other examples as: Henry Geller & Jane H.
Yurow, The Reasonable Access Provision (312(a)(7)) of the Communications Act: Once
More Down the Slippery Slope, 34 FED. COMM. L.J. 389 (1982) (arguing that the
Federal Election Commission review of a television station's refusal to allow a
federal candidate "reasonable access" creates a slippery slope for government
control of the media's editorial decisions); John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually
Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate Misuse of the Therapeutic State for Social Control, 15 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 655 (1992) (arguing that allowing the civil commitment of
persons labeled as violent sexual predators creates a slippery slope to the
widespread use of lifetime confinement of other people based on only a single
crime); Jennifer L. Bradshaw, Comment, The Slippery Slope of Modern Takings
Jurisprudence in New Jersey, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 433 (1997) (discussing a
decision upholding the Pinelands Protection Act and arguing that the slippery slope
endangers Fifth Amendment property rights); and as an example of a slippery slope
argument against something other than a potential infringement of a civil liberty see
generally JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN
OUR LEGAL SYSTEM (1997) (asserting that expert testimony about battered women's
syndrome creates a slippery slope away from personal responsibility)).
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For their persuasive force, slippery slope arguments depend
primarily on the perceived inability of future decisionmakers to
recognize or uphold doctrinal lines.327 However, arguments based
upon the difficulty of drawing lines "are based on a fallacious view of
the nature of language, one that presupposes that a distinction that
cannot be drawn sharply should not be drawn at all."
3 28
"The slippery slope argument is almost always universally
derided by philosophers as a bad argument."3 29 Such arguments are
called "the trump card of the traditionalist" because no proposed
societal reform is immune from the slippery slope objection, no
matter how strong the arguments are in its favor.330 In fact, the
stronger the arguments in favor of the reform, as is the case against
the food industry, the more likely the traditionalist will make the
slippery slope objection because "it is then the only one he has."
33'
"The slippery slope argument is almost always an embarrass-
ment to readers who possess even a modicum of critical skill." 332
While the slippery slope argument may be a valid concern, slippery
slope claims deserve to be viewed skeptically, and the proponent of
such a claim must be expected to provide the necessary empirical
support.333
The solution is for judges who adjudicate cases against the food
industry to make their holdings and rationales explicit, giving
examples of situations in which the principles would not apply,
3A
Further, judges should disregard the speculative risks.315 Judges
should recognize their duty to decide the cases the best they can and
refuse to entertain the speculative, concern that some people in the
future may oversimplify the reasoning into something broader.336
Speculative consequences notwithstanding, Medicaid recoupment
cases against the food industry must stand on their own merits.
327. Schauer, supra note 324, at 379-81.
328. Id. at 381.
329. Eric Lode, Comment, Slippety Slope Arguments and Legal Reasoning, 87 CAL. L.
REv. 1469, 1474 n.31 (1999) (quoting Jeffrey P. Whitman, The Many Guises of the
Slippery Slope Argument, 20 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 85, 85 (1994)).
330. Id. at 1473 (citing Glanville Williams, "Mercy Killing" Legislation-A Rejoinder,
43 MINN. L. REv. 1, 9 (1958)).
331. Id.
332. Paul F. Campos, Advocacy and Scholarship, 81 CAL. L. REv. 817, 834 (1993).
333. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Obesity is a public policy issue affecting the long-term health of
America's population, and the food industry has a duty to engage in
the battle against it. As stated by the United States Surgeon General:
[The food industry] has a vital role in the prevention of over-
weight and obesity. Through the production and distribution of
food and other consumer products, [the food industry] exerts a
tremendous impact on the nutritional quality of the food we eat
and the extent of physical activity in which we engage. [The food
industry] can use that leverage to create and sustain an environ-
ment that encourages individuals to achieve and maintain a
healthy or healthier body weight.337
This comment does not endorse all tort claims against the food
industry. It argues only in favor of claims that would allow states to
recover for costs imposed upon their Medicaid agencies as a result of
obesity if the food industry fails to comply with federal regulation of
the industry.
Tort claims against the food industry can compliment legislative
efforts to regulate the industry and can thereby make a contribution
to decreasing obesity in America. Imposing restrictions on the food
industry by using tort litigation as a substitute for legislation is
improper. However, tort liability can work in conjunction with
legislative regulation, providing incentives to prevent consumers
from over-consumption and becoming obese instead of looking for
ways to simply increase sales and profits.
The same reasoning behind the Medicaid suits against the
tobacco industry products applies equally to food products, parti-
cularly food products with negative or minimal nutritional value.338
Individuals require treatment for health problems caused by poor
diet just as individuals require treatment for health problems related
to usage of tobacco products.33 9 The statistical information required
to establish a "definitive link to a specific debilitation" 340 is sufficient
to justify forcing the food industry to help pay for the negative
337. Surgeon General's Call to Action, supra note 19, at 28.
338. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 515.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 515-16.
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effects imposed on society by its products on public policy
grounds.341
State Medicaid recoupment claims are not unwarranted or
unnecessary governmental intrusions into areas of purely personal
conduct. The intent of such lawsuits is not to impose governmental
mandates on proper diet and healthy lifestyles. Further, the goal of
such state actions is not to place the power of the legislative branch
to regulate industries into the hands of state attorneys general. The
judicial branch of our government is not the arm charged with
promulgating commercial regulations, 2
The proposed state Medicaid recoupment lawsuits would allow
the tort system to serve as a complementary check on industry
compliance with legislatively authorized regulations. Further,
because the food industry is profiting from consumer purchases of
its products, the industry has a duty to compensate the state
Medicaid budgets that bear the burden of paying for the ill effects of
obesity caused by the food industry's intent to generate profits.
341. See supra Section II.
342. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 517 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
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VI. APPENDIX A
National Conference of State Legislatures
2003 - 2005 State Legislation On Civil Immunity for Food
Vendors
Below is the most recent report from the National Conference
of State Legislatures regarding action on bills introduced during the
2003-2004 and 2004-2005 legislative sessions as of February 16,
2005. This report is available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/
health/Fvmemo.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
As concern continues to mount about the growing obesity
epidemic among both children and adults in the United States,
legislators have responded to different voices in the debate. In
many states, legislation has been introduced to limit the liability
of food manufacturers, sellers, and others in the food distribution
and marketing industry for claims resulting from individuals'
obesity, weight gain, or health conditions related to obesity as a
result of food consumption. Discussion of these bills focuses on:
(1) Industry concerns about who is responsible for healthy choices
in food consumption and the potential for food industry-focused
tort litigation,
(2) Public health concerns about the costs and health impact of
obesity-related chronic conditions such as heart disease, cancer,
stroke and diabetes (the first, second, third and sixth leading
causes of death in the United States), and
(3) Questions about the advisability of limiting access to potential
remedies through the courts.
Industry representatives argue that these bills will protect against
frivolous lawsuits for obesity claims. Trial lawyers contend that
court rules already provide for the early dismissal of frivolous
cases and the award of attorney's fees. In one state, concerns
have been raised that the proposed legislation conflicts with
constitutional provisions that guarantee injured people open
access to the courts.
State and Federal Activity
As of February 16, 2005, bills on this topic had been introduced
in thirty-five (35) states and enacted in thirteen (13) of those
states. The thirteen (13) states that have enacted legislation to
limit civil liability for obesity claims against food vendors and
others in the food industry are Arizona, Colorado, Florida,
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Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Washington State.
Many state-level proposals are modeled on federal legislation
introduced in 2003, either the Commonsense Consumption Act
(S 1428) or the Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act
(HR 339). The chart below details bills introduced in state
legislatures during the 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 legislative
sessions that would provide some degree of immunity from civil
lawsuits against food vendors, distributors, and marketers, and
others in the food industry.
As discussed in this Comment, a widely publicized obesity
lawsuit against McDonald's Corporation was dismissed by a federal
district court in September 2003. On January 26, 2005, the United
States Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit overruled the lower
federal court decision and reinstated portions of the case, ruling that
the plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to show that there was
a link between their obesity and eating foods from McDonald's.
Below is the latest reported action on bills introduced in the
state legislatures as prepared by Amy Winterfeld, Senior Policy
Specialist, Health Program, National Conference of State
Legislatures.
Arizona AZ HB 2220 (2004) (Enacted, signed by the
governor, 4/12/04, Chapter 67)
Provides that food products may not be classified as
defective and unreasonably dangerous for product
liability purposes; and that there is no duty to warn
purchasers that consumption of a food product may
cause health problems if consumed excessively.
Creates an affirmative defense for repeated consump-
tion of a food product as a proximate cause of injury.
California CA AB 173 (New bill for 2005, Introduced 1/27/05
To Assembly Committee on Judiciary)
Would provide civil liability immunity for food
manufacturers, packers, distributors, carriers, sellers or
associations for claims arising from weight gain,
obesity, or a health condition associated with weight
gain or obesity from the long-term consumption of the
food.
CA AB 1909 (2004) (Failed to pass judiciary
committee, 5/4/04) 1
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Would have exempted manufacturers, distributors, or
sellers of food or nonalcoholic beverages intended for
human consumption from civil liability for personal
injury or wrongful death based on an individual's
consumption of food or nonalcoholic beverages
leading to an individual's weight gain, obesity, or a
health condition related to weight gain or obesity.
CO HB 1150 (2004) (Enacted, signed by the
governor, 5/04, Chapter 229)
Creates the Commonsense Consumption Act, limiting
the civil liability of food manufacturers, distributors,
sellers, or retailers for claims resulting from a person's
obesity, weight gain, or health conditions related to
obesity resulting from a person's long-term
consumption of a food or beverage.
CT HB 6156 (New bill for 2005, Introduced 1/24/05,
To Joint Committee on Judiciary)
Would prohibit class action lawsuits for based on
obesity claims.
FL HB 333 (2004) (Enacted, signed by the governor,
5/21/04, Chapter No. 2004-88)
Provides food manufacturers, sellers, and distributors
with immunity from civil liability for personal injury or
wrongful death based upon long-term consumption of
certain foods or nonalcoholic beverages under certain
circumstances; and provide limitations on that
immunity if required nutritional content information
was not provided or if false or misleading information
was provided to the public.
Georgia GA HB 1519 (2004) (Enacted, Act 590, 5/14/04)
Creates the Commonsense Consumption Act,
prohibiting civil lawsuits against food manufacturers,
marketers, distributors, advertisers, sellers, and tradel
associations for claims resulting from a person's
obesity, weight gain, or health conditions related to
weight gain or obesity.
Idaho ID HB 590 (2004) (Enacted , Chaptered 4/2/04,
Chapter 380)
Creates the Commonsense Consumption Act,
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Illinois
Iowa
KS SB 75 (New bill for 2005, Introduced 1/24/05)
Would provide immunity from civil liability for claims
relating to weight _ain or oesit.
KY SB 103 (New bill for 2005, Last action 2/10/05,
Passed Senate, To House)
Would create the Commonsense Consumption Act
excluding food establishments from civil liability for
claims arising out of weight gain or obesity, for claims
pending on the effective date and all claims filed
thereafter regardless of when the claim arose.
KY SB 176 (2004) (Last action, 2/19/04, to Senate
Committee on Judiciary)
Would provide immunity from civil liability to food
manufacturers, packers, distributors, carriers, holders,
sellers, marketers, and advertisers for any claim arising
out of weight gain, obesity, a health condition
prohibiting civil lawsuits against food manufacturers,
marketers, distributors, advertisers, sellers, and trade
associations for claims resulting from a person's
obesity, weight gain, or health conditions related ta
weight gain or obesity. ______
IL HB 3981 (2004) (Enacted, signed by governor,
7/30/04, Public Act No. 93-848)
Creates the Commonsense Consumption Act,
providing that no person shall bring a qualified civil
action in State court against any seller of a food
product. Defines "qualified civil action" to include a
lawsuit against a food seller on a claim of injury
resulting from a person's weight gain, obesity, or any
obesity-related health condition.
IA SB 2186 (2004) (Last action, 3/2/04, in Senate
Committee on Judiciary)
Would limit the civil liability of manufacturers,
distributors, and sellers of food or nonalcoholic
relating to the consumption of food or nonalcoholic
beverage products unless the plaintiff proves that at
the time of sale, the product was not in compliance
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associated with weight gain or obesity, or other
generally known condition caused by or likely to result
from long-term consumption of food.
Louisiana LA HB 518 (2003) (Enacted, signed into law by the
governor 1/30/04, Act 158)
Limits the liability of manufacturers, distributors, and
sellers of food and non-alcoholic beverae products.
Maine ME SB 200 (New bill for 2005, Last action 2/8/05,
Referred by House to Joint Committee on Judiciary
in concurrence)
Would create a defense from liability for persons or
businesses serving food, for claims of obesity of or
excessive weight gain by consumers as a result of their
long-term consumption of food from that person or
entity, with exceptions for altered or misbranded food
items.
Maryland MD HB 15 (New bill for 2005, Last action 2/14/05,
Reported unfavorably from House Committee on
Judiciary.)
Would prohibit civil lawsuits against food sellers based
on a claim of injury or death resulting from a person's
weight gain, obesity, or a related health condition.
MD SB 315 (New bill for 2005, Introduced 1/31/05,
To Senate Committee on Judicial Proceedings)
Would prohibit civil lawsuits against food sellers based
on a claim of injury or death resulting from a person's
ht ain, obesity, or a related health condition.
Michigan MI HB 5809 (2003) (Enacted, signed into law by the
governor 10/7/04, Public Act No. 367)
Provides immunity from civil liability for food manufac-
turers, packers, distributors, carriers, holders, sellers,
marketers, or advertisers or an association that include
one or more of these entities for personal injury or
death arising out of weight gain, obesity, a health
condition associated with weight gain or obesity, ox
other generally known condition allegedly caused by o
allegedly likely to result from long-term consumptior
of food.__ __
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MN HB118 (New bill for 2005, Introduced 1/10/05
To House Committee on Agriculture and Rural
Development)
Would prohibit civil lawsuits against specified persons
for weight gain resulting from the consumption of
certain foods.
MN SB 631 (New bill for 2005, Introduced 1/31/05,
To Senate Committee on Judiciary)
Would prohibit civil lawsuits against certain persons for
weight gain resulting from the consumption of certain
foods.
MS HB 1054 (New bill for 2005, Introduced 1/17/05,
To House Committee on Judiciary)
Would limit the civil liability of food manufacturers andl
sellers for weight gain claims.
MS SB 2910 (2004) (Died in committee 3/9/04)
Would have limited civil lawsuits against food
manufacturers, marketers, distributors, advertisers,
sellers, and trade associations for claims resulting from
a person's obesity, weight gain, or health conditions
related to weight gain or obesity.
MO HB 1115 (2004) (Enacted, signed by governor,
6/25/04)
Creates the Commonsense Consumption Act,
prohibiting civil lawsuits against manufacturers,
distributors, and sellers of food for any claims arising
out of weight gain, obesity, or health conditions
associated with weight gain or obesity. Exceptions to
this prohibition are provided for certain violations of
state and federal law.
NE LB 1046 (2004) (Last action, placed on general
file as amended, 3/11/04)
Would provide limitations on civil liability for specified
claims against manufacturers, distributors, and sellers
of food or nonalcoholic beverages for any claims arising
out of weight gain, obesity, or health conditions
associated with weight gain or obesity based on an
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Nevada NV BDR748 (Bill draft request filed 10/25/04)
Would protect specified food manufacturers and
sellers from "frivolous" lawsuits arising from weight
gain or obesity.
New NH SB 408 (2004) (Failed to pass House, 4/15/04)
Hampshire Would have exempted food sellers, manufacturers,
distributors, packers, advertisers, and marketers from
civil liability for individuals' weight gain, obesity, or
health condition related to obesity.
New Jersey NJ AB 3514 (New bill, Introduced 11/15/04, Last
action 11/22/04, To Assembly Committee on
Judiciary)
Would limit the liability of food producers,
manufacturers, packers, distributors, carriers,
holders, sellers, marketers and advertisers for claims
for weight gain or obesity.
NJ SB 1462 (2004) (Last action, 11/8/04, From
Senate Committee on Judiciary as substituted)
Would prohibit lawsuits against food manufacturers
or sellers on the grounds that food consumption
caused a person's weight gain or obesity.
New Mexico NM HB 553 (New bill for 2005, Introduced 1/27/05,
To House Committee on Judiciary)
Would create the "Right to Eat Enchiladas Act"
eliminating civil liability for health conditions caused
by long-term food consumption.
New York 1 NY AB 11336 (2004) (Last action, 5/28/04, to
Assembly Committee on Codes)
Would define certain lawsuits against manufacturers,
packers, distributors, carriers, holders or sellers of
food as frivolous if alleging injury caused by the use
of food or deceptive trade practices in connection
with a perss p ase or consumption of food.
North Dakota ND HB 1241 (New bill for 2005, Passed House,
Last action, 2/7/05, To Senate Committee on
Judiciary)
Would limit the liability of food producers, manufac-
turers, ackrs, distributors, carriers, holders, sellers,
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marketers, trade associations, or advertisers foi
claims of injury resulting from weight gain, obesity,
or any health condition related to weight gain.
OH HB 350 (2003) (Last action, 5/26/04, Read on
concurrence. Informally passed.)
Would provide immunity from civil damages for food
manufacturers, sellers, and trade associations fox
claims resulting from a person's obesity or weight
gain or any health condition related to obesity,
weight gain, or cumulative consumption.
OH SB 161 (2003-2004) (Last action, 1/7/04, to
Senate Committee on Agriculture)
Would provide a qualified immunity from civil
damages to a manufacturer or supplier of a food or a
non- alcoholic beverage for a claim of weight gain,
obesity, or a related health condition resulting from
the consumption of the food or non-alcoholic
beverage unless certain circumstances are proven by a
claimant.
Oklahoma OK HB 1554 (New bill for 2005, Last action 2/i/05
To House Committee on Judiciary)
Would create the Commonsense Consumption Act to
prevent "frivolous" lawsuits against manufacturers,
sellers, holders, marketers or advertisers of food
products that comply with applicable statutory andregulatory requirements.
Pennsylvania PA HB 2912 (New bill introduced 10/14/04, Lasi
action 10/14/04, To House Committee on Judiciary)
Would provide for food purveyor civil immunity.
PA SB 1260 (New bill introduced 11/5/04, Lasl
action 11/5/04, To Senate Committee on Judiciary)
Would provide civil immunity from liability for food
purveyors under certain circumstances
PA HB 1986 (2003) (Last action, 9/16/03, to House
Committee on Judiciary)
To create the Personal Responsibility in Food
Consumption Act aimed at preventing lawsuits
deemed frivolous against manufacturers, distributors,
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that comply with statutory and regulatory
requirements.
South SC HB3118 (New bill introduced 12/8/04, Last
Carolina action 1/11/05, To House Committee on Judiciary)
Would provide immunity from liability for food
manufacturers, packers, distributors, carriers,
holders, sellers, marketers, and advertisers for claims
relating to weight gain or obesity; with exceptions for
claims based on adulteration or misbranding of food
labels.
South Dakota SD HB 1282 (2004) (Enacted, filed with SD
Secretary of State 3/9/04)
Disallows recovery on civil claims for injury or death
against a manufacturer, seller, trade association,
livestock producer, or retailer resulting from an
individual's weight gain, obesity, or a health
condition resulting from the individual's long-term
consumption of a ualified product.
Tennessee TN HB 3041 (2004) (Substituted on House floor by
S 2379)
TN SB 2379 (2004) (Enacted, chaptered as law
4/30/04, Chapter 570)
Enacts the Commonsense Consumption Act to
prohibit civil lawsuits for damages against
manufacturer, packer, distributor, seller or advertiser
of food claiming weight gain or obesity caused by
long-term consumption of the food unless: (1) The
alleged weight gain is a direct result of violation of
state or federal regulations on food content and
labeling; or (2) The weight gain is a direct result of
intentional violation of state or federal law on
manufacturing, marketing, distribution, advertising,
labeling or selling the food.
Utah UT SB 214 (2004) (Enacted and chaptered as
Chapter 194,3/19/04)
Provides manufacturers, packers, distributors,
carriers, holders, sellers, marketers,
and advertisers of food with immunity from civil
________ liability for obesity and weight gain claims, while
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allowing an exception for food that does not meet
state or federal standards; and requires that any civil
actions commenced plead with particularity the injury
and the proximate cause.
VA HB 1617 (New bill, Prefiled 12/16/04, Last
action 1/28/05, To Senate Committee on Courts of
Justice)
Would prohibit product liability actions against food
manufacturers or sellers for qualified food products,
for claims of injury, potential injury or death
resulting from consumption of a food product and
weight gain, obesity or any health condition related
to weight gain or obesity.
WA SB 6601 (2004) (Enacted and chaptered as
Chapter 139, 3/26/04)
Prohibits lawsuits against manufacturers, packers,
distributors, carriers, holders, sellers, marketers, or
advertisers of food products that comply with
applicable statutory and regulatory requirements for
claims arising out of weight gain, obesity, or health
conditions associated with weight gain or obesity,
caused by or allegedly likely to result from long-term
consumption of food.
WI AB 595 (2003-2004) (Vetoed by the governor,
3/17/04)
WI SB 289 (2003-2004)(Failed to pass pursuant to
Senate Joint Resolution 1, 3/31/04)
Both bills would have created a civil liability
exemption for food manufacturers, marketers,
packers, advertisers, distributors, or sellers for claims
resulting from a person's weight gain or obesity or
health condition related to weight gain or obesity
caused by the consumption of food.
2005]

EUROPEAN UNION FOOD LAW UPDATE
Nicole Coutrelis*
I. PUBLISHED REGULATIONS
A. Food Allergen Labeling: New Allergen Exemptions List
On November 10, 2003, the European Parliament and Council
Directive 2003/89/EC amended Directive 2000/13/EC.' Directive
2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and Council of March 20,
2000 "on the approximation of the laws of the Member States
relating to the [labeling], presentation and advertising of foodstuffs
'2
requires food manufacturers to indicate twelve potentially allergic
ingredients and their derivatives on food packaging.3 The allergen
substances are listed in the Annex IIIa to the Directive.4 These new
food allergen labeling requirements became effective on November
25, 2005. 5
However, Directive 2000/13/EC provided that the Commission
may provisionally exclude certain ingredients or products of those
ingredients from the allergen list if they are not likely to be a risk for
allergic peoples.6 In March 2005, the European Parliament and
Council published Directive 2005/26/EC "establishing a list of food
ingredients or substances provisionally excluded from Annex IIIa of
Directive 2000/13/EC. ' 7  Pursuant to Directive 2005/26/EC, eight
substances derived from those listed in Annex IlIa shall be excluded
* Nicole Coutrelis is a member of the Paris, France Bar and an attorney for
Coutrelis & Associates in Brussels, Belgium and Paris, France. Her practice focuses
on litigation and lobbying efforts in the area of food law. She also serves as
Secretary General of the European Food Law Association and she is a member of
the Paris Bar Association, the International Bar Assocation, the Food and Drug Law
Institute. She has taught several courses and published many articles on the subject
of food law in the European Union (E.U.).
1. Council Directive 2003/89, 2003 O.J. (L 308) 15 (EC).
2. Council Directive 2000/13, 2000 O.J. (L 109) 29 (EC).
3. Council Directive 2003/89, art. l(a), at 16-17.
4. Directive 2003/89, ann. ilia, at 18.
5. Directive 2003/89, art. 2(1), at 17-18.
6. See Directive 2003/89, art. 1(e), at 17.
7. Council Directive 2005/26, ann., 2005 O.J. (L 75) 33, 34 (EC).
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from this Annex when used in specific conditions.' The Directive
allows for such exclusion until November 25, 2007.' Member States
have until September 21, 2005, at the latest, to publish the
regulations necessary to comply with the exemption list.'" The new
provisions will be effective after November 25, 2005.
According to the minutes of its meeting held on June 23, 2005,
the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health dis-
cussed and approved by a wide majority a draft of informal guide-
lines." These guidelines were compiled by the Commission and
representatives of Member States to interpret the provisions set out




On February 8, 2005, the European Parliament and Council
published Regulation 183/2005/EC "laying down requirements for
feed hygiene."'" This regulation will be effective in all Member
States on January 1, 2006." Its objective is to strengthen feed safety
at all stages as feed traceability is an essential component in ensuring
such safety.' 5
Regulation 183/2005/EC replaced Council Directive 95/69/EC
that went into effect December 22, 1995.16 Regulation 95/69/EC
"[laid] down the conditions and arrangements for approving and
registering certain establishments and intermediaries operating in
the animal feed sector and [amending] Directives 70/524/EEC,
8. For example, wheat-based glucose syrups including dextrose are provisionally
excluded as a product derived of cereals containing gluten. See Directive 2005/26,
ann., at 34.
9. Directive 2005/26, art. 1, at 33.
10. Directive 2005/26, art. 2(1), at 33.
11. See Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health, Summary
Record of Meeting 23rd June 2005, at 2, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/
committees/regulatory/scfcah/general food/summary 16_en.pdf.
12. See Europa, Guidelines Relating to Article 6 Paragraph 10 of Directive 2000/13/EC
as Amended by Directive 2003/84/EC, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/food/
labellingnutrition/foodlabelling/guidelines_6_ O.pdf.
13. Commission Regulation 183/2005, 2005 O.J. (L 35) 1.
14. Regulation 183/2005, art. 34, at 12.
15. Regulation 183/2005, whereas 6, at 1.
16. See Regulation 183/2005, art. 33, at 12.
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74/63/EEC, 79/373/EEC and 82/471/EEC."'7 These amended direc-
tives provide for the approval and registration of feed businesses
involved in the manufacture, use, or marketing of certain feed
additives. 8 Regulation 183/2005/EC extends approval and registra-
tion for most all feed businesses.' 9 Regulation 183/2005/EC also
introduced Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP)
principles for the feed business operators other than at the level of
primary production.2" Regulation 183/2005/EC completes the
"hygiene package" published on April 29, 2004. The "hygiene
package" consisted of the following four regulations:
" Regulation 852/2004/EC of the European Parliament and
Council "on the hygiene of foodstuffs;"'"
* Regulation 853/2004/EC of the European Parliament and
Council "laying down specific hygiene rules for food of
animal origin;"22
* Regulation 854/2004/EC of European Parliament and
Council "laying down specific rules for the organi[z]ation of
official controls on products of animal origin intended for
human consumption;"23 and
* Regulation 882/2004/EC of European Parliament and
Council "on official controls performed to ensure the
verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal
health and welfare rules." 4
C. Food Contaminants
On January 28, 2005, the European Commission published
Regulation 123/2005/EC "amending Regulation 466/2001/EC as
regards ochratoxin A." '25 According to Regulation 466/2001/EC, the
provisions regarding ochratoxin A were to be reviewed to take into
17. Council Directive 95/69, 1995 O.J. (L 332) 15-32 (EC).
18. Directive 95/69, arts. 4 & 5, at 15-32.
19. Council Regulation 183/2005, arts. 4 & 5, at 5-6.
20. Regulation 183/2005, art. 6, at 6.
21. Council Regulation 852/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 139) 1 (EC).
22. Council Regulation 853/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 139) 55 (EC).
23. Council Regulation 854/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 139) 206 (EC),
24. Council Regulation 882/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 165) 1 (EC).
25. Commission Regulation 123/2005, 2005 O.J, (L 25) 3 (EC).
26. Regulation 466/2001 set maximum levels for contamination in foodstuffs. See
Regulation 466/2001, 2001 oJ. (L 77) 1 (EC).
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account the presence of such contaminant in some foodstuffs 7 (such
as cereals, wine, roasted coffee, etc.). 28  On January 26, 2005,
Directive 2005/5/EC was published "amending Directive 2002/26/EC
as regards sampling methods and methods of analysis for the official
control of the levels of ochratoxin A in certain foodstuffs. 29
On February 8, 2005, the European Commission published
Regulation 208/2005/EC of February 4, 2005 "amending Regulation
466/2001/EC as regards polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons." 0 This
regulation went into effect for all Member States on April 1, 2005."'
In its December 4, 2002 opinion, the Scientific Committee on
Food reached the conclusion that some polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons (PAH) are genotoxic carcinogens.32 To prevent PAH
contamination of foods, maximum levels for benzo(a)pyrene have
been set in Regulation 208/2005/EC." The European Commission
also published Directive 2005/10/EC "laying down the sampling
methods and the methods of analysis for the official control of the
levels of benzo(a)pyrene in foodstuffs.3 14 In addition, on February 8,
2005, the Commission published Recommendation 2005/108/EC
"on the further investigation into levels of polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons in certain foods."3"
D. Feed Contaminants
On January 29, 2005, in order to have analytical results
reported and interpreted in a uniform way, the Commission
published Directive 2005/7/EC "amending Directive 2002/70/EC
establishing requirements for the determination of levels of dioxins
and dioxin-like PCBs in feedingstuffs."36  On the same date, the
Commission also published Directive 2005/8/EC of January 28, 2005
"amending Annex I to Directive 2002/32/EC of the European
27. Commission Regulation 123/2005, 2005 O.J. (L 25) at 3-5.
28. Regulation 466/2001, ann. I, at 6.
29. Commission Directive 2005/5, 2005 O.J. (L 27) 38-40 (EC).
30. Commission Regulation 208/2005, 2005 O.J. (L 34) 3 (EC).
31. Regulation 208/2005, art. 2, at 4.
32. Regulation 208/2005, whereas 3, at 3.
33. Regulation 208/2005, whereas 6, at 3.
34. Commission Directive 2005/10, 2005 O.J. (L 34) 15-20 (EC).
35. Commission Recommendation 2005/108, 2005 O.J. (L 34) 43-45 (EC).
36. Commission Directive 2005/7, whereas 3, 2005 O.J. (L 27) 41 (EC).
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Parliament and of the Council on undesirable substances in animal
feed." 7
E. Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs)
On March 5, 2005, the European Commission published
Decision 2005/174/EC "establishing guidance notes supplementing
part B of Annex II to Council Directive 90/219/EEC on the
contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms."38 This
decision provides guidance to Member States for assessing the safety
of the contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms.
On April 21, 2005, the Commission published Decision
2005/317/EC "on emergency measures regarding the non-
authori[z]ed genetically modified organism Bt10 in maize pro-
ducts."39 This decision imposed controls on imports of genetically
modified corn gluten feed and brewers grain from the United
States.4 ° Such controls were imposed after the unauthorized Bt10
maize had been accidentally found in some batches.41
II. PENDING DRAFT REGULATIONS
A. Hygiene: Draft Community Guidance on HACCP Flexibility and
Draft Regulation on HACCP
Article 5 of Regulation 852/2004/EC4" "on the hygiene of
foodstuffs" was amended requiring food business operators to
implement and to maintain a permanent procedure based upon
HACCP principles.43 The concept allows HACCP principles to be
implemented with appropriate flexibility.
On May 25, 2005, the European Commission issued an updated
Draft Guidance document "on the implementation of HACCP as
mentioned in Article 5 of Regulation 852/2004/EC on the hygiene of
37. Commission Directive 2005/8, 2005 O.J. (L 27) 44-45 (EC).
38. Commission Decision 2005/174, 2005 O.J. (L 59) 20-26 (EC).
39. Commission Decision 2005/317, 2005 O.J. (L 101) 14-16 (EC).
40. Decision 2005/317, art. 1, at 15.
41. Decision 2005/317, whereas 2, at 14.
42. Council Regulation 852/2004, art. 5, 2004 O.J. (L 139) 1, 15 (EC).
43. Council Regulation 854/2004, 2004 O.J. (L226) 83, 87 (EC).
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foodstuffs."' 44 The aim of the Draft Guidance is to offer assistance on
the flexible application of the HACCP principles in order to ensure
a harmonized approach in all Member States.45
On May 25, 2005, the Commission also reissued an updated
version of the Draft Guidance document on the implementation of
HACCP principles in food businesses.46 It has yet to be decided
whether these documents will be finalized in the form of a guidance
document or a Commission decision. During a June 2005 meeting
of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health,
the Commission agreed, upon the advice offered from some
delegations, to merge both documents into a single one.47 Member
States expressed their general satisfaction with the drafts and were
asked to send any further comments as soon as possible.4" The
Commission is planning to have this document finalized before the
end of 2005.4"
B. Labeling: Health Claims
On June 3, 2005, European Union (E.U.) Health Ministers
reached a political agreement on the proposal for regulation on the
use of nutrition and health claims made on foods." On May 26,
2005, the European Parliament held its first reading vote on the
Commission's proposal and recommended several amendments.5
44. SANCO/1515/2005, Draft Guidance Document on the Facilitation and of the
Implementation of the HACCP Principles in Food Businesses, at 4, available at
http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/sanco15152005.pdf.
45. Id,
46. SANCO/2655/2004 Rev. 7, Draft Guidance Document on the Implementation of
HACCP as Mentioned in Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No. 852/2004 on the Hygiene of
Foodstuffs, available at http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/sanco26552004rev7
.pdf.
47. SANCO-E,2(05)D/521175, Summary Record of the Standing Committee on the Food





50. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Nutrition and Health Claims Made on Foods, COM (2003) 424 final, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/fl/fl07_en.pdf.
51. See Press Release, European Commission, Commissioner Kyprianou
Welcomes Council Agreement on Health Claims (June 3, 2005), available at
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The Commission accepted a number of these amendments but
rejected the deletion of Article 4 on nutrient profiles. The article
related to the amounts of fat, sugar, and salt a food may or may not
contain in order to be allowed to bear health-related claims. The
Commission also rejected the amendments replacing the
authorization procedure for health claims with a notification
procedure. 2 In June 2005, the Health Council accepted Article 4 as
drafted by the Commission as well as the authorization procedure. 51
A common position is expected to be published by the Council
in the coming months. The Health Claims Regulation will then
undergo a second reading by the European Parliament and Council.
A common regulation is expected to eventually be adopted in early
2006.
C. Addition of Vitamins and Minerals and of Certain Other Substances to
Foods (so-called Fortification)
As of today, national rules in the E.U. vary widely concerning
addition of vitamins or minerals to foodstuffs. In November 2003,
the European Commission issued a "proposal for regulation of the
addition of vitamins, minerals and other substances to foods."54 The
aim of the proposed regulation was to regulate the voluntary
addition of vitamins and minerals to foods in order to promote the
free circulation of such foods in the E.U. while providing a high level
of protection for consumers. The proposed regulation included
positive lists of vitamins and minerals which may be added to food.
It also recommended daily intakes of specific substances. The
proposed regulation provided a basis for restricting or prohibiting





54. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the Addition of Vitamins and Minerals and of Certain Other Substances to Foods,
COM (2003) 671 final, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/food/
labellingnutrition/vitamins/df ff reg1 en.pdf.
55. See Press Release, European Commission, Commission Proposes Common
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At the end of May 2005, the European Parliament welcomed the
proposed regulation in its first reading. The proposed regulation is
to be adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council of
Ministers under the co-decision procedure. 6 The Council has
considered the amendments offered by the Parliament but some
areas of disagreement exist between the two institutions.
Even though the Council reached a political agreement on the
proposed regulation and agreed to the content of its common
position, the Council is not expected to send the latter back to the
Parliament for a second reading until at least the end of 2005 due to
legal and linguistic editing of the text. Once the Parliament receives
the Council's common position, it will have three months to either
approve the Council's common position and adopt the regulation or
forward further amendments to the proposal to the Council and the
Commission. 7
D. Draft Proposals for New E. U. Regulation on
Food Additives and Enzymes
Following the meeting of the European Commission's Working
Group on Food Additives held at the end of February 2005, the
European Commission issued a revised version of a draft proposal
for a Regulation on food additives authorized for use in foodstuffs
intended for human consumption. 8 The Working Group also issued
a draft proposal for a new regulation on enzymes used or intended
for use in foods. 9
The Commission's first proposal on food additives aimed to
provide for a single E.U. regulation intended to replace Council
Directive 89/107/EEC6° of the Council "on the approximation of the
laws of the Member States concerning food additives authorized for
use in foodstuffs intended for human consumption" (the food
additives framework Directive).61 The hope was that this single
56. See id.
57. See EU Decision-making, available at http://www.ecosa.org/csi/ecosa2003.nsf/asw/
EU%20info-European%2OCommunity-EU%2ODecision-making.
58. See Food Law News, Additives-Draft Proposals for New EU Regulations on Food
Additives and Enzymes, Mar. 11, 2005, available at http://www.foodlaw.rdg.ac.uk/
news/eu-05021.htm [hereinafter Additive and Enzyme Proposals].
59. See id.
60. Council Directive 89/107, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 27-33 (EEC).
61. See Additive and Enzyme Proposals, supra note 58.
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regulation would eventually replace and repeal European Parliament
and Council Directive 95/2/EC62 "on food additives other than
[colors] and sweeteners," European Parliament and Council
Directive 94/35/EC "on sweeteners for use in foodstuffs,"6 and
European Parliament and Council Directive 94/36/EC "on [colors]
for use in foodstuffs.
64
The Commission's second proposal on food enzymes consisted
of an E.U. regulation to control uses of enzymes in foods. Currently,
some enzymes used as additives are regulated under Direc-
tive 95/2/EC,65 whereas controls on other enzymes used as processing
aids are not harmonized across the E.U. but rather are subject to
different national measures in each Member State.6 6 The Com-
mission's proposal would harmonize the regulation of enzymes at
the Community level. The new regulation on food enzymes would
require dossiers of safety and technical information on each enzyme
prior to their approval on the market.67 Furthermore, it would call
for enzymes to go through a reauthorization process every ten
years 8 -a rule which is likely to be imposed on additives. According
to the Commission, the two proposals on food additives and food
enzymes, which are only working documents as of today, are
expected to be formally published before the end of 2005.69
E. Proposal on Food Flavorings
As of today, the E.U. does not have a positive list for flavoring
substances. Instead, a register exists of more than 2,500 sub-
stances. 70  According to European Parliament and Council
Regulation 2232/96/EC "laying down a Community procedure for
[flavoring] substances used or intended for use in or on foodstuffs,
7 1
all substances listed in the register of flavoring substances are
62. Council Directive 95/2, 1995 O.J. (L 61) 1 (EC).
63. Council Directive 94/35, 1994 O.J. (L 237) 3 (EC).
64. Council Directive 94/36, 1994 O.J. (L 237) 13 (EC).
65. Council Directive 95/2, 1995 O.J. (L 61) 1 (EC).




70. Beveragedaily.com, Health Risk for Flavour List Needs New Data, says EFSA
Panel, Aug. 7, 2005, at http://www.beveragedaily.conf/news/ng.asp?n=61173-
flavours-positive-list (last visited Jan. 3, 2006).
71. Council Regulation 2232/96, 1996 O.J. (L 299) 1.
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required to undergo a safety evaluation. Once this procedure is
completed, a positive list of flavoring substances authorized for use
on or in foods in the E.U. is to be adopted.72
In February 2005, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)
adopted three additional opinions regarding flavoring group
evaluations.73 It had already published two opinions in November
2004.74 Initially, the positive list of flavoring substances was due for
completion in July 2005. According to the latest estimates of the
Commission, however, the evaluation process will not be completed
and a positive list adopted until July 2007.75
As far as the reform is concerned stemming from Council
Directive 88/388/EEC "on the approximation of the laws of the
Member States relating to [flavorings] for use in foodstuffs and to
source materials for their production, 76 no major event happened
during the first half of 2005. The Commission Working Group only
met to discuss the draft document of July 2004.
72. Regulation 2232/96, art. 5, at 3.
73. EFSA, Opinion of the Scientific on Food Additives, Flavourings, Processing Aids and
Materials in Contact with Food (AFC) on a Request from the Commission Related to
Flavouring Group Evaluation 7 (FGE.07), 164 E.F.S.A. J. 1-63 (2004), available at
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/afc/afcopinions/813/afcopinionflavej l64final-enl .p
df; EFSA, Opinion of the Scientific on Food Additives, Flavourings, Processing Aids and
Materials in Contact with Food (AFC) on a Request from the Commission Related to
Flavouring Group Evaluation 9 (FGE.09), 165 E.F.S.A. J. 1-51 (2004), available at
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/afc/afcopinions/814/afc opinionflav ej 165en 1.
pdf; EFSA, Opinion of the Scientific on Food Additives, Flavourings, Processing Aids and
Materials in Contact with Food (AFC) on a Request from the Commission Related to
Flavouring Group Evaluation 11 (FGE.11), 166 E.F.S.A. J. 1-44 (2004), available at
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/afc/afc-opinions/815/afcopinionflavej 166_enl.pdf.
74. EFSA, Opinion of the Scientific on Food Additives, Flavourings, Processing Aids and
Materials in Contact with Food (AFC) on a Request from the Commission Related to
Flavouring Group Evaluation 3 (FGE.03), 107 E.F.S.A. J. 1-59 (2004), available at
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/afc/afc opinions/67 1/afc opinion 18ej 107flavourings
_group3_enl.pdf; EFSA, Opinion of the Scientific on Food Additives, Flavourings,
Processing Aids and Materials in Contact with Food (AFC) on a Request from the Commission
Related to Flavouring Group Evaluation 6 (FGE.06), 108 E.F.S.A. J. 1-69 (2004),
available at http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/afc/afc opinions/672/afc opinionlgej 108
flavouringsgroup6_en 1.pdf.
75. See Food Law News, FSA Letter, FLAVOURINGS-Commission Working Group
on Flavourings-Ist March 2005, Mar. 14, 2005, available at http://www.Foodlaw
.rdg.ac.uk/news/eu-05022.htm.
76. Council Directive 88/388, 1988 O.J. (L 184) 61 (EEC).
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F. Proposal for a Recast Commission Directive on Infant Formulae and
Follow-on Formulae
On February 2005, the Commission's Directorate General for
Health and Consumer Affairs made available a recast version of a
working document for a proposal for the amendment of
Commission Directive 91/321/EEC" on infant formulae and follow-
on formulae called the "Working Draft Commission Directive ../../EC
of [...] on infant formulae and follow-on formulae."78 A first working
document had already been circulated in April 2004. The changes
proposed in the new document took into account the discussions at
the international level within the Codex Alimentarius as well as the
latest scientific advice on the essential composition of infant
formulae and follow-on formulae.
III. CASE LAW
A. Judgments Issued
1. Definitions of Foods and Medicines
Following the submission of request for a preliminary ruling on
June 9, 2005, 79 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) delivered its
judgment on several cases addressing the issue of classification of
products as foodstuffs or medicinal products for the purposes of
being marketed in Germany. The classification of products sold in
the Netherlands as food supplements (consequently as foodstuffs)
was at stake in these cases.
Pursuant to German food law, the Dutch companies that were
considering selling their products in Germany tried without success
to obtain from the national authorities a general application
77. Commission Directive 91/321, 1991 O.J. (L 175) 35 (EEC).
78. SANCO D4/HL/mm/D440180 Rev.2, Working Document Draft Commission
Directive ../../EC of [...J on Infant Formulae and Follow-on Formulae, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comn/food/consultations/working-doc-draft-en.pdf.
79. Joined Cases C-211/03, C-299/03, and C-316/03 - C-318/03, HLH Warenver-
triebs GmbH v. Federal Republic of Germany, available at http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/
cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Submit&alldocs = alldocs&docj = docj&docop =
docop&docor= docor&docjo=docjo&numaff= C-211%2F03&datefsf &date&
datefe= &nomusuel = &domainef &mots = &resmax= 100.
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approving the marketing of their product in their country."0 One of
the reasons the German authorities refused to approve marketing
was because the products were medicines and not foodstuffs.
Consequently, the Dutch companies have decided to bring an action
against the German authorities.8 '
Among the main questions covered in this judgment, the ECJ
confirmed" its earlier jurisprudence regarding the classification of
products; however, such confirmation offered little or no additional
guidance. The ECJ first confirmed that only the provisions of
Community law specific to medicinal products apply to a product
which satisfies both the conditions for classification as a foodstuff
and the conditions for classification as a medicinal product.8 "
The ECJ also confirmed8 4 that it is up to the Member States to
determine the status of the product on a case-by-case basis and that
the pharmacological properties of a product are the factor upon
which the authorities of a Member State must ascertain whether it,
for the purposes of Directive 2001/83/EC, may be administered to
human beings with a view to making a medical diagnosis or to
restoring, correcting or modifying physiological functions in human
beings.8 5 The ECJ held that the health risk a product possesses is an
autonomous factor that must also be taken into consideration when
classifying the product as medicinal.86 In its judgment, the ECJ also
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Case C-227/82, Van Bennekom, 1983 E.C.R. 3883 (1983).
83. Joined Cases C-211/03, C-299/03, and C-316/03 - C-318/03, HLH
Warenvertriebs GmbH v. Federal Republic of Germany, available at http://curia
.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Submit&alldocs=alldocs&docj =
docj&docop=docop&docor=docor&docjo=docjo&numaff=C-21 1%2F03&datefs
= &datefe= &nomusuel= &domaine- &mots =&resmax= 100.
84. Id.
85. Council Directive 2001/83, art. 1(2), 2001 O.J. (L 311) 67, 71 (EC); Joined
Cases C-211/03, C-299/03, and C-316/03 - C-318/03, HLH Warenvertriebs GmbH v.
Federal Republic of Germany, available at http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?
lang=en&Submit=Submit&alldocs=alldocs&docj =docj&docop=docop&docor=do
cor&docjo=docjo&numaff=C-211%2F03&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=
&domaine = &mots = &resmax= 100.
86. Joined Cases C-211/03, C-299/03, and C-316/03 - C-318/03, HLH
Warenvertriebs GmbH v. Federal Republic of Germany, available at http://
curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pllang=en&Submit=Submit&alldocs=alldocs&
docj =docj&docop=docopdocor=docor&docjo=docjo&numaff=C211%2F03&
datefs = &datefe = &nomusuel = &domaine = &mots= &resmax = 100.
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admitted that differences between Member States may still exist in
the classification of products as medicinal products or as foodstuffs. 7
Another important point is the ECJ's confirmation of the
fundamental principle of free movement of goods.8" To the extent
that Directive 2001/83/EC harmonizes the procedures for the
production, distribution, and use of medicinal products, the ECJ
held that Member States are no longer allowed to adopt national
measures which restrict the free movement of goods on the basis of
Article 30, in particular on grounds of the protection of human
health. 9
Finally, with respect to the powers of EFSA, the ECJ held that a
national court cannot refer questions on the classification of
products to EFSA.90 However, an opinion delivered by EFSA may
constitute evidence that that court should take into consideration in
the context of that dispute.9'
2. Use of Name "Tocai" for Certain Italian Wines
"Tocai" is a vine variety which is traditionally grown in the
Italian region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia.92 In 1993, the European
Community and Hungary signed an agreement on the reciprocal
protection and control of the names of wines. In order to protect
the Hungarian geographical indication "Tokaj," the parties agreed
to prohibit the use of the name "Tocai" until March 31, 2007.9s The






91. Joined Cases C-211/03, C-299/03, and C-316/03 - C-318/03, HLH
Warenvertriebs GmbH v. Federal Republic of Germany, available at http://curia
.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Submit&alldocs=all docs &docj=
docj&docop=docop&docor=docor&docjo=docjo&numaff =C-211%2 F03&datefs
= &datefe = &nomusuel= &domaine= &mots =& resmax = 100.
92. See Tom Cannavan, The Wines of Villa Russiz, Friuili, May 2005, at
http://www.wine-pages.con/organise/russiz.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2006).
93. The Budapest Sun Online, Tocai Appeal Rejected, Apr. 4, 2005, at
http://www.budapestsun.com/full-story.asp?ArticleID=%7B625254FEC03F4878A33
3A988418A50C3%7D&From =Business (last visited Jan. 15, 2006).
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In its judgment of May 12, 2005,"4 the ECJ noted that as
opposed to "Tokaj," "Tokai" did not constitute a geographical
indication within the meaning of the EC-Hungary Agreement on
wines. Because it does not exclude any reasonable method of
marketing Italian wines, the ECJ also held that the prohibition does
not constitute a deprivation of possession for the purposes of the
European Convention on Human Rights.95 The ECJ reached the
conclusion that the prohibition of the use of the name "Tocai" in
Italy was valid.96
B. Adventitious Presence of GMOs in Infant Foods
Pursuant to Council Regulation 1139/98/EC "concerning the
compulsory indication on the [labeling] of certain foodstuffs
produced from genetically modified organisms of particulars other
than those provided for in Directive 79/112/EEC, '9 7 all genetically
modified food must be labeled to show that it contains or was
produced from GMOs. An exemption from this labeling
requirement exists with respect for the adventitious or technically
unavoidable presence up to a limit of one percent (now 0.9%).98
Before the National Administrative Court, an Italian consumer
association successfully challenged the one percent labeling
exemption prescribed by Italian legislation to infant formulae.99
Upon appeal by the Italian Ministry of Public Health, the question
was referred to the ECJ.'00 In its judgment of May 26, 2005, the ECJ
ruled that the labeling exemption for one percent (now 0.9%)
94. Case C-347/03, Regione Autonoma Friuili-Venezia Giulia and ERSA v.




97. Council Regulation 1139/98, 1998 O.J. (L 159) 4. This Regulation is now
repealed and replaced by Council Regulation 1829/2003/EC of September 22, 2003
"on genetically modified food and feed." Council Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J.
(L 268) 1, 19.
98. Regulation 1829/2003, art. 12(2), at 11.
99. See Philip Bentley, Key Developments-Consumer Protection: Trade in Genetically
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applied to all foods, including infant formulae, and could not be
called into question on the basis of the precautionary principle.'0 '
C. Conclusions of Advocate General
1. Registration of the Name "Feta" as a Protected Designation
of Origin
On May 10, 2005, Advocate General Ruiz Jarabo delivered his
opinion 12 in two cases pertaining to the name "Feta"' ' in reference
to cheese. He proposed that the ECJ should dismiss the actions
brought both by Germany and Denmark against the registration of
the name "Feta" as a Protected Designation of Origin (PDO). In his
view, "Feta" meets the requirements of a PDO because it describes a
cheese originating from a substantial part of Greece whose
characteristics are derived from its geographical environment and its
production, processing, and preparation are carried out in a
geographically defined area. 04
By Commission Regulation 1829/2002/EC "amending the
Annex to Regulation 1107/96 with regard to the name 'Feta,"' the
word "feta" was inserted in the list of PDOs. 105 In his opinion, the
Advocate General considers the name "Feta" not to be generic
because it is associated with a specific foodstuff. 6 Yet, the Advocate
101. Case C-132/03, Ministero della Salute v. Coordinamento delle associazioni per
la difesa dell'ambiente e dei diritti degli utenti e dei consumatori (Codacons),
Federconsumatori, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/
2005/c_271/c27120051029enOO020003.pdf.
102. Joined Cases C-465/02, Federal Republic of Germany v. Commission of the
European Communities; and Case C-466/02, Kingdom of Denmark v. Commission
of the European Communities, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/
dat/2003/c 055/c_05520030308enOO110011.pdf.
103. Joined Cases C-465/02, Federal Republic of Germany v. Commission of the
European Communities; and Case C-466/02, Kingdom of Denmark v. Commission
of the European Communities, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/
2003/c_- 055/c_05520030308en
00 1 1001 l.pdf.
104. Joined Cases C-465/02, Federal Republic of Germany v. Commission of the
European Communities; and Case C-466/02, Kingdom of Denmark v. Commission
of the European Communities, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/
2003/c -055/c.05520030308en
0 0 l 1001 l.pdf.
105. Commission Regulation 1829/2002, art. 1(1), 2002 O.J. (L 277) 10, 14 (EC).
106. The Advocate General considers "Feta" to refer to cheese produced in a large
area of Greece using sheep's milk or a mixture of sheep's milk and goat's milk,
formed by the natural and artisan process of coagulation at normal pressure. See
2005]
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General reached the conclusion that the word "Feta" meets the
requirements to be regarded as a traditional name, which can be
assimilated to a designation of origin, and, therefore deserves
protection throughout the E.U. °7
2. Labeling Requirements for Animal Feed
On April 7, 2005, Advocate General Antonio Tizzano delivered
his opinion in several cases' addressing the validity and interpreta-
tion of the European Parliament and of Council Directive 2002/2/
EC.' O9 Directive 2002/2/EC was adopted with a view to provide
adequate safeguards for public health in the event of food-related
crises." 0 The Directive was prompted due to the fact that the former
system had proven to be inadequate for addressing the crises of
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)."'l
Several manufacturers of feedingstuffs in the United Kingdom,
Italy, and the Netherlands have brought proceedings before the
national courts challenging the domestic regulations implementing
Directive 2002/2/EC. In particular, the feed companies have
challenged two new stringent obligations imposed upon them by
Directive 2002/2/EC: (i) the obligation to provide detailed, quantita-
tive information by weight of the feed materials used in the feeding-
Joined Cases C-465/02, Federal Republic of Germany v. Commission of the
European Communities; and Case C-466/02, Kingdom of Denmark v. Commission
of the European Communities, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/
dat/2003/c055/c05520030308en001 1001 1.pdf.
107. Joined Cases C-465/02, Federal Republic of Germany v. Commission of the
European Communities; and Case C-466/02, Kingdom of Denmark v. Commission
of the European Communities, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/
dat/2003/c_055/c_05520030308en001 10011 .pdf.
108. Joined Cases C-453/03, The Queen, on the application of ABNA Ltd and
Others v. Secretary of State for Health and Food Standards Agency; Case C- 11/04,
Fratelli Martini & C. spa and Cargill srl v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali and Others; Case C-12/04, Ferrari Mangimi srl and Associazione nazionale
tra i produttori di alimenti zootecnici v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali and Others; and Case C-194/04, Nederlandse Vereniging Diervoeder-
industrie Nevedi v. Produktschap Diervoeder, available at http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/
cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Submit&alldocs=alldocs&docj =docj&docop=
docop&docor=docor&docjo=docjo&numaff=C- 194%2FO4&datefs=&datefe=&
nomusuel= &domaine= &mots=&resmax= 100.
109. Council Directive 2002/2, 2002 O.J. (L 63) 23 (EC).
110. See Directive 2002/2, whereas 8, at 23.
111. Directive 2002/2, whereas 4, at 23.
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stuffs on packaging with a margin of tolerance of fifteen percent
(Article 1(4)); and (ii) the obligation to provide, at the request of
customers, the exact percentages by weight of the ingredients used
in the products (Article l(1)(b)), 2 The national courts of those
three Member States asked the ECJ to determine whether Article
1(4) and Article l(1)(b) had been adopted on an incorrect legal basis
and to ascertain whether those two obligations were compatible with
the principle of proportionality, the fundamental right to property,
the precautionary principle, the principle of non-discrimination, and
the principle of the freedom to pursue a trade or profession." 3
In his opinion, the Advocate General began by stressing the
importance of public health within the Community system and the
priority to which public health must be given over economic and
commercial interests."' He also added that within an area such as
112. Joined Cases C-453/03, The Queen, on the application of ABNA Ltd and
Others v. Secretary of State for Health and Food Standards Agency; Case C- 11/04,
Fratelli Martini & C. spa and Cargill srl v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali and Others; Case C-12/04, Ferrari Mangimi srl and Associazione nazionale
tra i produttori di alimenti zootecnici v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali and Others; and Case C-194/04, Nederlandse Vereniging Diervoeder-
industrie Nevedi v. Produktschap Diervoeder, available at http://curia.eu.int/
jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit = Submit&alldocs =alldocs&docj =docj&
docop=docop&docor= docor &docjo=docjo&numaff=C-194%2F04&datefs=&
datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine= &mots=&resmax= 100.
113. Joined Cases C-453/03, The Queen, on the application of ABNA Ltd and
Others v. Secretary of State for Health and Food Standards Agency; Case C-i 1/04,
Fratelli Martini & C. spa and Cargill srl v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali and Others; Case C-12/04, Ferrari Mangimi srl and Associazione nazionale
tra i produttori di alimenti zootecnici v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali and Others; and Case C-194/04, Nederlandse Vereniging Diervoeder-
industrie Nevedi v. Produktschap Diervoeder, available at http://curia.eu.int/
jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang =en&Submit =Submit &alldocs=alldocs&docj= docj&
docop=docop&docor=docor&docjo=docjo&numaff=C- 194%2F04&datefs
= &datefe= &nomusuel= &domaine= &mots = &resmax = 100.
114. Joined Cases C-453/03, The Queen, on the application of ABNA Ltd and
Others v. Secretary of State for Health and Food Standards Agency; Case C-1 1/04,
Fratelli Martini & C. spa and Cargill srl v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali and Others; Case C-12/04, Ferrari Mangimi srl and Associazione nazionale
tra i produttori di alimenti zootecnici v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali and Others; and Case C-194/04, Nederlandse Vereniging Diervoeder-
industrie Nevedi v. Produktschap Diervoeder, available at http://curia.eu.int/ jurisp/
cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Submit& alldocs= alldocs&docj= docj&docop=
docop&docor=docor&dodo=docjo&numaff=C- 194%2F04&datefs=&datefe=&
nomusuel=&domaine= &mots= &resmax = 100.
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common agricultural policy, the Community legislature enjoys broad
discretion, and review by the ECJ must be limited to determining
whether there are manifest defects. 15
With respect to the validity of Article 1(4) and Article l(1)(b) of
Directive 2002/2/EC, the Advocate General stated that the first
obligation of providing quantitative information in labeling is legiti-
mate as it is necessary and adequate for safeguarding public health.
Whereas traceability of feedingstuffs is guaranteed primarily by the
indication of batch number on the packaging, the Advocate General
opined that the quantitative information enables stock farmers and
the authorities to speed up the traceability of a contaminated
substance and makes it possible to take appropriate measures." 6 On
the other hand, according to the Advocate General, the obligation to
inform customers upon their request of exact quantities goes beyond
what is required for safeguarding public health and is manifestly
disproportionate. As a result, he proposed that the court should
hold the second obligation invalid." 7
115. Joined Cases C-453/03, The Queen, on the application of ABNA Ltd and
Others v. Secretary of State for Health and Food Standards Agency; Case C- 11/04,
Fratelli Martini & C. spa and Cargill srl v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali and Others; Case C-12/04, Ferrari Mangimi srl and Associazione nazionale
tra i produttori di alimenti zootecnici v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali and Others; and Case C-194/04, Nederlandse Vereniging Diervoeder-
industrie Nevedi v. Produktschap Diervoeder, available at http://curia.eu.int/
jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pliang=en&Submit=Submit&alldocs=alldocs&docj =docj&
docop=docop&docor=docor&docjo=docjo&numaff=C-194%2F04&datefs
= &datefe = &nomusuel= &domaine = &mots = &resmax = 100.
116. Joined Cases C-453/03, The Queen, on the application of ABNA Ltd and
Others v. Secretary of State for Health and Food Standards Agency; Case C- 11/04,
Fratelli Martini & C. spa and Cargill srl v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali and Others; Case C-12/04, Ferrari Mangimi srl and Associazione nazionale
tra i produttori di alimenti zootecnici v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali and Others; and Case C-194/04, Nederlandse Vereniging Diervoeder-
industrie Nevedi v. Produktschap Diervoeder, available at http:// curia
.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang = en&Submit = Submit&alldocs = alldocs
&docj = docj&docop = docop&docor = docor&docjo = docjo&numaff= C- 194
%2F04&datefs = &datefe = &nomusuel= &domaine = &mots = &resmax =100.
117. Joined Cases C-453/03, The Queen, on the application of ABNA Ltd and
Others v. Secretary of State for Health and Food Standards Agency; Case C-I 1/04,
Fratelli Martini & C. spa and Cargill srl v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali and Others; Case C-12/04, Ferrari Mangimi srl and Associazione nazionale
tra i produttori di alimenti zootecnici v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali and Others; and Case C-194/04, Nederlandse Vereniging Diervoeder-
industrie Nevedi v. Produktschap Diervoeder, available at http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-
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The Advocate General also gave his opinion regarding two
questions regarding the interpretation of Directive 2002/2/EC." 8 He
first reached the conclusion that the obligation to indicate the feed
materials used by their specific names is not conditioned upon a
"positive list" of feed materials used in compound animal feeding-
stuffs. He stated that it should be left to the Member States to adopt
the necessary measures for them to comply with the obligations set
out in Directive 2002/2/EC." 9
Finally, the Advocate General stated that administrative
authorities of a Member State do not have the power to suspend the
implementation of internal measures giving effect to Community
provisions of disputed validity. Even in the case where a court of
another Member State has already requested that the ECJ deliver a
ruling on the validity of those provisions, authorities should not have
such suspension powers. In the case of an administrative authority,






118. Joined Cases C-453/03, The Queen, on the application of ABNA Ltd and
Others v. Secretary of State for Health and Food Standards Agency; Case C- 11/04,
Fratelli Martini & C. spa and Cargill srl v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali and Others; Case C-12/04, Ferrari Mangimi srl and Associazione nazionale
tra i produttori di alimenti zootecnici v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali and Others; and Case C-194/04, Nederlandse Vereniging
Diervoederindustrie Nevedi v. Produktschap Diervoeder, available at http://curia.eu
.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang= en&Submit= Submit&alldocs =alldocs&docj
=docj& docop = docop&docor = docor&docjo = docjo&numaff= C- 194%2F04&
datefs=& datefe = &nomusuel= &domaine =&mots=&resmax= 100.
119. Joined Cases C-453/03, The Queen, on the application of ABNA Ltd and
Others v. Secretary of State for Health and Food Standards Agency; Case C- 11/04,
Fratelli Martini & C. spa and Cargill srl v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali and Others; Case C-12/04, Ferrari Mangimi srl and Associazione nazionale
tra i produttori di alimenti zootecnici v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali and Others; and Case C-194/04, Nederlandse Vereniging Diervoederin-
dustrie Nevedi v. Produktschap Diervoeder, available at http://curia.eu.intfjurisp/cgi-
bir/form.pl?lang=en&Submit = Submit&alldocs= adocs&doc=docj&docop=docop&
docor=docor&dojo=dojo&numaff=C-1942F04&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=
&domaine=&mots=&resmax= 100.
120. Joined Cases C-453/03, The Queen, on the application of ABNA Ltd and
Others v. Secretary of State for Health and Food Standards Agency; Case C- 11/04,
Fratelli Martini & C. spa and Cargill srl v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali and Others; Case C-12/04, Ferrari Mangimi srl and Associazione nazionale
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In addition to the above-mentioned cases before the Court of
Justice, a case is pending before the European First Court of
Instance. The action was brought on September 8, 2003 by Juckem
GmbH and Others against European Parliament and Council of the
E.U. 12  The applicants claim compensation for the damage
supposedly caused by Directive 2002/2/EC.
D. Pending Cases
On March 18, 2005, the European Commission decided to
bring an action against Germany before the ECJ on two grounds.
First, the Commission brought action regarding the consistent
treatment of garlic preparations, such as capsules containing pure
dried garlic powder, as medicines, even though they are lawfully
marketed as foodstuffs in other Member States. 122 Secondly, action
was brought over Germany's requirement that hospitals can only be
supplied with medicines by pharmacies in the same city or district.
23
Regarding the first issue, the Commission is of the opinion that
the German practice constitutes a disproportionate and unnecessary
obstacle to the free movement of goods and is therefore prohibited
under Articles 28 and 30 of the EC Treaty. 24  Moreover, the
German position seems to demonstrate an insufficient under-
standing of the distinction between food supplements and medicinal
products in the context of current European legislation.
tra i produttori di alimenti zootecnici v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali and Others; and Case C-194/04, Nederlandse Vereniging Diervoeder-
industrie Nevedi v. Produktschap Diervoeder, available at http://curia.eu.int/
jurisp/ cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit= Submit&alldocs=alldocs&docj=
docj&docop = docop&docor = docor&docjo = docjo&numaff= C- 194%2F04 &
datefs=&datefe= &nomusuel =&domaine =&mots= &resmax= 100.
121. Case T-321/03, Juckem GmbH and Others v. European Parliament and




122. Case C-319/05, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, available at
http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Submit&alldocs=alldocs
&docj =docj&docop=docop&docor=docor&docjo=docjo&numaff=C-319%2FO5&
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IV. OTHER RELEVANT NEWS
A. Regulations Entered Into Application
January 1, 2005 was the effective date for some of the key
provisions of the European Parliament and Council Regulation
178/2002/EC "laying down the general principles and requirements
of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and
laying down procedures in matters of food safety."'125  The
traceability requirement affords food companies the ability to
completely trace the flow of goods throughout all stages of
production, processing, and distribution. 26 The requirement is one
of the significant new requirements which came into force during the
beginning of 2005.127
B. Unofficial Documents and Announcements
1. Food and Health
On March 15, 2005, the European Commission launched an
action group called the "Platform on Diet Physical Activity and
Health" to fight obesity in the E.U. 28 This platform is comprised of
representatives of European institutions as well as organizations
from business, civil society, and the public sector. Members of this
platform are expected to propose action plans in order to promote
healthier diets and to encourage people to participate in more
physical activities.
Several areas to be focused on include consumer information,
marketing, and advertising on composition of foods, availability of
healthy food options, portion sizes. Also, a Green Paper on the
obesity issue is to be prepared by the European Commission
125. Council Regulation 178/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 31) 1 (EC).
126. Regulation 178/2002, art. 3(15), at 8.
127. The other provisions of Regulation 178/2002 came into force on 21 February
2002. Regulation 178/2002, art. 65, at 24.
128. See Press Release, European Commission, EU Platform for Action on Diet,
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probably before the end of 2005.129 In 2006, the European
Commission intends to prepare a communication.
2. Hygiene
On June 29, 2005, the European Commission issued a useful
guidance document on the new rules for hygiene of foodstuffs'"0
(Regulation 852/2004/EC, Regulation 853/2004/EC and Regulation
854/2004/EC)'1
3 1
3. Risk and Crises Management in Agriculture
On March 9, 2005, the European Commission has published a
Communication on risk and crisis management in agriculture
(Communication)5 2 describing available crisis management tools to
help farmers in the E.U. In this Communication, three options were
presented to promote the development of crisis management tools at
the E.U. level. Option 1 addresses the possibility of contributing to
the payment of premiums to be paid by farmers, where they take
insurance against natural disasters, extreme weather conditions or
disease.533 Option 2 encourages the development of mutual funds
for agriculture by granting temporary and degressive support for the
funds' administration.14  Option 3 considers basic insurance
coverage against income crises. 35 These crisis management options
are to be assessed by the other European institutions.
129. See Press Release, European Commission, Commission Launches Consultation
on How to Promote Healthy Diets and Physical Activity (Dec. 8, 2005), available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1550&format=
HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLanguage=en.
130. Directorate General of Health and Consumer Protection, Guidance Document-
Key Questions Related to Import Requirements and the New Rules on Food Hygiene and
Official Food Controls, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/international/
trade/interpretationjimports.pdf.
131. Council Directive 852/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 139) 1 (EC); Directive 853/2004,
2004 O.J. (L 139) 55 (EC); Directive 854/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 155) 206.
132. Communication from Commission to the Council on Risk and Crisis
Management in Agriculture, COM (2005) 74 final, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/publi/communications/risk/com74_en.pdf.
133. Id. at 6-7.
134. Id. at 7-8.
135. Id. at 8. See Press Release, European Commission, Risk and Crisis
Management in Agriculture: Commission Invites Council to Debate Options (Mar.
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4. General Food Law Guidelines
In March 2005, the European Commission published guidelines
to facilitate the implementation of major requirements set in
Regulation 178/2002/EC "laying down the general principles and
requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety
Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety." '
These guidelines were effective as of January 1, 2005.137
The specific requirements found in those guidelines included
requirements applicable to imports and exports of food and feed
products (Articles 11 and 12),138 responsibilities of food and feed
business operators (Article 17),"9 traceability of food and feed
products (Article 18),4 ° and withdrawal of unsafe food or feed
products from the market and notification to the competent
authorities (articles 19 and 20)."' This guidance document was not
considered authoritative as the ECJ remains the only body entitled
to interpret the law.
5. European Food Safety Authority
In June 2005, EFSA, which was created by Regulation 178/2002/
EC primarily to conduct scientific risk assessment, moved to Parma,
Italy.
142
6. Standardization of Food Labels
In January 2005, the European Commission announced that it
was considering reviewing the current E.U. legislation on food
9, 2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? reference=
IP/05/274&format=HTML&aged= 0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
136. Council Regulation 178/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 31) 1 (EC).
137. Standing Committee on on the Food Chain and Animal Health, Annotated EC
Guidance on the Implementation of articles 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of Regulation
(EC) NO 178/2002 on General Food Law, 1-38, available at http://www.food.gov.uk/
multimedia/pdfs/gflreu 1782002.pdf#page= 1.
138. Id. at 34-38.
139. Id. at 6-8.
140. Id. at 9-17.
141. Id. at 18-33.
142. See Press Release, EFSA, EFSA Today Inaugurates Its Official Seat in Parma
(June 21, 2005), available at http://www.efsa.eu.int/press-room/press-release/980/
prinaugurationen 1 .pdf.
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labeling to accomplish standardization of labeling across the E.U. 14 3
Currently, food labeling is regulated by Directive 2000/13/EC.1
44
However, variations of this directive have been implemented by the
Member States.
143. See Dairyreporter.com, EU: Unified Version for Food Labels Across All States?, Jan.
27, 2005, at http://www.dairyreporter.com/news/ng.asp?id=57654-eu-unified-version
(last visited Jan. 15, 2006).
144. Council Directive 2000/13, 2000 O.J. (L 109) 29 (EC).
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Michael Tingey Roberts*
I. INTRODUCTION
This update summarizes significant changes and developments
in food law over the first half of 2005. Not every change in national
food law for the first half of 2005 is included; instead, this update is
limited to significant changes in national law. New developments in
state law, while certainly important and deserving of attention, are
beyond the scope of this update.
These updates provide a starting point for scholars, practi-
tioners, food scientists, and policymakers determined to understand
the shaping of food law in modem society. Tracing the develop-
ment of food law through these updates also builds an important
historical context for the overall development of food law.
II. RECENT CASE DECISIONS
A. Obesity Litigation Revived
In January 2005, the United States Second Circuit revived the
hopes of those intent on making the food industry liable for the
growing epidemic of obesity by reversing a district court's dismissal
of claims in the case of Pelman v. McDonald's Corporation.1 Statistics
substantiate the magnitude of the problem of obesity in the United
States: 97 million persons are overweight or obese and each year
obesity contributes to the death of 300,000 people.2
* Michael Tingey Roberts is a Research Associate Professor of Law and Director
of the National Agricultural Law Center at the University of Arkansas School of Law
in Fayetteville, Arkansas. Professor Roberts is also a faculty advisor to the Journal of
Food Law & Policy and teaches courses on food law and international food law
standards.
1. See Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 396 F.3d 508, 512 (2d Cir. 2005).
2. See NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, CLINICAL GUIDELINES ON THE IDENTIFICATION,
EVALUATION, AND TREATMENT OF OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY IN ADULTS: THE
EVIDENCE REPORT, NIH Publication No. 98-4083 at vii, available at
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/ob_gdlnspdf; Surgeon General's Call to
Action to Prevent and Decrease Overweight and Obesity, 2001, United States Dep't
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1. Background
The case began in August 2002, when the parents of two minor
children filed a class action lawsuit in state court against McDonald's
Corporation, McDonald's of New York, and two New York City fast
food restaurants (referred to collectively as McDonald's).' The
lawsuit was brought on behalf of all New York minors who had
purchased and consumed McDonald's products.' The suit alleged
that McDonald's engaged in deceptive practices, violated state
consumer protection laws, and claims of negligence and failure to
warn of harmful health effects of consuming McDonald's products.5
Finding deficiencies in the allegations, the court dismissed every
count in the complaint, but granted leave to amend.6 The court
expressly stated that it was guided by the general principle that it
was not the place of the law to protect people who knew, or ought to
have known, of the dangers of eating such food.7
The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint, alleging four
causes of action.8 The first three causes of action were for deceptive
acts and advertisements in violation of two sections of the New York
General Business Law: Section 350, which prohibits false
advertising, and Section 349, which prohibits "deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce or in
Health and Human Services, available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/
obesity/calltoaction/_0.htm.
3. See Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Although the original complaint named several local franchisees, the notice of
appeal named only McDonald's Corporation. See Pelman, 396 F.3d at 510 n.2.
Thus, the Second Circuit Court did not address whether the McDonald's franchises
should be liable for the alleged misconduct and, if so, indemnified by their
franchisor.
4. See Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 520.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 543. However, Count I (deceptive advertising and failure to warn)
and Count II (inducement of minors through deceptive marketing) of the complaint
were dismissed with prejudice to the extent they were based on the New York City
administrative code. Id.
7. See id. at 517. The author of the opinion, the Honorable Robert W. Sweet,
revealed in a footnote that he had publicly opposed the criminalization of drugs and
that his logic for doing so applied in the situation of fast food: as long as consumers
have adequate knowledge about even harmful substances, they should be entitled to
purchase them. See Pelman, 237 F. Supp. at 517 n.2.
8. See Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., No. 02-Civ.-7821, 2003 WL 22052778, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003) vacated in part, 396 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2005).
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the furnishing of any service."9  The fourth claim, which alleged
negligence by McDonald's because of its failure to warn plaintiffs of
the dangers and adverse health effects of eating processed foods
from McDonald's, was voluntarily dropped by the plaintiffs.'0
The district court dismissed the amended complaint principally
for two reasons: first, plaintiffs failed to plead an adequate causal
connection between the consumption of McDonald's food and their
alleged injuries, and second, certain alleged misrepresentations in
advertisements regarding McDonald's french fries and hash browns
were objectively non-deceptive and therefore not actionable."
Refusing to grant leave a second time to amend the complaint, the
district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. 2
2. Second Circuit Reversal
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court and
reinstated some of plaintiffs' claims."' The plaintiffs did not appeal
the dismissal of their Section 350 claims for false advertising, so the
Second Circuit considered only the dismissal of the Section 349
claims of deceptive acts or practices which dismissal rested entirely
on the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs failed to properly
allege causation. 4 The claims of deceptive acts or practices were as
follows: first, that the combined effect of McDonald's various
promotional representations created the false impression that its
"food products were nutritionally beneficial and part of a healthy
lifestyle;" second, that McDonald's failed to disclose its use of
additives and how its processes of products rendered those products
"substantially less healthy than represented;" and, third, that
McDonald's deceptively promoted the availability of nutritional
information in its stores.' 5
The Second Circuit found that the district court erred by
determining that the statutory claim of deceptive acts or practices
was subject to the pleading-with-particularity requirements of Rule
9. See id. at *4.
10. See id. at *2.
11. See id. at*11-14.
12. Seeid. at*14.




JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 Referring to the bare
bones notice-pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Second Circuit determined that the
statutory claim of deceptive acts or practices has a lower pleading
standard.' 7 Information, such as the amount plaintiffs exercised,
family medical history, and the other components of plaintiffs' diet
could be obtained in discovery, rather than constitute what the
district court believed requisite for plaintiffs to state a claim. 8 Thus,
the Second Circuit determined that the amended complaint was
properly pleaded. 9
3. Bills Barring Obesity-Related Lawsuits and Public Policy
Debate2"
An interesting outcome of the Pelman decision by the Second
Circuit is that it may be seized upon by some as evidence of the need
for protecting the food industry against obesity-related lawsuits.
Two bills introduced in Congress seek to prevent lawsuits against
manufacturers, distributors, and sellers of food and non-alcoholic
beverages rising from obesity claims-the proposed Personal
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2003 and the proposed
Commonsense Consumption Act of 2003, also known as "cheese-
burger bills.",2' Similar legislation has also received considerable
attention in state legislatures. As of May 2005, such legislation
reportedly became law in eighteen states, with another twenty-seven
states considering the legislation.2
Suggestions that the food industry may follow the tobacco
industry as the next target for massive class-action lawsuits have
16. Seeid. at511.
17. See id.
18. See Pelman, 396 F.3d at 511-12.
19. See id.
20. This update discusses such legislation relevant only to the first half of 2005.
During the second half of 2005, the U.S. House of Representative passed the
Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005. Further discussion of
this legislation will be addressed in subsequent versions of this update.
21. See Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. Res. 339, 108th
Cong. (2003); Commonsense Consumption Act of 2003, S. Res. 1428, 108th Cong.
(2003).
22. See Jeffrey Gilbert, Senate OKs Obesity Bill that Limits Lawsuits, Houston
Chronicle.com, May 26, 2005, at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/
special/O5/legislature/3198692 (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
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sparked the National Restaurant Association and allied groups to
push for these laws.23 The issue certainly has caught the attention of
many legal, political, and social commentators who debate issues
such as the role of courts in determining the complexities of the
nation's expanding waistline, the social responsibility of the food
industry, and the role of personal responsibility and individual
autonomy.24
B. Organic Rules Examined
In January 2005, the United States First Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed in the case of Harvey v. Veneman,25 possible
conflicts between the National Organic Program (Final Rule)26 and
the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 (OFPA). 27
1. Organic Foods Production Act of 1990
OFPA establishes national standards governing the marketing of
organically produced food products. 2 The purpose of the Act is
two-fold: "to assure consumers that organically produced products
meet a consistent standard" and to "facilitate interstate commerce"
in organically produced food.29 These purposes are advanced by the
establishment of a national certification program for producers and
handlers of organic products and by the regulation of the labeling of
organic products.3" To bear the United States Department of
Agriculture's (USDA) organic seal, a food product must be produced
and handled without the use of synthetic substances and in
accordance with an organic plan agreed to by an accredited
certifying agent and by the producer and handler of the food
23. See Hank Shaw, Democrats Say No to Limiting Fatty Food Suits, THE RECORD, May
4, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 7001270.
24. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Tell Me What You Eat, And I Will Tell You Whom to
Sue: Big Problems Ahead for "Big Food"?, 39 GA. L. REV. 839, 893 (2005) (suggesting
that while legislative action may be warranted if the food industry does not act on its
own, anti-obesity litigation, among other things, undermines personal autonomy).
25. 396 F.3d 28 (lst Cir. 2005).
26. See 7 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2005).
27. See Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 (OFPA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6522
(2000).
28. See id. at 7 U.S.C. § 6501 (Supp. 2005).
29. Id.
30. See id. at §§ 6503(a), 6504, 6505(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2005).
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product."' Synthetic substances that are exceptions to this general
prohibition against such use are to be listed on a National List
following notice and comment and are subject to review. 2
2. Lawsuit
Plaintiff Arthur Harvey brought a suit against the Secretary of
USDA in his multiple capacities as a producer and handler of
organic crops, an USDA-accredited certified inspector, and a
consumer of organic products.33 Harvey sought declaratory and
injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act and under
OFPA, alleging that certain provisions of the Final Rule were
inconsistent with OFPA and diluted organic standards.' Largely
adopting a magistrate judge's recommended decision, the district
court granted summary judgment to the Secretary on nine claims
asserted by Harvey.5
3. Appeal
On appeal, seven of Harvey's original nine claims were brought
before the First Circuit.3" The First Circuit affirmed the district
court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary on
four of the seven claims. These four claims asserted that the
following provisions in the Final Rule contravened the purposes of
OFPA: allowing use of a private certifier's seal on products
containing less than ninety-five percent organic ingredients,
excluding certain wholesalers and distributors from coverage under
OFPA, prohibiting advice from certifying agents regarding
certification standards for compensation, and imposing uniform
standards on private certifiers.37 Rejecting these claims, the First
31. See id. at § 6504 (Supp. 2005).
32. See OFPA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6517(a), (d), (e); 6518(k), (1), (m) (Supp. 2005).
33. Harvey, 396 F.3d at 32.
34. Id.
35. See Harvey v. Veneman, 297 F. Supp. 2d 334, 334-35 (D. Me. 2004). Harvey's
claim that the Secretary of Agriculture failed to implement a provision of OFPA
survived. Id. at 335.
36. Harvey, 396 F.3d at 33.
37. See id. at 36-45.
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Circuit found these four provisions to be consistent with the
purposes of OFPA.3S
The First Circuit ruled, however, in favor of Harvey on three of
the claims on appeal, reversing on two of the claims and remanding
on the third claim. On the first reversed claim, the First Circuit held
that the Final Rule allowing a converting herd to be fed a diet of
only eighty percent organic feed for a period of nine months for
newly converting herds violated the OFPA provision requiring all
organic dairy animals to receive organic feed for twelve months
prior to sale of milk or milk products. 9 On the second reversed
claim, the First Circuit held that the Final Rule allowing the listing
of synthetics for use in the handling of products labeled organic
contravened the OFPA provision that bars synthetics in processed
foods.4" On the third claim, the First Circuit remanded for
declaratory judgment as to whether the Final Rule establishes a
blanket exemption to the National List requirements for non-
organic products that are not commercially available.4" The First
Circuit directs that such a blanket exemption would controvert the
OFPA requirements for the National List.4"
C. Court Rules in Favor of Ephedra
In April 2005, the United States District Court of Utah ruled
against the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on a summary
judgment motion that served as a crucial test of the FDA's power to
ban questionable over-the-counter health products under the Dietary
Supplement Health and Education Act (DSHEA).43
1. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1999
DSHEA was enacted in 1994 as an amendment to the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA), as amended.
44
38. See id.
39. Id. at 44; see also OFPA, 7 U.S.C. § 6509(e)(2); 7 C.F.R. § 205.236(a) (2005).
40. Harvey, 396 F.3d at 40; see also OFPA, 7 U.S.C. § 6509(e)(2); 7 C.F.R. §§
205.600(b) (2005), 205.605(b) (2005).
41. Harvey, 396 F.3d at 36.
42. Id.
43. See Nutraceutical Corp. v. Crawford, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1321 (D. Utah
2005).
44. See DSHEA, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325 (1994).
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Under DSHEA, dietary supplements are regulated as a subset of
foods unless claims are made that bring the supplements within the
definition of a drug.45 As a food product, dietary supplements are
not subject to pre-market approval as are drugs, meaning that
evidence of product safety and efficacy prior to marketing is not
required for dietary supplements.46 Nor are dietary supplements
subject to post-market activity as are drugs, meaning that product
safety monitoring and reporting specifications are not required for
dietary supplements.47  Instead, as a food product, dietary
supplements may be banned if found by FDA to be adulterated. 48
DSHEA provides that FDA may deem a dietary supplement
adulterated in three situations: first, if a dietary supplement
presents a significant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury under
conditions of use recommended or suggested in labeling; second, if
a dietary supplement presents a significant or unreasonable risk of
illness or injury under ordinary conditions of use; and, third, if the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
finds that the dietary supplement poses an imminent hazard to
public health or safety.49 Within this regulatory framework, dietary
supplements have soared in popularity: the result is a $20 billion
dietary supplement industry with over 1,000 manufacturers
marketing 29,000 dietary supplement products, being used by
approximately one-fifth of Americans.5 °
2. Ephedra
Ephedrine alkaloids (EDS) used in dietary supplements are
naturally occurring stimulant compounds.5 Proponents of EDS
promote the supplement as an aid to weight loss, an enhancer of
45. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff) (Supp. 2005) ("[A] dietary supplement shall be deemed
to be a food within the meaning of [the act].").
46. Nutraceutical Corp., 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1312.
47. Id.
48. See 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1) (Supp. 2005).
49. See id.
50. See Justin Gillis, Herbal Remedies Turn Deadly for Patients, WASH. POST, Sept. 5,
2004, at A01, available at http:/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62671-
2004Sep4.html; Rob Stein, Alternative Remedies Gaining Popularity, WASH. POST, May
28, 2004, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.con/wp-
dyn/articles/A61657-2004May27.html.
51. See Nutraceutical, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1311-12.
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athletic performance, and a booster of energy levels.52 Critics of
EDS, on the other hand, link the supplement to numerous deaths,
including the death of twenty-three-year-old Baltimore Orioles
pitcher Steve Belcher in 2003."s
Concerns over the safety of EDS, countered by the general
popularity of dietary supplements, provide vexing problems for FDA
to formulate an effective regulatory approach. In February 2004,
FDA published a final rule, known as the Ephedra Rule, which
mandates that dietary supplements containing EDS are adulterated
under DSHEA.54 The premise for the rule is that use of EDS does
not provide a benefit sufficient to outweigh the substantial risks of
EDS-heart attack, stroke, and death.55 Thus, FDA concluded that




Nutraceutical International Corporation (Nutraceutical)57 filed
suit against FDA contesting the Ephedra Rule.5" The issue was
whether the Ephedra Rule banning all EDS violates the adulteration
provision of DSHEA.59 To resolve this issue, the court addressed
whether the FDA's use of a risk-benefit analysis is appropriate under
DSHEA and whether FDA provided sufficient evidence to support its
52. Id. at 1314.
53. See Gardiner Harris & Jay Schreiber, Judge's Decision Lifts Ban on Sale of
Ephedra in Utah, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 15, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.con/
2005/04/15/health/15ephedra.html?ex 1138078800&en0c10e1e92fe48108&ei=5
070.
54. See Final Rule Declaring Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine
Alkaloids Adulterated Because They Present an Unreasonable Risk, 69 Fed. Reg.
6788 (Feb. 11, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 119).
55. See Nutraceutical, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1313 (citing Final Rule Declaring Dietary
Supplements Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids Adulterated Because They Present an
Unreasonable Risk.)
56. See id. (citing Final Rule Declaring Dietary Supplements Containing
Ephedrine Alkaloids Adulterated Because They Present an Unreasonable Risk.)
57. Nutraceutical is a nutritional supplement manufacturer located in Park City,
Utah, the self-described "Silicon Valley of the supplement industry," where 80 to
100 companies operate a $2.5 billion business. Ephedra Ban Lifted by Judge in Utah,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 15, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 5925365.
58. Nutraceutical, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1310.
59. See id. at 131 6 .
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conclusion that any dose of EDS presents a significant or
unreasonable risk of illness or injury.60
Determining that the FDA's use of a risk-benefit analysis was not
appropriate under DSHEA, the court relied on the statute's
distinction between drugs and food."' Unlike drugs, dietary
supplements as a food product under DSHEA are not subject to a
risk-benefit analysis.6" Also, as a food product, no requirement exists
that a benefit be established for dietary supplements prior to sale.63
The court further noted that requiring producers of EDS to
demonstrate a benefit as a precondition to sale via a risk-benefit
analysis specifically contradicts congressional intent.64 As quoted by
the court, "21 U.S.C. § 342(f) [provides that] 'the United States shall
bear the burden of proof on each element to show that a dietary
supplement is adulterated."'65
In reviewing the FDA's evidence, the court held that the
agency's negative inference that a safe level of intake for EDS cannot
be determined does not satisfy the agency's burden to prove that any
dose amount of EDS poses a significant or unreasonable risk of
illness or injury.66 Thus, the court lifted the FDA ban and sent the
matter back to the agency for further evaluation.
6 7
4. Implications
The scope of the court's ruling should not be overstated. The
court's ruling is limited to rejecting the evidentiary process
employed by FDA to ban EDS, and does not address whether EDS at
any dose is safe or effective.6" As the continual threat of litigation,
lack of insurance coverage, and the low-carbohydrate dieting trend
all portend against a revival of ephedra supplements, it is unlikely
that the ruling will boost the legitimacy of ephedra.69 The ruling
60. See id.
61. See id. at 1319.
62. See id.
63. See Nutraceutical, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 1321.
67. See id.
68. See generally Nutraceutical, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1310.
69. See Glen Warchol, Ephedra Decision Leaves Questions, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 16,
2005, available at 2005 WLNR 6124346; Christopher Snowbeck, Court Ruling
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could, however, motivate Congress to revisit DSHEA in order to give
FDA more regulatory power.7"
D. "Bivens" Case Dismissed Against Federal Meat Inspectors
In February 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit dismissed a "Bivens" action brought by the operator of
a meat processing facility against federal meat inspectors in the case
of Nebraska Beef Ltd. v. Greening.7' A Bivens remedy allows tort
actions against federal officials and employees directly under the
Constitution.72 In this case, the operator, Nebraska Beef Ltd,
(Nebraska Beef) initiated a Bivens action against the inspectors,
claiming that the inspectors maliciously issued additional noncom-
pliance records in contravention of a previous consent decree.7" The
inspectors filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs
action was barred because a Bivens remedy was not available to
Nebraska Beef.74 The federal district court denied the inspectors'
motion, and the inspectors appealed to the Eighth Circuit.75
The Eighth Circuit held that a Bivens remedy was not available
to Nebraska Beef on three grounds. 76 First, Congress had not
explicitly created any direct right of action against the USDA
employees alleged to have committed constitutional violations.
77
Second, USDA has promulgated a comprehensive regulatory scheme
that includes the right to judicial review under the Administrative
Procedures Act. 8  Third, Congress has created a stringent
exhaustion requirement for grievances filed against the USDA
employees that further evidences its intent to have grievances aired
to and addressed by the agency prior to judicial review.79  The
Eighth Circuit concluded that these three factors, combined with the
Unlikely to Bring Back Ephedra, PrITSBURGH POsT-GAzETrE, Apr. 16, 2005, available at
2005 WLNR 5939524.
70. See Harris & Schreiber, supra note 53.
71. 398 F.3d 1080 (8th Cir. 2005).
72. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
73. See Nebraska Beef, 398 F.3d at 1081-82.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 1084.
77. See id.
78. See Nebraska Beef, 398 F.3d at 1084.
79. See id.
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United States Supreme Court's caution against extending Bivens
remedies to new contexts, precluded a Bivens action for Nebraska
Beef.
80
E. Trans Fat Litigation Settled
In February 2005, McDonald's Corporation (McDonald's)
settled two trans fat lawsuits."1  Produced through the partial
hydrogenation of vegetable oil, trans fat has been linked to as many
as 100,000 deaths a year from coronary heart disease. 2 In response
to these and other dire statistics, a number of food companies,
including McDonald's, have announced attempts to reduce the levels
of trans fat in their food products. 3 In a September 3, 2002 press
release, McDonald's announced that it intended to change the
cooking oil for its fried foods by February 2003, thereby effectively
reducing the level of trans fat in its food.84 The trans fat lawsuits
alleged that McDonald's failed to adequately disclose that it had
delayed its plan announced in the September 2002 press release. 5
In exchange for a broad release of claims, McDonald's agreed to pay
$7,000,000 to the American Heart Association to finance a campaign
educating consumers about trans fats and to spend $1,500,000 to
inform the public about the delay in changing the cooking oil.8"
III. RECENT ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced a new
initiative in November 2004 aimed at fighting deceptive advertising
80. See id, at 1084.
81. See Press Release, BanTransFats.com, Inc., Plaintiffs' Press Release on Settle-
ment of McDonald's Trans Fat Litigation (Feb. 11, 2005), available at http://www.
bantransfats.con/mcdonalds.html [hereinafter BanTransFats Press Release].
82. See Kim Severson & Melanie Warner, America's Oil Change: Losing Trans Fats;
Fat Substitute, Once Praised, Is Pushed Out of the Kitchen, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 2041305.
83. See id. (quoting James A. Skinner, McDonald's Chief Executive Officer, "We
remain committed to reduce trans fats").
84. See id.
85. See McDonald's Hit With Lawsuit Over French Fries, Signon San Diego.com, July
8, 2004, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/business/20048708-1751-
ca-mcdonalds-fries.html.
86. See BanTransFat Press Release, supra note 81.
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efforts regarding weight-loss products. " The initiative targets
companies who create the advertisements. FTC has named the
program "Operation Big Fat Lie," launching its campaign by filing
actions against six companies in courts around the country."8 The
announcement came during a time when FTC expressed increasing
interest in false or deceptive claims.89
As a part of the "Operation Big Fat Lie" campaign, FTC filed
charges against AVS Marketing, Inc. (AVS).9 ° According to FTC,
AVS deceptively marketed a dietary supplement called "Himalayan
Diet Breakthrough."'" FTC alleged that AVS claimed the product
causes rapid and substantial weight loss without dieting or exer-
cise; causes users to lose substantial weight while still consuming
unlimited amounts of food; causes substantial weight loss by
preventing the formation of body fat; causes substantial weight
loss for all users; and enables users to lose as much as 37 pounds
in eight weeks safely.92
In June 2005, AVS Marketing and its president agreed to pay
$400,000 to settle the FTC charges.93 A stipulated final judgment
and order prohibits AVS from making false or unsubstantiated
claims about weight-loss products or other products in the future.94
The order contained a judgment for more than $4,900,000-the
total amount of sales for the product at issue-however, because AVS
87. The FTC new initiative to fight deceptive advertising efforts regarding weight-
loss products is summarized more fully in the United States Food Law Update in the
first issue of this journal. See Michael T. Roberts & Margie Alsbrook, United States
Food Law Update, I J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 187, 214-16 (2005).
88. See Press Release, FTC, FTC Launches "Big Fat Lie" Initiative Targeting
Bogus Weight-Loss Claims (Nov. 9, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/
11 /bigfatliesweep.htm [hereinafter 2004 FTC Press Release].
89. See FTC Goes on Offensive Against Overblown, Weight Loss Claims, DRUG INDUS.
DAILY, Nov. 12, 2004 (noting FTC has been steadily increasing in its oversight of the
dietary supplement industry).
90. See 2004 FTC Press Release, supra note 88.
91. Press Release, FTC, Defendants Who Deceptively Marketed the "Himalyan
Diet Breakthrough" Settle FTC Charges: Agree to Pay $400,000 in Consumer
Redress (June 20, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/06/avsmarketing
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was unable to pay full redress, the order suspended the judgment
upon payment of $400,000 to FTC.
95
IV. RECENT FEDERAL REGULATIONS
A. The Saga of the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE) Final Rule
USDA, through its branch the Animal Plant and Health
Inspections Services (APHIS), published in January 2005, a final rule
(BSE Final Rule) that reversed a May 2003 ban of imports of cattle
and edible bovine products from Canada.96 Effective March 7, 2005,
the BSE Final Rule has been the subject of controversy due to ill-
timed BSE episodes before and after publication and a well-
publicized lawsuit that sought to enjoin its enforcement.97
1. Chronology of Four Mad Cows
First Mad Cow: After the first case of BSE native to North
America was diagnosed in a cow in Alberta, Canada, on May 20,
2003, the Secretary of USDA issued an emergency order adding
Canada to the list of regions where BSE was known to exist.98 BSE,
commonly known as "'mad cow disease,' is a degenerative, fatal
disease affecting the nervous system in cattle."99  Following the
detection of BSE in Great Britain in 1986, it was discovered that by
consuming cattle contaminated with BSE, people could be infected
with a new-variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD), a rare but fatal
human disease.' Under the USDA regulations, the emergency
95. Id. The stipulated final judgment stated that if it is found that AVS
misrepresented its financial condition, the full $4.9 million will become due
immediately. See 2005 FTC Press Release, supra note 91.
96. See Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions and
Importation of Commodities, 70 Fed. Reg. 460 (Jan. 4, 2005) (to be codified at 9
C.F.R. pts. 93-96).
97. See generally Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of
Am. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1085-87 (9th Cir. 2005).
98. See Change in Disease Status of Canada Because of BSE, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,939
(May 29, 2003) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 93-94).
99. See Geoffrey S. Becker, Mad Cow Disease: Agricultural Issues for Congress, CRS
Issue Brief for Congress at CRS-I, June 14, 2005, available at http://kuhl.house.govl
Uploaded Files/madcow.pdf
100. See id. at CRS-2.
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order effectively banned all imports of live ruminants or ruminant
meat products from Canada.' An easing of the ban was first made
nearly five months later when, on August 8, 2003, the Secretary
announced that she would begin allowing certain "low-risk"
ruminant products to be imported into the United States from
Canada.12 On November 4, 2003, the Secretary published notice of
a proposed rule to allow the importation of live ruminants and
ruminant products from regions that present a minimal risk of
introducing BSE into the United States.' Canada would be the
only region designated as a minimal risk. 1
04
Second Mad Cow: Shortly after the publication of the notice of
the proposed rule, on December 23, 2003, a cow that was born in
Canada and imported into Washington State in 2001 was diagnosed
with BSE. 05 The fact that the cow was born before a feed ban
prohibiting the feeding of ruminant protein to other ruminants that
went into effect in Canada in 1997 led USDA to determine that the
BSE infection was likely caused by contaminated feed available prior
to the Canadian ban. 6 On the heels of this discovery of a second
mad cow, USDA reopened the comment period for its proposed rule
for an additional thirty days, extending it until April 7, 2004.117 On
April 19, 2004, USDA moved, without public notice, to expand the
types of ruminant products eligible to be imported.1
0 8
Third Mad Cow: On January 2, 2005, another cow in Alberta,
Canada, was diagnosed with BSE. Since this Alberta cow was also
born before Canada's feed ban, USDA once again attributed the
infection to contaminated feed manufactured before Canada's feed
101. See 9 C.F.R. §§ 93.401, 93.418 (2003).
102. See Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions and
Importation of Commodities; Partial Delay of Applicability, 70 Fed. Reg. 460, 536
(Jan. 4, 2005).
103. See Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: Minimal Risk Regions and
Importation of Commodities, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,386 (Nov. 4, 2003) (to be codified at
9 C.F.R. pts. 93-95).
104. 68 Fed. Reg. at 62,387.
105. See Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: Minimal Risk Regions 
and
Importation of Commodities, 69 Fed. Reg. 10,634 (Mar. 8, 2004) (to be codified 
at
9 C.F.R. pts. 93-95).
106. See id.
107. See id. at 10,633.
108. See Ranchers Cattlemen, 415 F.3d at 1089.
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ban went into effect. 10 9 Two days later, on January 4, 2005, after
having considered 3,379 comments from interested parties, USDA
published its BSE Final Rule to reopen the border to Canadian
ruminants and ruminant products."' The BSE Final Rule also
allows the importation of Canadian cattle over thirty months of age
provided the cattle were immediately slaughtered or fed and then
slaughtered."' The thirty-month age is specified because BSE
infection levels are believed to rise as cattle grow older.
1
Fourth Mad Cow: Shortly after publication of the BSE Final
Rule, on January 11, 2005, the fourth "mad cow"-another Alberta
cow-was diagnosed with BSE."1  This cow was born shortly after
Canada's feed ban, but USDA once again attributed the infection to
contaminated feed manufactured before Canada's feed ban went
into effect." 4  USDA indefinitely suspended, however, the
implementation of the portion of its BSE Final Rule that permitted
the importation of beef products from cattle over thirty months of
age."
5
2. Judicial and Legislative Challenges to the BSE Final Rule
Six days after USDA published the BSE Final Rule, the
Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of
America (R-CALF)" 6 filed suit against USDA, seeking to enjoin the
109. See Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: Minimal Risk Regions and
Importation of Commodities: Finding of No Significant Impact and Affirmation of
Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 18,252, 18,258 (Apr. 8, 2005) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R.
pts. 93-95, 98).
110. See Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions and
Importation of Commodities; Partial Delay of Applicability, 70 Fed. Reg. 460, 469
(Jan. 4, 2005).
111. See 70 Fed. Reg. 460, 548.
112. See Ranchers Cattlemen, 415 F.3d at 1088 n.7.
113. See Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: Minimal Risk Regions and
Importation of Commodities: Finding No Significant Impact and Affirmation of
Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 18,254.
114. See id. at 18,255.
115. See Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: Minimal Risk Regions and
Importation of Commodities: Partial Delay of Applicability, 70 Fed. Reg. 12,112
(Mar. 11, 2005) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 94-95).
116. R-CALF is a non-profit cattle association that represents cattle producers,
cattle backgrounders, and independent feedlot operators on matters of
international trade and marketing. See Ranchers Cattlemen, 415 F.3d at 1090 n. 12.
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rule's implementation." 7 On March 2, 2005, the federal District
Court of Montana granted R-CALF's motion for a preliminary
injunction to prevent the BSE Final Rule from taking effect." 8 The
court found the Final Rule to be arbitrary and capricious in violation
of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)." 9 The court's principle
concern was that USDA "ignoring its statutory mandate to protect
the health and welfare of the people of the United States, established
its goal of re-opening the border to the importation of live beef from
Canada and thereafter attempted to work backwards to support and
justify this goal."'2 ° One day later, on March 3, 2005, the Senate
approved a joint resolution to overturn the BSE Final Rule.' A
similar resolution was introduced in the House of Representatives.'22
During the March vote in the Senate, however, it was announced
that the Administration strongly opposed Senate passage of the
resolution and would veto the bill. 3
In March 2005, USDA filed an appeal with the United States
Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit to reverse the district court
decision.'24 In August 2005, the Ninth Circuit held that the district
court erred in issuing a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
implementation of the BSE Final Rule. 1 5 The Ninth Circuit found
that the district court failed under APA to properly defer to the
USDA's judgment and expertise.2 6 The Ninth Circuit further found
an adequate basis in the administrative record for the USDA's
conclusion that the risks for reopening the border were
acceptable. 1
27
117. Id. at 1090.
118. See Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v.
United States Dep't of Agric., 359 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1074 (D. Mont. 2005) rev'd, 415
F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2005).
119. Id. at 1069.
120. Id. at 1066 (emphasis in original).
121. See S.J. Res. 4, 109th Cong. (2005).
122. See H.J. Res. 23, 109th Cong. (2005).
123. See Senate Passes Resolution to Kill Border Rule, 47 FOOD CHEM. NEws 11, Mar. 7,
2005.
124. See Ranchers Cattlemen, 415 F.3d at 1092.
125. See id. at 1093.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 1095-110 (Because the Ninth Circuit's decision was issued after the
time period covered in this update, a more complete summary of the decision and
an update on the status of this case will be included in the next issue of this journal).
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B. New Health-Conscious Labels for Meat and Poultry
In June 2005, the USDA's Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS)
issued a final rule allowing nutrient content claims for certain meat
and poultry products. 12' The rule establishes a general definition
and standard of identity for standardized meat and poultry products
that have been modified to qualify for use of an expressed nutrient-
content claim in the product names. 29 These qualifying products
may be identified by an expressed nutrition content claim such as
"fat free," "low fat," and "light" in conjunction with an appropriate
standardized term, such as "low fat bologna."' °  The final rule
replaces two interim policy memoranda that already allowed
modified versions of standardized meat and poultry products for-
mulated with less fat to use the nutrient-content claims.' 3 ' The rule
still prohibits the direct fortification of meat and poultry products.'
3 2
The rule does provide, however, that water and fat-replacers may be
added, along with textured vegetable protein, to replace fat. 33
The express purposes of the final rule are to promote healthy
dietary practices by providing meat and poultry products that have
reduced levels of unhealthy constituents such as fat, cholesterol, and
sodium; increasing regulatory flexibility and support meat and
poultry product innovation; and helping provide an informative
nutrition labeling system.'34
The effective date for the final rule is January 1, 2008,35
although food establishments may begin to make nutrient-content
128. See Food Standards: Requirements for Substitute Standardized Meat and
Poultry Products Named By Use of an Expressed Nutrient Content Claim and a
Standardized Term, 70 Fed. Reg. 33,803, 33,804 (June 10, 2005) (to be codified at
9 C.F.R. pts. 319, 381).
129. See 70 Fed. Reg. at 33,804, 33,814.
130. See 70 Fed. Reg. at 33,804, 33,814.
131. 70 Fed. Reg. at 33,804.
132. 70 Fed. Reg. at 33,805-06.
133. 70 Fed. Reg. at 33,809, 33,814.
134. 70 Fed. Reg. at 33,804.
135. In March 2005, FDA issued a final rule establishing January 1, 2008, as the
uniform compliance date for any food labeling regulations issued between January
1, 2005 and December 31, 2006. See Uniform Compliance Date for Food Labeling
Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 74,405 (Dec. 14, 2004) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts.
317, 381).
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claims for their meat and poultry products in compliance with the
final rule at any time." 6
V. RECENT GUIDELINES
A. Guidance for Mandatory COOL for Fish and Shellfish
In March 2005, one month prior to the effective date for man-
datory country of origin labeling (COOL) for fish and shellfish,'37
USDA issued a "Notice to the Trade" (Notice).' Mandatory COOL
requires that fish and shellfish sold in retail venues must have labels
that identify both the country of origin of the product and the
method in which it was raised (the rule gives the example of
identifying wild verses farm-raised salmon).'39
Issued in response to inquiries and comments from retailers and
their suppliers, the Notice clarified the final rule's documentation
and recordkeeping requirements.14 USDA noted two parts of the
recordkeeping requirements. 4' The first part of the record
establishes the chain of custody of the product, which USDA antici-
pates retailers and their suppliers should be able to maintain
through routine business documents." The second part of the
record establishes country of origin and method of production, and
according to the notice the compliance depends on whether or not
the covered product is labeled prior to being possessed by the
136. See 70 Fed. Reg. at 33,804.
137. See News Release, Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), USDA, Retail
Country of Origin Labeling Becomes Effective April 4 (Mar. 25, 2005), available at
http://www.ams.usda.gov/news/074-05.htm [hereinafter AMS News Release]; see also
AMS, USDA, 2002 Farm Bill Provisions, available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/cool/
index.htm (providing the full text of the Interim Final Rule for the mandatory
COOL of fish and shellfish).
138. See AMS, USDA, NOTICE TO THE TRADE MANDATORY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
LABELING FOR FISH AND SHELLFISH (2005), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/
cool/notice.htm [hereinafter NOTICE].
139. See 7 C.F.R. § 60.200 (2005). Fish and shellfish that are included as
ingredients in processed food products, however, are excluded from the COOL
requirements. Processed food products include those that have been combined with
other ingredients, pre-cooked or undergone a change. See 70 C.F.R. § 60.119
(2005).
140. See 7 C.F.R. § 60.400 (2005).
141. See NOTICE, supra note 138.
142. See id.
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retailer."" If the product is labeled prior to possession by the
retailer, the label itself suffices as an adequate record while the
product is in the possession of the retailer and supplier.'44 Once the
pre-labeled product leaves the possession of the supplier or retailer,
their recordkeeping requirements expire.'45 For covered products
that are not pre-labeled, documentation must be maintained at the
retail site while the product is on-hand and for a period of one year
thereafter by the retailer and their suppliers.'46 The Notice clarifies
that a pre-labeled product under the interim final rule does not
refer to a covered product repackaged by the retailer.1
4 7
B. National Animal Identification Draft Strategic Plan
In May 2005, USDA announced the release of a National
Animal Identification System (NAIS) Draft Strategic Plan. 4 The
USDA's Draft Strategic Plan 2005 to 2009 presents the current views
of USDA on how the NAIS implementation process will develop.'49
The strategy paper covers four significant issues: data confidential-
lity, mandatory versus voluntary participation, data ownership, and a
timeline for implementation. 5 ° The timeline proposes that NAIS be
fully implemented and all components mandatory by 2009.'1' Later
in May 2005, the comment period for the strategy paper was
extended to July 6, 2005, a one month extension of the original
deadline.
52
C. New Dietary Guidelines
In January 2005, for the first time in five years, DHHS and




146. See NOTICE, supra note 138.
147. See id.
148. See National Animal Identification System; Notice of Availability of a Draft
Strategic Plan and Draft Program Standards, 70 Fed. Reg. 23,961 (May 6, 2005).
149. See APHIS, USDA, NATIONAL ANIMAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (NAIS) DRAFT
STRATEGIC PLAN 2005 TO 2009 (Apr. 25, 2005), available at http://animalid.aphis
.usda.gov/nais/about/pdf/NAISDraftStrategicPlan_42505.pdf.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 10.
152. See 70 Fed. Reg. 29,269, 29,270 (May 20, 2005).
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tions for Americans. 13 These agencies are required every five years
to release new recommended dietary guidelines.' 54 While the guide-
lines do not have any coercive effect on what foods are sold and
consumed in the United States, they are subject to intense scrutiny
because they influence the types of foods Americans choose to
purchase and consume.'55 The new guidelines emphasize reducing
calorie consumption and increasing physical activity.156 The new
guidelines also recommend an increased consumption of fruits,
vegetables, whole grains, and non-fat or low-fat milk or milk pro-
ducts. 5 7 Finally, the new guidelines recommend choosing fats and
carbohydrates wisely, choosing and preparing foods with little salt,
drinking alcoholic beverages in moderation (if one chooses to drink),
and keeping food safe to eat. 5 S
VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND PENDING LEGISLATION
A. The Protracted Battle Over Mandatory COOL
Efforts to delay and repeal mandatory COOL continued in the
first half of 2005. As reported in the previous section of this issue,




154. See Announcement of the Availability of the Final Report of the Dietary
Guidelines Advisory Committee, A Public Commend Period, and a Public Meeting,
69 Fed. Reg. 52,697 (Aug. 27, 2004). The release of nutrition guidelines is
mandated by the National Nutrition Monitoring and Related Research Act. See 7
U.S.C. § 5312 (a)(8)(B) (Supp. 2005).
155. See David Feder, Building a New Food Pyramid ... or Plate, or Whatever: The
2005 USDA Dietary Guidelines Are On Their Way With More Than the Recommended
Allowance of Controversy, FOOD PROCESSING, Oct. 1, 2004, at S14 (discussing the
political process of creating the dietary guidelines); Judith Weinraub, Redrawing the
U.S. Roadmap to Health: Revised Dietary Guidelines Expected to Have Major Impact, SUN-
SENTINAL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 9, 2004, at 5 (originally published as Coming
Soon: The Government's Revised Guidelines for Healthful Eating, WASH. POST, Dec. 1,
2004 at FI); see also Emily Heil, Critics See Food Pyramid With Lobbyists at the Top,
CONG. DAILY, Sept. 21, 2004 (stating that "[f]ood lobbies representing large
commodities-such as beef and sugar-swarm around the process, as a prime spot
on the pyramid can be a potent marketing tool").
156. See Press Release, DHHS, New Dietary Guidelines Will Help Americans Make
Better Food Choices, Live Healthier Lives (Jan. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2005pres/
2 00 50112.html.
157. See Dietary Guidelines, supra note 153, at 23-26.
158. See id. at 29-50.
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mandatory COOL requirements for fish and shellfish became
effective in April 2005.159 For the other covered commodities, how-
ever, mandatory COOL appears to be dead or, at best, stalemated.
COOL was introduced in the Farm Security and Rural Invest-
ment Act of 2002 (2002 Farm Bill), which amended the 1946
Agricultural Marketing Act (AMA). 160 COOL was to become manda-
tory in September 2004.61 On October 30, 2003, the USDA's
Agriculture Marketing Service (AMS) published a proposed rule to
implement the mandatory COOL program. 62 The statute requires
"a retailer of a covered commodity" to inform consumers "at the
final point of sale of the covered commodity to consumer, of the
country of origin of the covered commodity." 6 ' Covered commo-
dities include beef, lamb, pork, fish, and perishable agricultural
commodities such as peanuts."' Food service establishments, such
as restaurants, lunchrooms, cafeterias, food stands, bars, lounges,
and similar enterprises are exempt from mandatory COOL.165
COOL has since been beset by congressional postponement.
On January 23, 2004, Congress passed an omnibus appropriations
bill, which included a provision amending AMA.166 This provision,
Section 749 of Division A, Title VII, of the AMA, delayed the
mandatory application of COOL until September 2006 for all
products covered under that law, except for "farm-raised fish" and
"wild fish.'
167
Whether mandatory COOL is implemented in September 2006
has yet to be determined. In June 2005, the House of Representa-
159. See AMS News Release, supra note 137.
160. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171,
116 Stat. 134 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
161. See 7 U.S.C. § 1638c (b) (Supp. 2005).
162. See Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Lamb, Pork, Fish,
Perishable Agricultural Commodities, and Peanuts, 68 Fed. Reg. 61,944 (Oct. 30,
2003) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 60).
163. 7 U.S.C.§ 1638a (a)(1) (Supp. 2005).
164. See id. at § 1638a (a)(2).
165. See Country of Origin Labeling: Definitions, 7 U.S.C. § 1638a (b) (Supp.
2005) (exempting food service establishments from the country of origin labeling
requirements). Food service establishments include "a restaurant, cafeteria, lunch
room, food stand, saloon, tavern, bar, lounge, or other similar facility operated as
an enterprise engaged in the business of selling food to the public." 7 U.S.C. §
1638(4) (Supp. 2005).
166. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat, 3
(2004) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1638d).
167. See id. at § 749.
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tives approved a fiscal 2006 USDA appropriations bill that contained
a provision delaying mandatory country-of-origin for meat beyond
the current September 30, 2006 deadline. 68 The Senate Appropria-
tions Committee, however, left funds in the fiscal 2006 USDA
appropriations bill to implement mandatory COOL for meat.'
6 9
Implementation of COOL will likely be a thorny issue when the
House and Senate meet to reconcile the two versions of the spending
bills. 7 '
Making matters even more complicated, pending bills in the
House and Senate would prohibit the implementation of the BSE
Final Rule that reopens the border to Canadian ruminants and
ruminant products,17 ' unless the retail COOL is in effect.
172
Introduced in the House of Representatives in May 2005, the
Meat Promotion Act of 2005 would repeal any COOL requirements
present in the 1946 AMA and replace them with a voluntary country-
of-origin program, dubbed as the VCOOL program.
173  The bill
would allow retailers to label beef, pork, lamb, and seafood as
products of the United States if they are derived exclusively from
animals, born, raised, and slaughtered in the United States.
174
USDA would administer the VCOOL program and create a unique
label that retailers could use for designating country-of-origin.
175
Participants in the program would be required to maintain records
enabling USDA to verify compliance with the terms of the
program.176 Violators of the program, such as anyone who labels
meat that has not been born, raised, and slaughtered in the United
States as having country-of-origin status, would be subject to a civil
penalty of up to $10,000 per violation.1
77





171. Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions and Importation
of Commodities; Partial Delay of Applicability, 70 Fed. Reg. 460, 469 (Jan. 4, 2005).
172. See H.R. Res. 384, 109th Cong. (2005); S. Res. 108, 109th Cong. 
(2005).
173. See H.R. Res. 2068, 109th Cong. (2005). The same legislation 
was also
proposed in June 2004. See H.R. Res. 4576, 108th Cong. (2004).
174. See H.R. Res. 2068, 109th Cong. (2005) at § 294.
175. See id. at § 
29 3 .
176. See id. at § 295.
177. See id. at § 296 (a)(
2 ).
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B. WTO Regional Indications
In March 2005, a World Trade Organization (WATO) dispute
panel issued a ruling addressing claims made by the United States
against the European Union (E.U.) system of geographical
indications. 17' The United States and E.U. both claim the panel
decision a victory for its respective position.1
79
Geographical indications fall under the purview of the WTO's
1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPs Agreement), which establishes the minimum stand-
ards for the protection of geographical indications within the WTO
member countries. 8 ° The TRIPs Agreement defines geographical
indications as "indications which identify a good as originating in the
territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where
a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is
essentially attributable to its geographical origin."'' Examples of
geographic food names in the United States include Florida oranges
and Idaho potatoes; examples of geographic food names in Europe
include Parma ham and Roquefort cheese.'82 Geographical Indica-
tions have been the source of intense disagreement between the
United States and the E.U. The E.U. holds geographical indications
as sources of cultural and economic wealth and view the terms as a
specific type of intellectual property.8 3 In contrast, the United
States generally does not care about who makes a food product or
178. Panel Report, European Communities - Protection of Trademarks and Geographical
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15, 2005),
available at http://www.wto.org/English/tratope/dispue/174re.pdf.
179. See, e.g., Both Sides Declare Final Victory in WTO Food Names Dispute, 47 FOOD
CHEM. NEWS 22 (Mar. 21, 2005).
180. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81, 91-92
(1994).
181. See id. at 91.
182. See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, United
States Wins "Food Name" Case in WTO Against EU (Mar. 15, 2005), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2005/March/UnitedStates_W
insFood NameCase inWTOAgainstEU.html [hereinafter Office of the United
Stated Trade Representative].
183. See Frances G. Zacher, Comment, Pass the Parmesan: Geographic Indications in
the United States and the European Union-Can There Be Compromise?, 19 EMORY INT'L L.
REv. 427, 427 (2005).
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where it comes from, as long as the characteristics remain consistent
with taste and consistency expectations. 84 This cultural divide has
helped contribute to an international dispute over the intellectual
property protection of geographic indications.S'
The United States claimed the panel decision a victory because
the panel determined under the W1O rules that the E.U. had
discriminated against United States producers by excluding the
United States from the same protection on geographically named
products as E.U. food producers.'86 The panel also agreed with the
United States that the E.U. could not, under the WTO rules, deny
United States trademark owners their rights, stating that any
exceptions to trademark rights for the use of registered geographical
indications were narrow and limited to the actual geographical
indication name as registered. 7
The E.U. claimed victory because the panel decision upholds
the integrity of the E.U. system of geographical indications. 88 The
panel decision upholds the requirement for inspection structures to
verify that the conditions for each geographical indication are
fulfilled in order to benefit from the high level of protection against
unlawful use. 9 Moreover, the panel confirmed the provision of the
E.U. system that allows the coexistence of geographical indications
with prior trade marks under certain circumstances.
90
C. Proposal to Revamp Food Identity Standards
In May 2005, USDA and FDA issued a proposed rule to
establish a set of general principles for evaluating whether to revise,
eliminate, or create standards of identity for food."' These agencies
share responsibility for ensuring that food labels are truthful and not
184. See id.
185. See id. at 427-28.
186. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, supra note 
182.
187. See id.
188. See Press Release, Europa, WTO Panel Upholds EU System 
of Protection of
"Geographical Indications" (Mar. 15, 2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/





191. See Food Standards; General Principles and Food Standards 
Modernization,
70 Fed. Reg. 29,214 (May 20, 2005) (to be codified at 
9 C.F.R. pt. 410 and 21
C.F.R. pt. 130).
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misleading. 9 USDA through its branch agency, FSIS, regulates the
labeling of meat, poultry, and processed egg products, while FDA
regulates the labeling of all other foods. 93 Food standards ensure
that food products sold under a particular name have the
characteristics expected by the consumer.'
The new proposal would not modernize all existing food
standards; rather, the agencies would use the new general principles
in reviewing petitions filed by the food industry to change, create, or
eliminate a food standard.'95 The general principles are designed to
protect and promote honest and fair dealing in the interest of
consumers, allow for technological advances in food production,
harmonize food standards with international food standards, and
expedite the use of the standards by manufacturers and enforcing
agencies. '96
The principles proposed respectively by FSIS and FDA differ in
certain respects. FSIS is proposing that a food standard be based on
a finished product in order to ensure easier compliance.'97 FDA
does not see a need for a parallel provision in the proposed the FDA
food standards principles because the essential characteristics of
FDA-regulated food are based on the finished product, rather than
at the point of formulation or at intermediate stages during
manufacturing.'9" FSIS is also proposing that food standards
identify whether the product is a ready-to-eat item to ensure that
consumer expectations are met.199 FDA is not proposing food
standards to address whether the food is ready-to-eat or not due to
the basic nature of standardized foods regulated by FDA.
200
192. See News Release, FDA, USDA and HHS Propose to Modernize Principles for
Food Standards of Identity (May 17, 2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/
topics/news/2005/usda-hhs051705.html; News Release, USDA, USDA and HHS
Propose to Modernize Principles for Food Standards of Identity (May 17, 2005),
available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_Events/NR_051705_0 1/index.asp.
193. See 70 Fed. Reg. at 29,215.
194. See id. at 29,220,
195. See id. at 29,221.
196. Id. at 29,223.
197. See id. at 29,224.
198. See 70 Fed. Reg. at 29,224.
199. See id. at 29,224-29,225.
200. See id.
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D. Produce Labeling Proposed Rule
In April 2005, FDA reopened the comment period on a
proposed rule for produce labeling."' Three years earlier, FDA
issued a proposed rule to amend its voluntary nutrition labeling
regulations by updating the names and nutrition labeling values for
the twenty most frequently consumed raw fruits, vegetables, and
fish. °' Since publication of the proposed rule in 2002, FDA has
received new data in comments that it intends to use to further
update the nutrition labeling values. 3  The comment period, which
expired June 3, 2005, allowed stakeholders to comment on the
updated nutrition values and to submit new data. 4 The produce list
includes apples, avocados, bananas, cantaloupe, grapefruit, honey-
dew melon, kiwifruit, lemon, nectarine, orange, peach, pear, pine-
apple, plums, strawberries, sweet cherries, tangerines, and water-
melon.20 1 The vegetable list includes bell pepper, broccoli, carrot,
celery, cucumber, iceberg lettuce, leaf lettuce, onion, potato, radish,
sweet potato, and tomato.2 6  FDA also requested comments on
whether Chinook salmon should be added to the list of salmon
already eligible for voluntary nutrition labeling.0
E. Homeland Security Report
A report issued by the General Accounting Office (GAO) in
March 2005 examined the efforts by government agencies in
managing the risks of agroterrorism2 0 8 The agencies examined
201. See Food Labeling; Guidelines for Voluntary Nutrition Labeling of Raw Fruits,
Vegetables, and Fish; Identification of the 20 Most Frequently Consumed Raw
Fruits, Vegetables, and Fish; Reopening of the Comment Period, 70 Fed. Reg.
16,995 (Apr. 5, 2005) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101).
202. See Food Labeling; Guidelines for Voluntary Nutrition Labeling of Raw Fruits,
Vegetables, and Fish; Identification of the 20 Most Frequently Consumed Raw
Fruits, Vegetables, and Fish, 67 Fed. Reg. 12,918 (Mar. 20, 2002).
203. See 70 Fed. Reg. 16,995.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 16,996-16,999.
206. See id. at 17,000-17,002.
207. See id. at 16,996.
208. See UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), 
HOMELAND SECURITY:
MUCH is BEING DONE TO PROTECT AGRICULTURE FROM A TERRORIST 
ATTACK, BUT
IMPORTANT CHALLENGES REMAIN, GAO-05-214, 3 (Mar. 2005), available at http://
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include USDA, DHHS, and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). °9  Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, the roles and
responsibilities of federal government agencies have been modified
to protect against agroterrorism.21 The report notes important
steps taken by federal agencies to better manage the risks of
agroterrorism, including the development of a National Response
Plan that details how these agencies would work together in the
event of a terrorist attack on agriculture and the adoption of
standard protocols that include establishing emergency operation
centers and a chain of command.21' While acknowledging these
important steps, the report also documents challenges and problems
that remain, especially for the livestock and poultry industries.
212
The report recommends several additional steps that the agencies
could take to manage the risks of terrorism, including that USDA
examine the costs and benefits of developing stockpiles of ready-to-
use vaccines and that DHS and USDA determine the reasons for
declining agricultural inspections.2 1 ' Agricultural inspections at
ports of entry have declined over the past two years, while imports
have increased. 4
F. Single Food Agency Proposal
In April 2005, the Safe Food Act of 2005, which would establish
a federal single food safety agency, was proposed in both the Senate
and House.1 5 While the proposal for a single food safety agency is
not new or novel, the timing of the April bill is noteworthy given the
backdrop of three reports issued in the first half of 2005 by GAO
that recommend the consolidation of food safety agencies into a
single food safety agency or, short of reorganization, the reduction
of overlapping federal inspections and related activities. 216 It is
www.gao.gov/New.items/d05214.pdf [hereinafter GAO HOMELAND SECURITY
REPORT].
209. See id. at 4.
210. See id. at 13-21.
211. See id. at 21-27.
212. See id. at 27-55.
213. See GAO HOMELAND SECURITY REPORT, supra note 208, at 56-57.
214. See id. at 40-46.
215. See S. Res. 729, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Res. 1507, 109th Cong. (2005).
216. See GAO, OVERSEEING THE U.S. FOOD SUPPLY: STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN TO
REDUCE OVERLAPPING INSPECTIONS AND RELATED ACTIVITIES, GAO-05-549T (May
2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/New.items/d05549t.pdf; GAO, OVERSIGHT OF
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doubtful that the proposed legislation will gain much attention, as
the Bush administration has openly stated its opposition to
consolidating food safety agencies into a single food safety agency."
7
The rationale for opposition to a single food safety agency is
generally premised on the assertion that the current food safety
system is working, and dramatic changes will create confusion, thus
leading to short-term greater food safety risks."
'
The proposed Safe Food Act of 2005 has some noteworthy
features within its four sections. The first section establishes a food
safety administration headed by an Administrator of Food Safety,
appointed by the President.2 9 The Administrator would be required
to enforce food safety laws, serve as a representative to international
food safety interests, promulgate safety regulations, and oversee all
food safety activities. 220  The first section would also transfer
numerous federal agencies and functions to the proposed new Food
Safety Administration. 2
The second section would require the Administrator to
administer a national safety program to protect public health.
222
Most likely in response to the recent mad cow disease incidents, the
section also requires the Administrator to develop a national food
traceability plan.223
The third section would require the Administrator to coordinate
with the Director of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to
FOOD SAFETY ACTwIES: FEDERAL AGENCIES SHOULD PURSUE OPPORTUNITIES TO
REDUCE OVERLAP AND BETTER LEVERAGE RESOURCES, GAO-05-213 (Mar. 2005),
available at http://www.gao.gov/New.items/d05213.pdf; GAO, FOOD SAFETY:
EXPERIENCES OF SEVEN COUNTRIES IN CONSOLIDATING THEIR FOOD SAFETY 
SYSTEMS,
GAO-05-212 (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/New.items/d05212.pdf
hereinafter GAO FOOD SAFETY].
217. See GAO, FOOD SAFETY, supra note 216, at 58 (referring to a DHHS letter
setting forth the Bush Administration's position in 2002 toward the issue of
consolidating food safety agencies).
218. See id.; see also generally Stuart M. Pape, Paul D. Rubin & Heili Kim, Food
Security Would Be Compromised By Combining the Food and Drug Administration and the
u.s. Department of Agriculture Into a Single Food Agency, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 405,
406 (2004) (arguing that the primary problem is the absence of statutory 
authority
for FDA and USDA for food regulation and enforcement).
219. Safe Food Act, H.R. Res. 1507, 109th Cong. §§ 101-103 (2005).
220. See id. at § 101 (b)(l)-(4).
221. See id. at § 102 .
222. Id. at § 201 (a).
223. See id. at § 201 (c)(7).
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establish a research and education program.224 The Administrator
would also coordinate with the Director of CDC in the maintaining
of an active surveillance system for foodborne illness that would be
used to assess the frequency and sources of food safety illness in the
United States.225
The fourth section would grant the Administrator with broad
enforcement powers. 26 Food producers would be required to
include a code on their products so they are easily traceable in the
event of a foodborne illness outbreak.227 Voluntary recalls would
continue so long as they are effective; otherwise, the Administrator
may institute a mandatory recall.228 Consumers would also be
notified as to where the food was sold to minimize product
consumption.229 Persons may be assessed a penalty of up to $10,000
for violating a food safety law, and individuals who commit a
violation with the intent to defraud or mislead may be imprisoned
for up to three years, fined up to $ 100,00 or both.25 °
G. FDA Asking For Comment on Food Label Changes
In April 2005, FDA asked for public comment on two proposals
to give more prominence to calories on food labels.2 ' The
proposals are in response to recommendations in the FDA's Obesity
Working Group report entitled "Calories Count" that addresses the
problem of obesity. 2  The comment period expired June 20,
2005.255
224. See Safe Food Act, H.R. Res. 1507, 109th Cong. §§ 301-303 (2005).
225. See id. at § 301 (a)(2).
226. See id. at §§ 401-409.
227. See id. at §§ 401 (5), 205 (h)(3)(F).
228. See id. at §§ 403 (a)(2), (b)(1).
229, See Safe Food Act, H.R. Res. 1507, 109th Cong. § 403 (b)(3).
230. See id. at §§ 405 (a)(1), (b)(2).
231. See Food Labeling; Prominence of Calories, 70 Fed. Reg. 17,008 (Apr. 4,
2005) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101).
232. See id. at 17,009.
233. See id. at 17,008.
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